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Stereotyping, as defined in this thesis, is the use of generalization or shorthand for 
describing groups of people, cultures, religions or ethnicities. Stereotypes are to be 
distinguished from ideologies, which, as defined in this thesis, are sets of attitudes that 
manage social and political interests including the media. Ideologies work to serve 
particular interests by setting agendas and managing people’s opinions to serve the 
ultimate goal of the ruling class. Stereotypical images can be used to serve certain 
ideologies especially when this is done systematically and in an organised manner.  
Technological advances, and especially the internet, have increased the volume of 
language and media exchange, hence increasing the translation of news texts. This 
research is concerned with tracking the role of translation in rendering stereotypical and 
ideological expressions between English and Arabic in relation to news texts extracted 
from two news services: BBC and Reuters. The general theory adopted is critical 
discourse analysis.  
The news texts are pertinent to two topics: the Israel/Palestine question and 
Islamophobia. The data is collected over one month: May 2016. The methodology 
followed for the purpose of analysis is the Discourse Historical Approach developed by 
Ruth Wodak et al. The methodology identifies a number of strategies which can be used 
to identify evaluative/stereotypical presentations in news texts: nomination, 
predication, perspectivation, mitigation and argumentation. It tries to incorporate as 
much relevant available knowledge as possible about the historical sources and the 
background of the social and political context in which discursive practices are 
embedded.  
The selected texts are analysed using the above methodology. Background information 
is gathered as part of the methodological approach. The analysis is followed by a 
comparative qualitative analysis of both the English and Arabic texts. A quantitative 
analysis is also conducted, by assigning numerical categories to the 
stereotypes/ideologies defined within the texts. Here, two types of 





reader. News service stereotypes/ideologies are identified through analysis of the 
relevant aspects of the text. Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies are identified where 
possible by determining the ‘typical’ or ‘average’ reader through extrapolation from 
statistically reliable quantitative publicly available sources, such as public opinion 
surveys conducted in America, Britain and the Arab world. The quantitative results are 
analysed, and then those for news service stereotypes/ideologies are compared to the 
qualitative analysis to provide a composite qualitative-quantitative analysis of each text.  
The results endorse the view that images of Islam in Islamophobia-related texts are 
generally negative for both English and Arabic texts, but more negative for English ones. 
For Sunni Islam, the stereotypes are consistently very negative. For Shia Islam the 
stereotypes vary between fairly and very negative for both English and Arabic texts. For 
the Israel/Palestine texts, the ideological and stereotypical expressions in the English 
texts are more pro-Israel than those in the Arabic ones. 
This research demonstrates that stereotypes are used in media to enhance the 
ideological agenda of the news service. It also shows that media contributes to 
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0.1 Background to the study 
The question of stereotyping has not been researched on many levels. As will be 
discussed later in the thesis, stereotyping has been confined to psychology and to 
images of religious or ethnic groups. The era of globalization which we have been 
experiencing for around two decades has pushed the issue of stereotyping to the fore. 
The revolution in technology, the internet and its applications have increased the 
interaction between various communities and groups. The likelihood of stereotyping 
would automatically increase with higher volumes of communication and language use.  
Since news constitutes a substantial part of language communication, there is ample 
room for using pejorative expressions or discriminatory language. The Arab Spring has 
provided a platform for extensive news reporting and of course translation. The Arab 
Spring has also coincided with the rise of Islamophobia which intensified the likelihood 
of racist discourse, and of constructing and deconstructing new and old stereotypes. 
Ideological discourse has long been associated with political issues and news reporting: 
“Although by no means limited to the field of politics, ideology is nevertheless of 
particular relevance for politics. Translation plays a role in political communication as 
well […]” (Schaffner, 2010, pp. 107-108). However, this has not been the case for 
stereotyping. Reading news reports during the Arab Spring alerted the researcher to the 
use of stereotypes in promoting certain ideologies by news outlets. This triggered the 
need to explore the relationship between stereotyping and ideology, and how 
stereotypes are employed or incorporated in the ideological agendas of news outlets. 
The process of translation in news outlets is not purely linguistic, and that is why it is 
more correctly called trans-editing. Trans-editing involves strategies for adaptation or 
translation of the same piece of news in order to address specific audiences (in this case 
speakers of specific languages).  
The need to deal with linguistic diversity in news production and the 
simultaneous circulation of news in different languages make 





do not tend to employ translators as such. This is because translation 
is not conceived as separate from other journalistic tasks of writing up 
and editing, and is mainly assumed by the news editor, who usually 
works as part of a desk, where news reports are edited and translated 
and sent to a specific newswire (Bielsa and Bassnett, 2008, p. 57). 
There are a number of considerations which determine the choice and later the 
translation and editing of news texts, which can be political, cultural or ideological. 
Andre Lefevere says that journalistic translation like other genres entails processes of 
adaptation and manipulation of the original text (1992, p. 8). This research study will 
examine the ideological aspect in relation to political and cultural factors.  
The thesis will investigate the translation of news texts in relation to two themes: 
Israel/Palestine conflict and Islamophobia. It will attempt to unveil the techniques used 
in the trans-editing process in order to promote a certain ideology and present it as the 
de facto situation or to persuade the reader of some political visions. The study will 
evaluate the role of the stereotypes in stimulating ideological discourse, and it will also 
demonstrate that stereotypes are not static, but are subject to evolution and can be part 
and parcel of constructing an identity.  
 
0.2 Research Scope and Statement of the Problem 
This research aims at featuring the utilisation of stereotypes in constructing racist and 
discriminatory representations. It also works on exposing the overlap between ideology 
and stereotype when used to promote ideological discourses. The research will rely on 
news texts collected in May 2016. Choosing a time-limited sample allowed for sufficient 
data, but not an excessive amount which it would have been impossible to analyse in 
the body of the thesis within the time available. The analysed sample is essentially 
random and has not been manipulated. However, in order to consider texts which 
contain rich data, I eliminated texts where Islamophobia or the Arab-Israeli conflict were 
minor elements. As mentioned above, the two main topics of the news texts will be 
Israel/Palestine conflict and Islamophobia. Since in 2016 the events and complications 
of the Arab Spring were still operative, the study researches the translations of 





the BBC news service and the Islamophobia texts are collected from Reuters news 
agency.  
Political news texts can scarcely be neutral.  News agencies/services usually have some 
agenda, and therefore can sometimes lack objectivity in disseminating the news. This 
problem has increased with the technology revolution and the mass media. Translation 
is an essential part of this news communication and through translation, prejudices, 
stereotypes and ideologies can be mediated, mitigated or intensified. This research will 
trace and compare the ideological representations and stereotyping between English 
and Arabic news texts using the Discourse-Historical Approach, which stems from 
Critical Discourse Analysis. The approach specifications help to position the stereotypes 
and ideologies in their political, cultural and historical perspectives as they require 
analysis on a number of levels, one of which is resorting to the social, cultural and 
historical background of the discriminatory expression at hand. The study will also 
demonstrate that due to certain ideological agendas, some stereotypes may dwindle, 
and others rise and flourish or even be newly formed.  
The analysis is of two types: qualitative and quantitative. The qualitative analysis is 
represented in a detailed discussion which follows the data analysis of both the English 
and Arabic texts.  Then, a quantitative analysis is carried out by assigning numerical 
categories to the stereotypes/ideologies defined within the texts. The stereotypes and 
ideologies will be sub-categorized into those of the text itself (news service) and those 
of the reader when possible. Since those of the reader are not absolute, then they are 
referred to as ‘likely’ reader stereotypes and ideologies. They are extrapolated by 
resorting to reliable sources such as public opinion polls and surveys as well as 
newspaper articles. Excel sheets were used for each of the data analysis texts in order 
to calculate the numerical results of the quantitative analysis. Finally, both the 
qualitative and quantitative analyses were discussed and compared to provide a 
composite qualitative-quantitative analysis of each text.  
 
0.3 Research questions 





1. Do translations retain stereotypes, stereotypical imagery/discourse between 
Arabic and British-based media? 
2. Do translations increase, decrease or otherwise alter stereotypes/stereotypical 
imagery/discourse; in other words do they construct new stereotypes between 
Arabic and British-based media? 
3. If translations increase, decrease or otherwise alter stereotypes/stereotypical 
imagery/discourse between Arabic and British-based media, how do they do so? 
4. How do stereotypes and ideologies overlap, and how can they be combined or 
incorporated to serve some ideological discourses?  
 
0.4 Significance of the research 
While research studies which examined ideological discourses are plentiful, there are 
only a few which looked into the issue of stereotyping. This is a novel piece of research 
which looks coherently into stereotyping in both English and Arabic texts and focuses on 
stereotypes rather than ideologies, yet it establishes a link between ideology and 
stereotyping and evidences that stereotypes work as part of ideologies to serve 
ideological discourses. Moreover, this thesis demonstrates the evolvement and change 
of stereotypes not only within the texts but also chronically over a period of time. It also 
digs into the historical, cultural and socio-political foundation of the stereotype itself. It 
is also the first language-based research work that differentiates between reader 
stereotypes and writer stereotypes while taking steps to reduce the subjective element 
as much as possible. The quantitative analysis undertaken is original and done 
independently of the qualitative analysis, meaning that any conformity between the two 
analyses has an independent significance which would be lacking were one of the two 
analyses simply dependent on the other. 
 
0.5 Methodology and Data 
The methodology adopted in this research study is the Discourse-Historical Approach 
(DHA), which is discussed extensively in chapter 3. DHA is an approach developed within 
the perspective of Critical Discourse Analysis, which is in itself an analytical tool designed 





and their relation to social and political processes. DHA stresses the importance of 
context, and so in addition to the discursive strategies it postulates (chapter 3), it relies 
heavily on contextual information – broader socio-political and historical contexts which 
the discriminatory discourse relates to.  
The data is news texts collected over a period of one month and relating to two main 
topics: Israel/Palestine conflict and Islamophobia. The texts which fall under the 
umbrella of Islamophobia have been in turn grouped under the name of the country 
which the news text is relevant to. Hence we have a number of texts under each of the 
following: Iraq, Saudi, Syria and Yemen, plus one general text.  
As noted, the analysis is carried out following the DHA approach. There is an analysis of 
the English text, then a translation of the Arabic text followed by an analysis of the Arabic 
text. A discussion of both English and Arabic texts is given (qualitative analysis) followed 
by the results of the quantitative analysis. Finally, a comparison of both qualitative and 
quantitative analyses is provided, allowing for consideration of the extent to which the 
two analysis corroborate and enhance one another. A final quantitative result of all the 
data for the Israel/Palestine conflict and Islamophobia is presented through illustrative 
graphs.  
 
0.6 Structure of the thesis 
This thesis consists of five chapters in addition to an introduction and a conclusion. 
Chapter 1 explores the relationship between language and culture, and the effect of the 
technology revolution on language exchange starting with traditional media tools (radio 
and television), but elaborating on the impact of the internet on the intensity of 
language utilization. Then, the chapter discusses the role of media in shaping public 
opinion: examples from modern history with focus on the internet applications in media 
are given. The notion of stereotyping is then introduced with illustrative examples from 
both academic writings and media. The media examples are followed by discussion and 
comparison between the texts and their corresponding translated texts.  
Chapter 2 presents overviews of key concepts: stereotyping and ideology, discourse and 





perspectives with special focus on the position of ideology in CDA. The chapter then 
establishes the link between the two notions explaining how stereotyping can be used 
to endorse a particular ideology. Then it introduces the conception of discourse from 
different perspectives, giving, however, special attention to discourse from the 
viewpoint of social scientists and critical theorists. How discourse accommodates certain 
ideologies and how these ideologies incorporate some stereotypes are discussed. Then 
the chapter moves on to explore the relationship between translation and ideology. 
Finally, the concept of CDA is introduced integrating the notions of ideology, 
stereotyping and discourse and highlighting its suitability as the background theory for 
this study.  
The third chapter provides a comprehensive account of the Discourse-Historical 
Approach (DHA), which will be used as the research tool of this research study. First a 
review of four discourse analysis approaches which contributed to the formation of DHA 
is presented. Then, the strategies of analysis are fully explained and illustrated with 
examples where necessary. The concepts of text and genre are presented since they are 
instrumental to the multi-level analytical dimensions of the Discourse-Historical 
Approach. The chapter wraps up with an account of the structure of the strategies of 
analysis which will be applied in chapter five. 
Chapter 4 falls into two main parts. The first covers the theoretical framework of this 
research study from a translation studies, and also philosophical, perspective. Then, the 
analytical framework of the study presented in chapter three is further developed by 
presenting specific aspects of the corpus-based translation analytical methods which fit 
the data selected for this research. The second part of the chapter addresses issues 
pertinent to the choice of particular news agencies as well as particular topics. The 
impartiality of news agencies is briefly discussed. To set the scene for the following 
chapter, the two chosen topics of analysis, the Israel/Palestine conflict and Islamophobia, 
are presented from historical and socio-political viewpoints. 
Chapter 5 is dedicated to the data analysis. This is divided into two major sections that 
correspond to the themes of the news texts: Israel/Palestine conflict and Islamophobia. 





(Iraq, Saudi, Syria, Yemen), as the chosen news texts cover events occurring in those 
countries or relevant to them. However, before embarking on the data analysis, 
guidelines for the analysis process and subdivisions are presented and clarified. A 
sizeable volume of background information, as well as cultural, historical and socio-
political term-specific overviews, is provided to support the analysis. Background 
information for each of the country subgroups is also provided.  
The conclusion of the thesis gives a general summary of this study explaining its 
significance. It then presents a summary of the results and findings. It finally considers 
the limitations of the study and puts forward recommendations for further research in 













This chapter seeks to provide a background to the subject at hand, which is to study the 
translation of stereotypical and ideological expressions in media texts especially in a 
period when the internet and the technological revolution have changed the means and 
amounts of language exchange.  
The chapter comprises 4 main sections (1.2-1.5), plus a Conclusion (Section 1.6). Since 
stereotypes in particular have a cultural element it is essential to look into the 
fundamental relationship between languages and culture in a number of aspects. This is 
done in Section 1.2. In the same section, the theory of linguistic relativity and the 
influence of linguistics on cognitive reality are also touched on. Section 1.3 explores the 
remarkable increase in language utilisation due to the technological revolution starting 
with radio and television, but elaborating on the advent of the internet and its 
applications in the past two decades. Section 1.4 sheds light on the effect of media on 
shaping people’s opinions with focus on political scenarios from modern history. 
Contemporary internet applications in media tools and how they affected people’s lives 
and opinions are also investigated. Sections 1.5-1.5.5 introduce the notion of 
stereotyping, illustrated with examples of stereotyping selected from academic writings 
(Bernard Lewis and Daniel Pipes) and from media. Media texts from various news 
agencies in Arabic and in English are presented to illustrate instances of stereotyping 
and sometimes ideological intervention in media and translated media with discussion 
and comparison between the texts in Arabic and in English.  
 
1.2 The relationship between Language and Culture 
The relationship between language and culture has been examined from the viewpoints 
of different disciplines. Linguists, sociologists and anthropologists have written many 
books and articles on this subject. Below, I will highlight the importance of this 






Kramsch (2010 p. 3) describes culture as: “the membership in a discourse community 
that shares a common social space and history, and a common system of standards for 
perceiving, believing, evaluating, and acting.” Language and culture interlock at various 
points. In fact language is the principal medium and reflection of culture. Literature in 
its diverse genres, history, customs and traditions is entirely expressed through language. 
It is language and the first alphabets that enabled us to discover ancient civilisations and 
find out about their contributions to the making of the world we now know. “The world 
without language becomes unimaginable since language makes the articulation of our 
thoughts and the human experience possible” Corsen (2009 p. 63) states. These old signs 
and symbols have made it possible in the 21st century to communicate with and build 
on the achievements of our very ancient ancestors. Juri Lotman, the Soviet semiotician 
who described language as a modelling system, declares: “No language can exist unless 
it is steeped in the context of culture; and no culture can exist which does not have at 
its centre, the structure of natural language. Language then is the heart within the body 
of culture, and it is the interaction between the two that results in the continuation of 
life energy” (Lotman 1978, cited in Bassnett 1991 p.14). 
Language is also a medium that reflects the changes which occur in a given society: 
economic, political, social and cultural. New expressions, novel uses of certain words, 
and borrowed words from other languages are examples of the dynamic nature of 
language which mirror cultural transformations. Throughout history, language has also 
been the means to document these changes. Edward Sapir (Sapir 1956, cited in Bassnett 
1991 p.13) claims, “language is a guide to social reality”. He further argues that human 
beings are at the mercy of the language that has become the medium of expression for 
their society (cf. Sapir’s Linguistic Relativity Hypothesis, which is discussed below). 
A contemporary example of the bond between language and culture is the new 
methodologies in teaching languages. Cultural aspects of the country whose language is 
being taught are embedded in teaching books, and educational trips are regularly 
organised to the country to further enhance the information in the text books and 





language. Eli Hinkel explains that cultural aspects of both the native culture and the 
second language culture have recently been examined to serve teaching and learning 
purposes (Hinkel, 1999). 
Language is also a medium used for retaining culture and we can observe this in 
immigrants’ environments because language helps to maintain customs and other 
aspects of the cultural heritage of the immigrants while in their new host country.  
According to Nunan and Choi (2010), “there are aspects of language that are culturally 
specific”. In many languages prose and poetry are highly reflective of the culture of a 
given place. They are in some instances the register of a nation’s history and cultural 
evolution. That is why literary translators should be well aware of the cultures of both 
languages. Bush (2001, p. 127) states: “A literary translator is bilingual and bicultural and 
thus inhabits a landscape which is not mapped by conventional geographies; s/he is at 
home with the flux that is the reality of contemporary culture.” 
Earlier in the last century, some linguists investigated the relationship between language 
and human behaviour/thought. The hypothesis of ‘linguistic relativity’ laid out by 
Edward Sapir and further enhanced by Benjamin Lee Whorf holds that language 
influences thought and that linguistic categories influence or even determine cognitive 
categories. Sapir 1956 (cited in Bassnett 1991 p.13) stipulates that “No two languages 
are ever sufficiently similar to be considered as representing the same social reality.” 
The worlds in which different societies live are distinct worlds, not merely the same 
world with different labels attached”. “Sapir also argued that cultures sharing a language 
share a way of thinking, and that these ways of thinking constituted the psychology of 
the culture” (Nunan, 2007). The Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis has however been disputed by 
a number of subsequent linguists such as Eric Lenneberg, Noam Chomsky and Steven 
Pinker. In his book The Language Instinct (Pinker, 2003), Pinker discredits examples 
introduced by Whorf to illustrate how language influences habitual behaviour. “Pinker’s 
The Language Instinct (2003) is a well-argued and influential case for believing that the 
appearances are misleading. English and other languages might look like purely cultural 
creations, but they really are not”, Geoffery Sampson (2005) elucidates. In this thesis we 





Human beings have a natural need to express themselves and interact with each other. 
When this interaction takes place through the medium of language, cultural aspects are 
part of it and will outline the way people perceive themselves and other communities 
as well. In support of this, Corsen (2009) argues in line with the linguistic relativity 
hypothesis: “through the interrelated nature of language and its cultural components, 
the way we learn and recognise the world becomes predetermined and dependent on 
our specific system of symbols and sounds used within our communities, developing our 
sense of reality and cultural identity.” This stipulation of course leads us to better 
recognise the impact of the relationship between language and culture in a world of 
mass communication. Language is a major tool of communication if not the most 
important at all and is strongly linked to culture: “Language is an index of culture”, 
Fishman says. Kramsch (1998) describes the communicative role of language as follows: 
“The words people utter refer to common experience. They express facts, ideas or 
events that are communicable because they refer to a stock of knowledge about the 
world that other people share”.  
In the following sections, the increasing importance of language utilisation in the light 
of mass communication and modern technologies will be investigated.   
 
1.3 Language Utilisation in the Light of Mass Communication and New Technologies 
Language is verbal and written messages that we send and receive.  In addition to the 
language bond with culture and identity, which was discussed in the previous sections, 
language is the main tool people use to communicate and share information. Edward 
Sapir (1963 p. 7) describes language as a communication tool: “The truth of the matter 
is that language is an essentially perfect means of expression and communication among 
every known people”. Through history, language has enabled people to communicate 
their needs, thoughts and feelings. Sapir (1963 p.7) continues: “In the first place, 
language is primarily a system of phonetic symbols for the expression of communicable 
thought and feeling.” 
Radio, telephone and television spread rapidly in the 20th century, giving rise to the 





dominance of the rise of the printed book as the medium of communication has become 
challenged by the rise of the new electronic media” (Benczik, 2003, p.11). 
In the 21st century, the introduction of the computer has changed the way people work. 
Gradually both private and government organisations have become computerised. The 
evolution of ICT as a discipline and its numerous applications have been quick and 
overwhelming.  
There is no doubt that the major invention that has affected our lives in the past decade 
or so is the internet. Although other means of communication are definitely important, 
the internet has added a volume of speed, mobility and comprehensiveness that none 
of the previous communication tools was able to provide. The applications of the 
internet are embedded in people’s daily lives allowing an intense long distance exchange 
between human beings across the globe. According to albawaba Business, (2010): “A 
new Arabic financial website (www.nuqudy.com) reported on Tuesday that the total 
number of Web users in the Arab world is estimated at about 75 million users by the 
end of July 2010”. [...]The report claimed that in some countries internet penetration 
rate is low but cellular penetration rate is close to 100%. For example, the internet 
penetration rate in Algeria is put at about 15%, while the penetration rate of mobile 
phones in this country is over 100% (meaning that on average Algerians own slightly 
more than one mobile phone each). The United Arab Emirates boasts the highest 
penetration of the internet in the Arab world at 76%. However, most of the users in this 
country are expatriates. Bahrain and Qatar are ranked second and third respectively 
with penetration rates of 56% and 53%. Egypt is leading the Arab world in terms of 
internet users with 17.5 million. There are 11 million users in Morocco and 8.5 million in 
Saudi Arabia. 
A natural consequence of this extensive communication is the extensive use of language. 
We are aware that accessing information about various subjects has become a simple 
task through using search engines. The internet “has now become the vital source of 
information that is highly helpful in education. A person can find any information such 
as essays, blogs, books, articles, pictures, news, or any other topic. If the person is still 





page with their findings to help others” (Internet Democracy, Freedom of Speech Runs 
Deep 2011). 
ICT technologies and the internet have been of added value to the teaching and learning 
processes. Students are able to use computer software programmes and the internet to 
present research projects. Hence they can be more active in the learning process and 
better equipped to abandon a solely recipient role in the classroom. Since language is 
our core issue here, an English language teacher in Spain explains how ICT has provided 
a useful tool and a safe environment for teaching (Lopez-Brea Fernandez, 2005): “In this 
sense I consider that ICT provides for the language teacher a relatively safe environment 
(provided the teacher “feels” confident with the media), but also a strongly realistic use 
of language, thus providing a reason to learn. There is little doubt that we, language 
teachers, need to focus on the use of language, and ICT makes it easy for us to do so.” 
We can keep ourselves updated with current events through reading news and analysis 
of news on the internet, and by watching the numerous satellite channels which are 
another product of mass communication technology. Paterson (1998) states: “The rapid 
spread of cable and satellite technologies has given rise to many fledgling news 
operations, most multi-national in character”. Through the many satellite channels 
people are now more exposed to different languages and cultures more than any other 
time in the past. “The new technologies are breaking down borders and barriers at a 
faster rate than is possible in physical terms. Sudden, unexpected encounters with other 
languages and cultures confront European citizens with new choices, opportunities and 
challenges”, as stated in a report on Education and Culture (International Certificate 
Conference, no date). What the report considers applies not only to European citizens, 
but also to all the citizens of the world. The growth of satellite channels in the Middle 
East has not only opened doors to programmes from diverse cultural, intellectual and 
perhaps doctrinal backgrounds, but it has also opened our eyes to the many ethnicities 
and their languages which have existed in the region whether for thousands of years or 
just a few generations, but were not widely spoken in the Arab world, such as Kurdish, 
Assyrian, Armenian and Circassian. It has certainly contributed to a cultural revolution 
that has swept the Arab world. “The arrival of satellite television in the Arabic language 





Arab world closer together […], satellite television was part of a cultural revolution that 
had taken place across the Arabic speaking world in the decade leading up to 2011” 
(Noueihed and Warren, 2012, p. 46). 
Audiences may however tend to be selective in what they watch or in what type of 
information they would like to access according to the theory of ‘Selective Exposure’. 
“People tend to see and hear communications that are favorable or congenial to their 
predispositions; they are more likely to see and hear congenial communications than 
neutral or hostile ones” (Sears and Freedman, 1967 p.211). Yet, this abundance of 
communication through different channels and applications exposes people to a range 
of information and cultures even if they did not really intend to be acquainted with them. 
In this context language plays a vital role in determining how the novel information they 
have encountered is relayed to the various audiences. “The reports exist only in and 
through language; my attempts to read them depend entirely on language”, Kress (1983 
p.121) stresses. This notion of how language shapes people opinions will be further 
discussed in section 1.4. 
 
1.4 The growing effect of modern media tools on shaping people’s opinions 
Media is an important tool of communication. After the invention of numerous means 
of media, the world has experienced dramatic changes in many aspects. Media has been 
used to serve certain objectives or even create the right atmosphere for major events 
which left a print on modern history. Hitler had a Ministry of Propaganda, which 
controlled radio and press campaigns to promote his war plans and later his actual 
invasions of neighbouring European countries. “Before the Führer rose to speak, the 
German radio announcer named literally dozens of countries, from Lithuania to Uruguay, 
where the speech was being broadcast live” (Vaughan, 2008). This diplomatic crisis was 
a turning point in radio history. Marshall McLuhan states: “That Hitler came into political 
existence at all is directly owing to radio and public address systems. […] Radio provided 
the first massive experience of electronic implosion, that reversal of the entire direction 
and meaning of literate Western civilization” (McLuhan, 1971, p.57). By 1938, radio had 
reached almost every household in Europe and North America, and its alchemy, at the 





The engagement of television in election campaigns has also been very effective. 
Television appearances, advertisements and debates have been used to disseminate 
political information and to allow political figures specially the runner ups to the 
American presidency to influence the voters’ opinions. Probably the most remembered 
debates are the Nixon-Kennedy presidential debates of 1960.  Television, in contrast 
with radio and newspapers, gave the opportunity to viewers to observe and visually 
appreciate the traits of the competitors and vice versa: “In substance, the candidates 
were much more evenly matched. Indeed, those who heard the first debate on the radio 
pronounced Nixon the winner. But the 70 million who watched television saw a 
candidate still sickly and obviously discomforted by Kennedy's smooth delivery and 
charisma. Those television viewers focused on what they saw, not what they heard. 
Studies of the audience indicated that, among television viewers, Kennedy was 
perceived the winner of the first debate by a very large margin” (Tyner Allen, no date). 
Televised debates have opened the door to a number of questions regarding the role of 
television in determining election results, but most importantly to the role of television 
and other media in the whole democratic scene in a given country.  
Perhaps most important, the Great Debates forced citizens to rethink how 
democracy would work in a television era. To what extent does television 
change debate, indeed, change campaigning altogether? What is the 
difference between a debate that "just happens" to be broadcast and one 
specifically crafted for television? What is lost in the latter? Do televised 
debates really help us to evaluate the relative competencies of the candidates, 
to evaluate policy options, to increase voter participation and intellectual 
engagement, to strengthen national unity? (Tyner Allen, ND). 
If radio plays the role of quick news feeder, the device that puts us on track regarding 
weather, transport and other local issues then, it can also be used to serve certain 
objectives. Mcluhan (1964) describes radio’s effect on people: “Radio affects most 
people intimately, person-to-person, offering a world of unspoken communication 
between writer-speaker and the listener” (Berry, 1971, pg. 57). Although some may 
claim that the press has lost a lot of its impact vis a vis radio and television, it also retains 





cartoons and advertisements. Berry (1971) refers to the role of the newspaper in the 
era of radio and television, saying: “It cannot achieve the instant coverage of 
contemporary events that broadcasting can, but its strength – extensive verbal 
amplification of the news – is unchallengeable”.  
Taking the above into account, then perhaps we understand how media could be 
involved in the democratic process and in influencing the public or in other words 
‘controlling the public mind’. Noam Chomsky (2002, p.14-15) explains that liberal 
democratic theorists and leading media figures in America like for example Walter 
Lippmann, argued that “a ‘revolution in the art of democracy’, could be used to 
‘manufacture consent’, that is, to bring about agreement on the part of the public for 
things they didn’t want by the new techniques of propaganda”. Lippmann’s democratic 
theory is based on a group of ‘responsible men’ who are also smart enough to realise 
‘the common interests’ of the community and take the lead. According to Lippmann, the 
other group of people, which is the majority ‘the bewildered herd’, is not equipped with 
the skills that qualify them to manage crucial issues. Yet, since it is a democracy, they 
are allowed to participate in the democratic process by giving their consent. Chomsky 
(2002, p.18) goes on to explain how to deal with this situation according to Lippmann’s 
theory of progressive democracy: “So we need something to tame the bewildered herd, 
and that something is this new revolution in the art of democracy: the manufacture of 
consent. The media, the schools, and popular culture have to be divided”. Media again 
is classified amongst the major tools used to manage public opinion. 
As noted in section 1.2, the last twenty years have witnessed a massive increase in the 
amount and means of communication due to the technological revolution and the wide 
reception of these modern communication tools by various audiences across the globe. 
Undoubtedly, these portable, easy-to-access small devices have been very rapidly taken 
up amongst different segments of world societies. Internet and mobile phones have 
been skilfully applied to serve numerous purposes including news and media. “These 
new technologies have indeed modified relationships between the public and private 
spheres, radically changing the organization of work, and transforming the functioning 





Social websites have provided a particularly interesting platform for people to 
communicate and express themselvesː their likes and inclinations, and political, social 
and religious views. The constant communication and exchange of ideas which these 
websites permit have allowed a free zone, and an appropriate environment for 
consolidating certain views in various Arab societies. Online communities have emerged 
to call for action regarding different causes, the Arab Spring being a vivid example of the 
impact of internet communication on speeding up social change and converting timid 
voices into loud cries for freedom. Noueihed and Warren (2012) speak about the role of 
the internet in the Arab revolutions: “Whatever its role in the mechanics of the revolts, 
the rapid rise in internet use, blogs and social media over the preceding five years had 
already had a democratizing effect on Arab society that authoritarian governments 
could not roll back” (Noueihed and Warren, 2012, p. 55). 
The internet and its ‘social networking service’ applications have empowered their users 
with the ability to discuss their concerns with intensity and speed with large numbers of 
internet visitors. They have been able to address challenges and difficulties, propose 
ideas and solutions and take initiatives. In addition to this facility, blogs have also 
become available. Statistics produced by the Population Reference Bureau in 2010 
(Zuehlke, 2012) about the percentage of internet penetrations in different Arab 
countries show that for each 100  persons in Egypt 6.4 log into the internet from a mobile 
and 1.8 from a fixed computer. Corresponding figures in Jordan are 2.4%, 3.2% and in 
Libya 42.7%, and 1.2%.  A case study conducted at Harvard University in 2009 “identified 
a base network of approximately 35,000 active Arabic language blogs”. The study aimed 
at assessing the “networked public sphere” in the Arab World, “and its relationship to a 
range of emergent issues, including politics, media, religion, culture, and international 
affairs”. The study team organised the Arab blogosphere over countries or number of 
countries. The study reached the following conclusions in relation to what Arab bloggers 
think about personal life and local issues (Etling, Kelly, Faris and Palfrey, 2009): “Overall, 
the writing of most bloggers is centred on personal, diary-style observations. Those that 
write about politics tend to focus on issues within their own country and are more often 
than not critical of domestic political leaders. Foreign political leaders are discussed less 





popular than international news among general politics and public life topics, especially 
within large national clusters writing entirely in Arabic. The one political issue that 
commands attention of bloggers across the Arab world is Palestine, and in particular the 
situation in Gaza (Israel’s December 2008/January 2009 military action occurred during 
the study)”. My own observation of the above findings is that online forums have 
contributed to the current upheaval in the region and that the internet has definitely 
influenced public opinion at least in a large region like the Arab World. 
The internet also offers online ‘community’ e-magazines, which contain articles, analysis, 
reviews and interviews. The Arabist and Jadaliyya are examples of serious blogs looking 
into Arab affairs and culture which help to increase the knowledge of the more 
cultivated internet users.  
As the study of Etling, Kelly, Faris and Palfrey (2009) indicates, the predominant group 
of Arab bloggers are young people. However, the vast number of satellite channels, 
another production of mass communication and modern media, attract young and old 
alike. The audiences are exposed to varied sources of information and culture. People 
tend to choose what they prefer from what is offered. Sears and Freedman (1971 p.209) 
state in their review of Selective Exposure theory: “We know that in general we try to 
select from the media what we think will be useful to us or what we expect to enjoy”. 
Yet, due to the extensive flow of programmes shown on the very many channels, it is 
quite likely that audiences may become more familiar with new cultures or exposed to 
an alternative point of view. Moreover, satellite channels cater for computer-illiterate 
populations, and for individuals who are not qualified in English. The percentage of these 
individuals in Arab societies is quite substantial. A paper presented during the 9th Annual 
Conference on Al Jazeera and the New Arab Media (Conte, 2007) elucidates: “Instead, 
satellite televisions have many advantages: they are much more difficult to control as 
journalistic content, they can easily be broadcast from other countries to avoid 
censorship, and they can exceed the limit of illiteracy”. 
Within this setting of new players in the global scene, communications and media seem 







1.5 The notion of Stereotyping 
“The great majority of mankind is influenced by things that seem, rather 
than by things that are” (Niccolo Machiavelli). 
‘Generalisation’ or ‘assumption’, frequently not based on factual information, could be 
the key words to describe stereotyping. Stereotypes concern groups of people who may 
belong to a certain culture, ethnicity, religion, sect, gender or even different social class. 
Stereotype is commonly associated with prejudice, although some stereotypes could be 
positive. 
Stereotypes are those common shared attitudes that serve as a shorthand for assessing 
groups of people based on fixed images or ideas. They can be prevalent in a certain 
culture, society or a social class. However, they become far more serious when they 
infiltrate the media, cinema and televised programmes including commercials. With the 
revolution in technology and mass communication, stereotypes have found in internet 
and social media platforms a hotbed in which to proliferate.  
 
1.5.1 The use of stereotypical language in media and in translated media 
Stereotyping can exist between any two or more cultures or between smaller groups of 
people. As an Arab who has witnessed the increase of stereotyping over her own culture 
within the past decade, I will concentrate in this research on perceptions affecting Arabs 
and Muslims. There are generalisations frequently used about Arabs and Muslims, and 
unfortunately some academics make this link between infamous extremists and all 
Muslims. My first example will be from a book by Bernard Lewis, with a short overview 
of his life and work first. 
 
1.5.2 Bernard Lewisː an overview 
Bernard Lewis was a British American historian and a specialist in oriental studies. He 
graduated from the University of London (History with Special Reference to the Near 
and Middle East) and earned his doctorate from the same university (SOAS) specialising 





University in the United States, which marked the most productive period of his 
academic life.  
Lewis took an active interest in the social and economic history of the Middle East, and 
he is especially famous in academic circles for his works on the Ottoman Empire. Martin 
Kramer (1999) says: “Lewis’ early work centred on medieval Arab-Islamic history, 
especially in what is now Syria. However, after the creation of Israel, it became difficult 
for scholars of Jewish origin to conduct archival and field research in most Arab countries. 
Lewis turned his efforts to the study of Arab lands through Ottoman archives available 
in Istanbul, and to the study of the Ottoman Empire itself. The Emergence of Modern 
Turkey (1961) examined the history of modernizing reform not through the European 
lens of the “Eastern Question,” but through the eyes of the Ottoman reformers 
themselves” (Kramer, 1999, p. 719-20). 
Lewis argues that the Middle East is currently backward and its decline is a largely self-
inflicted condition resulting from both culture and religion, as opposed to the post-
colonialist view, which mainly relates the under development of the region to 19th 
century European colonization. Kramer (1999) states: “Lewis, however, insisted that 
Ottoman decline was both real and self-inflicted. It resulted not only from the West’s 
material superiority, but from a Muslim attitude of cultural superiority, which impeded 
borrowing. The importance of creative borrowing, and the costs of Muslim insularity, 
was major themes in his Muslim Discovery of Europe (1982)”.  
Lewis is known for his public debates with the Palestinian intellectual Edward Said, 
which concerned Said’s book ‘Orientalism’ (Said 1978). Bernard Lewis was among the 
scholars whose work was questioned in Edward Said’s ‘Orientalism’. Said thought that 
Lewis did not possess an academic background that qualified him to write about Arabs 
and Muslims; Lewis had not lived in or even visited an Arab country for a long time, most 
of his Muslim experience being Turkish-based. Yet he labelled the whole culture as 
violent, angry and anti-modern. Said added that Lewis’s work on the Muslims and Arabs 
lacked the necessary authenticity. “What he writes about Islam is all so self-evident that 
it allows him to bypass normal conventions of intellectual discourse, including proof” 





and fed it with a biased and distorted interpretation of the September 11 bombings 
(Adoing, 2008). 
For his part Lewis thought that Said in his book Orientalism had ignored a number of 
scholars whose work was not merely based on a legend of the orient (Adoing, 2008, 
p.18). “What is the background of Oriental legend that inspired Burton or Lane? Was 
Flaubert‘s vivid imagination stimulated by Oriental legend, and was this the same 
legendary material that inspired Burton, Lane and Lamartine?” (Lewis, 2002). Lewis also 
accused Said of being anti-western, which Said has denied, explaining that ”there is no 
enduring oriental reality and even less an enduring Western essence, that he has no 
interest in, much less capacity for, showing what the true Orient and Islam really are” 
(Adoing, 2008). Lewis has also accused Said of using pretentious and incomprehensible 
language which conceals banal observations (Adoing 2008).  
In his book, The crisis of Islam, Holy War and Unholy Terror, (Lewis 2003 p.xviii) Bernard 
Lewis mentions how “historical allusions [...] which may seem abstruse to many 
Americans are common among Muslims”. Bernard Lewis arrived at this conclusion after 
quoting one of Ben Ladin’s pronouncements on the “humiliation and disgrace” that 
Islam has suffered for “more than eighty years” (Lewis, 2003 p. xv). He continues (Lewis 
2003 p. xv): “Most American-and, no doubt, European observers of the Middle Eastern 
scene began an anxious search for something that had happened ‘more than eighty 
years’ ago and came up with various answers. We can be fairly sure that Bin Ladin’s 
Muslim listeners – the people he was addressing –picked up the allusion immediately 
and appreciated its significance”. In this example Bernard Lewis is proposing that all 
Muslims are listening attentively to Bin Laden and thereby assuming that he is an 
important Muslim figure whose speeches and references are highly appreciated by his 
Muslim audience. This assumption by an academic and historian such as Bernard Lewis 
is liable to tarnish the image of Islam and Muslims within an important segment of 
educated people and young people in particular. 
 
1.5.3 Daniel Pipes: an overview 
My second example is from a book by Daniel Pipes. Again before providing and analysing 





Daniel Pipes is an American historian, writer and political commentator. He is the 
founder and director of the Middle East Forum and the editor of the Middle East 
Quarterly Journal (Middle East Forum n.d.). Pipes studied history at Harvard University, 
majoring in Middle East History in 1971. After his graduation, he spent two years in Cairo 
where he learnt Arabic and studied the Quran. He returned to Harvard in 1973 to 
embark on PhD research in medieval Islamic history. His PhD thesis entitled, ‘Slave 
Soldiers and Islam’ became his first book.  
Pipes taught at a number of universities and then served as director of the Foreign Policy 
Research Institute, before founding the Middle East Forum. His 2003 nomination by U.S. 
President Bush to the board of directors of the U.S. Institute of Peace was protested 
by Democratic leaders, Arab-American groups, and civil rights activists, who cited his 
allegedly rightist views and belief that force was the most effective remedy for 
conflict. An online article on the Middle East Forum website says (Middle East Forum, 
no date): “The Wall Street Journal calls Mr. Pipes "an authoritative commentator on the 
Middle East”. CBS Sunday Morning says he was "years ahead of the curve in identifying 
the threat of radical Islam”. "Unnoticed by most Westerners," he wrote for example in 
1995, "war has been unilaterally declared on Europe and the United States”. It is evident 
that such statements could be inflammatory and extremely destabilizing of European 
communities, and mainstream European politicians in countries with large Muslim 
populations would be very unlikely to welcome them. 
Pipes has written or co-written more than a dozen books, and has written columns or 
opinion pieces for many newspapers. He frequently participates in discussion panels on 
television, and has lectured profusely in the U.S. and abroad. He is currently the Taube 
Distinguished Visiting Fellow at Stanford University's Hoover Institution. 
In a book entitled Greater Syria, The History of an Ambition, Daniel Pipes (1990) 
describes the scenarios of the making of Lebanon a Maronite/Christian state. He says 
that there were two proposals: keeping Lebanon small but with Christian demographic 
predominance, or having a bigger geographical territory but then encompassing more 
non-Maronites or non-Christians (Pipes, 1990, p.33-35). Pipes goes on to say that the 





price of expansion was that many unwilling Muslims became Lebanese, sowing the 
seeds of the civil war that began in 1975” (Pipes, 1990 p.34). Pipes is presuming that the 
prime reason for the 15-year civil war in Lebanon was Muslim unwillingness to co-exist 
in a diverse environment, while the majority of contemporary observers perceive a 
number of critical issues behind the eruption of the Lebanese civil war (regional factors, 
as well as local dissatisfaction among some Lebanese communities). 
 
1.5.4 Translating examples involving stereotypes 
As discussed in previous sections, translation can stress prejudices and enlarge existing 
gaps between cultures. The following translation from one of the speeches of former 
Iraqi president Saddam Hussein is an example. The speech was delivered on 17 January 
2003 on the eve of the American invasion: 
د العراق الجديد، همة ورؤية، وقلباً زاده التصميم على االرتقاء، وقهر الصعاب، ثباتا في محبته ألمته، ول
وصالبة في مواجهة أعدائها، وعمق فيه أيمانه، الذي أثابه هللا عليه، بعد أن عطر الموقف والراية بدماء 
األمور في بغداد، فوجد األجنبي، بسنابك خيله، سخية من أبنائه، قرباناً تقبّله هللا عن الغفلة التي أصابت والة 
  (2009شبكة المنصور,)طريقه اليها 
The official TT produced by the Iraqi state reads: 
A new Iraq was born with firm resolution, great power of vision and a heart, which 
has been increased in the strength by a determination for ascent and for 
overcoming difficulties. It was firm in its love for its nation. Its faith, which God has 
given it and which the situation and banner was perfumed by the generous blood 
from its sons, has been deepened by a sacrifice which God accepted in 
compensation for the negligence which took over those who ruled Baghdad, and 
therefore the foreigners with horny feet of their horses, found their way towards 
it. (Iraq News Agency: English version; cited in Moreton, 2010  p.252). 
The Arabic original text can be classified as flowery and redundant. It features an over-
use of poetic and dramatic expressions which aim at striking the eye and the ear of the 
listener/reader. The almost literal English translation, by contrast, sounds to the English 





enhancing the negative image of an Arab country/political leadership regardless of 
where we stand on the actions of Saddam Hussein. 
Another example, this time from Farsi, is when Ayatollah Khamenei in 2012 described 
the acquisition of nuclear weapons as a sinful act that cannot be forgiven. The original 
text in Farsi reads: 
 
ئي و شيميائي و نظائر آن را گناهي ايشان تاکيد کردند: جمهوري اسالمي ايران استفاده از سالح هسته
را  Èئيي عاري از سالح هستهخاورميانهÇ گ و نابخشودني ميداند و بر همين اساس شعاربزر
 طرح کرده و به آن پايبند است
. 
رهبر انقالب اسالمي با تاکيد بر اينکه طرح اين شعار از جانب جمهوري اسالمي ايران به معناي 
ر نشان ئي نيست، خاطسوخت هسته ئي و توليدآميز از انرژي هستهبرداري صلحپوشي از حق بهرهچشم
ي کشورها است و همه بايد المللي حق همهآميز از اين انرژي براساس قوانين بيني صلحکردند: استفاده
بتوانند از اين انرژي سالم در مصارف گوناگون حياتي کشور و ملتشان استفاده کنند و در اِعمال اين 
 حق وابسته به ديگران نباشند
 
The TT reads: 
The Islamic Republic of Iran considers the use of nuclear, chemical and similar 
weapons as a great and unforgivable sin. We proposed the idea of Middle East 
free of nuclear weapons and we are committed to it. This does not mean 
forgoing our right to peaceful use of nuclear power and production of nuclear 
fuel. On the basis of international laws, peaceful use of nuclear energy is a right 
of every country. All should be able to employ this wholesome source of energy 
for various vital uses of their country and people, without having to depend on 
others for exercising this right. Some Western countries, themselves possessing 
nuclear weapons and guilty of this illegal action, want to monopolize the 
production of nuclear fuel. Surreptitious moves are under way to consolidate a 
permanent monopoly over production and sale of nuclear fuel in centres 






Although the overall translation is of good quality, the literal rendering of the sentence 
“The Islamic Republic of Iran considers the use of nuclear, chemical and similar weapons 
as a great and unforgivable sin” gives an immediate impression of a non-objective 
approach to the issue of the Iranian nuclear programme and might increase fears on the 
opposing side. 
 
1.5.5 News Agency Translations 
It can be argued that news agencies are not in practice translating news reports from 
one language to another. They are more producing independent reports for different 
audiences and the differences traced fall more in the area of marketing and social 
science rather than translation. Christina Schaffner (2010, p. 107), however, provides a 
counter-argument when she says: “However, research, as conducted in particular within 
the framework of descriptive translation studies and post-modern theories, has 
revealed that translation is also used to promote dominant ideologies [...] (e.g. Venuti 
1998, Baker 2006). Translation methods are applied strategically to make target texts 
conform to or to challenge dominant world views”. Many of the prominent news 
agencies have sections for reporting news in other languages: the BBC, CNN and Al 
Jazeera are well-known examples in the Arab world. “For mediating politics to the 
general public, mass media play a significant role, including the reporting of politics in 
other countries” (Schaffner, 2010, p. 107). In order for the news agency to produce 
politically convincing reports, it depends on translators, and not only on professional 
translators: “As research into global news and translation has shown, it is a widespread 
phenomenon that journalists in fact do translations, but do not refer to this work as 
translation” (Schaffner,2010, p. 109). 
 
It might be obvious to some people, specially those who work in the media field, or are 
extensively exposed to media and news, that different media agencies deliver the same 
piece of news differently. This can be attributed to the policy, ideology and strategy of 
the news agency. News agencies are not simply relaying news, as their primary task 
seems to be. They are actually persistently influencing their audiences by implanting or 





An apparatus like media by which individuals are daily subjected to massive 
inculcation and “cramming” of concepts (e.g. moralism, terrorism, 
martyrdom or suicide bombing), can forge one’s beliefs about the way 
specific subjects should be interpellated in a particular conflict, thus, 
imposing what Althusser calls imaginary relations between the ruling 
ideology and the ruled individuals.  
An example of this can be seen in the news regarding the current conflict in Syria. When 
the official Syrian Television reports a bombing in Damascus, the incident is described 
as follows (SANA 2012):  
السكني بدمشق ما  86فجر إرهابيون اليوم عبوة ناسفة وضعوها تحت سيارة فى حى مزة جبل سانا 
 من المواطنين وعشرات الجرحى بينهم أطفال ونساء  11أسفر عن استشهاد 
التفجير اإلرهابى أن التفجير أدى إلى وقوع أضرار كبيرة في المكان  وأفاد مراسل سانا إلى مكان
المزدحم بالسكان إضافة إلى تدمير عدد كبير من السيارات والمحالت التجارية وتضرر البنى 
 والمرافق الخدمية في المنطقة.
TT (SANA 2012): 
Terrorists on Monday detonated an explosive device planted under a car in 
Mazzeh Jabal 86 area in Damascus, killing 11 citizens and injuring tens, 
including women and children. 
SANA's correspondent who visited the bombing site said the explosion caused 
significant damage to the area which is heavily populated, and that a large 
number of cars and shops were destroyed and infrastructure and utilities were 
also damaged. 
By contrast the same incident is reported by the Al Jazeera Satellite Channel (JSC 2012), 
as follows: 
شخصا  11دينة مما تسبب في مقتل وفي دمشق أيضا, انفجرت عبوة ناسفة في حي المزة غربي الم
  .آخرين بينهم أطفال ونساء طبقا للتلفزيون السوري 30وجرح 





There were also reports of a car bombing in Mezzeh, an upscale 
neighbourhood in the Syrian capital, in which four people were killed and 
dozens wounded on Monday. 
The same principle of ‘imaginary relations between the ruling ideology and the ruled 
individuals’ can be applied to individual translators. We come across texts influenced or 
even target texts manoeuvred by the translator according to his/her own positioning 
and ‘Ideological State Apparatuses’ as termed by Althusser. Hatim and Munday (2004, 
p.200) confirm this notion: “equivalence no longer governs the production and 
reception of translation. Translation is not merely an innocent transfer of ideas from one 
language into another. The process of translation can be ideologically manipulated to 
influence perceptions and to undermine the target culture”. 
The Syrian Prime Minister Riad Hijab, who defected from the Syrian regime in 2012, 
made the following announcement in Amman after he arrived there (JSC 2012): 
أؤكد لكم بحكم خبرتي وموقعي الذي كنت اشغله بأن النظام بات منهارا معنويا وماديا واقتصاديا ومتصدعا 
% من ارض سوريا. فلتستمر الثورة في نهجها 30عسكريا حيث لم يعد مسيطرا بالفعل على أكثر من 
تستكمل صورتها المشرقة عبر الحفاظ على وحدة البالد ونسيجها الوطني المتماسك الحضاري المتميز ل
وعبر الحفاظ على مؤسسات الدولة ومنشآتها الحيوية وبنيتها التحتية التي بتيناها جميعا بجهدنا وعرقنا 
ا وسد ودماء أبنائنا, اما عن فصائل المعارضة الحارجية فهي مدعوة اكثر من أي يوم مضى لتوحيد جهوده
 ذرائع من يتهمها بالتشتت والتشرذم فاختالف المشارب ال يلغي وحدة الهدف.
أؤكد في هذه المناسبة عدم رغبتي في تقلد أي موقع أو منصب سواء كان في الوقت الراهن أو في المستقبل 
من وراء ذلك بسورية المحررة والذي أراه قريبا باذن هللا, انما نذرت نفسي جنديا في مسيرة الحق ال أبغي 
اال وجه ربي ثم ارضاء ضميري والوفاء لوطن أعطانا الكثير وينتظر منا أن نعطيه ما يستحق من خالل 
 البذل والتضحية وعلو الهمة للوصول الى دولة مدنية, ديمقراطية تكفل الحق والعدل والكرامة لجميع السوريين.
 
Translation: 
From my experience and because of the position I held I assure you that the regime 
is decaying morally, financially and economically. It is broken militarily as it 
practically controls no more than 30% of the Syrian territory. Let our revolution 
continue in this civilised manner to complete its bright picture and maintain the 





state’s institutions and establishments, the infrastructure which we all built with 
our sweat and blood. As for the opposition factions, they are demanded more than 
ever to unite their efforts and refute others’ accusations of disintegration and 
fragmentation. The diversity of the opposition should not revoke their sole 
objective. 
On this occasion, I confirm that I do not wish to take up any senior position whether 
currently or in the future free Syria, which I see it near, God willing. More, I have 
dedicated myself as a soldier in the march for the righteous cause. In doing this, I 
am only asking for God’s blessings, a contented conscience and faithfulness to a 
country which has given us a lot and is waiting that we give it what it deserves 
through providing, sacrifice and firm resolution to reach a civil state, a democracy 
that guarantees people’s rights, equality and dignity for all Syrians. 
The English translation as quoted from AJE news reads (AJE 2012): 
I confirm that the regime is decaying: morally, financially and economically. It is 
militarily losing ground, let the revolution continue in this civilised manner to 
maintain the integrity of the people and the state institutions which we built 
with our sweat and effort. Now, the opposition abroad is invited to unite and 
unify the ranks. Here I confirm that I don’t intend to take any office now or in 
the future. 
The translator omitted the parts which could have made the announcement redundant 
and not quite meaningful. The translator’s intention is to secure the readers’ support for 
the Syrian revolution. Since using a flowery and rather too eloquent expressions is more 
a feature of Arabic, and Western readers won’t favour this type of language, so the 
translator resorted to omitting parts of the TT. The translator maintained a pro-
revolution stance through the translation. For a clearer idea, please see translation 
below. 
In the process of preparing pieces of news for different audiences, omissions could also 
be made in order for the text to be better received by a particular mind-set or 
‘Ideological State Apparatus’. As previously discussed, another reason is where the news 





The following is the news report about the Palestinian Authority (PA) bid for non-
member state recognition at the UN (Reuters عربي   2012): 
ء الخارجية العرب في مقر جامعة الدول العربية وقال عباس للصحفيين في القاهرة عقب اجتماع لوزرا
نوفمبر تشرين الثاني  29بشأن التصويت المزمع لألمم المتحدة انه تم االتفاق على اجراء التصويت في 
 .الجاري مشيرا الى ان االغلبية الالزمة للفوز في االقتراع ستكون في مصلحة الجانب الفلسطيني
غير عضو دولة مراقب ..اذا ارادوا حوارا في اليوم التالي فنحن وأضاف "ذاهبون لنحصل على دولة 
 ".مستعدون
ووزعت السلطة الفلسطينية مشروع قرار على الدول األعضاء في األمم المتحدة يوم األربعاء يطالب 
 .بترقية وضعها الى دولة مراقب على الرغم من اعتراضات الواليات المتحدة وإسرائيل
ري التصويت عليه في الجمعية العامة لألمم المتحدة في وقت الحق من الشهر واقتراح عباس الذي سيج
الجاري سيكون اعترافا ضمنيا بدولة فلسطينية وربما يؤدي أيضا إلى انضمام فلسطين إلى هيئات دولية 
 .مثل المحكمة الجنائية الدولية في الهاي
 ".مع إسرائيل وقال عباس "نحن ال نريد ان نتصادم مع احد ال مع أمريكا وال
وبات في حكم المؤكد أن يحصل الرئيس الفلسطيني على تأييد اغلبية األصوات في الجمعية العامة التي 
 .دولة لرفع التمثيل الفلسطيني 193تضم 
 
Translation: 
Following a meeting of Arab foreign ministers in the headquarters of the Arab 
League in Cairo, Abbas told journalists about the intended vote of the United 
Nations which was agreed to take place on 29 November (this month). Abbas 
noted that the majority will vote in the Palestinian favour. 
“We are going to obtain the United Nation’s recognition for a non-member state. 
If they want to talk the day after, we are ready”, he added. 
The Palestinian Authority on Wednesday circulated a draft resolution to U.N. 
member states that calls for upgrading its U.N. status to that of observer state, 
despite objections by the United States and Israel.  
Abbas’s proposal which will be voted on in the United Nation’s General 





state, and it may also result in Palestine joining international organisations such 
as International Criminal Court in The Hague. 
 “We do not seek confrontations with anyone neither America nor Israel”, Abbas 
said. 
It is almost certain that President Abbas will obtain the majority of votes in the 
U.N. General assembly which comprises 193 stats to upgrade the Palestinian 
representation. 
As the English version of this piece of news is quite lengthy, I have chosen a few 
paragraphs to comment on. The English starts as follows (Reuters 2012): 
(Reuters) - Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas told President Barack 
Obama on Sunday he was intent on pressing ahead with a Palestinian bid for 
United Nations recognition as a non-member state, despite the U.S. leader's 
objections. 
As we read through the passage, we realise that some paragraphs which highlight the 
link between the Palestinian Authority and the west have been omitted as well as those 
which reveal the dependent relationship between The PA and Israel: Israel controls the 
economy and is able to monopolise all the resources leaving no room for the proposed 
‘viable Palestinian state’: 
[…] The Western-backed Palestinian Authority on Wednesday circulated a draft 
resolution to U.N. member states that calls for upgrading its U.N. status to that of 
observer state, despite objections by the United States and Israel. 
President Abbas cited the reasons and motives for the Palestinian decision to seek 
non-member statehood as continued Israeli settlement activity and the continued 
attacks on Palestinians and their property," Abu Rdaineh said. 
The White House said Obama, responding to a message from Abbas congratulating 
him on his re-election, used the call to reiterate "opposition to unilateral efforts at 





[...]The upgrade seems certain to win approval in any vote in the 193-nation 
General Assembly, which is composed mostly of post-colonial states historically 
sympathetic to the Palestinians. 
Palestinian diplomats also are courting European countries to further burnish their 
case. 
Israel and the United States say Palestinian statehood must be achieved by 
negotiation and have called on Abbas to return to peace talks that collapsed in 
2010 over Israeli settlement construction in the occupied West Bank. 
"In his discussion with President Abbas, President Obama reaffirmed his 
commitment to Middle East peace and his strong support for direct negotiations 
between Israel and the Palestinians with the objective of two states living side by 
side in peace and security," the White House said. 
Obama pledged to make Middle East peacemaking a top priority when he took 
office in 2008 but on-again-off-again U.S. diplomacy yielded no tangible progress. 
With Washington focused on the West's nuclear standoff with Iran and seeking to 
avert any unilateral Israeli attack on its nuclear sites, the White House has shown 
no real appetite for any immediate new Israeli-Palestinian peace initiative. 
[...] The Palestinians seek to establish a state in the Israeli-occupied West Bank and 
the Gaza Strip - which is controlled by the Islamist Hamas group who are bitter 
rivals of the Palestinian Authority - and want East Jerusalem as its capital. 
Abbas has billed the U.N. move as a last-ditch attempt to advance long-stalled talks 
to achieve statehood by first having the world recognize Palestine as a state under 
Israeli occupation and its borders. 
But U.S. officials have warned that the U.N. bid is counterproductive and will make 
it harder for the two sides to agree to renewed negotiations. 
On Saturday, Israeli Finance Minister Yuval Steinitz threatened to stop collecting 
tax revenues for the Palestinian Authority and not hand over any money if Abbas 





The aid-dependent Palestinian economy in the West Bank faces financial crisis due 
to a drop in aid from Western backers and wealthy Gulf states, as well as Israeli 
restrictions on trade. 
When a news agency works to promote a political figure, they may need to elaborate in 
order to enhance their positive traits. Bearing in mind Qatar’s stance towards the Syrian 
Revolution and the relevant events, AJE introduced the new Syrian Coalition leader, 
Ahmad Moaz Al Khatib, by describing at length his firm stand against the Syrian regime, 
especially after the start of the uprising in March 2011, while JSC kept this concise (JSC 
2012): 
ومعاذ الخطيب اسم ارتبط بالمعارضة السورية منذ انطالق االحتجاجات ضد حكم الرئيس بشار األسد، حيث 
 خلفية مشاركته في المظاهرات المناوئة للنظام.مرات عدة على  اعتقلته السلطات السورية
كانت خطبه من منبر الجامع األموي في دمشق وفي مجالس العزاء رسائل احتجاج على سياسة النظام، 
وجلبت له متاعب مع أجهزة األمن السورية التي دأبت على استدعائه للتحقيق معه مرات عديدة في عامي 
 .2012و 2011
ة المنتقدة للحكم السوري، عرف عن الداعية معاذ الخطيب مواقفه المعتدلة، ويحسب وعلى قدر خطبه الناري
من دعاة التعدد الطائفي والعقائدي في سوريا، حيث ألقى خطبه الداعمة لالحتجاجات وإلى جانبه رموز من 
 الطائفتين العلوية والمسيحية.
السورية، قال الخطيب إن عمل وفور انتخابه رئيسا لالئتالف الوطني لقوى الثورة والمعارضة 
سينتهي فور سقوط النظام، مشيرا إلى أن االئتالف لم ولن يتعهد أمام أي جهة بأية أمور "تخون  االئتالف
 دماء الشعب الثائر".
وكان الخطيب دائم المطالبة بالحريات العامة في كل بالد المسلمين، وإطالق سراح المعتقلين السياسيين، 
وارئ واألحكام العرفية واالعتقال التعسفي، وإلغاء سيطرة الحزب الواحد، ومحاربة الرشوة وإلغاء قوانين الط
والفساد السياسي واالجتماعي واالقتصادي، وإيقاف نهب األموال، وتذكير الناس بحقوقهم ومنها الرعاية 
 ناس وتالعب بهم.االجتماعية، ويرى أن كل ذلك من صميم اإلسالم، وتجاوزه هو زراية بالدين واستغباء لل
Translation: 
The name of Muath Al Khatib has been associated with the Syrian opposition since 
the break out of protests against Bashar al-Assad rule, he was arrested by the 






His speeches which were delivered from the pulpit of the Omayyad mosque in 
Damascus, and in the funeral ceremonies were messages of criticism of the 
regime’s policies’ and have put him into trouble with the security services which 
frequently summoned him for interrogation in 2011 and 2012.  
As much as preacher Muath Al Khatib is known for his fiery speeches, he is as well 
known for his moderate positions. He preached religious and ideological pluralism 
in Syria, as he gave his pro protests speeches with a number of Alawi and Christian 
figures standing next to him. 
Once he was elected president for the Syrian Coalition, Al Khatib said the task of 
the Coalition would end as soon as the regime falls. He indicated that the coalition 
did not and would not make any promises to any party in a way that would “betray 
the blood of the revolutionary people”.  
Al Khatib always demanded public freedoms in all Muslim countries, he also called 
for releasing political prisoners, removing emergency and martial laws, and abrupt 
detention, ending the one party rule, combating bribery and political, social and 
economic corruption, halting public wealth looting, and making people alert to 
their rights including social care. He finds all this intrinsic part of Islam, and 
superseding it means we are despising religion and undermining people’s minds 
and manipulating them.  
Although the Arabic version is rather rhetorical, it is shorter and much less detailed than 
the English one: 
Just 20 days into the eruption of anti-regime protests across the country on 
March 15, 2011, Khatib was seen in the Damascus suburb of Douma at the 
funeral of an anti-government protester killed by security forces. 
“We speak up for the freedom of every human in this country; for every Sunni, 
Alawite, Ismaili, Christian, for every Arab and every Kurd,” he said that day as 
he stood on a high platform. 





Two days later, Khatib was at another funeral for a slain protester in the 
Damascus suburb of Madimiyyah. 
“The free person feels for other people’s pain, lives their feelings, cries with 
them and calls for their rights,” he told mourners in Madimiyyah. 
Khatib was arrested several times for his involvement in the movement, 
including his most recent incarceration in April 2012. 
Al Khatib is from a religious Muslim family; he has been Imam to several mosques in 
Damascus including the “prestigious Omayyad Mosque”, according to Al Jazeera. What 
is interesting here is that Al Jazeera is promoting an Islamic figure by implicitly defying 
the stereotype about Muslims being exclusive and rigid: 
His struggle for freedom along with what many consider his moderate 
Islamic discourse made him a popular figure among many Syrians. He has 
written dozens of books and articles on religion and society, advocating for 
equality between men and women, for minority rights and political plurality. 
The English version of this article is longer and much more detailed than the Arabic one. 
It contains examples of Al Khatib’s rebellious attitudes towards the regime, and his 
open-mindedness (AJE 2012): 
“I knew him personally for twenty years…I used to attend his Friday 
speeches at the mosque with my friends at Damascus University, we all 
were liberal but proud Muslims, and we found in him the right figure. He 
was always very open-minded and ready to talk to us about anything," Rim 
Turkmani, a Syrian-born astrophysicist at Imperial College London, said. 
"His attitude towards women is very admirable as well.”  
[...] Fadi Salem, a Syrian researcher based in Dubai, sees Khatib as a 
"moderate Islamist" who has a lot of support among conservative urban 
Sunnis. He could be the right man to tackle the rise of extremism, the 
researcher said. 
Religious issues are on numerous occasions the focus of cultural stereotyping especially 





leadership were interwoven. In modern times leadership in different Arab states has 
become more secular. However, people have suffered from dictatorship, poverty and 
political repression, which have given rise to political Islam, which came to be at the 
forefront of the Arab spring that changed the face of the Arab region. The Muslim 
Brotherhood, which won the 2011 elections in Egypt, subsequently faced accusations of 
cementing authoritarianism. Reuters Arabic published the following article about the 
crisis in Egypt caused by a presidential decree seen by opponents as an attempt to 
monopolise political decision making (Reuters 2012 عربي):  
أبلغ مصدر رئاسي رويترز يوم االربعاء أن الرئيس محمد مرسي سيلقي يوم  -القاهرة )رويترز( 
الخميس كلمة للشعب المصري يتناول فيها أمورا من بينها اإلعالن الدستوري الذي اصدره األسبوع 
 .الماضي واالحتجاجات التي اندلعت عقب صدوره
ويقول المحتجون إن مرسي منح نفسه باإلعالن صالحيات دكتاتورية لكن المصدر أوضح أن مرسي 
 .سيسعى لتوضيح خالف ذلك
وقال المصدر الرئاسي "سيلقي الرئيس خطابا إلى الشعب في التلفزيون الرسمي مساء الخميس وسيتناول 
 ".اإلعالن الدستوري وسبب اصداره واألحداث التي اعقبته
يس ديوان رئيس الجمهورية محمد رفاعة الطهطاوي في اتصال هاتفي مع تلفزيون الحياة على أن وأكد رئ
 .مرسي سيلقي الخطاب يوم الخميس
وقال عضو في جماعة اإلخوان المسلمين على دراية بكيفية صدور اإلعالن لرويترز إن مرسي ونائبه 
شرعوا في العمل على اإلعالن في اكتوبر  محمود مكي واثنين آخرين من الخبراء القانونيين المستقلين
 .تشرين األول بعد ان فشل الرئيس في إقالة النائب العام عبد المجيد محمود
وأثار تحرك مرسي غضبا من القضاة الذين قالوا انه تجاوز صالحياته وأثار أيضا احتجاجات كبيرة من 
تورقبل المصريين الذين اتهموه بمحاولة الحصول على صالحيات دكتا . 
وقال عضو الجماعة الذي طلب عدم الكشف عن هويته "بدأ الرئيس ونائبه في أكتوبر العمل سرا في 
المساء بعد انتهاء العمل مع اثنين من الخبراء القانونيين لصياغة اإلعالن الذي يسمح له بإقالة النائب العام 
 ".وذلك من بين امور أخرى
لتجنب أي تسرب لإلعالن إلى وسائل اإلعالم أو القضاء.  وقال إن مرسي اختار عدم إبالغ مستشاريه







A presidential source told Reuters on Wednesday that President Mursi will 
address the nation on Thursday eve. He will give a speech that will address a 
number of issues including the constitutional declaration which was issued last 
week, the reason behind issuing it, and the protests prompted by it. 
Protesters say that Mursi has granted himself sweeping powers by issuing the 
constitutional declaration, however the source said that Mursi seeks to clarify 
that it is not as it seems. 
“The president will address the nation on the state television on Thursday eve, 
which will discuss the constitutional declaration, why it was issued and the events 
that followed, the presidential source said. 
The president of the presidential court Muhammad Rafaa Al Tahtawi confirmed 
in a phone call with Al Hayat television that Mursi will give a speech on Thursday. 
A member of the Muslim brotherhood who is well informed of how the 
declaration was issued said to Reuters that Mursi and his deputy Mahmoud Makki 
and two other independent legal experts have started working on the constitutional 
declaration in October, in the aftermath of the president’s failure to discharge 
the General Prosecutor Abdul Majid Mahmoud 
Mursi’s measure exasperated the judges who said he has exceeded his capacities, 
and caused wide spread protests among Egyptians who accused him of 
attempting to grant himself dictatorial authorities. 
“The president and his deputy started working secretly in October during the eves 
with two legal experts to structure the declaration which allowed him to 
discharge the General Prosecutor and other things, “The group member who 
asked to remain anonymous said. 
He said, Mursi chose not to inform his counsellors to avoid any leak of the 
declaration to media or to Judiciary. Muslim Brothers group were not aware of 





The Arabic version does state that Mursi, the Egyptian president, has issued a decree to 
grant himself extra powers, and that, along with dismissing the General Prosecutor, this 
has caused resentment and persistent protests in the country. Yet, it does not elaborate 
on or include the statements made by major and well-liked figures who had a significant 
impact on the Egyptian revolution. Reuters English published the following version of 
the same article (Reuters 2012): 
(Reuters) - Egyptian President Mohamed Mursi will address the nation on 
Thursday, calling for unity as he pushes through a new constitution he hopes 
will defuse a crisis prompted by his decision to grant himself sweeping powers. 
The assembly tasked with writing the constitution said it was hoping to wrap up 
a final draft with a view to voting on the document later on Thursday. 
But as Mursi's opponents pressed on with their week-old protests in Cairo's 
Tahrir Square, critics said the Islamist-dominated assembly's bid to finish the 
constitution quickly could make matters worse. 
Two people have been killed and hundreds injured in countrywide protest set 
off by Mursi's decree since it was issued last week. 
The Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamist group which was behind Mursi's election 
June, hopes to end the crisis by replacing the decree with an entirely new 
constitution to be approved in a popular referendum, a Brotherhood official 
told Reuters. 
It is a gamble based on the Islamists' belief that they can mobilise enough voters 
to win the referendum: they have won all elections held since Hosni Mubarak 
was toppled from power. 
But the move seemed likely to deepen divisions that are being exposed in the 
street. 
In his speech, Mursi was expected to explain why he had issued his decree and 
to outline what he saw as conspiracies being planned by his non-Islamist 





The Muslim Brotherhood and its Islamist allies have called for protests on 
Saturday in Tahrir Square, setting the stage for more confrontation with their 
opponents, who staged a mass rally there on Tuesday. 
The constitution is one of the main reasons Mursi is at loggerheads with non-
Islamist opponents. They are boycotting the 100-member constitutional 
assembly, saying the Islamists have tried to impose their vision for Egypt's future. 
The assembly's legitimacy has been called into question by a series of court 
cases demanding its dissolution. Its standing has also been hit by the withdrawal 
of members including church representatives and liberals. 
 
RIOT POLICE 
Just down the road from the constitutional assembly meeting, protesters were 
clashing with riot police in Tahrir Square. Members of the assembly watched on 
television as they waited to go into session on Wednesday. 
"The constitution is in its last phases and will be put to a referendum soon and 
God willing it will solve a lot of the problems in the street," said Talaat Marzouk, 
an assembly member from the Salafi Nour Party, as he watched the images. 
But Wael Ghonim, a prominent activist whose online blogging helped ignite the 
anti-Mubarak uprising, said a constitution passed in such circumstances would 
"entrench authoritarianism". 
The constitution is supposed to be the cornerstone of a new, democratic Egypt 
following Mubarak's three decades of autocratic rule. The assembly has been at 
work for six months. Mursi had extended its December 12 deadline by two 
months - extra time that the assembly speaker said was not needed. 
The constitution will determine the powers of the president and parliament and 
define the roles of the judiciary and a military establishment that had been at 
the heart of power for decades until Mubarak was toppled. It will also set out 





The effort to conclude the text quickly could mean trouble, said Nathan Brown, 
a professor of political science at George Washington University in the United 
States. 
"It may be regarded with hostility by a lot of state actors too, including the 
judiciary," he said. 
Leading opposition and former Arab League chief figure Amr Moussa slammed 
the move. He walked out of the assembly earlier this month. "This is nonsensical 
and one of the steps that shouldn't be taken, given the background of anger and 
resentment to the current constitutional assembly," he told Reuters. 
Once drafted, the constitution will go to Mursi for approval, and he must then 
put it to a referendum within 15 days, which could mean the vote would be held 
by mid-December. 
The assembly said that legislative powers assumed by Mursi in August would be 
handed to the Shura Council, or upper house of parliament, once the 
constitution is ratified at the weekend. 
A constitution must be in place before a new parliament can be elected, and 
until that time Mursi holds both executive and legislative powers. An election 
could take place in early 2013. 
The English version mentions ‘Al Tahrir Square’ and ‘Wael Ghunaim’, both strongly 
associated with the Egyptian revolution with all the enthusiasm, sympathy and 
admiration the revolution received internationally. Even Amr Mousa (a secular politician 
who had held a high position over a long period of time) is introduced in a positive way. 
On more than one occasion, however, it is hinted that the ‘constitutional assembly’ is 
dominated by Islamists, and therefore, it is very possible that the constitution will be 
tailored to the agenda of the Muslim Brotherhood and their Islamist allies. 
 
1.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has provided the necessary background for embarking on this research. It 





drawn on the bond between language and culture, and clarified the notion of language 
as a medium of communication, and the mutual effect between communities and 
cultures inflected by language.  It has demonstrated that the media is a vital means of 
communication especially with recent inventions that have led to a revolution in 
communication, and has shed light on the role of media in shaping people’s opinions.  
The chapter has clearly made the link between mass media and news dissemination.  
In section 1.5, it has introduced the notion of stereotyping, illustrating this with 
examples. Finally the chapter has presented a number of illustrative media texts in 
English and Arabic from news agencies and provided comparisons and discussions 









The first chapter looked into the relationship between language and culture and 
introduced the notion of stereotyping illustrated with cases involving the use of media 
examples that have a blend of stereotypical as well as ideological elements. It is now 
essential to further explain the concepts of stereotyping and ideology and their position 
in discourse. This chapter will also examine the relationship between ideology and 
translation and finally set out the theoretical background for the research tool used in 
this study by giving an overview of Critical Discourse Analysis.  
The chapter consists of nine sections (2.2-2.9) and a conclusion (2.10).  Section 2.2 is a 
brief review of the definition of ideology from different perspectives, while special focus 
is placed on the perspective of ideology within critical discourse analysis. Section 2.3 
looks into the concept of stereotyping and its position in psychology and social science. 
Section 2.4 then establishes the relationship between ideology and stereotyping and 
explains how the latter is used in practice in ideological discourses. Section 2.5 
introduces the conception of discourse from various perspectives, highlighting the 
position of discourse in social science, and from the viewpoint of proponents of critical 
theorists: a text in context. Section 2.6 builds more on the conception of discourse as a 
means which incorporates certain ideologies and how stereotypes can be used to 
consolidate the ideologies of the elite. Section 2.7 is dedicated to exploring the 
connection between translation and ideology where the views of a number of 
translation scholars are presented. Section 2.8 presents the conception of Critical 
Discourse Analysis (CDA) as complementary to previous conceptions of ideology, 
stereotyping and discourse. It is also shown how CDA is a suitable research theory for 




Many of the definitions of ideology share the notion that it is a set of attitudes, or a body 





‘ideology’ has been subject to two major turning points: one at a period of time following 
the French revolution (Napoleon 1803-1815), while the second is associated with Karl 
Marx (1818-1883).  
Antoine Destutt De Tracy, one of the Enlightenment era philosophers wrote Elements 
d’Idéologie in which he proposed a ‘new science of ideas’. De Tracy rejected ideas which 
derive from established authorities (religion, state) or biology and advocated that the 
behaviour and ideas of a human being are the product of his upbringing and the 
environmental conditions he is subject to. De Tracy also advocated democracy as a 
feasible and rational way to govern on the basis of humane and positive ideas. Napoleon 
severely criticised the enlightenment philosophers and their ‘social policy’, as he found 
them contradictory to his dictatorial inclinations (Gee, 1996, p. 1-3). 
The second turning point was Karl Marx and his economic-based social theory. Marx 
introduced a crucial point when he made the association between people’s beliefs, 
behaviour and knowledge and their economic status. Marx argued that the economic 
position of people shaped their beliefs and views. In consequence, the more powerful 
and wealthier social classes had social and political views and beliefs that reflected their 
interests (Gee, 1996, p. 4-5). Marxism adopts a very specific approach to ideology. Karl 
Marx put forward his fundamental ideas on ideology in his book The German Ideology 
two years before he published his famous Communist Manifesto, and already here he 
presents a well formulated, and revolutionary, understanding of ideology.  
Many of the definitions of ideology share the notion that it is a set of attitudes, or a body 
of concepts or a system of beliefs (Mclosky, 1964; Lane, 1962). Yet, there is some variety 
in the body of the definitions, between those which adopt a more structured definition 
of ideology and those which adopt a more flexible one. An example of the more 
structured approach is Sartori (1969), who defines ideology as: “A typically dogmatic, 
i.e., rigid and impermeable, approach to politics”. Campbell et al. (1960) agree with 
Sartori that ideology is “A particularly elaborate, close woven, and far-ranging structure 
of attitudes. By origin and usage its connotations are primarily political”. The more 
flexible definition of ideology is illustrated by Sleiger (1976), who describes ideologies 





social action, and specifically political action, irrespective of whether such action aims 
to preserve, amend, uproot or rebuild a given social order”. 
In the modern era, the concept of ideology has been used specially in relation to politics. 
Leach (2009) explains that political ideas have been powerful and some revolutionary 
slogans have transformed the world. As is clear from Leach’s discussion, the word 
‘ideology’ is often closely associated with Marxist thought and the policies of the 
working classes. Leach concludes that different ideologies expressed at any time reflect 
conflicting class interests.  
‘Ideology’ has been described as a “central term of Social Science discourse” (Gerring, 
1997). Thus, it has been classified within the realm of social science. It also has a strong 
link to political thought and sometimes to economic or more accurately economic 
reform.  
According to one fairly standard definition of ideology, it is a set of beliefs that affects 
our outlook on the world. It acts as a filter through which we see events and also people. 
Ideology is a comprehensive vision, or a set of ideas typically proposed by the dominant 
class of the society. Fairclough states: “Practices which appear to be universal and 
common sensical can often be shown to originate in the dominant class or the dominant 
bloc and to have become naturalized” (Fairclough, 2001, p. 27). In this sense, ideology 
is not merely feelings or a psychological state, but it is the perspective of the dominant 
class being cascaded to the rest of the society. 
As noted, ideology is frequently described as the mindset of the more powerful class or 
group of the society imposed on others. The imposture is however, is of the powerful 
class and not randomly done, and there is an organised lobbying of power and exercise 
of control over important sectors in public life. Ideology in the following pages will be 
used in this sense. 
Within this research, the term ‘ideology’ will be used as the political set of attitudes that 
manage social and political interests including the media. It works to serve particular 
interests by setting agendas and managing people’s opinions to serve the ultimate goal 







A considerable amount of research and analysis has been dedicated to the notion of 
ideology and its relevance and applications in politics, economics and social science. 
Fewer studies have been conducted on stereotyping and its relevance to other domains. 
Some studies have, however, touched on the relationship between stereotyping and 
social science and psychology/social psychology. Gordon Willard Allport (1897-1967), 
who was an American psychologist, put forward the early theories of stereotype content. 
Katz and Braly conducted a piece of research about the attitudes of 100 students at 
Princeton University in 1933 (Katz and Braly 1933, p. 28; pp. 280-290). The study was 
based on asking the students to list traits of 10 prominent social groups at the time. The 
study came to the conclusion that stereotypes were “[...] not based upon animosity 
toward a member of a prescribed group” because of individual characteristics, but 
rather because of attitudes (or ‘stereotypes’) against ‘race names’ (p. 280). Although the 
study deals with attitudes towards people grouped according to their nationality or 
religion, it is classified under the area of psychology and no obvious link to social or 
political issues is made.  
Stereotyping was described by Lippmann (1922) as “knowledge structures that serve as 
mental pictures of the groups in question” (Stagnor, 2010). Allport (1954) said that 
stereotypes have characteristics such as inaccuracy, negativity and overgeneralisation. 
More recently, a tendency to simplify the concept of stereotyping has led to overlooking 
these concepts and concentrating more on the particular traits of individual groups: “I’d 
say that we generally agree that stereotypes represent the traits that we view as 
characteristics of social groups, or of individual members of those groups, and 
particularly those that differentiate groups from each other. In short, they are the traits 
that come to mind quickly when we think about the groups” (Stangor, 2010, p. 2). 
“Edmund Ghareeb, a Middle East specialist, notes that stereotypes provide a method of 
‘shorthand’ for identifying groups” (Saloom, 2006, p. 24). Although stereotypes can be 
positive, as explained above they tend to be negative and related to prejudice: “The 





exist, prejudice will follow. This approach suggests that stereotypes are automatically 
(or heuristically) applied to members of the stereotyped group” (Divine, 1989, p. 5). 
However, the first decade of the 21 century witnessed a rapid development of  research 
on the notion of imagology and its relationship to translation studies. By ‘imagology’ is 
meant representations of cultural, historical and political dispositions including other 
representations (Flynn, Leersen and Van Doorslaer, 2015). The three researchers 
introduce the term ‘ethnotype’, which means assigning specific characteristics to some 
nations, linking the formulation of ethnotypes to literary-narrative genres. They argue 
that ethnotypes are “[…] invoked without conscious awareness of their source and 
provenance […]” (Flynn, Leersen and Van Doorslaer, 2015, p. 3).  
While the authors explain that the roots of imagology lie in literary studies which have 
had a lasting influence on constructing ethnotypes, van Doorslaer (2010) stresses that it 
has been proven that  media discourse can also have a considerable impact on the 
spread of images through translation selection.  
The authors explore the impact of globalization on national and cultural images in 
relation to translation, concluding that “Much work still needs to be done on the impact 
of globalization on translation, and more particularly on the translation of various types 
of image. In a more general or global sense, has the instantaneous availability of 
information brought about selection processes that reinforce cultural stereotyping (in 
translation) rather than dispelling it?” (Flynn, Leersen, Doorslaer, 2015, p.  7). The 
authors emphasise that the main focus of imagology has been on tracing ethnotypes 
and tropes particularly in ‘literary represetations’. However, “how such manifestations 
are mediated by translation and its agents in various linguistic  and cultural spaces – not 
only in literary discourses – has yet remained largely unexplored” (Flynn, Leersen and 
Doorslaer, 2015, p. 8).  
According to Valdeon (2015), translation scholars have recently begun investigating the 
connections between “language, translation and the construction of national image”. 
For the purpose of exploring language as a base of social interaction, the concept of 
framing has been used. ‘Framing’ has multidisciplinary utilities; in linguistics, sociology 





frame is a central organising idea for news content that supplies a context and suggests 
what the issue is through the use of selection, emphasis, exclusion, and elaboration” 
(Tankard, Hendrickson, Silberman, Bliss, and Ghanem, 2010; cited in Valdeon, 2015, p. 
221). Other communication studies scholars have stressed that pre-existing knowledge 
of current events affects the way news is re-produced. Valdeon discusses the shared 
roles of writers and readers in interpreting or reacting to the news, which leads to 
another conclusion that frames are not necessarily static: “[…] the promotion of national 
images in news texts depends on the frames that writers and readers might share (or 
not), on the ideological position of the medium and the writer, and on the multimodal 
text understood as a combination of verbal and non-verbal signs. These factors allow for 
certain elements to be activated and forgrounded given the appropriate circumstances 
(Leerssen, 2000) but they also account for the flexibility characteristic of change 
(Valdeon, 2015, p. 221). 
If stereotyping is mainly about prejudiced groups’ characteristics and the immediate 
mental picture that comes to our mind when dealing with or discussing ethnic or 
religious groups, then it will affect the relationships between social groups, classes, and 
also civilizations: “Stereotypes homogenize people which results in biased depictions” 
(Saloom, 2006, p. 24). 
But how is stereotyping different from ideology and is there any overlap between the 
two? 
2.4 Stereotyping and Ideology 
Stereotypes among different social groups unconsciously produce more fortunate 
segments of a given society or a more fortunate society/culture in relation to two or 
more distinct societies. Stereotypes can also consciously be used to promote certain 
ideologies.  Stereotypical images and approaches are hence frequently encountered in 
social media but in a more organised way in international media. “[...] [I]deologies are 
typically, though not exclusively, expressed and reproduced in discourse and 
communication, including non-verbal semiotic messages, such as pictures, photographs 
and movies. Obviously, ideologies are enacted in other forms of action and interaction, 





(Van Dijk, 1995, p. 17). When the stereotypical perspective is professionally employed 
to serve specific interests on a large scale, those stereotypes have practically entered a 
new phase which is more like ideology.  
Ideological influence is harmonised and complemented between politics, economy, 
media and even art. “Power relations are not reducible to class relations” (Fairclough, 
2001, p. 28). He also confirms: “[...] the power to project one’s practices as universal and 
‘common sense’ is a significant complement to economic and political power, and of 
particular significance here because it is exercised in discourse” (Fairclough, 2001, p. 27). 
Stereotyping is more relevant to describing groups of people and on many occasions 
ascribing negative connotations to these groups. Such connotations can be used to serve 
the interests of the dominant class of the society and hence stereotyping links to 
ideology. One of the phenomena which demonstrates this proposition is the state of 
public alarm caused by ‘Moral Panic’, “defined as a condition or situation in which public 
fears and state interventions greatly exceed the objective threat posed to society by a 
particular group that is claimed to be responsible for the condition” (Cohen, 1972; 
McCorkle & Miethe, 1998, cited in Bonn, 2010. p. 5). The concept of moral panic 
confirms that stereotypes of some group are being used/engineered by the social elite 
through mass media and law enforcers in order to turn this group into ‘folk devils’. “It 
has been argued that moral panics arise when distorted mass media campaigns are used 
to create fear, reinforce stereotypes, and exacerbate pre-existing divisions in the world, 
often based on race, ethnicity and class (Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 1994, cited in Bonn, 2010. 
p. 6). Another example is the pervasive negative stereotypes of Arabs in Hollywood films. 
Jack Shaheen (2001) explains that “Obviously, filmmakers did not create the stereotype 
but inherited and embellished Europe’s pre-existing Arab caricatures” (Shaheen, 2001, 
p. 7).  
 
2.5 Discourse 
The term ‘discourse’ has been defined in many different ways. While some writers 
define it as more abstract and general (the linguistic approach), others include social and 





A basic definition of ‘discourse’ from a linguistic perspective can be found in A Dictionary 
of Linguistics and Phonetics (Crystal, 2008), where it is defined as: “[…] a continuous 
stretch of (especially spoken) language larger than a sentence – but, within this broad 
notion, several different applications may be found. [...] Several linguists have 
attempted to discover linguistic regularities in discourses (discourse analysis or DA), 
using grammatical, phonological and semantic criteria (e.g. cohesion, anaphora, inter-
sentence connectivity)”. Discourse has also been examined in relation to applied 
linguistics where the lexico-grammatical forms claim their meanings from particular 
contexts, thus seeking to match form and function. 
There is another trend which categorises discourse within the perspective of social 
sciences and sees discourse as a form of social practice. This highlights the use of 
meaning and making new meanings in particular historical, social, and political 
conditions. “At this level, the term ‘discourse’ is employed to explain the conditions of 
language use within the social relations that structure them” (Koteyko, 2006, pp.132 -
157). 
In relation to the definition of discourse as a form of social practice, Foucault’s study on 
discourse is one of the elemental studies that should be taken into consideration. 
Foucault thinks that the main unit of discourse is the statement and not the text and 
when a number of statements are formed together, they make discourse. “Whenever 
one can describe, between a number of statements, such a system of dispersion, 
whenever, between objects, types of statements, concepts, or thematic choices, one 
can define a regularity, we will say for the sake of convenience, that we are dealing with 
discursive formation” (Foucault, 1989, p.38).  
Another influential figure in the development of notions of discourse analysis is the 
German philosopher and sociologist Jürgen Habermas. Habermas thinks that the 
primary threat to human beings is the encroachment of the market system bureaucratic 
authorities into human  day-to-day social relationships – what he calls the ‘lifeworld’ – 
resulting in the erosion of their characteristic human qualities. This unfavourable impact 
is also manifested in the destruction of specifically human communication structures as 





rationalization results in a society that has greater control of the environment and where 
citizens enjoy material abundance. On the other hand, the lifeworld rationalization 
brings forth the enrichment of life as truth, goodness and beauty flourish. Unfortunately, 
the lifeworld’s rationalization does not currently flourish because of the system’s 
domination. As a result, people are able to enjoy the fruits of the system rationalization 
as in the rise of their standard of living, but their lives are not enriched (given the 
persistent threat of war, nuclear annihilation, urban blight, pollution, alienation and the 
like). 
It is in this context that Habermas proposes his theory of communicative action. This 
theory urges both critical thought and practical action. Habermas seeks to rediscover 
ways in which individuals can live together in harmony and mutual dependence, but 
providing adequate space for individual autonomy and taking advantage of 
technological advancement. He insists on the active involvement of the actors in the 
interaction which is governed by binding consensual norms, which in turn, are defined 
by their mutual expectations. One assumption is that people should be able to express 
their intentions to one another in the most truthful and sincere manner. Such 
communication demands open and uninterrupted argumentation. 
Habermas’s view of discourse states that discourse should accommodate for the 
marginalised sections of the society to express themselves; in this respect he is in line 
with proponents of diversity. Baumeister (2003) deals with Habermas’ concept of 
‘Discourse and Cultural Diversity: “[…] his vision of discourse ethics can be reconciled 
with the struggle for recognition on the part of many groups historically marginalised in 
liberal democracies and that, properly understood, a liberal theory of rights is not blind 
to cultural difference. […] his approach is sensitive to many of the concerns expressed 
by those proponents of diversity whose demands for recognition are rooted in liberal 
values and a desire to enable citizens to participate in the public realm on equal terms” 
(Baumeister, 2003, p. 740). This sense of discourse is rooted in Critical Theory (The 
Frankfurt School), which was influenced by Marxian theory. However the Frankfurt 
School theorists “sought to extend and update the Marxian tradition by examining the 





societies” (Bonn, 2010, p. 19).  Frankfurt School theorists including Habermas and 
Horkheimer saw that media can be used as a tool to oppress the masses.  
Within the flow of this research, I will be using the term ‘discourse’ in the CDA sense and 
the media texts I use will be analysed in their relation to the implicit meaning of the 
author or the news agency that produced them. 
 
2.6 Discourse and ideology/stereotyping 
 As explained above, discourse can be used to project certain ideologies and manage 
public opinion (Chomsky, 2002). In this context, stereotyping can be embedded in 
discourse as stereotyping in many cases is part of ideology given that “[...] ideologies 
consist of social representations that define the social identity of a group, that is, its 
shared beliefs about its fundamental conditions and ways of existence and reproduction” 
(Van Dijk, 2006, p. 116) 
Media tools can be used to promote specific political, economic and social views. In 
order for the media to embody these views or ideologies, it should have some sort of 
power. This could be political power as is common in less democratic states. On the 
other hand, media in the more democratic states still embodies ideologies and 
stereotypes of the more dominant class of the society, where this projection of specific 
beliefs becomes common sense and the right vision. “There are key discourse types 
which embody ideologies which legitimize more or less directly existing societal 
relations, and are so salient in modern society that they have colonized many 
institutional orders of discourse” (Fairclough, 2001, p. 30). 
According to a number of scholars, discourse is fundamentally linked to the power 
relations in the society. Knowing that there is a constant struggle over power between 
the various classes/segments of the society, discourse is a very important tool that has 
been effectively used on many occasions particularly in the modern era to exercise 
control and win over the perspectives of other societal groups. The news, 
advertisements, cartoons and talk shows are examples of vehicles to convey and 
persuade people of the views of the dominant class. “Discourse assumes such 





and societal power-holders is one factor in the maintenance of their power” (Fairclough, 
2001, p.31). 
Stereotypes, as mentioned above, are used in the process of consolidating certain views 
which could be spread at random among members of some social groups. Since 
ideologies are by definition more organised and mobilised than stereotypes, stereotypes 
are employed to serve some ideologies and to even make them more popular. This 
demonstrates the correlation between ideology and stereotyping, Van Dijk defines the 
role of ideologies as follows: “First of all, as explained above, they organise and ground 
the social representations shared by the members of (ideological) groups. Secondly, 
they are the ultimate basis of the discourses and other social practices of the members 
of social groups [...] Thirdly, they allow members to organise and coordinate their (joint) 
actions and interactions in view of the goals and interests of the group as a whole. Finally, 
they function as the part of the sociocognitive interface between social structures 
(conditions, etc.) of groups on the one hand, and their discourses and other social 
practices on the other hand” (Van Dijk, 2006, p. 117). 
 
2.7 Translation and ideology 
The section concentrates on translation and ideology. The general objective of most 
forms of translation is to preserve the message and particularly the main idea of the 
source text when received by an audience from a different linguistic background and 
often a different culture. When texts have the ideological element as defined in the 
previous sections (2.4, 2.5 and 2.7), translation becomes a more sensitive process, 
“Ideology shapes discourse and is shaped by it” (Fowler, 1986).  
The role of the translator is recognised in all translational work. The element of 
mediation can vary according to the type of text being handled. If the text is ideological, 
then the translator should be well informed about the ideology of the ST and maybe 
expected to reproduce this in the TT or even requested to translate according to a 
counter/different ideology. Alternatively, the translators may themselves have a 
counter/different ideology and hence the mediation could lead to an inaccurate target 
text. Basil Hatim has distinguished two perspectives in researching ideology and 





text to be translated and how best to convey this in translation; [...] 2- The ideology of 
translation with ideology becoming a cover for what is essentially in and of translation” 
(Hatim, 2001, p. 126 -127). Hatim recognises two challenges in each perspective. In the 
first one he believes there are societal constraints stemming from the social conventions 
of a given social group. The other challenge relating to the second perspective is 
translational constraints; for example how fluent the translation is (Hatim, 2001). Hatim 
also highlights the importance of the notion of mediation stating: “Mediation is a facet 
of the translator’s work which straddles the two perspectives [...]. Translator mediation 
can be ideological in itself,” (Hatim, 2001, p.127) 
According to Hatim, the translation of Ideology is associated with the cultural studies 
perspective. Cultural Studies according to Cary Nelson, Paula A. Treichler, and Lawrence 
Grossberg (1992) include: “the history of cultural studies, gender and sexuality, 
nationhood and national identity, popular culture and its audiences, science and 
technology, identity politics, pedagogy, the politics of aesthetics, cultural institutions, 
the politics of the disciplinarity, discourse and textuality, history, and global culture in a 
postmodern age”. 
Hatim states that “A number of factors surround the act of translation and influence the 
conditions under which translations are made” (Hatim, 2001, p. 129). The factors that 
Hatim lists can be summarised in the role of the critical establishment, the kind of 
interventions made by translators, the economics of the exercise and the influences 
which translations exert on or receive from the dominant ideology (Hatim, 2001). 
Hatim mentions “Expropriation”, introduced by Vladimir Maccura who “felt that to 
translate is to prove one’s national identity (expropriation), and that a language is 
capable of rendering the treasures which other languages [...] possess” (Hatim, 2001, p. 
128). Then he moves on to “Mimicking target discourse” (Hatim, 2001, P. 129). To 
explain what he means by this, Hatim gave the example of a study on the Bengali poet 
Tagore’s auto- translation: “The study outlines the pitfalls of a translation in which 
faithfulness is exclusively shown towards the target language and culture”. The poet has 
apparently changed his own work through translation to match the target audience style, 





Hatim brings to the surface reasons why some literary works get translated more than 
others. Considering the research conducted by the cultural theorist and translation 
scholar Donald Bruce. Bruce (1994) sought “to enquire into a familiar question of 
cultural politics which returns repeatedly to haunt translators and cultural historians: 
what factors determine whether a text will be translated or not?”(Hatim, 2002, p.129). 
Bruce’s case study was Jules Valles’ (1871) literary works. He concluded that issues such 
as ideological marginalisation, and delegitimization of these novels could be the factors 
behind their exclusion. Bruce also suggested that a taste for this kind of writing was yet 
cultivated (Hatim, 2001). 
Based on the above, Bruce “develops a working model for the analysis of the discourse 
of the Commune”(Hatim, 2001, p.130). The model according to Hatim (2001) is 
applicable to many texts, and stresses the interactive relationship between text and 
context in order to produce meaning. Bruce believes that “[...] translators must first 
thoroughly acquaint themselves with the cultural politics surrounding an issue. Literary 
and cultural theory are particularly beneficial in laying the foundations for conceptually 
more valid translation methodologies, a trend which, according to Bruce (1994, p. 47) 
can be enhanced by enlisting discourse analysis (Hatim, 2001, p. 131). 
In another context investigated by Maysaa Tanjour (2011), there are a number of 
reasons that decide on the amount and type of translated texts. She says, “There is a 
network of interconnected linguistic and socio-cultural norms that govern translation 
activity at all levels: economic, political, cultural and ideological norms”. Tanjour gives 
an outline of these norms but applies them to the Syrian context in relation to literary 
translation. So in addition to the commercial and financial factors in the sense how well 
the translated text is going to sell, she also adds: “Censorship is one of the cultural and 
ideological factors that govern literary works of Syrian authors as well as translated ones. 
Institutional censorship in Syria plays an important role in regarding all kinds of 
expression...” (2011, p. 93). 
In relation to the ideology of translation, Hatim considers the feminist perspective, 
feminism being a kind of ideology. Feminist translators have endeavoured to make the 





introduced. Flotow (1991), a feminist translator, used a number of interventionist 
strategies:   
1- Supplementing the source text 
2- Prefacing and footnoting 
3- Appropriation  
The above strategies are already existing ones, but originally they were used to serve 
ideologies which are not necessarily feminist (Hatim, 2001). “Massadier-Kenny (1995: 
57) puts forward a comprehensive scheme setting out major strategies which have been 
or can be adapted to advance a feminist agenda. Such a framework is useful not only for 
researching feminist translation issues, but also for describing the process of the 
translation in general” (Hatim, 2001, p. 135). This framework covers ‘author-centred’ 
and ‘translator-centred’ strategies and involve translation methods such as: 
Commentary, Recovery, Resistancy, Framing, Annotation, Parallel texts, and 
Collaboration. 
Subsequently however, Francoise Massadier-Kenny (1997) who seems to have an 
alternative view and challenges the traditional distinctions within feminist thinking on 
translation has argued, “The use of ‘feminist’ or ‘woman’ provides an unstable point of 
departure for translation practice. Active translation does not depart from 
predetermined gender definitions but must lead to an interrogation of such gender 
definitions and roles” (Hatim, 2001, p.134). 
Other Scholars have made the link between ideology, translation and the socio-cultural 
environment. Jeremy Munday (2009) states that literary translation is not only related 
to style: “[...] the functional conception of style developed in this book is also linked to 
the socio-cultural environment and ideology of which translation is a part” (Munday, 
2009, p. 43). (Bassnett, 1998: 123) supports this view when she says that: “Translation 
never takes place in a void but always in a context”. Tanjour (2011) deduces from this 
viewpoint that ideology is part and parcel of the translation process right from the very 
beginning: “In such an environment, cultural and ideological norms seem to regulate the 
translation process and product starting from the very choice of which texts to translate 





(2010) explains that translation is relevant to the prevailing ideologies “Translation 
methods are applied strategically to make target texts conform to or to challenge 
dominant world views. The very choice of texts to be translated or not to be translated, 
as the case may be, is often an ideologically motivated decision” (Schaffner, 2010, p. 
107). 
Mona Baker (2010) emphasises the clear link between translation, power and conflict. 
She notes that her research “[...] draws extensively-though not exclusively – on 
examples of political, armed conflict [...]. It also assumes that translation and 
interpreting are part of the institution of war and hence play a major role in the 
management of conflict-by all parties, from warmongers to peace activists” (Baker, 2010, 
p.1-2). Baker then goes on to explain how translation is used in the first declarations of 
war, and in the accompanying/relevant propaganda. She adds that modern warfare 
consists of more than one army and communication/coordination between these 
armies makes the need for translation/interpreting inevitable: “The very process of 
mobilizing military power then is heavily dependent on continuous acts of translation 
and interpreting; including – crucially - acts of translation and interpreting that allow 
military personnel to communicate with civilians living in the region. Propaganda leaflets 
dropped by US forces over Iraq in March 2003 communicated a variety of messages to 
Iraqi civilians and soldiers” (Baker, 2010, p. 2). 
Of course, propaganda as we must have all noticed at least in the past two decades, is 
not exclusive to war time, but a large part of it is previous to the start of military 
operations themselves. People both locally and internationally need to be prepared to 
accept such costly action that involves pain and brutality on all sides. “Contemporary 
wars have to be sold to an international and not just domestic audiences, and translation 
is a major variable influencing the circulation and legitimation of the narratives that 
sustain these activities” (Baker, 2010, p.2). When the parties engaged in the conflict 
have decided to find channels of communication to manage the conflict or agree on a 
solution that will put an end to the war, translation again plays a vital role. “[…] once 
war is underway, attempts to broker and manage an end to the conflict typically take 





negotiations. All these require the mediation of translators and interpreters” (Baker, 
2010, p. 2). 
When discussing the mediating role of translation and interpreting, Mona Baker 
proposes the relationship between this role and the concept of narrative. She recognizes 
a similarity between this concept and that of ‘discourse’ previously introduced by 
Foucault. She starts by explaining: “The notion of narrative used in this book overlaps to 
some extent with Foucault’s and Barthes ‘myths’, especially in its emphasis on the 
normalizing effect of publicly disseminated representations” (Baker, 2010, p. 3). 
Narratives are generally defined as any account of connected events, presented to a 
reader or listener in a sequence of written or spoken words, or in a sequence of (moving) 
pictures. Narrative is defined by Mona Baker in a different context as:  
 
 “ A story that unfolds in time with a (perceived) beginning and a (projected) end; 
 Populated by participants, real or imaginary, in a configured relationship to each 
other and to the unfolding story; 
 Realised through a variety of media; 
 And across texts and media: local narratives are episodes of larger narratives” 
(Baker, ND. p.1). 
Narratives have been approached and defined in a number of ways. Fisher (1987) states: 
“Narration is the context for interpreting and assessing all communication-not a mode 
of discourse laid on by a creator’s deliberate choice but the shape of knowledge as we 
first apprehend it” (Fisher, 1987, p.193). 
Baker however, approaches the concept of narrative from a social and communication 
theory perspective rather from a linguistic or a literary one. She also does not categorize 
the ‘narrative’ as a genre (Baker, 2010). Baker then sheds light on scientific narratives 
demonstrating that “scientific stories and reports are narratives in the sense that they 
are ultimately ‘stories’ that have a beginning, middle and end. [...] It is narrativity that 
turns the continuous flow of experience into a set of delineated categories that can be 





Baker refers to Zureik (2001) who discussed the use of census counting in colonial and 
post-colonial societies. She explains: “Needless to say, every set of statistical figures 
participates in elaborating different and often competing narratives. In the context of 
the Middle East, for example, both Palestinians and Israelis appeal to a different set of 
statistical /census data ‘to garner legitimacy for their respective claims’ (2001:215)” 
(Baker, 2010, p.10). 
Baker concludes that narrative in general including scientific narratives: “[...] systemizes 
experience by ordering events in relation to each other” (Baker , 2010, p.2010). 
Narratives even allow us “not only to relate events, but also stances and dispositions 
towards those events” (Baquedano-Lopez, 2001, cited in Baker, 2010 p. 10). Finally, she 
stresses the sensitivity of scientific narratives as they can be employed in a direct 
political sense due to the fact that: “[...] scientific narratives – like all narratives –are 
ultimately concerned with legitimizing and justifying actions and positions in the real 
world [...]” (Baker,2010, p.11). 
Baker then discusses the ‘normalizing function of narratives’. She explains that 
narratives have an effect on the audience making people receive stories/messages as 
the realities and unquestionable facts of the world. This normalising effect brings to the 
mind the relationship between power and discourse previously discussed in this chapter, 
and how discourse is used to manage public opinion and disseminate certain 
opinions/stereotypes to make some ideologies prevail. Baker states: “One of the effects 
of narrativity is that it normalizes the accounts it projects over a period of time, so that 
they come to be perceived as self-evident, benign, uncontestable and non-controversial” 
(Baker, 2010, p.11). Baker goes on to illustrate the relation between narratives and some 
clichés about “‘security and terrorism’, Islamic fundamentalism’, and the so called ‘clash 
of civilisations’” (Baker, 2010, p.11-12). 
There are thus substantive similarities between the notion of narrative and that of 
discourse, especially when Baker states that narratives “embody the truths of social 
elites and their publics” (Baker, 2010, p. 13). As mentioned in section 2.5 discourse is 
defined and used in this thesis from the perspective of social relations of power, and the 






2.8 Critical discourse analysis 
Foucault’s view (section 2.5) to some extent contrasts to the views of the proponents of 
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), who associate the text with the underlying intentions 
of the author. They further make the link between discourse and ideology, and relate 
discourse analysis to social situations and relations within society itself. According to a 
number of scholars (Fairclough, Van Dijk, Wodak), discourse is fundamentally linked to 
the power relations in the society. It is a very important tool that has been effectively 
used on many occasions particularly in the modern era to exercise control and win over 
the perspectives of other societal groups. News, advertisements, films, cartoons and talk 
shows are examples of vehicles to convey and persuade people of the views of the 
dominant class. 
Van Dijk (2003) defines CDA as follows: “Critical discourse analysis (CDA) is a type of 
discourse analytical research that primarily studies the way social power abuse, 
dominance, and inequality are enacted, reproduced, and resisted by text and talk in the 
social and political context. With such dissident research, critical discourse analysts take 
explicit position, and thus want to understand, expose, and ultimately resist social 
inequality “(Van Dijk, 2003, p.352). 
Issues of stereotyping and the translation of stereotypes can also be fruitfully 
investigated using Critical Language and CDA, which of both consider the context of the 
language used to be crucial (Wodak, 2000; Benke 2000) and are concerned with 
analysing “[…] structural relationships of dominance, discrimination, power and control 
as manifested in language” (Wodak and Meyer, 2001, p. 2). CDA hence gives importance 
to the social structures and to some extent the political setting within which a text is 
produced. Therefore the concepts of power, history and ideology are intrinsic in the 
process of CDA studies. 
Because CDA  is mainly concerned with the underlying intentions of texts and seeks to 
unveil the hidden power relationships, it is very well suited to media and political texts 
where the relations of power “connections between language use in a society and 





and even “legitimated by ideologies of powerful groups” (Wodak and Meyer, 2001,p. 3). 
Examining the context of the discourse in question means that we are looking at social, 
psychological, historical and ideological factors. As has been discussed before, 
stereotyping has social and psychological relevance and can also be employed to 
reinforce some ideological thoughts when required.  
However CDA opponents have reservations which concern the probability of subjectivity 
of CDA as an analytical approach. Their reservations mainly involve the positioning of 
CDA analysts when referring to words, phrases or collocations as ideological. 
Widdowson (1998) has reviewed three CDA works which lay the corner-stones of critical 
discourse analysis: Texts and Practices Reasings in Critical Discourse Analysis by C.R. 
Caldas-Coulthard and M. Coulthard (eds), Critical Discourse Analysis by N. Fairclough and 
Language as Ideology by R. Hodge and G. Kress. Widdowson explains that Kress presents 
two concepts: presentation and transformation. While presentation is a Hallidayan term 
that refers to ‘semiotic abstraction’, Kress argues that different communities have 
different ‘representational resources’. Transformation is on the other hand “[…] the 
process whereby one representation impinges on another and modifies it” (Widdowson, 
1998, p. 138). Although this postulated theory of language is one of semiotic change as 
Widdowson concludes, it does not provide an explanation to how this change is brought 
about: “Thus we are shown different configurations of verbal and visual features in 
certain newspapers and told that these necessarily represent particular subjectivities, 
particular ways of conceiving the world, and that these necessarily bring about a 
transformation of how the world is conceived by the reader” (Widdowson, 1998, p. 138).  
Widdowson then adds that the proposed representational subjectivity is not that 
frequently immediately recognisable. Many times this subjectivity requires ‘careful 
structural analysis’, which is in Widdowson’s view a type of transformation that works 
to unveil intentions and meanings subtly embedded in the text. In Hodge and Kress’ 
conception, some sentences will carry representational subjectivity but others will not, 
and so some sentences will be transformed but others will not. Widdowson finds this 
problematic as it is not feasible to identify neutral sentences, and should neutral 
sentences be identified, it means that it is possible to have language free of 





language: “There are two difficulties here. […] In the absence of any theoretical 
substantiation of this new concept of transformation as converting one kind of sentence 
into another, there is no way of identifying a neutral sentence as distinct from a 
transformed one. […] It seems a matter of descriptive convenience. Secondly, even if we 
were able to identify the neutral sentences, their very existence means that it is in 
principle, by a judicious avoidance of transformation, to produce language which is 
entirely free of representational subjectivity. But this contradicts the critical linguistic 
tenet that there is no neutral language: all of it is loaded, ‘ideologically saturated as Kress 
puts it (Kress, 1992 174)” (Widdowson, 1998, p. 140). Widdowson even concludes that 
transformations exercise power themselves, and so they may suppress or distort 
information particularly when they rely on a realist approach.  
Widdowson also criticises what he sees as contradictions among critical analysts 
themselves about relating practices of production and consumption to texts. While 
Kress and his colleagues enphasise this point, Fairclpough admits that it has not been 
adequately operationalized (Ibid, p. 143). Then he explains that this inadequacy is very 
serious because it detaches the textual from the contextual analyses and consequently 
‘invalidates the critical operation’. Ultimately, Widdowson blames critical analysts for 
the fact that, although they mean to disclose and expose how language can be exploited, 
they do this from their own ideological positioning, which means they are being selective: 
“Fairclough, in common with his critical colleagues, sets out to expose how language is 
exploited in the covert insinuation of ideological influence. But they do this in careful 
selection and partial interpretation of whatever linguistic features suit their own 
ideological position and disregarding the rest” (Widdowson, 1998, p. 146).            
I have addressed the above concerns by using a well-framed methodology which has 
built on a number of theories and approaches including the pragmatic approach, which 
involves contextual setting and information in the overall analysis. I have also allowed 
room for variation in ideologies and stereotypes, minimising the possibility of bias in 
terms of ideology or positioning. It should be noted as well that Widdowson’s criticism 
was written in 1998. Since then critical analysts have further developed the theory of 
CDA addressing initial deficiencies. However,  a minimal degree of subjectivity is 





The CDA approach employs concepts such as intertextuality and interdiscursivity; CDA 
makes use of the textual aspect of the text to derive results. Many CDA scholars have 
contributed to the linguistic analysis of discourse. A prominent name is M.A.K. Halliday 
who developed Systemic Functional Linguistics based on social semiotics, hence 
promoting the social-cultural meaning of the sign and building on Saussure’s 
structuralist approach. 
The various methods of CDA aim at rendering their theoretical claims into analytical 
tools.  Figures like Siegfried Jager, Norman Fairclough and Ruth Wodak have viewed CDA 
from the perspective of Society and Power. Basing himself on socio-cognitive theory, 
Van Dijk defines discourse as a “communicative event”. He understands linguistics in a 
broad structural-functional sense and argues that “CDA should be based on a sound 
theory of context” (Wodak and Meyer, 2001, p. 21).  
 
2.9 CDA approaches 
In the previous sections, an account of the notion of discourse was given, explaining in 
what sense it is related to CDA, and hence accommodating the ideological dimension in 
examining discourse.  
Many scholars have approached CDA from various angles. Two major but also general 
categories can be identified: contextual and textual analysis of the text.  Contextual 
analysis refers to the analysis of the relationship between the text and its surrounding 
circumstances, while textual analysis is concerned with the formal linguistics of the text. 
Some linguistic theories have made the link between the text itself and other influential 
factors be they cultural, ideological or personal. A major theory that researchers have 
frequently built on when looking at discoursal issues is Michael Halliday’s Systemic 
Functional Linguistics. Halliday considers language as a communication system and 
focuses on what language is used for. He identifies three major metafunctions of 
language/grammar (Halliday 1994; Halliday & Matthiessen 2004) namely, the ideational, 
interpersonal, and textual metafunctions. The ideational metafunction is concerned 
with describing or presenting realities, including how society functions, and how people 
work together. It could also describe how we feel or what we regard as true or false. In 





metafunction is concerned with relationships and types of affiliation in those 
relationships (authority, friendliness, hostility etc.). The textual metafunction describes 
the relations between linguistic units: how linguistic elements fit together to form an 
integrated text.  All the three metafunctions are reflected in a system network, which 
specifies all the meaning potentials; or the centrality of “[...] the ideas of system and 
choice” (Hoigilt, 2011, p.14). Systemicists in general view language as a tool for making 
meaning. Halliday believes that the choices that we make affect the meaning of our 
message. “A system network is a theory of language as a choice. It represents a language 
or any part of a language, as a resource for making meaning by choosing. Each choice 
point in the network specifies (1) an environment, consisting of choices already made, 
and (2) a set of possibilities of which one is (to be) chosen; (1) and (2) taken together 
constitute a ‘system’ in this technical sense” (Halliday, 1985, p. Xxvii). 
Systemic Functional Linguistics has many applications, but no matter what application is 
at hand, the common focus of all of them when dealing with texts is “their relation to 
the cultural and social context in which they are negotiated ”(Eggins, 1994, p. 1). This 
focus has made Systemic Functional Linguistics a point of departure for many linguists 
investigating discourse analysis.  
Systemic Functional Linguists pose questions such as: how do people use language? and 
how is language structured for use? Then another set of questions is proposed like: how 
do people make the distinction between types of meaning? and how are texts structured 
and organised to make meaning? Thus the perspective from which systemic linguistics 
sees language is a semantic one.  (Eggins, 1994). Since Systemic Functional Linguistics 
views language as a system of choices where a chosen word acquires its meaning from 
being in contrast with another possible choice of a word, this allows a semiotic 
interpretation of this system of choices. “This semiotic interpretation of the system of 
language allows us to consider the appropriacy or inappropriacy of different linguistic 
choices in relation to their contexts of use, and to view language as a resource which we 






2.9.1 The Semiotic Approach 
The main relationship between semiotics and language is that language is considered a 
semiotic system, i.e. language is considered as a system of signs.  A simple simile is that 
of traffic lights where each of the signs has a meaning and entails a specific action. In 
linguistic terms meaning = content encoded as expression = realisation.  
The father of semiotics is the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure who envisaged a 
model of the sign that formed the base for further studies in this domain. He used the 
terms signifié (signified) = content and signifiant (signifier) = expression (Saussure, 1959 
– 1966). The signifier and the signified are linked through encoding or realisation.  
According to (Eggins, 1994) the traffic lights example illustrates that “semiotic systems 
are established by social convention” (Eggins, 1994, p. 15), and she builds this 
assumption on Saussure’s argument that the fusion between the two sides of the sign is 
arbitrary. In other words, another colour could have been chosen other than red to 
mean ‘stop’, but it is social consensus that granted this expression its meaning or 
content. 
This notion can then be applied in a more detailed way when we make choices of words 
that reflect the ideational/experiential function or the interpersonal function and lastly 
the textual one:  
The intensity of the civil war in Syria, combined with the continued upheavals 
in Iraq and the endemic instability of Lebanese politics, has naturally led to 
speculation that the famously “artificial” borders in the eastern Arab world, 
drawn by Britain and France in the aftermath of the collapse of the Ottoman 
Empire, are on their last legs.  
In the above example, the word ‘artificial’ was chosen to describe the type of borders 
separating Arab countries when we had other choices (‘unnatural’, ‘contrived’). 
‘Artificial’ is representing and describing facts. In another example the choice of the 





Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu blasted Palestinian President 
Mahmoud's Abbas on Sunday after Abbas released a special message 
condemning the Holocaust as one of the most "heinous" crimes against 
humanity in modern history 
The word ‘blasted’ here indicated the upper hand and an attitude of superiority on the 
Israeli side towards the Palestinian Authority. Another word which does not convey this 
attitude could have been chosen, e.g. ‘criticised’. 
The two examples above draw attention to the lexical choices we make in language and 
how they are part of a semiotic system where “[...] words encode meaningful 
oppositions, and that the process of choosing a lexical item is a semiotic process” (Eggins, 
1994, p. 18). 
 
2.9.2 Rhetorics 
Jacob Hoigilt (2011) has used Systemic Functional Linguistics, and particularly the 
interpersonal and ideational metafunctions, to explain what he calls ‘Islamic Rhetoric’. 
He found that “Functional Grammar [i.e. Systemic Functional Linguistics] offers a way of 
conceptualizing the relations between the lexico-grammatical choices we make and the 
meanings we thus produce” (Hoigilt, 2011, p.15). He explains that how each author 
construes himself under the interpersonal domain and draws on the Aristotalian 
categories of ethos, pathos and logos in realising the rhetorical potential of texts.  
First Hoigilt builds on Ken Hyland’s notion of ‘metadiscourse’, which is, as he further 
explains: “[...] a cover term for all the linguistic choices that serve some purpose in the 
relation between writer and reader in texts” (Hyland, 2005; cited in Hoigilt, 2011, p.19). 
Hoigilt works on the interpersonal aspect, identifying two main categories: personal 
reference or pronoun, and mood choice. Pronoun use helps in working out relations of 
respect and distance and also the how a writer can emphasise his own person in the text, 
and finally as a means to make the text interactional. Mood (part of Halliday’s schema 
of speech functions: offer, command, statement and question) helps in working out the 





of mood, and more specifically those of giving and demanding, stating and asking. These 
choices according to Hoigilt are a “natural part of any text; they often contribute to 
placing it in a certain genre, such as political speech or scientific text book” (Hoigilt, 2011, 
p.22). Hoigilt further explains that expository texts tend to feature more declarative 
clauses while “Horatory discourse” is likely to feature more imperative language. Then, 
Hoigilt looks at modality in interpersonal analysis, illustrating this in the degrees of 
commitment to “the truth value of commitment or to the imperative force of command” 
(Hoigilt, 2011, p.22). He also underlines the choices of where the important information 
is placed in the clause and the “rhetorical implication” this placement has. 
The ideational aspect which “[...] represents experience through the system of 
transitivity” (Hoigilt, 2011, p. 23)  includes a number of processes: material process, 
relational process and attributive process. Halliday states: “The clause is also a mode of 
reflection, of imposing order on the endless variation and flow of events […]. The 
transitivity system construes the world of experience into manageable sets of process 
types” (Halliday, 2004, p.170). Hoigilt uses this framework to clarify the ideological 
relation of Islamic discourse to the choices of actors and participants. 
From a different theoretical approach, Hoigilt’s account can be looked at in terms of the 
contextual dimension of texts analysis. This contextual dimension is related, as Van Dijk 
(1998) describes it, to the socio-cognitive component and concerned with the 
subjectivity of experiences, evaluative beliefs, knowledge, attitudes, truth criteria, 
common sense, the cognitive construction of groups, the group’s identity and the 
legitimation of power by social and ideological institutions.  
The textual dimension is more concerned with the linguistic aspect of the text. As Samia 
Bazzi (2009, p. 75) states, “[...] the analyst employs pragmatic, stylistic and rhetorical 
studies. Hence, textual descriptions should focus upon lexical selection, in what way 
style can be derogatory, syntactic structures (e.g. agency and passivization), conditional 
relations between clauses relecting cause and effect, presuppositions, selective or 







The chapter has provided the theoretical framework for the analytical tool to be used in 
this research study. It has given an overview of key concepts: ideology, stereotyping and 
discourse, and established the relationship between these concepts to legitimise the use 
of media examples that have a blend of stereotypical as well as ideological elements. 
Moreover, it has demonstrated the connection between translation and 
ideology/stereotyping and justified the rationale for choosing Critical Discourse Analysis 









The previous chapter has discussed the conceptions of ideology, stereotyping and 
discourse. It has also elucidated the link between these various conceptions and then 
the relationship between ideology and translation was discussed. The chapter finally 
gave an overview of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). It is now appropriate to embark 
on explaining the particular approach to be used in this research as the tool for data 
analysis.  
The chapter consists of four sections (3.2-3.4) and a conclusion (3.5).  Section 3.2 
provides an overview of the Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA) in addition to a review 
of four critical discourse analytical approaches which influenced the formation of DHA. 
The section later investigates the postulated strategy of analysis and provides a 
thorough explanation of the five strategies of analysis in three sub-sections. Section 3.3 
then presents the notions of text and genre in order to explicate how these notions are 
utilized in DHA and how they support the analytical levels of the Discourse- Historical 
Approach. Section 3.4 wraps up the categories of analysis which will be applied in 
chapter 5 in a structured manner.  
 
3.2 Discourse-Historical Approach, an overview: 
This research looks into current socio-political issues; hence it is appropriate to use 
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) because CDA is an analytical tool designed for social 
research and relates text and discourse to social processes, conventions and social 
change to provide a deeper and more comprehensive analysis of texts. Within the 
general perspective of CDA, a number of more specific approaches have been developed. 
In the following, I will introduce the Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA) which will later 
be used as the analysis tool for the thesis data.  
Ruth Wodak and other CDA scholars, such as Martin Reisigl and Michael Meyer, have 
proposed the Discourse-Historical Approach, implementing it in a number of studies. 
They used this approach particularly to trace anti-Semitic words, phrases, sentences or 





The Discourse Historical Approach is committed to critical discourse analysis and 
adheres to critical theory. However, it “[…] considers discourse analysis not just to be a 
method of language analysis, but a multidimensional project incorporating theory, 
methods, methodology and empirically based research practices that yield concrete 
social applications” (Reisigl, 2018, p. 48).  
The approach also adopts the principle of ‘triangulation’, which as explained by Wodak 
(2001) means: “[…] to work with different approaches, multimethodically and on the 
basis of a variety of empirical data as well as background information” (Wodak, 2001, p. 
65). Hence, the discourse-historical approach relies heavily on integrating a significant 
amount of knowledge about the historical, political and social background of the 
discursive practice (utterance) in question.  
Before they started introducing the approach itself, they reviewed four discourse 
analytical approaches to racism. They began with Uta Quasthoff, who made an analysis 
of social prejudices though her analysis did not exceed the sentence level. In her work, 
Quasthoff defines the term ‘stereotype’ (cf. also the discussion in section 2.3) as “the 
verbal expression of a certain conviction or belief directed towards a social group or an 
individual as a member of the social group”. Quasthoff elaborates on the meaning of 
stereotype: “The stereotype is typically an element of common knowledge, shared to a 
high degree in a particular culture” (Quasthoff, 1987, p. 786). She had previously 
explained that the stereotype “[...] takes the logical form of a judgement that attributes 
or denies in an oversimplified and generalising manner, and with an emotionally slanted 
tendency, particular qualities or behavioural patterns to a certain class of persons” 
(Quasthoff, 1973, cited in Reisigl and Wodak, 2001, p. 19).  
Quasthoff groups stereotypical expressions in four categories according to directness.  
1- Analytical expressions: These are the basic form of all stereotypes and claim to 
tell the truth.  
2- Modified statements: This is where the stereotypical expression uses certain 





3- Directly expressed stereotypes: These are utterances where the speaker refers 
to himself/herself by means of personal reference (‘I’) and a verb of believing or 
thinking. 
4- Text linguistics: Here the stereotype is expressed implicitly and the 
interpretation of the stereotype “[…] relies on knowledge of context and 
transcends the sentence level” (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001, p. 21). 
The second analytical approach is the socio-cognitive discourse analytical approach 
developed by Van Dijk. According to Van Dijk,  
prejudice is not merely a characteristic of individual beliefs or emotions 
about social groups, but a shared form of social representation in group 
members, acquired during processes of socialisation transformed and 
enacted in social communication and interaction. Such ethnic attitudes 
have social functions, e.g. to protect the interests of the ingroup. Their 
cognitive structures and the strategies of their use reflect these social 
functions (Van Dijk, 1984, p. 13).  
Van Dijk’s model links the generation of prejudice to discursive units larger than the 
sentence. He focuses on the rationalisation of discriminatory attitudes towards 
minorities. Van Dijk uses a multidisciplinary approach which values the study of 
cognition in the critical analysis of discourse, interaction and communication. He 
differentiates between three types of memories:  
1- Semantic memory. Here the collective shared beliefs of a society are stored and are 
consequently organised as attitudes (group schemata).  
2- Episodic memory. This retains personal or narrated experiences and events as well as 
patterns abstracted from these experiences.  
3- The control system. “In 1998 Van Dijk conceptualises the third structure of long-term 
memory, the control system. This memory is responsible for linking “communicative 
aims and interests (e.g persuasion) with the situational and individual social conditions” 





A third approach is that of Discourse Strands and collective symbols. The main figures in 
this approach are Siegfried and Margret Jager and the Duisburg group. The Duisburg 
group follows and extends the research of Van Dijk. Their research technique includes 
interviewing different groups of people to elicit their attitudes towards ‘foreigners’ and 
‘Jews’. Their methods lead people to tell their stories in depth. The group studied 
everyday racism and conducted media analysis of a number of German newspapers.  
Margret and Siegfred Jager adopt the same theoretical and methodological framework. 
However, a major interest of Margret Jager, which is not found in the other writers, is 
the relationship between culturalist racism or ethnicism and the discourse about gender 
inequality. She conducted interviews about sexism and the attitudes of male/female 
foreigners towards the host society and towards each other. 
The major part of the studies conducted by the Duisburg group was about ‘Collective 
Symbols’, which are “designated as ‘cultural stereotypes in the form of metaphorical 
and cultural synecdochic symbols that are immediately understood by the members of 
the same speech community” (Link 1982, 1988, 1990 and 1992 cited in Reisigl and 
Wodak, 2001, p. 26). For example in Germany, images of natural disasters like ships 
sinking or avalanches represent immigration as a cause of social and national problems. 
Moreover, the headscarf also serves a collective symbol that is interpreted in a number 
of ways; “[...] the reading as a symbol of sexist suppression of Islamic women, as a 
symbol of the acceptance of this male suppression by the suppressed, and, in general, 
as a symbol of the cultural and religious difference of Moslems” (Reisigl and Wodak, 
2001, p. 26). 
The Duisburg researchers rely on Michael Foucault’s theory of power and discourse. 
They also use elements from Van Dijk’s sociocognitive model. They integrate the social, 
political and historical contexts in their analysis in a similar fashion to the Discourse-
Historical Approach. The Duisburg group reiterate the concept of power and discourse 
when they argue that the group in power employs collective symbols to “stigmatise, 
marginalise, and exclude minority groups” (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001, p. 27). In other 
words, racism is tied to power and hegemony. The methodology adopted by the group 





in a precise and differentiated manner would shed light into the interdiscourse (i.e. the 
implicit or explicit relations that a discourse has to other discourses). On the other hand, 
quantitative analysis, they say, is only necessary in particular cases. 
The Loughborough group, namely the sociospychologists, Margret Wetherell and 
Jonathan Potter (1992), oppose sociocognitive approaches that give priority to the 
cognitive dimension in the analysis of racism and tend to “universalise the conditions 
for racism” (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p. 28). They argue from a constructivist point of view 
that attitudes and stereotypes are not simply mediated via cognition and reject social 
identity theory (the perceived membership of a relevant social group), and the social 
cognition approach. They stress that racist discourse is not static and homogeneous but 
dynamic and contradictory and it is also context-dependent, in a similar manner to the 
Duisburg group and the discourse-historical approach. Their methodology relied on 
interviewing people from New Zealand and they used social-psychological, ethnographic 
and post-structuralist perspectives for the analysis of these interviews. Accordingly, 
Wetherell and Potter integrate contextual information in their analysis of racist practices 
and representations. In their book Mapping the Language of Racism, they state: “We are 
not wanting to argue that racism is a simple matter of linguistic practice. Investigations 
of racism must also focus on institutional practices, on discriminatory actions and on 
social structures and social divisions. But the study of these things is intertwined with 
the study of discourse. Our emphasis will be on the ways in which a society gives voice 
to racism and how forms of discourse institute, solidify, change, create and reproduce 
social formations” (Wetherell and Potter, 1992, p. 3). 
The authors developed the notion of ‘interpretative repertoire’, which is mostly the 
counterpart of the interdiscourse of the Duisburg school except that the Duisburg school 
focuses on metaphors and symbols while the Loughborough school instead focuses on 
narratives and argumentation. 
In addition to the above-mentioned four approaches the Discourse Historical Approach 
in recent years has been influenced by the tradition of Hallidayan systemic functional 
linguistics (by Fairclough, Fowler, Hodge and Kress) as well as by classical and new 





As mentioned above, the research will rely more specifically on the Discourse Historical 
Approach postulated by Wodak et al. This approach tries to incorporate as much 
available knowledge as possible about the historical sources and the background of the 
social and political context in which discursive practices are embedded. “One of the 
most salient distinguishing features of the discourse-historical approach is its endeavour 
to work with different approaches, multimethodically and on the basis of variety of 
empirical data as well as background information (Wodak and Meyer, 2001, p. 65). It is 
also highlighted that a mutual influence exists between, situational, institutional and 
social settings and discourses: “[…] discourse influences social and political processes 
and actions” (Wodak and Meyer, 2001, p. 66). On the other hand, institutional, political 
and social settings contribute to shaping discourse. The approach integrates theory and 
methodology in a selective manner to help investigate the discourse in question. 
Wodak and Reisigl (2009) develop a five-question strategy of analysis:  
1- How are persons, objects, phenomena/events, process and actions named? 
(nomination) 
2- What characteristics, qualities and features are attributed to social actors, 
objects, phenomena/events and processes? (predication) 
3- What arguments are employed in the discourse in question? (argumentation) 
4- From what perspective are these nominations, attributions and arguments 
expressed? (perspectivation) 
5- Are the respective utterances articulated overtly; are they mitigated or 
intensified? (mitigation and intensification) 
Since all of these strategies refer to positive self-representation and negative other-
representation, then naturally they involve stereotyping or evaluative statements. For a 
better understanding of the above strategies, they will be further described here below, 
where they will be grouped into three subgroups: 1. Reference and Predication, 2, 






3.2.1   Reference and Predication 
Both are concerned with constructing and representing social actors, which is the 
simplest form of linguistic and rhetorical discrimination: 
Reference 
This involves how persons are named and referred to linguistically. This can be done: 
1-  By membership categories devices, including reference by tropes, biological, 
naturalising and depersonalising metaphors and metonymies and synecdoches. 
2- By naming social actors derogatorily. 
3- By metaphorical (figurative or the use of metaphor/metaphorical in the broad 
sense) references. These are very common: they are based on a referential 
identification procedure which is tropologically described as ‘synecdochisation’. 
A specific feature, trait or characteristic is selectively pushed to the fore as a ’part 
for the whole’, as a representative depicter. Because of the descriptive quality of 
such referential categorisation, linguistic identification is already related to 
strategic predication and thus very often involves evaluation.  
 
The main referential strategies are categorised by Van Leeuwen (1993 and 1996) as: 
exclusion, inclusion, specification, genericisation, assimilation, collectivisation, 
aggregation, impersonalisation, abstraction and objectivation. 
 
Predication 
1- What traits, characteristics, qualities and features are attributed to particular 
people or groups. Once the social actors as groups or individuals are constructed 
or identified, they are provided with predications.  
2- Predicational strategies may be realised as stereotypical, evaluative attributions 
of negative and positive traits in the linguistic form of implicit or explicit 
predicates. Predication strategies cannot be neatly separated from nomination 
strategies. Moreover, in a certain sense, some of the referential strategies can 





referential identification very often already involves a denotatively as well as 
connotatively more or less deprecatory or appreciative labelling of social actors.  
3- Predication is a very basic process and result of linguistically assigning qualities 
to persons, animals, objects, events and social phenomena. Through predication, 
persons and things are specified and characterised with respect to quality, 
quantity, space, time, etc.  
4- Predicational strategies are mainly realised by specific forms of reference (based 
on explicit denotation as well as on implicit connotation). They can also be 
realised through the following: 
 
a) attributes in the form of adjectives,  
b) appositions,  
c) prepositional phrases,  
d) relative clauses,  
e) conjunctional clauses,  
f) infinitive clauses, 
g) participial clauses or groups  
h) predicates or predicative nouns/ adjectives/pronouns 
i) collocations 
j) explicit comparisons, involving similes, metaphors and other rhetorical 
figures, such as metonymies, hyperbole, litotes, euphemism, allusion, 
evocations, presuppositions/implications, flag words (e.g. 
‘multiculturalism’), stigma words (racism). 
 
Tropes and Reference and Predication (the tropological Construction and 
Discrimination of Ingroups and Outgroups) 
Tropes like metonymies, synecdoches and metaphors are related both to reference and 
predication, as they help in creating homogeneity and generalisation. These tropes can 






Synechdoche: a substitution of part for whole, 
Metonymy: There are four types corresponding to the four causes: 
substitution of cause for effect or effect for cause, proper name for one of its 
qualities or vice versa.. 
Metaphor: changing a word from its literal meaning to one not properly 
applicable but analogous to it; assertion of identity rather than, as with simile, 
likeness.  
Personification: An animal or an inanimate object is represented as having 
human attributes and addressed or made to speak as if it were human” 
(Lanham, 1991, pp. 100-148). 
The term “foreigner” is very often used as a synecdoche (part for a whole), where the 
seemingly all-inclusive nomination actually refers only selectively to a very specific 
groups of persons. 
Metonymies and synecdoches can achieve the following discursive effects: de-
individualisation, referential absorption, generalising and selective foregrounding of 
common particularities. The previous effects can also be common particularities of 
metaphors.  
Synecdoches are substitutions within one and the same field of reference: a term is 
replaced by another term, the extension of which is either semantically wider or 
semantically narrower than the non-synecdoche to which it corresponds.  
a. Particularising synecdoche (part standing for a whole) or collective singular 
(singular stands for the plural), e.g. ‘foreigner’, ‘Jew’, ‘Muslim’;  
b. Generalising synecdoche (whole for part); 
Metonymies are substitutions involving two semantically (and materially or cognitively) 
adjacent fields of reference. The name of the referent is replaced by the name of 
another referent which semantically (abstractly or concretely) adjoins the referent of 






a. The cause by the product 
b. The user of an object by an object 
c. The person by the place 
d. The person by the building in which the person is 
e. The action or event by the place 
f. The country or state by the persons living in this country 
g. The persons by the time 
h. The representatives of an institution by the institution 
i. The action or events by the institution connected with these actions or events. 
According to Reisigl and Wodak, “metonymies enable the speaker to conjure away 
responsible, involved or affected actors (whether victims or perpetrators), or keep them 
in the semantic background” (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001, p. 58). 
Metaphors can be used largely as ‘collective symbols. See section 3.1.  
Personifications vitalise abstract entities, phenomena, ideas and imaginations. Their 
apparent concreteness and vividness often invite hearers or readers to identify or feel 
solidarity with the personified entity. They play a decisive role in animating imagined 
‘collective subjects’ as for example races, nations, ethnicities.  
Fallacious generalisations can be suggestively implied by the frequent referential 
foregrounding of specific features or traits. (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001, pp. 56-59). 
 
3.2.2 Argumentation 
How do racist, ethnicist and nationalist prejudices come into one’s mind? From a 
linguistic and rhetorical point of view, the answer to this is, by persuasion. According to 
Reisigl and Wodak (2001, p.70-71), there are rules for rational disputes and constructive 
arguing that allow for characterising and discerning reasonableness in critical 
discussions. These rules are: 
1- Freedom to argue  
2- Obligation to give reasons 





4- Obligation to matter-of-factness 
5- Correct reference to implicit premises 
6- Respect for shared starting points 
7- Use of plausible arguments and schemes of argumentation 
8- Logical validity (the arguments used must be validated by the explicitisation of 
one or more unexpressed premises) 
9- Acceptance of the result of the discussion 
10- Clarity of expression and correct interpretation 
 
There are a number of pragmatic fallacies serving the justification of discrimination:  
 
Fallacy 
The rule(s) it violates Example 
Threatening to use force 
against the antagonist 
Rule 1 and rule 4 Al Zawahri 
threatened to use 
force against The 
Russians and 
Western crusaders 
and also against the 
Shi’a troops in Syria.  
The US threatened to 
apply sanctions 
against Iran 
Verbal attack on the 
antagonist’s personality 
and character 
Rule 4 Erdogan slams Assad 
for killing dozens 
everyday (Reuters, 10 
April, 2012) 
Unjustifiably appealing for 
compassion 
Rule 4 ‘The voters perfectly 
know that we, the 
Austrian Freedom 
Party, are the real 
victims of the policy 
of exclusion’ 
Pathetic fallacy 
This consists of the appeal 
to the prejudiced emotions, 
opinions and convictions of 
Rule 4 In a meeting with 
Norwegian PM, 
Netanayhu says 





a specific social group 
instead of relevant 
arguments. 
threat to our 
common civilization” 
(Jerusalem Post) 
Appeal to ignorance 
This means that a 
standpoint, argument or 
thesis is to be regarded as 
true if it has not been 
refuted. Conversely, if the 
argument has been 
defended weakly one 
concludes that the contrary 
standpoint is true.  
Rule 9 Israel, the only 
democracy and 
tolerant society in the 
Middle East, is 
surrounded by Muslim 
states that have sworn 
to destroy it and have 
conducted a genocidal 
propaganda campaign 
against the Jews, 
promising to "finish the 
job that Hitler started." 
A global wave of Jew-
hatred, fomented by 
Muslim propaganda 
and left-wing anti-
Semitism, has spread 
through Europe and 
the United Nations and 
made Israel a pariah 
nation.  (Horowitz, 
2009). 
Misplaced appeal to deep 
respect and reverence for 
authorities or in falsely 
parading once own qualities 
Rule 4 and rule 7 “Our great people... 
The valiant men of 
our Armed forces. On 
previous occasions, 
we have said that our 
view of our history 
in Iraq, which is also 
our view of our 
history as a nation, is 
that it is tantamount 
to faith. This is 
because history, to 
our nation and 
people, is not merely 






It is rather a record of 
sacrifices made in 
blood in order for the 
nation to preserve its 
qualities and 
maintain its role, and 
in order for our 
people as well to 





This amounts to twisting 
somebody’s words, to 
presenting a distorted 
picture of the antagonist’s 
standpoint in order to be 
able to refute it. 
Rule 3 and Rule 5 
"The comparison drawn 
in the words of the 
deputy chief of staff 
regarding events which 
characterised Nazi 
Germany 80 years ago is 
outrageous," he said. 
"They do injustice to 
Israeli society and cause 




events occurring earlier in 
time as the causes of events 
happening later 
Rule 7 Increase in 
unemployment rates 
in the UK is the 
consequence of the 
growing number of 
immigrants. 
Begging the question  
This means that what is 
controversial and in 
question is presupposed as 
the starting point  
Rule 6  Palestinians are 
attacking settlers in 
the West Bank. 
 Immigrants are a 
burden on the 
economy 
Rigged question 
This is committed when one 
manipulatively asks 
Rule 6 “When will the 
Ministry of Interior 





questions containing one or 
more presuppositions that 
are open to discussion.  
the foreigners over 
the nationals” 
Ignoring counter-proof or 
counter-argument 
This consists of discussing 
or proving a standpoint that 
is not the standpoint in 
question. 
Rule 3 and Rule 4 Israel has the right to 
protect itself 
Ambiguity, equivocation, 
amphibole or lack of clarity 
This consists of 
surreptitiously changing the 
interpretation of an 
ambiguous utterance or of 
intentionally playing with 
ambiguous polysemic 
meanings for the purpose 
of weakening the 
antagonist’s arguments and 
standpoints. 
Rule 10 The interpretation of 





The fallacy of hasty 
generalisation 
Rule 4 The majority of 
Austrians are against 
immigration. 
Unfavourable light is cast 
on a thesis by pointing out 
its possible consequences, 
without rightness of the 
thesis itself being disputed 
Rule 2 Removing Assad 
means the danger of 
Islamist extremists 
ruling Syria. 
The non sequitur.  
It consists of 
argumentatively tying 
arguments to a conclusion 
that would be correct but 
where the connection is 
false, for the conclusion 
does not follow from 
arguments.  
Rule 7 The Arab Spring is a 







The trajectio in alium 
Strategically employed in 
rationalisation, in the 
discursive construction of 
scapegoats, in victim 
victimiser reversals 
consisting of putting the 
responsibility, guilt or 
blame on somebody else 
Rule 7 David Horowitz’s 
classic Why Israel Is 
the Victim. 
Figure 3- 1 
 
The different forms of social exclusion and discrimination can also be discussed by 
means of topoi. These “[…] are the content-related warrants or ‘conclusion rules’ that 
connect the argument or arguments with the conclusion, the claim. As such, they justify 
the transition from the argument or arguments to the conclusion” (Kienpointner, 1992, 
p. 194). Reisigl and Wodak warn that “[…] discourse analysts should always keep in mind 
that the lines between more-or-less plausible argumentation and fallacies cannot be 
drawn clearly in any case, especially where prejudiced predications are part of 
argumentation schemes” (Reisgil and Wodak, 2001, p. 75). 
The analysis of typical content related argument schemes used in argumentation for and 
against discrimination can be done against the background of the following list of topoi. 
 
Topos Example 
Topos of advantage and 
usefulness  
If an action under a specific 
relevant point of view will be 
useful, then one should 
perform it. Sub-types: to the 
advantage of all, to the 
advantage of us, to the 
advantage of them. 
 
Usefulness of guest workers 





Topos of uselessness/ 
disadvantage 
This is a specific causal 
argumentation scheme 
which relies on the 
conditional 
If we allow immigration, our 
jobs will be at risk.  
Topos of definition or 
topos of name 
interpretation 
The euphemistic term 
‘guest worker’ implies 
that these workers will or 
have to return back. It 
could otherwise imply 
that they will be treated 
with hospitality.  
Topos of danger and topos 
of threat 
If a political action or 
decision bears specific 
dangerous, threatening 
consequences, one should 
not do it.  
Subtype: topos of threat 
and racism 
This argumentation 
scheme could lead to a 
victim-victimiser reversal 
If too many immigrants 
or refugees enter the 
country, the native 
population will not be 
able to cope with the 
situation and will become 
hostile to foreigners.  
Topos of humanitarianism 
If a political action or 
decision does or does not 
conform with human 
rights and humanitarian 
values, one should or 
should not do it.  
Arbitrary detention does 
not conform with human 
rights. 
Topos of justice 
This is based on the 
principle and claim of 
equal rights for all.  
As far as social security is 
concerned, workers 
should be treated equally 
since they are making the 






Topos of responsibility 
This occurs when a state 
or group of persons is 
responsible for the 
emergence of specific 
problems, it or they should 
act to find solutions to 
these problems. 
The government is held 
responsible for 
unemployment and 
required to reduce the 
quota of immigrants. 
Topos of burdening or 
weighing down 
This is a specific causal 
topos (a topos of 
sequence) which means if 
a person, an institution or 
a country is burdened by a 
problem, one should act to 
diminish these burdens. 
The boat is 
full/overcrowded. 
Topos of finances 
If a specific situation or 
action costs a lot of money 
or causes a loss of 
revenue, one should 
perform actions that 
diminish the costs or help 
to avoid the loss (close to 
topos of burdening). 
Implicitly used by the 
head of Upper Austria 
(Jozef Ratzenbock), when 
he argued against the 
accommodation of 
Romanian refugees. 
Topos of reality 
This can be paraphrased 
as follows: because reality 
is as it is, a specific 
action/decision should be 
performed or made.  
A general example would 
be: social, economic and 
political realities have 
changed and the Asylum 
Act does not fit anymore. 
Therefore, the law must 
also be changed.  
Topos of numbers 
If the numbers prove a 
specific topos, a specific 
action should be 
performed/not 
performed. This topos can 
In a letter addressed to a 
student who asked 
Michael Häupl (the 
Mayor of Vienna) who 
enquired about his right 





become fallacious if it is 
related to incorrectly 
presumed majorities that 
are not verified 
empirically. It can be 
combined with the 
pathetic fallacy. 
the fact that there is no 
general right to vote for 
foreigners in these parts 
is that an extraordinarily 
large majority of the 
Austrians are against it’. 
Topos of law or topos of 
right. 
If a law or an otherwise 
codified norm prescribes 
or forbids a specific 
politico-administrative 
action, the action has to 
be performed or omitted. 
It can be considered a 
specific form of the topos 
of authority. 
The use of this topos is 
exemplified in rejections 
of applications for 
residence permits. 
Topos of authority 
X is right then X has to be 
done or X has to be 
omitted because A = an 
authority. Of course this 
topos is not easily 




appeal to reverence and 
respect. 
During the Austrian 
Asylum debate in April 
1991, the FPÖ 
representative, Alois 
Huber argued against 
‘the mixture of races’ by 
appealing to religious 
authorities. Which he 
used as an argument 
against immigration. 
Topos of history 
History teaches that 
specific actions have 
specific consequences, 
one should perform or 
omit a specific action in a 
specific situation 
(allegedly) comparable 
with the historical 
To compare the leader of 
the Austrian FPÖ, Jörg 
Haidar, with Hitler, is 








example referred to. This 
means that we have 
learned from the past and 
so we will not repeat the 
same mistakes. This could 
lead to trivialising and 
playing down horrendous 
crimes committed in the 
past. This specific topos 
backgrounds the victims 
afflicted by this wrongful 
act. Topoi of history are 
also used to warn of a 
repetition of the past. 
Topos of culture 
Because the culture of a 
specific group of people is 
as it is, specific problems 
arise in specific situations.  
This topos is employed by 
Haider in combination 
with the topos of danger 
on 16 December 1992: 
‘The greatest damage that 
one can do to a people is 
to put its identity, its 
cultural heritage, and the 
opportunities of it youth’. 
 
There is a lot of discourse 
about the threat of 
Islamic culture to Europe 
specially after the Syrian 
crisis and the fleeing of 
millions of Syrians to 
neighbouring countries 
and Europe. 
Topos of abuse 
If a right or an offer for 
help is abused, the right 
should be changed or the 
offer for help should be 
withdrawn or measures 
against the abuse should 
be taken.  
Frequently used by right 
wing politicians to restrict 







Figure 3- 2 
 
The example of ‘guest worker as well as the naturalising metaphor ‘flood of immigrants’ 
which implicitly carries two conclusion rules (if something is a flood, then it is dangerous 
and threatening, and if it is dangerous and threatening, then something must be done 
about it) bring to our minds the relationship between argumentation and referential 
strategies.  
 
3.2.3 Perspectivation and framing, mitigation and intensification 
Perspectivation, framing and discourse representation relate to the fact that “[…] 
speakers express their involvement in discourse and position their point of view in the 
discursive flux: for example, in the reporting, description, narration and quotation of 
discriminatory events or utterances […]” (Wodak and Reisigl, 2001, p. 81).  
‘Intensifying’ and ‘mitigation’ (Wodak and Reisigl 2001; Wodak and Meyer 2002) mean 
“qualifying and modifying the epistemic status of the proposition”. They also affect the 
degree of certainty in addition to “the persuasive impact on the hearers and readers. 
They either intensify or mitigate the illocutionary force of racist, antisemitic, nationalist 
or ethnicist utterances” (Wodak and Reisigl, 2001, p. 81).  
Wodak and Reisigl have built their involvement and detachment model on Erving 
Goffman’s concepts of ‘participation framework’, ‘frame’ and ‘footing’ (1974). Goffman 
(1974) uses the term ‘keying’: “I refer here to the set of conventions by which a given 
activity, one already meaningful in terms of some primary framework, is transformed 
into something patterned on this activity but seen by the participants to be something 
quite else. The process of transcription can be called keying” (Goffman, 1974, p. 43-44).  
A participation framework as Goffman describes it, involves the fact that “When a word 
is spoken, all those who happen to be in perceptual range of the event will have some 
sort of participation status relative to it. The codification of these various positions and 
the normative specification of appropriate conduct within each provide an essential 
background for interaction analysis – whether (I presume) in our own society or any 
other” (Goffman, 1981, p. 3). A participation framework involves the following (cf. 





1- Animator: the person who produces an utterance (tells the story) 
2- Author: the person who creates an utterance 
3- Figure: the person portrayed through the utterance (protagonist) 
4- Principal: the person responsible for the utterance and committed to what is said 
These four statuses can fall on one person, in which situation they produce a case of 
narrative.  
Frames are conceptualised as organisational and interactional principles by which 
situations are defined and sustained as experiences (Goffman, 1974). Wine (2008, p.1) 
describes frames as follows: “Frames are mental structures that shape the way we see 
the world“. One can distinguish different frames:  
a) Frames of deception 
b) Frames of playing 
c) Frames of joking  
d) Frames of dreaming  
e) Frames of contest and fight 
f) Frames of celebration  
g) Frames of testing and rehearsal 
h) Frames of demonstration or performance  
i) Frames of participatory observation  
“Framing capabilities: cues distinguishing special readings to apply across strips of 
bracketed communication, recasting otherwise conventional sense, as in making ironic 
aside, quoting another, joking, and so forth […]”Goffman, 1981, pp.14-15). 
Footing is the way in which writers or speakers arrange themselves and their 
relationship to others. “Footing relates to the alignments we take up to ourselves and 
the others present as expressed in the way we manage the production or reception of 
an utterance” (Goffman, 1981, p. 128).  
 
 





1- Direct speech 
2- Selection of the recipient 
3- Interjections 
4- Repetitions 
5- Personal directness or involvement 
6- Emphasis 
7- Separation of topic 
8- Discourse type (lecture, discussion) 
Footing and framing are closely connected with the speaker’s or writer’s involvement or 
distance. Strategies of involvement aim at two things: expressing the speakers’ inner 
states, attitudes and feelings or degrees of emotional interest and engagement; and 
emotionally and cognitively engaging the hearers in the discourse. These strategies are 
opposed to strategies of detachment, which are realised by discursive means for 
encoding distance. Levinson (1992) explains that “some shifts in footing have more 
enduring implications, transforming social relations, and sometimes whole activities, 
into something else” (Wine, 2008, p. 2). 
Detachment can be expressed by means of complex hypotactic syntax, where 
hypotactic  is “A term used in traditional grammatical analysis, and often found in 
descriptive linguistic studies, to refer to dependent constructions, especially those 
where constituents have been linked through the use of subordinating conjunctions. 
‘Hypotactic constructions’ are opposed to paratactic ones, where the linkage is 
conveyed solely by juxtaposition and punctuation/intonation” (Crystal, 2008, p.233). 
Hypotactic constructions include relative and complement clauses, sequences of 
prepositional phrases, or the abstractive passive voice, nominalisations and 
metonymisations or distancing personal, local and temporal deictics (‘deixis’ – involving 
a word or expression whose meaning is dependent on the context in which it is used – 
such as ‘here’, ‘you’, ‘that one’, ‘there’, or ‘next Tuesday’), and forms of address and 
salutation, or of indirect speech.  
Involvement often, but not always, goes hand in hand with intensification. 





1- Turn-taking: in interruptions and overlapping talks  
2- Repetition at all levels (textual and discursive)  
3- Intensity markers: emphasising particles (‘really’, ‘very’, ‘absolutely’, ‘only’) or 
amplifying particles (‘very’, ‘too’, ‘absolutely’), and amplifying morphemes 
(‘super’, ‘mega’)  
4- Exaggerating quantifiers and intensifying verbs 
5- Verb phrases, adjectives and adverbs that encode the speaker’s emotions, 
feelings, moods and general dispositions 
6- Superlative and primary as well as secondary interjections (which work also as 
intensifiers) 
7- Ellipsis 
8- Rhetorical figures (metaphor, irony and hyperbole) 
9- Meta-communicative parts of utterances and factious scenarios 
A way of expressing either involvement or detachment is ‘discourse representation’. 
One can represent, for example, racist, nationalist or ethnicist discourse by means of 
direct quotation, indirect quotation or free indirect speech. Usually indirect speech is an 
indicator of distance, but in comparison direct speech and free direct speech express 
the speaker’s and evoke the hearer’s involvement.  
Involvement and detachment are highly connected to the discourse genre and the field 
of social action with which the genre is associated. For example, narratives and 
conversations have a high degree of involvement. Detachment is not necessarily 
associated with mitigation, especially if mitigation is an expression of prudence and 
deliberation. 











(macro-strategies: mitigation in the matrix clause/sentence or in parenthesis) 
Categories Forms/Examples of realisation 





- Speaker-oriented. Related to the 
importance/relevance of the 
following/previous part of 
discourse/text or related to the 
conversational organisation 
 Modal verbs + verbs of saying 
 Verbs of feeling (verba sentiendi) 
and verbs of thinking (verba 
cogitandi) 
 








- If you don’t mind…/unless I have 
misunderstood you…/unless I 
heard incorrectly 
- I’m not an expert, but… 




I would like to tell you something 
I think, we can do it over again… 
I guess, I suppose, I reckon, I gather (used 
parenthetically) 
 
It seems quite clear that… (mitigation also 
by ‘seem’ and ‘quite’) 
It appears that… (mitigation also by 
‘appear’) 
I would like to say… 
Indirect micro-mitigation 
(micro-strategies: competition between the basic illocution and the realised illocution, 
ordered according to the strength of indirectness) 
Categories Forms/Examples of realisation 
 Question instead of assertion 
Basic: question/realised: 
directive 
(Especially together with 
negations) 
 
 Assertion with ‘we’/’one’/’it’ 
 
Shouldn’t we go further? 
Can you shut the windows, Robert? 
 
We have to consider recent developments 
in… 





instead of directive with ‘you’ 
 
 
 Assertion with ‘we’/’one’/’it’ 
instead of assertion with ‘I’ 
 
 Particles and adverbs in 
questions and directives 
 
We proposed the new strategy yesterday… 
One cannot carry on as usual after this… 
 
Surely you are not serious? 
Would you kindly fasten your seatbelts?  
Direct micro-mitigation 
(micro-strategies) 
Categories Forms/Examples of realisation 
 Vague expressions 
 
 Tag questions 













 Hesitations, false starts, self-
corrections, repetitions  
 
 
There may be some point you didn’t 
mention before. 
It was because of the tension, wasn’t it?  
Fairly, pretty, quite, rather, somewhat, 
supposedly, perhaps, theoretically, 
technically, strictly speaking, just, possibly, 
probably, likely,… 
 
Such a move might anger much of black 
Africa/it would be endangering relations to 
black Africa  
 
Not unlikely, not unhappy, not 
unreasonable … 
The relationship here is not unproblematic. 
 
 
Well---/uhm they don’t want ah to adapt 
themselves 






It is important for the sake of the analysis to determine the genres that the texts in 
question belong to. In the section that follows an overview of genre and text is given. 
 
3.3 Genre and text  
A ‘text’ could be defined as the main body of a manuscript, book, newspaper etc. Some 
linguists use the word ‘text’ to refer to written material only while others use it to refer 
to both written and spoken material. Another definition of a ‘text’ given by Dickins, 
Hervey and Higgins (2002, p. 242) is: “any stretch of speech or writing produced in a 
given language (or mixture of languages […] and assumed to make a coherent whole on 
the discourse level”.  
Genre is a specific type of production, whether music, film, or writing, etc. Thus literary 
genres include science fiction, and a film genres include horror, comedy or romance. In 
linguistics and literature the term can get more complicated. Genre is a traditional term 
in literary criticism (the word ‘genre’ itself means ‘type’, ‘kind’ or ‘sort’ in French). We  
are used to classifications in literature such are ‘prose fiction’, ‘thriller’, ‘detective story’ 
[…]. As with the subject field and institutional context, the list of such genres (also sub-
genres, etc.) seems potentially endless.  
Many approaches to genre, such as those above, rely on subject matter for their 
classification. Dickins, Hervey and Higgins have introduced a different approach to the 
categorisation of genres where the subject matter is not the main criterion according to 
which genres are specified. Hervey and Higgins argue that the fundamental issue in 
question is the “author’s attitude, implicit or explicit, to treatment of the subject matter. 
This attitude also includes the intention that the text should have a particular sort of 
effect on the reader or listener, and acceptance of the probability or improbability of 
this intention being completely achieved” (Dickins, Hervey and Higgins 2002: p.178). 
The five genres which are traditional, at least in pre-modern Western culture, according 
to Dickins, Hervey and Higgins are: Literary, which has many sub-genres; Religious (of 
spiritual content); Philosophical, concerning the ‘world of ideas’; Empirical, which is 
relevant to science and technology and other informative texts; and Persuasive, which 





manner. Manuals, rules and regulations, and some media texts, especially 
advertisements or editorials, fall under this category. The sub-genres in this category are 
endless, but they have a common goal which is to persuade readers or listeners of 
certain action or way of thinking. 
Following Lemke’s approach (Lemke, 1995), Wodak (2001) makes a distinction between 
text and discourse: “’Discourse’ can thus be understood as a complex bundle of 
simultaneous and sequential interrelated linguistic acts, which manifest themselves 
within and across the social fields of action as thematically interrelated semiotic, oral or 
written tokens, very often as ‘texts’, that belong to specific semiotic types, that is genres 
[…], (Wodak, 2001, p. 66). In establishing their theory of discourse Wodak et al. use the 
word ‘genre’ in the ‘subject matter’ sense, as explained above, especially when they talk 
about media genre.  Genres, according to Wodak, can be considered as semiotic types 
and texts (written or oral) as tokens. The texts belong to various genres within the social 
fields of action. A sequence of thematically interrelated texts that belong to specific 
genres will formulate a discourse. She understands the notion ‘field of action’ to mean 
“institutionalised aims of discursive practices”. She gives some examples of fields of 
action in the political arena: manufacturing public opinion, functions of legislations, 
developing party-internal consent, advertising and vote- getting, etc. For ‘genres’, she 
gives examples such as: laws, bills, press releases, interviews, election programme, 
speeches in elections, decisions (approval/rejection) inaugural speeches, etc., which 
develop the discourse topic. 
 
3.4 Categories of analysis: 
The Discourse Historical Approach developed for a number of discrimination-relevant 
case studies is three-dimensional. First, the contents or topics of a particular discourse 
(usually racist or discriminatory) are established. Second, the discursive strategies are 
investigated, and thirdly the linguistic means (as types) and the linguistic realizations (as 
tokens) are examined. Accordingly, in respect of these dimensions, I have established 
the contents of my topics: Israel/Palestine conflict and Islamophobia; for more 
comprehensive discussion refer to chapter 4. I have investigated the discursive 





overview is given above. Thirdly, I have examined the ideological and stereotypical 
images in the chosen texts (corpus) which belong to the media genre. Further discussion 
of the topics used is presented in chapter 4. 
 
Strategy Objective Devices 








Predication Labelling social actors more 
or less positively or 
negatively, deprecatorily or 
appreciatively 
Stereotypical, evaluative 
attributions of negative or 
positive traits. 
Implicit and explicit 
predicates 
Argumentation Justification of positive or 
negative attributions 
Topoi used to justify 
political inclusion or 
exclusion, discrimination 





Positioning speaker’s point 
of view 
Reporting, description, 





Modifying the epistemic 
status of a proposition 
Intensifying or mitigating 
the illocutionary force of 
utterances 
Figure 3- 4 
 
The discourse-historical approach as shown in the above is eclectic and interdisciplinary. 
It is also problem oriented, integrating the theories and methods which work best at 
unveiling racist utterances and relations of power as well as the constructing and 








The chapter has provided a comprehensive overview of the Discourse-Historical 
Approach, its theoretical background, motivation, formation and categories of analysis. 
The interdisciplinary and problem-oriented nature of this approach in addition to the 
multi-level exploration   of contextual information justifies its suitability to be the 









This chapter is divided into two main parts covering six sections (4.2-4.7) and a conclusion 
(4.8).  In the first part, section 4.2 introduces the theoretical framework of the study from 
a translation studies perspective, providing the title of the thesis, research questions, 
resources and topics. It also covers the research position from ontological and 
epistemological viewpoints. Section 4.3 presents focused aspects of the research 
methodology developing the discussion of the general approach which has been laid out 
in chapter 3. In section 4.4 reasons behind choosing specific news services and topics 
are given. Since the data collected for this research is ‘news texts’, the second part will 
address the issue of news agencies’ impartiality in section 4.5. Then sections 4.6 The 
Israel Palestine Conflict and 4.7 Islamophobia will set the background for the two central 
themes of the news texts selected to be analysed in chapter 5.  Section 4.7 will in turn 
involve two sub-categories which will further enhance the reader’s knowledge of the 
complexities concerning the relationship between Muslim communities and the West.  
 
4.2 Introduction to Research Methodology: 
Translation studies is interdisciplinary. It borrows research methods and approaches 
from a number of other disciplines, but at the same time, it covers various fields because 
it is relevant to linguistics, literature and to social science, cultural studies, philosophy, 
gender studies and others. Recently many developments in computational linguistics 
have become associated with translation studies, such as machine translation, CAT tools, 
and corpus analysis of parallel – i.e. translated – texts). 
The general topic and title of the thesis is ‘Translation and stereotyping in Arabic and 
English news texts with reference to Islamophobia and the Arab-Israeli conflict’. 










My initial research questions are: 
 
1. Do translations retain stereotypes, stereotypical imagery/discourse between 
Arabic and British-based media? 
2. Do translations increase, decrease or otherwise alter stereotypes/stereotypical 
imagery/discourse; in other words do they construct new stereotypes between 
Arabic and Western media (British)? 
3. If translations increase, decrease or otherwise alter stereotypes/stereotypical 
imagery/discourse between Arabic and British-based media, how do they do so? 
4. How do stereotypes and ideologies overlap, and how can they be combined or 
incorporated to serve some ideological discourses?  
These research questions are fundamentally descriptive – conceived in Descriptive 
Translation Studies (DTS) – a descriptive research question being one that seeks to elicit 
data through which a phenomenon can be described in detail. The research goes beyond 
this, however, in seeking to assess the degree of stereotyping, define its nature, and 
illustrate in which way it has been used: this is when the research moves on to CDA. 
 
These two questions can be converted into two hypotheses, the first being a null 
hypothesis, as follows: 
1. Translations do not increase, decrease or otherwise alter stereotypes, 
stereotypical imagery/discourse between Arabic and British-based media. 
2. (Assuming hypothesis 1 is refuted) there are identifiable ways in which 
translations increase, decrease or otherwise alter or construct stereotypes, 
stereotypical imagery/discourse between Arabic and British-based media. 
 
4.2.1 Ontology and Epistemology: 
According to O’Brien and Saldanha (2013), ‘ontology’ is a key term that should be 
understood before embarking on research. Matthews and Ross (2010, p.23) define 
ontology as “the way the social world is seen to be and what can be assumed about the 
nature and reality of the social phenomena that make up the social world”. 





theory of knowledge and how we know things” (ibid.). Matthews and Ross identify three 
basic categorisations for seeing the social world:  objectivism, constructivism and 
realism. Linked to these, there are three epistemological positions: positivism, 
interpretivism and realism, each of which “entails some beliefs as to what counts as 
knowledge and how knowledge can be obtained” (O’Brien and Saldanha, 2011, p. 11). 
In fact, there are many more ontological and epistemological positions, but these are 
the essential ones.  
Ontological Categories: 
1. OBJECTIVISM: “asserts that the social phenomena that make up our social world 
have an existence of their own […], apart from and independent of the social 
actors (humans) who are involved”. 
2. CONSTRUCTIVISM: asserts that social phenomena “are only real in the sense that 
they are constructed ideas which are continually being reviewed by those 
involved in them [the social actors]” (ibid, p. 25). 
3. REALISM: adopts an intermediate position between objectivism and 
constructivism. It accepts that social phenomena can have a reality that is 
separate from the social actors involved in it but also recognizes that there is 
another dimension that relates to what we know about the social world as social 
beings. This dimension includes “structures and mechanisms that trigger or 
affect the social reality that can be observed” (ibid, p. 26). 
Each of the ontological positions above is linked to an epistemological position: that is, 
it entails some beliefs as to what counts as knowledge and how knowledge can be 
obtained.  
Epistemological Positions: 
1- POSITIVISM: The ontological belief of Objectivism assumes a positivist 
epistemology, which asserts that the social phenomena can be objectively 
researched, data about the social world can be collected and measured, and the 
resulting observations must remain independent of the researcher’s subjective 
understanding: that is to say, the researcher remains independent and has no 





research and to empiricism, which means the collection of observable evidence. 
However in postpositivist research, empiricism and objectivism are treated as 
distinct positions: “just because research is empirical does not mean that it is 
‘objective’” (Tymoczko, 2007; cited in Saldanha and O'Brien, 2013, p.147). 
Crisafulli (2003, p. 82) states: “empirical facts do not exist independently of the 
scholar’s viewpoint; indeed, it is the scholar who creates the empirical fact of the 
analysis by making observable (raw) data relevant to his/her perspective”.  
 
2- INTERPRETIVISM: This is linked to the ontological position of constructivism; it 
prioritizes people’s subjective understandings and interpretations of social 
phenomena and is often linked with qualitative approaches to research, where 
the researchers attempt to explore the social world from the point of view of the 
actors and reflect on their own subjective interpretations.  
 
3- REALISM: Realism is both an ontological and epistemological position. As an 
epistemological position, it claims that certain social phenomena exist outside 
the human mind and can be objectively investigated using approaches similar to 
those in the natural sciences. In this respect, realism agrees with positivism. 
However, it also recognizes the existence of invisible but powerful structures and 
mechanisms that cannot be directly observable but whose effects are apparent, 
and these effects can provide evidence of the underlying structures and 
mechanisms (Matthews and Ross 2010, p. 29). Realist approaches to research 
might typically adopt both quantitative and qualitative tools and methods.  
 
Since the research at hand relies largely on collecting observable “textual data 
containing many instances of whatever is being analysed” (Williams and Chesterman, 
2002, p. 66) – in other words it uses a corpus-based driven methodology – it falls under 
the category of empirical research. However, some conceptual research has been also 
conducted when the concept of CDA is introduced and clarified and when the theoretical 





Having stated this, the research is mainly empirical and seeks new data and new 
information. Since the corpus-based methodology used encompasses both quantitative 
and qualitative analysis, the ontological stance of this research project can be regarded 
as realist, assuming, as mentioned, above a realist epistemological position. However, 
the research might also be argued to adopt a postpositivist position in that data are 
collected to identify and highlight a specific social phenomenon.  
 
4.2.2 Resources: 
As noted in the Introduction chapter, my primary resources are media texts from news 




The topics are: 
1- Islamophobia 
2- Israel/Palestine conflict 
I have chosen the examples for Islamophobia from Reuters news agency and the 
examples related to the Israel/Palestine conflict from the BBC. 
 
4.3 What type of research is being engaged in: 
As previously mentioned, this will be a corpus-based translation studies project. 
According to Laviosa (1998, p.1), corpus-based methodology “[…] hopes to show that 
the corpus-based approach is evolving, through theoretical elaboration and empirical 
realisation, into a coherent, composite and rich paradigm that addresses a variety of 
issues pertaining to theory, description, and practice of translation”. The scope of this 
project will be to cover the news related to two topics, discussed below, over a period 
of one month.  
 “The adoption of corpus linguistics as a methodology for the study of language is based 





starting from actual data” (Zanettin, 2012, p. 11). It can even be argued that corpus 
linguistics has established itself as a theoretical approach in its own right.  
Corpus studies use a wide range of textual data. A corpus does not have to be computer 
based: “A corpus can mean a heap of books or a pile of photocopies and cut-outs” 
(Zanettin, 2011, p. 103). There should be one or more criteria for compiling a corpus, 
while the investigation method could differ from one corpus to another (e.g. computer-
based or not).  
This study is also relevant to ‘comparative models’, which is one of the earliest 
translation approaches, revolving around the notion of equivalence (Williams and 
Chesterman, 2002).  Comparative translation models work to align Source Text (ST) and 
Target Text (TT) by selecting the closest elements of the target language with given 
elements from the source language. This approach has close links with contrastive 
linguistics. Relevance is optimized in the successive comparisons between two 
corresponding/respective texts. By ‘corresponding’, I mean two texts that cover the 
same piece of news in a clearly similar manner.  
A comparative corpus–based study would normally have two main sets of data which 
are called “corpora components or subcorpora” (Zanettin, 2012, p. 10). These sets of 
data could belong to the same language (monolingual) or to two or more different 
languages. Corpora used in descriptive and applied translation studies usually involve 
the comparison of at least two main sets of data. These can be translations with their 
respective original texts, or can all be translations of different texts from one language 
to the other. The corpus which I intend to use is classified as a bilingual corpus (i.e. a 
corpus involving two languages).  
A distinction is also frequently made between comparable and parallel corpora. 
Comparable corpora consist of texts in two or more languages which are markedly 
similar to one another in terms of subject matter (etc.), and can be compared with one 
another in various ways. “Sampling techniques, balance and representativeness” 
(McEcenry et al., 2006. P. 49) are three important factors needed to ensure the 





In contrast with comparable corpora, parallel corpora typically consist of source texts in 
one language and their translations in another language. The source language and the 
target language do not have to be constant, so the target language could become a 
source language and then the source language a target language (bidirectional). 
Although Zanettin argues that “A parallel corpus may contain, for instance, text pairs 
which are not or are only partially translations of each other, that is texts which were 
created or developed independently in each language but which have a common 
ideational source” (Zanettin, 2012, p. 153). Such corpora are at the margin of the parallel 
corpus category, sharing some features with comparable corpora. Most parallel corpora 
are bilingual but we come across multilingual parallel corpora which could be made up 
of several translations of one source text (O’Brien and Saldanha, 2011, p. 68). Parallel 
corpora are, on the whole, designed to include only one translation for each source text 
(Laviosa, 1998, p.3). 
The material in this study belongs primarily to the parallel corpus category since it 
involves sets of two texts one of which (or, in some cases, either of which) could be 
regarded as an original text and the other as derived from this (by translation and/or 
transediting). It also, however, has some features of the comparable corpus category 
because it involves an element of comparison between two texts whose relationship is 
not clearly one of straightforward translation. 
The analysis will comprise both qualitative discussion and quantitative analysis which 




4.4 Choice of Examples: 
As noted above, I have selected 2 main news outlets to be the sources of my examples:  
1- Reuters 
2- BBC 
This choice is made for several reasons. These two news outlets are prominent ones on 





I am concerned with the Arabic and English versions. The most critical reason, however, 
is that the both news outlets have a reputation for being objective, and yet not very 
neutral reporting of the news can be spotted specially in the English version.  
Topics which I thought might be controversial and could generate considerable 
instances of stereotyping are: 
1- Islamophobia 
2- The Palestine Israel conflict 
 
In this research, I will attempt to make a connection between the deeply rooted 
misconceptions (stereotypes) in the western mentality, taking British-based media 
outlets as an example, of Arab/Muslim culture and how these can be used to 
disseminate some pieces of news in a biased/non-neutral manner. 
 
4.5 Impartiality of news agencies 
The domestication of news to make it more familiar to a local audience is a widespread 
phenomenon. “‘[F]oreign’ news events are told in ways that render them more familiar, 
more comprehensible and more compatible for consumption by different national 
audiences” (Gurevitch et al, 1991; cited in Alasuutari, Qadir and Creutz, 2013, p. 693). 
However, in some instances, this phenomenon may go beyond the stage of 
domestication of to become a kind of biased reporting of news. For example in the 
American context, we encounter this issue on a relatively large scale: “In his study of 
American television news, Herbert Gans (1979) already pointed out that foreign news 
deals either with ‘stories thought relevant to Americans or American interests’ or 
‘interpretations that apply American values’” (Alasuutari, Qadir, and Creutz, 2013, p. 
695). 
According to leaked reports, the BBC and Sky News change their narrative specially when 
news are related to the Middle East. According to some reports, this is due to 
interference from the pro-Israel lobby, which is very influential in both the UK and the 
USA. The Israel lobby organisation, BICOM (Britain Israel Communication and Research 





of the BBC. “In the email [..], Fitzsimmons reveals how BICOM officials regularly met with 
editors and journalists from the BBC, Sky News and the Financial Times to 'brief' them 
on how to frame issues relating to Israel in order to ensure that, “the most objectively 
favourable line was taken” (Watson, 2011). Lorna Fitzsimmons is a former MP and the 
CEO of BICOM between 29/09/2006 and 22/03/2012. 
The Electronic Intifada has also listed a number of incidents which jeopardise the 
integrity and impartiality of the BBC when it comes to commenting on the Palestinian 
Israeli conflict. For example, the BBC received an imbalanced number of Israeli and 
Palestinian commentators on the Israeli assault on Gaza in 2012. The BBC also 
interviewed pro-Israel analysts and pundits and introduced them as independent while 
they were not. Three people were given the chance to justify the Israeli actions in Gaza 
through television, radio and even online.  
 
“On 22 July, BBC Online uploaded a long feature headlined “Gaza: How Hamas 
tunnel network grew. [...] Reams of paragraphs are devoted to tunnels “booby-
trapped with explosives” — and the effort needed by Israel to detect them [...] The 
article is written, not by a BBC journalist, but by Dr. Eado Hecht, who is described 
by the BBC as an “independent defence analyst and lecturer in military doctrine at 
the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies at Bar Ilan University.” […] But Hecht is 
not “independent,” as the BBC claims. He is in the pay of the Israeli army. Unknown 
to readers of the BBC Online article, Hecht also teaches at the Israeli military’s 
Command and General Staff College” (Saleem, 2014). 
 
In March 2006 John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt published an essay entitled "The 
Israel Lobby" in The London Review of Books (Vol. 28, No. 6, March 23, 2006). The essay 
was later turned into a book in 2007. This courageous attempt by the two writers 
entailed a public debate in the United States and elsewhere. Noam Chomsky 
commented saying “M-W deserve credit for taking a position that is sure to elicit 
tantrums and fanatical lies and denunciations, but it’s worth noting that there is nothing 
unusual about that” (Chomsky, 2006). A sample of the debate aroused by this 





more general influence of the Israel lobby in America and Britain is discussed in the 
following section. 
4.6 Historical background (Israel/Palestine conflict) 
I heard you in the other room asking your mother, 'Mama, am I a 
Palestinian?'. When she answered 'Yes' a heavy silence fell on the whole 
house. It was as if something hanging over our heads had fallen, its noise 
exploding, then - silence. Afterwards...I heard you crying. I could not move. 
[...] Do you believe that man grows? No, he is born suddenly - a word, a 
moment, penetrates his heart to a new throb. One scene can hurl him down 
from the ceiling of childhood onto the ruggedness of the road  
(Ghassan Kanafani, 1999, p.10). 
 
4.6.1The Israel lobby in Britain 
The influence of the Jewish lobby in Britain dates back more than 100 years ago. The 
pioneering Zionists, Theodor Herzl and Chaim Weizmann, made connections with British 
politicians and policy makers. Herzl, who is regarded as the father of political Zionism, 
was a Jewish Austro-Hungarian journalist and playwright.  He was deeply affected by the 
anti-Semitic feelings that swept Europe in the second half of the 19th century. As a 
journalist, he covered the Dreyfus affair, in which a French Jewish officer was falsely 
accused of passing secrets to the Germans. In 1881, following the assassination of Tsar 
Alexander II, large numbers of Jews were killed in a series of Russian pogroms. By 1914 
up to 2 million Jews had fled Russia to escape persecution. Most of those went to the 
United States, but 25,000 arrived in Palestine in two waves of immigration in 1882-84 
and 1890-91. Herzl first thought that Jews could assimilate into European societies, but 
he later reached the conclusion that the only solution for Jewish dispersal and living as 
minorities was to create a Jewish state in which Jews would be the majority and able to 
exercise ‘national self-determination’ (Philo and Berry, 2004 pp. 2-3).  
In order to achieve his goal, Herzl started canvassing the current powers for an ‘imperial 
sponsor prepared to grant a settlement charter’. Herzl thought of Argentina and 
Palestine as potential locations for the prospective Jewish state. He canvassed 





advantages and benefits this Jewish state would bring them. His attempts were not 
successful with the Ottoman Sultan although he offered Jewish capital to cover the 
Ottoman public debt. Herzl then switched his attention to Britain trying to link Jewish 
and British imperial interests. Herzl lobbied Lord Rothschild 1  to achieve the Zionist 
aspirations (Philo and Berry, 2004, p. 3-4). 
During the 1st World War the imperial powers were negotiating the future of the 
Ottoman territories as it was becoming evident that the Ottoman Empire was about to 
be dissolved. Jewish leaders had extensive communication with British politicians: 
Arthur Balfour, Herbert Samuel and Mark Sykes. In 1915, Samuel (a Liberal party 
politician and banker) presented a memorandum under the name ‘The Future of 
Palestine’ in which he proposed “British annexation of Palestine [where] we might plant 
three or four million European Jews” (Weisgal, 1944, p.131; cited in United Nations, 
1990). The Zionists efforts culminated in the Balfour Declaration addressed to Lord 
Rothschild (2 November 1917) in which British support for a Jewish homeland in 
Palestine was explicit: 
I have much pleasure in conveying to you, on behalf of His Majesty's 
Government, the following declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist 
aspirations which has been submitted to, and approved by, the Cabinet. His 
Majesty’s Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a 
national home for the Jewish people, and will use its best endeavours to 
facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that 
nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of 
existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political 
status enjoyed by the Jews in any other country (William, and Staff, 2017). 
 
One of the ways used to convince the British government was that having a home for 
the Jews in Palestine would lessen the flood of Jews into Britain. The Zionists were also 
                                                             
1 Conspiracy Zone. 2017. Lord Rothschild Discusses How His Family Created Israel! 2017 







able to make connections with the League of Nations, since the League had accredited 
the mandate of Britain and France over countries in the region in the aftermath of World 
War 1 (which had new borderlines according to the Sykes-Picot treaty). The way was 
paved for more Jewish immigration to Palestine. Britain facilitated Jewish Immigration 
and the Jewish Agency worked on buying land and establishing plantations and small 
factories to provide for the new settlers (Hourani, 1991). Hourani explains: “In 1922 
Jews had formed about 11% of a total population of three quarters of a million, the rest 
being mainly Arabic speaking Muslims and Christians; by 1949 they formed more than 
30% of a population which had doubled. [...] there had been considerable investment 
both by individual Jews and by institutions formed to help in the creation of the national 
home [...] some to industrial projects: electrification (for which a Jewish company was 
given an exclusive concession), building materials, food processing. Much also went into 
the buying of land and agricultural projects” (Hourani, 1991, p. 323). For information 
about proportion of land ownership in Palestine by Jews and by Palestinians in 1947, 
please see figure and table below.  
The support that London extended for the making of a national home for Jews in 
Palestine in the first half of the 20th century was, as mentioned above, lobbied for by 
Chaim Weizmann, the Zionist leader and Manchester University academic, who later 
became the first president of Israel. According to an article entitled ‘The UK’s Pro-Israel 
Lobby in Context’, “Weizmann worked with a close-knit trio of supporters; 
the Guardian journalist Harry Sacher and the businessmen Simon Marks and Israel Sieff, 
who together ran the quintessential British clothing retailer Marks & Spencer” (Mills, 
Aked, Griffin and Miller, 2013). In cooperation with other leading Zionists, this trio 
established a number of organisations which later became Israeli national organisations: 
the World Zionist Organisation, the Jewish Agency and the Foundation Fund. Other 
institutions, the English Zionist Federation, the Joint Palestine Appeal and the Jewish 
National Fund, remained UK institutions, “Whilst affiliated to the ‘parent national 
institutions’ in Israel” (Mills, Aked, Griffin and Miller, 2013). These organisations, located 
in London’s Great Russel Street later formed the core of the UK Israel lobby. 
The Zionist Federation, which was not completely favoured by a considerable number 





new role “in public relations, political lobbying, cultural diplomacy and the promotion 
of aliyah (Jewish immigration to Israel)” (Mills, Aked, Griffin and Miller, 2013). The 
Zionists came to dominate the Board of Deputies of British Jews and one of their 
constitutional purposes is now “to advance Israel’s security, welfare and standing”. 
In the 1970’s the British Israel Communications and research Council (BICOM) was 
established. Although BICOM did not act as hard-line pro-Israel institution, it is still 
embedded within the British Zionist movement. “It has adopted a strategic approach to 
communications, employing public relations and lobbying professionals. It seeks to 
insulate policy-makers from the negative opinions about Israel encountered in the 
public” (Mills, Aked, Griffin and Miller, 2013). 
The Labour Friends of Israel was established in 1957. Israel was first ruled by the left-
wing party Mapai, which later merged with the Israel Labour Party (1968), and hence it 
enjoyed good relations with the British Labour Party. During the 1950’s the British 
Labour Party was supportive of Israel, but this support faded and the Conservatives 
subsequently identified themselves more with Israel. The Conservative Friends of Israel 
was established by Michael Fidler and in 1974 80 MP’s joined the group including 
Margret Thatcher. Funding for the Conservative Friends of Israel was mainly raised by 
Michael Sacher and other donors (businessmen and financiers). However, under Tony 
Blair there was another shift towards Labour by ‘The Funding Fathers’ (a group of very 
powerful donors). Michael Levy, one of the Funding Fathers, was introduced to Blair by 
an official at the Israeli Embassy and was later appointed as a fundraiser for Blair. “He 
became a key figure in a network of New Labour donors that allowed Blair to achieve 
financial independence from the trade unions and to build up a coterie of advisors – 
including Alastair Campbell and Jonathan Powell – who would follow him to 10 Downing 
Street” (Mills, Aked, Griffin and Miller, 2013). This new circle of donors is seen as part 
of a shift in the politics of the Labour Party to the right. 
 
4.6.2The Israel lobby in the United States: 
Any average observer of America’s foreign policy will inevitably notice unlimited 
favouring of Israel at the expense of other countries/parties in the Middle East. 





towards this theoretically foreign country and even competed in expressing their 
commitment and support for it, although they could have lively disagreements over 
many other issues such as combating terrorism, standing up to Iran’s nuclear ambitions,  
responding to China’s rising economic power and so on and so forth. By contrast, 
unanimous agreement is expressed for Israel.  
In March 2006 an essay entitled "The Israel Lobby" was published in The London Review 
of Books. A documented version of this article was also posted on the Working Papers 
website of the John F. Kennedy School of Government at the University of Harvard. This 
article was turned into a book (Mearsheimer and Walt 2007). This was the first time the 
issue of the influence of the Israel lobby on US foreign policy was openly discussed. 
The electoral campaign for the presidential election of 2008 is given as an example in 
‘The Israel Lobby and U.S Foreign Policy’: “In 2008, as in previous election years, serious 
candidates for the highest office in the land will go to considerable lengths to express 
their deep personal commitment to one foreign country – Israel – as well as their 
determination to maintain unyielding U.S. support for the Jewish state” (Mearsheimer 
and Walt, 2007, p.3). This repeated favouring of Israel by America’s politicians, whether 
Democrats or Republicans, has not been frequently questioned. On some occasions, it 
has been justified by the moral case that Israel is the only country in the region that 
“shares our values”. Senator Hillary Clinton spoke before the powerful American Israel 
Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC): “in this moment of great difficulty for Israel and great 
peril for Israel ... what is vital is that we stand by our friend and our ally and we stand by 
our values. Israel is a beacon of what’s right in a neighbourhood overshadowed by the 
wrongs of radicalism, extremism, despotism, and terrorism” (Mearsheimer and Walt, 
2007, p. 4). The other justification that some would argue for is that Israel is a vital 
strategic asset for the United States. But this latter rationale has recently been seen to 
be on shaky grounds as some Americans have started to realise that Israel is now more 
of a liability for America’s politics in the Middle East than an asset. The first justification, 
Israel being the only democratic haven in the region opposing terror and extremism, is 
also no longer convincing as the brutal treatment of Israel towards the Palestinians has 





Given the above reasons, it would be in the United States interests to pursue a more 
balanced policy towards Israel and the Palestinians. Then, what is the real reason behind 
this consistent deference from leading American politicians towards Israel? 
A programme produced and presented by Stephen Sackur ‘gives an insight in to an 
alliance that has formed in America between the traditional Zionists and the ultra-right 
Christians who call themselves Christian Zionists.’ Mearsheimer and Walt also confirm 
the power of the Israel lobby: “The real reason why American politicians are so 
deferential is that the political power of the Israel lobby. The lobby is a loose coalition 
of individuals and organisations that actively works to move U.S. foreign policy in a pro-
Israel direction” (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2007, p. 5). The pro-Israel lobby emerging from 
this alliance is far stronger than the so-called "Jewish lobby".  
Americans who challenge Israel are frequently subject to attacks from the lobby. Jon 
Stewart, the famous Jewish American political satirist and television host came under 
fire for “being both too lenient and too harsh when it comes to the topic of Israel” (Dekel, 
2014). On more than one occasion Stewart drew attention to the “asymmetrical nature 
of the conflict” during the 2014 Israeli offensive on Gaza. Although Stewart declared that 
criticising Israel does not make him anti-Israel, it did not stop some voices in the US from 






Jewish Owned Land in Palestine as of 1947 
As of 1947, Jews in Palestine owned under 7% of the Palestine's lands, and after the 
1948 war 80% of the Palestinian people were dispossessed of their homes, farms, and 
businesses.  
 









Share of Palestinian vs. Jewish land ownership as of April 1st, 1943 





Dunums (1000 sq. meters) 
Urban 76,662 70,111 146,773 
Citrus 145,572 141,188 286,760 
Bananas 2,300 1,430 3,730 
Rural built-on area 36,851 42,330 79,181 
Plantation 1,079,788 95,514 1,175,302 
Cereal land (taxable) 5,503,183 814,102 6,317,285 
Cereal land (not taxable) 900,294 51,049 951,343 
Uncultivable 16,925,805 298,523 17,224.328 
Total area: 24,670,455 1,514,247 26,184,702 
Percentage 94.22% 5.8% 100% 
Roads, railways, rivers, and lakes 135,803 
Total Area including roads, railways, etc. 26,320,505 
Figure 4- 2 
 
4.7 Islamophobia: 
Islam releases us from the blind zeal and the ardour of ignorance. 
Allah, the Almighty and Splendid, says: “Oh, Humankind! We have 
created you from male and a female, and made you into nations and 
tribes, that you may know one another. Verily, the most honourable 
before Allah, is the most pious of you” (Ar- Risālah, 1976). 
Islamophobia can be defined as an anti-Islamic sentiment or prejudice against Muslims 
or social groups identified as Muslims. In recent years, Muslims have become highly 
stereotyped in western media. Undoubtedly acts like the London bombings and the 9/11 
have contributed to this violent image of Muslim groups, but as is always the problem 
with stereotyping, there is a generalisation attributing a number of traits, most likely 
negative, to a whole social group. There is no simple answer to this multifactorial 
problem as it has roots in race and in history. There is also the ongoing issues of 
economics: the difficult economic situation in the Middle East, and social inequality, 
with a rich minority and other extremely poor segments of society. This necessarily leads 





Middle East, have no clear idea where the extremist groups are coming from and how 
they come to operate. The irony which some may not be aware of is that the vast 
majority of victims of extremism are Muslims. 
It is somewhat unclear when the term ‘Islamophobia’ was first used. In the 1980’s 
Khaleda Khan identified the problem, putting down her observations of the situation of 
ordinary Muslims in the London Borough of Brent where anti-Muslim prejudice was 
beginning to emerge. Significantly, the first generations of Muslims in Britain identified 
themselves in terms of their country of origin, but later generations have “attributed 
less emotional and cultural meaning to their country of ancestral heritage” (Allen, 2010, 
p. 7) and a shift from Asian identity to a more prominent Muslim identity has been 
recognised. Anti-Muslim feeling in Britain could be seen in terms of the general issue of 
racism. Yet, for a number of reasons, this phenomenon had many special features that 
make it stand as an independent issue on its own. In 1989, the Satanic Verses affair 
generated an air of discomfort towards the Muslim reaction. The establishment of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran and its role in inflaming the Satanic Verses affair by sentencing 
Rushdie to death in absentia was yet another development in the recent history of anti-
Islamic sentiment. Rana Kabbani (1989) wrote her ‘Letter to Christendom’ following the 
Salman Rushdie affair: “This book is the modest contribution by a woman who had been 
a sort of underground Muslin before she was forced into the open by the Salman 
Rushdie affair” (Kabbani, 1989, p.ix).  
In 1990 Kalim Siddiqi published what is known as the Muslim Manifesto, in which he 
accused the political parties and mass media of adopting a negative discourse about 
Muslims in an attempt to turn Muslims into an oppressed minority. The Manifesto was 
followed by the establishment of the Muslim Parliament, and both attracted extensive 
media coverage, which was generally negative; “[…] the mediatised form of Muslim 
identity was one that from the outset was overtly represented in negative frames and 
one that was highly politicised […]” (Allen, 2010, p. 12).  
The United Nations acknowledged Islamophobia as a global phenomenon alongside 
racism and anti-Semitism without giving a definition. At this point, Islamophobia 





historical dimensions and one that is recognised on many levels including academia, 
media, and policy making. In her book ‘The Enemy Within’, Baroness Warsi discusses the 
fact that some people in Britain believe that Islam is a violent religion. She lists a number 
of statistical sources which support her view: “COMERS in 2016 found that 43 per cent 
of people polled felt that Islam is a negative force in the UK, and 72 per cent agreed that 
most people in the UK have a negative view of Islam. […] A YouGov poll conducted in 
2015 found that 55 per cent of people agreed with the statement “There is a 
fundamental clash between Islam and the values of British Society’” (Warsi, 2016, p. 
141). 
Many of the theories of Islamophobia have highlighted the historical factor in the issue. 
Weller (2001; cited in Bakali, 2016, p.11), affirms that “Islamophobia is undeniably 
rooted in the historical inheritance of a conflictual relationship that has developed over 
many centuries involving the overlap of religion, politics and warfare”. 
In the few decades following the death of the Prophet Mohammad, Muslims were able 
to conquer vast areas which were largely ruled and populated by Christians. Damascus, 
Baghdad and of course Jerusalem came under Muslim rule. In Europe (Roman 
Christendom) there was a feeling of threat from the unknown other, while the absence 
of direct contact augmented a discourse of antipathy towards a danger in the East. 
The most confrontational direct contact with Muslims was with the Crusades (1095 -
1291), refer to Crusades 5.6.8, which started following a call from Pope Urban II to 
liberate the Holy Land (Jerusalem) from the infidels, or Saracens. Although this 
militaristic pilgrimage had underlying internal political and economic reasons, it seemed 
to have the necessary religious element to convince many. After this direct contact with 
the Muslim World, the Crusaders did not go back with a deep understanding of the 
Muslims or the Islamic World but rather with more fantastical and romanticised picture 
of the East. The violent and long period of conflict helped in enhancing an image of 
Muslims as barbaric enemies of Christianity. 
In the centuries that followed, the influence of the church weakened in Europe. There 
was less concentration on the interpretation of Islam or representation of Muslims from 





culture and civilisation was inherently different and obtuse to its European/Western 
counterpart” (Allen. 2010, p. 28). The image of Muslims and the Prophet remained 
though much the same as in the Crusaders’ myths. “These stories, and others like them 
have been used over the centuries to justify a depiction of the Prophet as plagiarist, 
libertine and opportunist, a picture which is with us still” (Kabbani, 1989, p. 8). 
In the 1700s, there was a strong interest in Islamic civilisation from a cultural angle, 
maintaining a superior stand towards the East especially from an intellectual 
perspective. This is evident in the travelogues which some members of the western elite 
wrote after travelling to the Middle East to experience Muslim culture. In 1979, Edward 
Said analysed and presented these writings as a romanticised depiction of the Orient 
which continued to be portrayed as backward, dreamy, and posing itself as the 
contradiction of the occident, which was more objective, practical and advanced. The 
Orient remained in the eyes of these Orientalists a place which can be feared or 
controlled. “The general basis of Orientalist thought is an imaginative and yet drastically 
polarized geography dividing the world into two unequal parts, the larger, “different” 
one called the Orient, the other, also known as “our” world, called the Occident or the 
west. […] Insofar as Islam has always been seen as belonging to the Orient, its particular 
fate within the general structure of Orientalism has been to be looked at first of all as 
one monolithic thing, and then with a very special hostility and fear” (Said, 1997, p. 4).  
Many Muslim countries in the Middle East moved away from Islamic rule after gaining 
independence from European mandates between the 1940’s and the 1960’s. Although 
the type of rule in many of these countries of Muslim majority was not democratic, it 
was secular. During the 1960’s and 1970’s, the relationship between the Middle East 
and the West (principally Western Europe and the United States) was not overshadowed 
by an Islamic-Christian conflict as in previous periods. Saudi Arabia as an Islamic state 
did not represent a Muslim civilisation in the same sense as the Arab Caliphate or the 
Ottoman Empire. Rather it re-presented a number of the backward images of Islam 
found in some history books and travelogues as well as in many westerners’ mentality: 
polygamy, sex separation, and restricted women’s rights as well application of Islamic 
worshipping practices by force.  Hence, the inherited images of Muslims in the previous 





stimulated when there was a rise in Islamic fundamentalist groups or at the time of the 
Satanic Verses affair. It is very likely that the media have built upon these 
images/stereotypes and enhanced the notion of the backward, barbaric ‘other’. 
Stereotypes of Muslims not only affect the Middle East and Islamic world more 
generally. They are also influenced by, and influence, the perceptions of Muslims living 
in the West. This is the topic of the next section. 
 
4.7.1 Reasons for Emigration: 
The waves of Muslim emigration to the UK overlapped with the two world wars as there 
was a need for labourers to work in the factories. “As demand for labourers increased 
whilst our boys were away fighting in the First World War, Britain saw dramatic and 
visible increases in Muslim populations in small towns and cities near the shipping 
industry and the dock” (Warsi, 2017, p. 17). However, many Muslim emigrants in the UK 
arrived here in the 1950’s and 1960’s especially from India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. 
There was a culture of migration in these countries that is related to economic factors 
and social status. Emigration intensified due to family links and more education 
opportunities in these countries. For example, in India education became more available 
for the middle and lower classes. The feudal system also collapsed and allowed better 
opportunities for a wider sector of people. Educated young men found it easier to 
migrate and gain higher incomes and social statuses. The main reasons for migration 
were study, work and the fact of easier travel opportunities abroad (Ali, 2007, pp. 37-
58). Another category of emigrants were the poorly skilled workers who arrived in the 
UK to work in British factories during the 1960’s. With the industrial recession of the 
1970’s these workers became redundant, and over time they came to constitute a 
relatively impoverished community both economically and socially. 
 
4.7.2 Muslims in France 
France is the home of the biggest Muslim minority in Europe with around 4-5million 
Muslims, and as such provides a good case study of the relationships between Muslims 
and non-Muslims in Europe more generally. The majority of the Muslim population in 





were former French colonies. Most of the Muslim emigrants arrived in France in the 
aftermath of the 2nd World War to cover for the shortage of labour caused by the war.  
The relationship between these immigrants and the existing French population has been 
affected by the problematic colonial decades, and at the same time the indigenous 
French were not welcoming to new comers. There has been some circulation between 
Algeria and France since the early 20th century. Hundreds of thousands of Algerians died 
for France in the First World War. Acknowledging the ‘blood debt,’ France built the 
Mosque of Paris in 1926 in the heart of Paris. Yet, the highest numbers of Muslim 
emigrants arriving from Algeria was in the post-World War Two-era to meet “Labour 
needs of France” (Maillard, 2005, p.64). Those were allocated housing in the outskirts of 
the big cities, which were later called banlieues. Many of these banlieues, or suburbs, 
have become Muslim ghettos. In 1953 the Algerian War of Independence broke out and 
the French authorities thought that the living conditions of Algerian workers in France 
needed immediate improvement and constructed “residences for bachelors”. However, 
“Algerian workers who could not find access to bachelors’ residences or families without 
housing have settled in makeshift shantytowns stigmatized by the propaganda of the 
NLF” (Maillard, 2005, p.65). By the year 1957, the French authorities changed their 
stance towards the Muslim/Algerian population in France and attempts at assimilation 
were replaced my monitoring and control of emigration. The economic slump of the 
1970’s turned many of the French Muslims who were initially received in France to work 
in factories into unemployed and impoverished communities. The strong sense of 
cultural and national identity among the French has also contributed to them not 
accepting Muslims though many of these Muslims were born in France.  
The social and economic situation of the French Muslim community has not improved 
much and is currently rather difficult, with unemployment at 20% and a high level of 
crime that is not even accurately reported as police frequently ignore Muslim areas. 
Serious riots took place in 2005, which drew the attention of the French government to 
the fact that it needs to improve their living conditions. The general feeling of the 





The French introduced the concept of laïcité ‘secularism’ in the late 19th century, which 
surprisingly has no agreed definition. Regardless of the number of ways in which French 
politicians/thinkers expressed their views of laïcité, it is still fundamentally a secular 
concept that stresses freeing society from religious dogmas. A law separating the state 
and church was passed in 1905. The concept developed with the establishment of the 
French republics (there have been 5 republics already, the 5th one established in 1959). 
It seems that French secularism has not worked very well with the Muslim community 
as they feel it has been used to restrict their freedom of religious practice. Thus, in 2004 
the veil was banned in French schools (banning of ‘ostentatious’ religious symbols). On 
the other hand many French feel that Muslims have a problem of integration in French 
society and culture. However, Wolfreys provides this understanding of laïcité:  
At the core of the French Republican notion of citizenship is the belief that 
shared values, rather than ties of blood or race, are fundamental to the 
relationship between individuals and the state. Identification with the 
Republic’s ‘universal’ values takes precedence over particular, individual 
interests or affiliations based on gender, sexuality, ethnicity or religion. State 
institutions play a central role in disseminating these values, acting as 
‘pathways to integration’ (Wolfreys, 2018, p. 89). 
The veil issue in France started in 1989 when a number of schoolgirls wore headscarves 
at school in a small town north of Paris. The girls were excluded from school “[...] on the 
grounds that their veils were not compatible with the laïque [laïcité] principles of the 
French state schooling system” (Gemie, 2010, p. 19). The issue surfaced again in 2003 
when two Jewish girl converts attended school with headscarves on and again were 
excluded from school. There were three dimensions to the issue of the girls wearing veils 
at school, which can be summarised as follows:  
1- Public concern with the condition of schooling 
2- Political machinations 
3- Laïcité and the revival of the republic 
President Chirac himself described wearing the veil as an aggressive act, though some 





Catholic nuns were not seen as such. Muslim communities in France started to believe 
that laïque principles are applied selectively and this widened the gap between them 
and the host community and establishment. From a secular French point of view, Milton 
Virost says “Schools have a mission to neutralize religious differences between students 
while imbuing them with French civilisation” (Viorst, 1996). The Muslim 
counterargument is that “wearing Hijab at school is not a religious symbol but a cultural 
artefact” (Viorst, 1996). In 2010, France became the first European country to ban 
women from wearing the Niqab or burqa (the face cover).  
As mentioned above the sensitive relationship between France and its Muslim 
population dates back to 1830, the year of the French invasion of Algeria. Taking into 
consideration that Algeria and other North African French colonies were also part of the 
Orient, and that we can thus apply the orientalist perspectives to them, we can presume 
that the sensitive relationship dates even long before 1830. This is illustrated by 
statements by a number of French officials. Jacqueline Costa-Lascoux, who was a 
member of the Stasi Commission on the Veil issue stated: “Islam opposes its concepts 
to ours, the first of which are LaÏcité and Tolerance”. For writers such as Regis Debray 
and Michèle Vianès, Islam is at best a problem to be solved and at worst a threat to be 
defeated. Yet, the long years of antagonistic confrontations with the French colonisers 
must have shaped a more difficult relationship between the North Africans particularly 
Algerians, who make up about 1.5 million of the Muslim community in France. Despite 
the many years of relentless efforts by the French to impose assimilation into French 
culture (by introducing technical advances and enforcing French education in schools) 
on the Algerians and other North African peoples, the French had limited success, 
particularly given the consistent inequality between the colonised and the coloniser. It 
is also interesting to note the claim by the French colonisers was that they were in 
Algeria to free women from the oppression of Islam and apparently the veil was a 
symbol of that oppression in their eyes. The implementation of laÏcité seemed very 
much concerned with the appearance of Muslim women in particular “Since 1989, when 
the issue of laÏcité came to the fore, measures aimed at upholding or preserving France’s 
secular traditions at both national and local level have primarily been concerned with 





During the relatively long period of colonisation, the French established settlements in 
Algeria in which about one million Europeans lived. Those Europeans were referred to 
as the pieds noirs (‘black feet’) named after the colour of their leather boots. The French 
had in mind their welfare in Algeria when they were taking measures concerning the 
Muslim and particularly the European community in Algeria. Thus, some of the 
improvements and integration strategies aimed at the Muslim population in France 
were a trade-off for securing privileges for the European settlers in Algeria. “The French 
authorities in their negotiations with the NLF [National Liberation Front] had in mind to 
trade improved status of the Algerian immigrants for the future status of the Europeans 
living in Algeria” (Maillard, 2005, p.66). 
Another episode in this problematic relationship was the Islamic Salvation Front which 
won the Algerian elections in 1990, but was later associated with horrific acts of terror. 
The French people’s image of Islam as a violent religion was intensified.  
The hard economic and social conditions suffered by the Muslim community have 
contributed to making these Muslim ghettos or banlieues a hotbed for Muslim 
radicalism. “More than 1,200 French Muslims have joined ISIS in Syria – more Jihadist 
than any other European country” (The Week, 2015). Most Muslims were opposed to 
the Charlie Hebdo attack in 2015, in which Islamist militants attacked the offices of the 
French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo, which had a record of anti-Islamist (and even 
anti-Muslim) coverage. However, these Muslims also criticised the mockery of the 
Prophet, seeing it as symbolic of the humiliation they themselves experience. 
There have been Muslim public figures who adopted a contrary attitude towards the veil 
issue and the general Islamic viewpoint in regard with the position of French Muslims. 
For example Chahdortt Djavann (Iranian in origin) was a frequent public speaker on 
French television during the years of the war of the veil. Her first famous publication was 
“Down with the Veil” in 2003. The 47-page pamphlet provided a media context in which 
Djavann’s work flourished and received very good reviews from French magazines and 
newspapers (Gemie, 2010). Djavann introduced herself as a ferocious defender of the 
principle of laїcite and launched a harsh attack on the veil pronouncing it as “a way of 





of the most conspicuous features of Djavann’s views is that she does not acknowledge 
more than one version of Islam (e.g. extremist vs. moderate). She declares that the 
origin of Islamism is Islam.  
There is, however another point of view towards these emigrants which considered 
accepting them an expression of the founding values of the French Republic “by giving 




The chapter has presented the theoretical and philosophical framework of this research 
study. It has also defined the resources, topics of the data, and introduced the 
dimensions and levels of the research methodology of the data analysis. Finally, it 
provided a socio-political and cultural introduction to the two main topic of the selected 









This chapter deals with the data analysis. It provides the directly relevant explanations 
and guidelines that inform the data analysis and clarifies any possible ambiguities in 
addition to examples of analysed texts. The chapter comprises twelve sections and a 
conclusion (5.2-5.13). Section 5.2 provides a detailed description of how the analysis will 
be conducted, which sub-categories have been devised and how the reader stereotypes 
have been elicited. It also presents the classifications of the stereotypes/ideologies and 
their numerical grades for the purpose of processing the results (quantitative analysis). 
Section 5.3 gives background information about issues, locations, bodies and figures 
which have been mentioned in the Israel/Palestine conflict texts, and it is a pre requisite 
to introduce the reader to the contextual setting of the utterance. In section 5.4 an 
example of Israel/Palestine conflict data analysis is presented followed by a graph 
showing the overall final results of the analysis of Israel/Palestine texts, that is section 
5.4.1. Section 5.5 takes us to the second theme of the texts analysed, which is 
‘Islamophobia’. Another fact sheet that includes background information on issues, 
locations, bodies and figures mentioned in the Islamophobia-related texts is provided. 
Section 5.6 covers a discussion of a number of terms that can be controversial from 
socio-political, or even cultural and historical as well as translational perspectives 
between English and Arabic. The section has eight sub-sections. Section 5.7 justifies 
giving similar weight to the pro-Shia and pro-Sunni reader stereotypes/ideologies, which 
have been essentially extrapolated. Since the Islamophobia-related texts have been sub-
grouped according to country except for one general text, section 5.8 introduces the 
reader to the background of the Syrian conflict, and then presents an example of the 
Syria-related data analysis in 5.8.1 followed by graphs that show the final results of the 
quantitative analysis of the Syria-related texts in section 5.8.2. Section 5.9 informs the 
reader about the Iraq conflict, and a graph showing final quantitative results for the Iraq-
related texts is presented in section 5.9.1. Section 5.10 sets the background to the 
Yemeni conflict, and in section 5.10.1 a graph that illustrates the quantitative results of 





Arabia-related texts, and a graph that represents the average results of the Saudi-
related texts is shown in section 5.11. There is no section devoted to the Saudi status 
quo since there is not a raging conflict in Saudi Arabia, and a considerable volume of 
information associated with Saudi Arabia has been given in the fact sheets and in the 
various data analysis texts.  Section 5.12 displays a graph that represents the overall 
results of the quantitative analysis of all the Islamophobia-related texts.  
 
5.2 Guidelines to data analysis 
As has been mentioned in previous chapters, the data is collected from Reuters and the 
BBC news services during May 2016. The texts are aligned to two major themes: the 
Israel/Palestine question and Islamophobia. The Islamophobia texts are grouped 
according to the topic of the text, so we have a number of texts under Iraq, Saudi Arabia, 
Syria and Yemen, and one general text. The analysis is carried out using the Discourse 
Historical Approach (chapter 3).  
For each data analysis, I have devised in addition to the categories put forward by Wodak 
(2001), another category: ‘justification for using a particular strategy’. The strategies 





5- Intensification, mitigation 
I have also distinguished between two types of perspectivation: direct and indirect. 
Direct perspectivation is when the news service is adopting a certain perspective. 
Indirect perspectivation is when the news service is reporting someone’s or some party’s  
perspective.  
 
For some of the examples, I elaborated on the category ‘justification for using a 
particular strategy’ by adding four sub-categories: Basic analysis, Background facts, 





sub-categories have been used in most of the analyses, particularly in nomination and 
perspectivation, but not so much in predication. ‘Predication’ is a stereotype, a label or 
an evaluative description in its own right used by the news service itself, so it does not 
require an addition of a likely stereotype. The sub-categories of Basic analysis, 
Background facts, Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies and News service 
stereotypes/ideologies have not been used in mitigation, intensification or 
argumentation. Also, these sub-categories are overlooked when the reference or the 
quotation is not essential to the overall analysis. However, a concise justification without 
sub-categories is given in all cases except in argumentation where a definition of the 
fallacy is provided. Each reference (nomination) is analysed once, and the same goes for 
predication, although predications are not frequently repeated while nominations are.  
For the Arabic texts analysis, another category is added, which is the translation of the 
example into English.  
The format of the analytical tables is as follows: 
 
Strategy Objective Devices Justification for using 
a particular strategy 
Example 








stereotype ideologies:  
 
Figure 5- 1 
 
The basic analysis (justification) is provided for each of the examples even if the heading 
‘basic analysis’ is not given. 
Some of the background facts/information are provided in an introductory section to 
the data analysis. Others are provided in two fact sheets, one for each theme (Israel-
Palestine question and Islamophobia). The reader will be referred to the specific section. 
For the Islamophobia-related texts, some key terms such as ‘Islamist’, ‘jihadist’, 





background where necessary in separate sections. A background to each of the 
devastating conflicts in Iraq, Syria and Yemen is also provided to help the reader 
understand the ideology and stereotypes of the news service and that of both the British 
and Arab readers. Finally some background facts are mentioned in the flow of the 
analysis under ‘background facts’.  
Likely reader stereotypes are presented whenever available. By ‘available’, I mean 
whenever a realistic stereotype has been discerned from opinion polls, reviews and 
newspaper articles. In the case of the British reader opinion regarding the Israel-
Palestine question, the YouGov poll shows that the British opinion is divided between 
those who are pro-Israel, pro-Palestinian, those who have no specific allegiance towards 
either side, and finally those who are simply not informed about the issue. For British 
public opinion, I have used the links below in addition to a significant number of 








For a complete list of the sources consulted in this regard, see Appendix 1.The Israel- 
Palestine conflict has been going on for a long time (over 70 years). During this time, 
the conflict has gone through many phases and British public opinion has fluctuated 
according to various developments and of course media influence. The wars on Gaza 
have certainly shifted British public opinion more to the Palestinian side. However, the 
rise of Islamist fundamentalism can reflect negatively on the Palestinian cause, taking 
into consideration that Hamas is an Islamist paramilitary movement. The likely reader 
stereotypes for the Israel-Palestine question are structured along those lines. Most of 
the examples of the Israel-Palestine related texts entail one or two reader stereotypes, 
and in very few cases three or four. 
Arabic public opinion, which has generally been supportive of the Palestinians or what 





been affected by a number of setbacks, change of priorities and the emergence of Iran 
as a regional super-power, which some Arab countries feel is threatening. Discerning 
Arabic public opinion towards the Palestinian issue is no longer a straightforward 
matter, especially given that opinion polls are not frequently conducted in the Arab 
world. However, I have been able to refer to the following in addition of course to 
newspaper articles and the views of the main Arab TV channels like Al Jazeera and Al 
Arabia, which currently represent two polarised opinions on a number of issues 
including the Israel-Palestine question. Again there are one or two and in a few cases 


















For a complete list of the sources consulted in this regard, see Appendix 1.  
The news service stereotypes/ideologies are cited in the text.  
The stereotypes/ideologies of the BBC texts (Israel-Palestine question) whether reader 






2- Fairly pro-Palestinian 
3- Neutral 
4- Fairly pro-Israel  
5- Pro-Israel 
6- The stereotype is not classified (not relevant to the topic to be measured). 
 
For working out results, a numeric categorisation is devised as follows: 
1- Pro-Palestinian  2 
2- Fairly pro-Palestinian  1 
3- Neutral   0 
4- Fairly pro-Israel              -1 
5- Pro-Israel                        -2 
6- The stereotype is not classified (not relevant to the topic to be measured). 
 
Thus, the results for any individual element range between 2 and -2. Taking averages of 
results for individual elements, the following classification has been used. 
 
 2  is classified as ‘very strongly pro-Palestinian’ 
 1. 5 to 1.85 is classified as ‘strongly pro-Palestinian’  
 1.1 to 1.49 is classified as ‘clearly pro-Palestinian’ 
 0.6 to 1 is classified as ‘fairly pro-Palestinian’ 
 0.2 to 0.59 is classified as ‘slightly pro-Palestinian’ 
 Anything below 0.2 but above 0 is classified as ‘very slightly pro-Palestinian’ 
 0 is classified as ‘neutral’ 
 Anything above -0.2 but below 0 is classified as ‘very slightly pro-Israel’ 
 -0.2 to -0.59 is classified as ‘slightly pro-Israel’ 
 -0.6 to -1 is classified as ‘fairly pro-Israel’ 
 -1.1 to -1.49 is classified as ‘clearly pro-Israel’ 
 -1.5 to -1.85 is classified as ‘strongly pro-Israel’ 
 -2 is classified as ‘very strongly pro-Israel’  
 
As for the Islamophobia-related texts, again for the stereotype of the British reader, I 
referred to surveys and opinion polls in addition to a significant number of newspaper 















For a complete list of the sources consulted in this regard, see Appendix 1. 
A lot of the literature in the Islamophobia-related texts revolves around the Sunni-Shia 
divide. However the British reader does not particularly differentiate between Sunnis 
and Shia. The concept of the two types of Muslims, Sunni and Shia is relatively new to 
the British reader. As explained in ‘Islamophobia’ 4.7, there is a generally negative 
perception of Islam which has been increased by the recent terror attacks and the rise 
of Islamic fundamentalism. Refer to Islamism and Jihadism 5.6.1 and 5.6.2. On the other 
hand, a conspicuous polarisation between Sunni and Shia has emerged in the 
Arab/Islamic worlds. Hence, the reader stereotype on controversial issues, because they 
are relevant to the Sunni Shia divide which has regional and sometimes international 
dimensions, will be reflected in two reader stereotypes. For further information on this, 
refer to reader stereotypes case 5.7. I have also referred to numerous newspaper 
articles and surveys and opinion polls whenever possible to provide as representative as 
possible stereotypes/ideologies of the Arab reader towards groups or parties of the 

















For a complete list of the sources consulted in this regard, see Appendix 1. However, it 
should be highlighted that sometimes the likely reader stereotypes for both themes 
(Israel/Palestine question and Islamophobia are not always materialised in two or three 
stereotypes which reflect the varied attitudes of the reader. This is because the context 
of the media text may suppress or surface some of the readers’ opinions. 
The stereotypes/ideologies of the Reuters texts on Islamophobia, whether reader or 
news service stereotype/ideology are classified as follows: 
A. Islam and Sectarian Division 
B. Sunni Islam 
C. Shia Islam 
 
For working out results, the tables were transferred to Excel sheets. A numeric 
categorisation was devised as follows: 
A. Islam and Sectarian Division 
 Very positive image of Islam and sectarian division   2 
 Fairly positive image of Islam and sectarian division  1 
 Neutral        0 
 Fairly negative image Islam and sectarian division             - 1 
 Very negative image of Islam and sectarian division            - 2 
 The stereotype is not classified (not relevant to the topic to be measured). 
 
B. Sunni Islam 
 Very positive image of Sunni Islam  2  
 Fairly positive image of Sunni Islam   1 
 Neutral     0 
 Fairly negative image Sunni Islam             - 1 
 Very negative image of Sunni Islam             - 2 
 The stereotype is not classified (not relevant to the topic to be measured).  
  
 C. Shia Islam 
 Very positive image of Shia Islam   2  
 Fairly positive image of Shia Islam   1  
 Neutral      0  





 Very negative image of Shia Islam             - 2 
 The stereotype is not classified (not relevant to the topic to be measured). 
 
Thus, the results for any individual element range between 2 and -2. Taking averages 
of results for individual elements, the following classification has been used. 
 
 2  is classified as ‘extremely positive’ 
 1. 5 to 1.85 is classified as ‘strongly positive’  
 1.1 to 1.49 is classified as ‘clearly positive’ 
 0.6 to 1 is classified as ‘fairly positive’ 
 0.2 to 0.59 is classified as ‘slightly positive’ 
 Anything below 0.2 but above 0 is classified as ‘very slightly positive’ 
 0 is classified as ‘neutral’ 
 Anything above -0.2 but below 0 is classified as ‘very slightly negative’ 
  -0.2 to -0.59 is classified as ‘slightly negative’ 
 -0.6 to -1 is classified as ‘fairly negative’ 
 -1.1 to -1.49 is classified as ‘clearly negative’ 
 -1.5 to -1.85 is classified as ‘strongly negative’ 
 -2 is classified as ‘extremely negative’  
 
5.3 Fact sheet (Israel/Palestine Conflict) 
 
(1) Avigdor Liberman: 
Avigdor Liberman was born in Moldova 1958, and emigrated to Israel in 1978. He served 
in the IDF and obtained a bachelor degree in International Relations and Political Science 
from the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. He has served as member of the Knesset since 
1998. He was the Director General of the Likud Movement, and later a director General 
of the Prime Minister’s office. In 1999 he founded and headed the Yisrael Beiteinu party. 
“Yisrael Beitenu claims to be "a national movement with the clear vision to follow in the 
brave path of [Zionist leader] Zev Jabotinsky [which] fulfils the three cardinal principles 
of Zionism: Aliyah (Jewish immigration to Israel), settlement and security movements" 
(BBC, 2016). Yisrael Beitenu is formed of mainly Russian speaking members. It very much 
encourages Jewish immigration, and takes a hard line towards the peace talks with 
Palestinians and the integration of Israeli Arabs. Liberman lives in a Jewish settlement in 





assumed the position of Foreign minister twice in two Netanyahu governments: from 
2009-2012 and from 2013-2015 (MFA, 2013).  
 
(2) Benjamin Netanyahu: 
The longest-serving Israeli Prime Minister, and the first to be born in Israel in 1949 – one 
year after the establishment of Israel. He has held many senior positions starting with 
Deputy Chief of the Israeli ambassador in the US in 1982. Netanyahu also served as an 
Israeli ambassador to the United Nations from 1984 to 1988. In 1988 he won a seat in 
the Knesset for the Likud, and became Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs. In 1993 he 
was elected chairman for the Likud party and in 1996 he became the youngest Israeli 
prime minister ever. He assumed the finance portfolio in 2003 in a cabinet led by Ariel 
Sharon. He took office again in 2009 and was re-elected in 2013.  
Netanyahu has been a fierce critic of Oslo Accords between Israel and the Palestinians. 
He is known for his three no’s “no withdrawal from the Golan Heights, no discussion 
regarding Jerusalem and no preconditioned negotiations” (Haaretz, 2017b). He has also 
encouraged building Jewish settlements in the occupied West Bank. Due to this policy 
along with continuous construction in East Jerusalem, peace talks with Palestinians 
collapsed in late 2010 (BBC, 2015). Although he expressed initial acceptance for a two 
state solution, he put rigorous conditions for its establishment: “During his current term, 
Netanyahu has expressed acceptance of a Palestinian state alongside Israel, in principal. 
However, he has also stipulated that any future Palestinian state should be fully 
demilitarized, with no control of its airspace, and said that Jerusalem would be 
undivided Israeli territory. He also stated that the Palestinians must recognize Israel as 
the Jewish national state with an undivided Jerusalem, and he has rejected a right of 
return for Palestinian refugees” (Haaretz, 2017a). 
 
(3) B’Tselem: 
The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories. It was 
founded in 1989 during the first intifada by Israeli academics and activists of left-wing 





committed by the Israeli forces or settlers against the Palestinians (killings, injuries, 
house demolitions, collective punishments and detentions. It publishes reports, photos 
and other evidence that supports its documentations (Firbanks, 2015). 
 
(4) Gaza Strip:  
“The world’s largest open-air prison”, as it is frequently called in the media. The Strip is 
about 360 sq km and is inhabited by 2 million Palestinians who have been besieged by 
Israel since June 2007 when Hamas formed its own government after failing to form a 
unity government with the Palestinian Authority (The Guardian, 2007) and after a battle 
over control of security forces. Almost half the population are Palestinian Arab refugees 
who were deported from areas where the state of Israel was established. Most of those 
refugees live in impoverished, squalid refugee camps and are mainly sustained by the 
aid provided by UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees 
in the Near East) (Encyclopaedia Britannica, ND). 
Gaza was part of historical Palestine. After the establishment of the state of Israel in 
1948, it fell under Egyptian military administration until 1967 when it was captured by 
Israel along with the West Bank and East Jerusalem. In 2005, Israel withdrew from Gaza 
in what is termed the Israel disengagement “Israeli army and settlers pulled out of Gaza, 
but it retains control of borders, airspace and ports” (Al Jazeera, 2017a). In 2007, Hamas, 
a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, took over the Strip after a short war with Fatah 
(Palestinian National Liberation Movement), a main faction of the Palestine Liberation 
Organisation.   
In December/January 2008/2009 Israel launched an assault on Gaza (Operation Cast 
Lead) which lasted for three weeks, and aimed according to Israel to halt Hamas 
activities and blast the “infrastructure of terror”, which apparently included police 
stations, homes, and mosques (The Guardian, 2009). The assault caused the death of 
1,440 Palestinians, and 13 Israelis (Zanotti, 2010). According to Al Jazeera, 920 of the 
Palestinian deaths were civilians while the Congressional Research Service based in 
Washington said “[...] approximately 1,440 Palestinians have died (with some 





dead (including four civilians) on the Israeli side” (Zanotti, 2010). The Goldstone report 
for the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict headed by Richard 
Goldstone “concluded that both Israeli forces and Palestinian armed groups committed 
grave violations of international law, including war crimes and possibly crimes against 
humanity” (Amnesty, 2009a). Both Israel and Hamas found the report biased. Judge 
Goldstone was accused by Israel supporters of being “a "blood libel", a false accusation 
that had been used to demonise Jews in the past” (Urquhart, 2011) and personally “[..] 
regretted aspects of the report that bears his name, [..]” (The Irish Times, 2011) 2. 
However, the report remained and all other report authors maintained their original 
position.  
On 14 November 2012, Israel mounted another operation “Operation Pillar of Defence” 
an 8-day campaign in Gaza by launching airstrikes and killing a Hamas military leader. 
The Israeli forces killed 167 Palestinians, including 87 civilians (Al Jazeera, 2017a). 
“Human Rights Watch field investigations found 14 strikes by aerial drones or other 
aircraft for which there was no indication of a legitimate military target at the site at the 
time of the attack. In four other cases, attacks may have targeted Palestinian fighters, 
but appeared to use indiscriminate means or caused disproportionate harm to civilians 
(Human Rights Watch, 2013). 
In July 2014 Israel launched its operation “Protective Edge” which lasted for 50 days. 
Israel said its offensive came as a response to Palestinian rocket fire (NBC News, 2014a). 
However, the Israeli attempt to stop rocket fire killed 2,139 Palestinians amongst whom 
were 490 children. 11,000 Palestinians were wounded, up to 500,000 Palestinians were 
displaced and 20,000 homes were destroyed (Dearden, 2014). 
Life in Gaza for the majority of Gazans is exemplified by hardship, poverty and immense 
difficulties. All basic everyday activities are a challenge.  
 
(5) Hamas: 
                                                             
2 The Irish Times. 2011. Co-authors reject retraction by Gaza report chairman. [online]. 






A Palestinian Islamist organisation founded by Sheikh Ahmad Yasin in 1987. The 
acronym ‘Hamas’ stands for Islamic Resistance Movement in Arabic.  Hamas is a branch 
of the Muslim Brotherhood, which believes in liberating historic Palestine (including land 
from 1948 when the state of Israel was first established) from Israeli control, as stated 
in its charter. Its armed wing is called Izz al-Din al-Qassam brigades. However, Hamas 
and Islamic Jihad were designated as terror groups by some international powers: 
“Hamas as a whole, or in some cases its military wing, is designated a terrorist group by 
Israel, the US, EU, and UK, as well as other powers” (BBC, 2017a). 
 
Hamas established civil service institutions (clinics, schools and charities) in Gaza and 
the West Bank, which gained popularity for it. It also worked on building its own rocket 
arsenal. Hamas manufactured Al Qassam rockets locally, while other rockets were 
smuggled in from Iran. However, all its rocket arsenal was of limited range and quality 
(Business Insider, 2014).  
Hamas, along with some other Islamic factions, denounced the Oslo accords concluded 
with Israel in 1993 and, as a result, it engaged in inconsistent clashes with Israeli forces 
(Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2017). The confrontations intensified with the collapse of the 
Israeli/Palestinian peace talks and the start of the Second Intifada in September 2000.  
In 2006 Hamas won a sweeping victory over Fatah (Palestine National Liberation 
Movement) in elections for the Palestinian Legislative Council. The two major factions 
had differences which culminated in a short war that ended in Hamas taking over the 
Gaza Strip and Fatah taking control of the West Bank. In the same year, Israel imposed 
a blockade on Hamas-ruled Gaza which involved power cuts, border closures by both 
Israel and Egypt, and heavy restrictions on imports. In order to obtain basic goods, as 
well as smuggle rockets, Hamas built long tunnels that stretched under the border into 
Egypt, while others, intended for military purposes, went into Israel. Israel targeted 
these tunnels, which it considered a means for Hamas to carry out attacks on Israel and 
achieve its terrorist objectives (Business Insider, 2014).  
Israel has carried out numerous assassinations of Hamas leaders and key figures since 
the 1990’s (Younes, 2018). Israel launched three major military campaigns against Gaza 





through tunnels) in 2008, 2012 and 2014. The campaigns caused thousands of deaths 
and injuries amongst Palestinians and dozens amongst Israelis (BBC, 2017a). 
Hamas, which was supported by Iran and had offices in Syria, changed loyalty in 2012 in 
the aftermath of the Syrian revolution: “Hamas relations with the governments of Syria 
and Iran, two of its primary sources of support, were strained in 2011 when Hamas 
leaders in Damascus conspicuously avoided expressing support for a crackdown by 
Syrian armed forces against anti-government protestors inside the country” 
(Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2017). By 2012, Hamas had formed a new alliance with Egypt, 
which at that time had an elected Muslim Brotherhood (Freedom and Justice Party) 
government, and Qatar. However, this alliance did not last long, as the Muslim 
Brotherhood government in Egypt was toppled by a military coup. As a result, Hamas 
became unwelcome and was designated a terrorist group in Egypt. Hamas, which found 
itself in a desperate situation, had to re-open channels of communication with Iran.  
Some efforts at reconciliation with the Palestinian Authority have been made under the 
patronage of the Egyptian government during the past decade, the most recent one 
being signed in 2017: “Hamas and Fatah have signed a landmark reconciliation deal in 
Cairo in a key step towards ending a decade-long rift between the two Palestinian 
factions” (BBC, 2017b). 
 
(6) Hebron: 
Hebron is a Palestinian city in the West Bank which was occupied by Israel in 1967. 
According to Ramsay and Dwaik: 
Hebron, the largest city in the West Bank, is unique among other West Bank 
cities in that illegal Israeli settlements are distributed not only at its 
periphery, but also in the heart of the city, including in Tel Rumeida. These 
are accompanied by military checkpoints spread out over the city centre 
preventing the free movement of its inhabitants, and dividing the city into 
isolated sections which have become a sort of exhibition of contemporary 
apartheid, or - from the point of view of the terrorised inhabitants who 





The city has a fairly conservative social background and it has an important Muslim site – 
the Ibrahimi Mosque or the Sanctuary of Abraham. In the Hebrew tradition, the mosque 
is called Cave of Machpelah or Cave of Patriarchs where the tombs of Abraham, Isaac, 
Jacob, Sarah and Lea are found. In February 1994, an American Israeli Baruch Goldstein 
opened fire on Palestinians who had gathered to pray during Ramadan. He killed 29 
Palestinians and injured 125. The incident triggered protests throughout the West Bank 
and another 20-26 Palestinians were killed and 120 injured during clashes with the IDF. 
Some zealous settlers in Hebron praised Stein for his deed. “Ephraim Rosenstein, a Jewish 
settler from Kiryat Arba, praised the man who committed last February's massacre. Baruch 
Goldstein, the American-born physician who brought his assault rifle to the tomb and fired 
into the mass of kneeling Muslim worshipers, was actually preventing a "massacre of the 
Jews," Rosenstein said” (Gellman, 1994). 
The situation in Hebron has always been very tense and difficult. It has been 
characterised by violent settler’ abuse of Palestinians, protected by the Israeli army. The 
number of killings and violent actions have always been high. The Israeli authorities 
implement restrictions and discriminatory actions against Palestinians in Hebron. Over 
20 years ago, the Israeli authorities closed the commercial centre of the city to 
Palestinians: “For more than two decades, the Israeli authorities have imposed severe 
and deeply discriminatory restrictions on Palestinian residents of Hebron’s Old City. New 
restrictions have compounded these violations and intensified the collective 
punishment of tens of thousands of Palestinians, in violation of international law” 
(Amnesty International, 2016).  
 
(7) Holocaust: 
The Holocaust, or the “final Solution” as termed by the Nazis, was the systematic killing 
and persecution of European Jews and other persecuted communities (Gypsies and 
homosexuals) in Germany and other occupied parts of Europe. Over the course of the 
Second World War, millions of people were imprisoned in concentration camps and 
death camps which were specifically constructed for the mass killing of European Jews. 
By 1945, the end of the Second World War, 6 million Jews had died in those camps, 





The Holocaust has frequently been evoked in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict, in culture, history, and political discourse. For some, the Holocaust gave Europe 
an ethical justification for the establishment of Israel in 1948. “The internment of Jewish 
refugees – many of them Holocaust survivors-turned world opinion against British policy 
in Palestine. The report of the Anglo-American Commission of Inquiry in January 1946 
led US president Harry Truman to pressure Britain into admitting 100,000 Jewish 
refugees into Palestine” (Holocaust Encyclopaedia, ND). Others argue that the horrors 
of the Holocaust did not constitute a valid ethical reason for the occupation, that one 
cannot correct one injustice by imposing another (Said, 2014)3. 
Gerstenfeld, a scholar of anti-Semitism, argued that European culture is complicit in 
anti-Semitism and that it would not act in case of future genocide. He argues that if 
another Holocaust could happen, it would be in the Arab world. In this scenario, the 
actual murderers would be Muslims/Arabs but Europe will be indirectly contributing as 
it was bystander in the face of motions and movements aiming at demonization of Israel 
(Gerstenfeld, 2012, p. 389-397). By examining numbers of casualties on both sides of 
the two Palestinian uprisings and the three wars on Gaza in addition to daily casualties 
of Israeli occupation, we can discern that Gerstenfeld’s statement is far from reality.  
 
(8) Israel: 
A Jewish state which was established in 1948 after forcing the indigenous Palestinians 
out of their homeland (historic Palestine) and replacing them by mainly immigrant 
European Jews. Israel denies the ‘ethnic cleansing of Palestinians4. The establishment 
of Israel has caused an ongoing Arab/Israeli conflict. For further information about the 
Palestine-Israel conflict, see Historical Background, (Chapter 4, section xx). 
 
                                                             
3 Academic Freedom Conference – Are there Limits to Inquiry. 2014. Professor Edward Said ... 
Holocaust legitimizes Palestinian struggle for Justice. [Online]. [05 September 2018]. Available 
from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dBaMUSJCxtI 






(9) Israelis (Israeli society): 
The Jewish population of Israel is made up of Jews who immigrated to historic Palestine 
predominantly from Europe. In Europe, Jews suffered persecution for centuries which 
increased in the 20th century, culminating in the Holocaust. Jewish communities, mainly 
from Europe, have replaced indigenous Palestinians who were subsequently subjected 
to deportation by force (ethnic cleansing). To this day, immigration to Israel is open for 
Jews in the diaspora. The Israeli population resides both within the state of Israel, as 
well as in settlements in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights. Israeli 
society is highly militarised and military service is compulsory for both men and women 
from the ages of 18. For further information, see (10). 
 
(10) Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) 
The IDF is the strongest army in the Middle East possessing advanced weapons and the 
only nuclear arsenal in the Middle East, although Israel keeps information about its 
nuclear arsenal ambiguous. In its own words: “What has typified the Israeli army 
throughout its diverse history is its commitment to innovation and its continuous 
maximization of the resources at its disposal, both human and technological” (IDF 
Mahal, ND). 
Since its inception in 1948, The Israeli Defence Forces have invested in much more than 
defence. It has been able to annex large swathes of Arab land in 1967, including Sinai in 
Egypt and the Golan Heights in Syria. Its air force carried out numerous raids in Lebanon 
during the 1970s up till the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. Since then, Israel has 
waged two large offensive wars on Lebanon (Grapes of Wrath 1996 and the July 2006 
war)5 and three wars on Gaza. Israel maintains that the offensives were meant to be 
self defence against both Hezbollah in South Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza. For further 
                                                             
5 For further information see: Amnesty International. 1996. [Online]. [Accessed 31 October 
2017]. Available from: https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/MDE15/042/1996/en/; 








information, see (5) above. In both cases, Lebanese and the Palestinian sides have 
suffered many more casualties than the Israelis due to a significant imbalance in modern 
weapons and technology. The Israeli airforce is a very important part of the Israeli army 
as it is highly developed and capable of causing large-scale damage. 
In Israel, conscription applies to all citizens (men and women) above the age of 18, 
including the Druze and Circassians, but not Israeli Arabs (Druze are not considered 
Arabs by the Israeli state). “The Israeli army is comprised of conscription, reserve and 
career service. All eligible men and women are drafted at age 18, three years for men 
and two years for women.  Men are liable for reserve duty until age 51 and women until 
age 24” (ADL, ND). 
 
(11) Mahmoud Abbas: 
Mahmoud Abbas was born in Safed (Northern city of Historic or British Mandate 
Palestine) in 1935. His family was forced to leave Palestine in 1948. The family resided 
in Syria where Abbas earned a degree in law from Damascus University. He is a founding 
member of Fatah. Abbas is known for his moderate policies. He was a signatory of the 
Oslo Accords, and he signed an interim peace agreement with Israel in 1995. In 2004, he 
became the chairman of the PLO after the death of Yasser Arafat, and in 2005 he won 
the Palestinian presidential elections becoming the president of the Palestinian 
authority, a position which he still retains till now (Al Jazeera, 2017).  
 
(12) Nazi Germany: 
In the 1930s, Germany was still paying reparations put in place after the Treaty of 
Versailles following the First World War, and the buying power of the German currency 
disintegrated (History on the Net, 2013). The National Socialist German Worker’s Party 
was founded in 1919. Hitler became its leader in 1921. The party promoted German 
nationalism, anti-Semitism and resentment against the Post-War reparations and 
economic despair. Hitler became German Chancellor following elections in 1933 and 
assumed dictatorial powers. A charismatic public speaker, Hitler promised the German 





same time, he blamed Germany’s problems on the communists, Jews and corrupt 
politicians. Hitler began to eradicate his opponents through the “suppression of all 
political parties except the Nazis” (History on the Net, 2013).  
Hitler espoused an ideology of extreme nationalism and the concept of the ‘Aryans’ as 
a master race. The Nazis created a system of exclusion and eradication of races, cultures, 
and people who they thought did not fit in their homogeneous national Aryan society 
(BBC History, 2011). Jews, Gypsies (Roma and Sinti), some East European communities, 
homosexuals, and disabled people were among the victims of Nazi policies.  
The Nazis quickly issued a number of laws and legislations which limited the rights of 
Jewish citizens and curtailed their participation in public life. The first major law was 
“Law for the Restoration of the Professional Civil Service” (Holocaust Encyclopedia, ND). 
This law prevented Jews from joining the public sector. Other laws which restricted the 
number of Jewish students at schools and universities were to follow. In due course, 
laws were passed that prevented Jews from the practice of medicine, and law, and 
excluded Jewish civilian workers from the army (Holocaust Encyclopedia, ND). The 
persecution against non-‘Aryans’, particularly Jews, culminated in the Holocaust.  
 
(15) Occupied West Bank: 
Israel has occupied the West Bank, including Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip, since 1967 
(West Jerusalem was occupied in 1948 and claimed as part of Israel, East Jerusalem was 
occupied in 1967 and it is a legally disputed area). Ever since, Palestinians have been 
subjected to oppression and numerous violations of human rights. Israel has adopted a 
settlement building policy in the West Bank and used Palestinian resources to support 
these settlements, establishing 237 settlements by 2017 (Human Rights Watch, 2017). 
Moreover, the settlers in these settlements are allowed to use weapons by Israeli law, 
while neighbouring Palestinians are not. The West Bank is divided by settlements and 
also features the apartheid wall and a special status for Jerusalem (accorded by the 
United Nations). However, East Jerusalem can only be reached by residents of the West 
Bank with immense difficulty. The West Bank itself is full of checkpoints and movement 





situation with the following: “Since the occupation first began in June 1967, Israel’s 
ruthless policies of land confiscation, illegal settlement and dispossession, coupled with 
rampant discrimination, have inflicted immense suffering on Palestinians, depriving 
them of their basic rights” (Amnesty International, ND).  
Daily life is made very difficult for Palestinian in the occupied West Bank since Israel 
systematically demolishes houses and annexes land in addition to putting restrictions 
on Palestinian access to safe and clean water. This is exacerbated by military control of 
these territories, including 3 large offensives on Gaza Strip between 2008 and 2014: “In 
the West Bank, Israeli security forces have routinely used excessive force in policing 
situations, killing or grievously wounding thousands of demonstrators, rock-throwers, 
suspected assailants, and others with live ammunition when lesser means could have 
averted a threat or maintained order” (Human Rights Watch, 2017). 
 
(13) Palestinians: 
The Palestinian people in the analysed texts are those who were forced out from their 
homeland in 1948. Consequently, they became refugees in neighbouring countries or 
elsewhere in the diaspora. The ones who managed to avoid deportation live as an ethnic 
minority inside Israel. Others suffer from the Israeli occupation in Gaza, East Jerusalem, 
and the West Bank. 
 
(14) Palestinian National Authority (PA): 
The Palestinian National Authority was established in 1994 following the signing of Oslo 
Accords to govern the West Bank and Gaza Strip. According to the signed agreements, 
the PA (Palestinian Authority) does not have full control over rural areas, while Israel 
retained control over bypass roads between Palestinian cities, the Jordan valley and 
Israeli settlements. In the Gaza Strip, the Israelis retained control over the airspace, 








(16) Peace Talks: 
The peace process with the aim of solving the Arab/Israeli conflict started in Madrid 
1991 sponsored by the United States and the Soviet Union. It resulted in a peace 
agreement between Jordan and Israel in 1993. In 1994 the PLO and Israel signed the 
Oslo Accords where mutual recognition was achieved. “The Oslo Agreement stipulated 
that Israeli troops would withdraw in stages from the West Bank and Gaza and that a 
"Palestinian Interim Self-Governing Authority" would be set up for a five-year 
transitional period, leading to a permanent settlement based on resolutions 242 and 
338” (BBC, 2013). There are also final status issues which have not been resolved to date 
(refugees’ right of return, Jerusalem, borders, territory, security, the Jewish state). In 
order to finalise the final status issues, there have been numerous phases of 
negotiations which have mostly reached a stalemate. The peace talks have all been 
mediated and sponsored by the United States. For further information see6 
 
(17) Saeb Erekat: 
The Palestinian Chief negotiator. He is also a member of the PLO and has held several 
senior positions in the Palestinian Authority, but his diplomatic career has 
overshadowed his other positions. Erekat was named Chief Palestinian negotiator in 
1995, a post he continued to hold till 2011, when he officially resigned. His current status 





                                                             
6  Sherwood, H. 2014. Israel-Palestinian peace talks: the key issues. [Online]. [Accessed 30 
October 2017]. Available from: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/30/israel-
palestinian-peace-talks-key-issues; BBC. 2013. History of Mid-East peace talks. [Online]. 








Settlements are one of the intractable issues between Israel and the Palestinians. Israel 
has been building settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem since after 1967. 
These settlements are illegal under international law, and they are built on occupied 
land where Palestinians hope to establish their sovereign state. “Today, between 
600,000 and 750,000 Israelis live in these sizeable settlements, equivalent to roughly 11 
percent of the total Jewish Israeli population” (Al Jazeera, 2017). In 2017 Netanyahu 
vowed that he would not evacuate any settlement in the West Bank, calling it the ‘land 
of Israel’ (Haaretz, 2017).  
 
(19) Yair Golan 
Yair Golan has filled many senior positions in the Israeli Defence Forces IDF during his 37 
years career  “[…] including head of the Nahal Brigade, head of the West Bank Division 
during the tail end of the Second Intifada […]” (The times of Israel, 2017). He also 
participated in engagements with Hezbollah in South Lebanon. He was ousted from his 
position as deputy chief of staff few weeks after making these controversial remarks 
about the holocaust.  
 
(20) Zionist/Zionism: 
Although the term ‘Zionism’ generally relates to the Jewish religion and history, it was 
first coined in 1890 by Nathan Birnbaum, an Austrian writer and journalist who 
embraced Jewish nationalist ideas and wrote a number of books which reflect his 
passion for Jewish emancipation and “[…] resettlement in Palestine” (The Jewish Virtual 
Library, ND). Those ideas were later promoted by Herzl who called for the first Zionist 
Congress in 1897 in Basel, Switzerland. A number of Jewish thinkers including Leon 
Pinsker had contemplated ways of solving the Jewish question in other ways in response 
to the persecution of Jews in Europe. 
The Zionist efforts paid off with the signing of the Balfour Declaration (1917) and the 
creation of a Jewish state in Palestine in 1948, which resulted in the deportation of 700 





question) which is ongoing to date with many serious repercussions (see chapter 3). The 
establishment of Israel caused a number of regional wars and continuous aggression 
against Palestinians and bordering Arab countries. Zionism is considered by the majority 
of Arabs including Hezbollah as an antagonist ideology and practice. 
5.4 Data Analysis 
The following is an example of the data analysis for Israel/Palestine conflict. 
BBC 09/05/2016 
Israeli soldier goes on trial for killing wounded Palestinian attacker 
The trial of an Israeli soldier charged with manslaughter after killing a wounded 
Palestinian attacker has opened at a military court in Jaffa 
Sgt Elor Azaria, 19, shot Abdul Fatah al-Sharif in the head while the 21-year-old was 
apparently incapacitated in Hebron, in the West Bank, in March. 
The soldier denies violating the Israeli military's rules of engagement without operational 
justification. 
The incident, which was caught on video, has divided opinion in Israel. 
Human rights groups say Sgt Azaria carried out an extra-judicial killing, while thousands 
of people who believe he did nothing wrong attended rallies in support of him last month. 
Truth will out' 
Sgt Azaria sat on a bench inside the courtroom as his trial began on Monday morning 
with the head of the three-judge panel reading out the indictment. 
"The truth will come out. The path will be long. We will endure," said Binyamin Malka, 
a member of the soldier's defence team. 
In their indictment, prosecutors said Sgt Azaria "violated the rules of engagement 
without operational justification as the terrorist was lying on the ground wounded and 





Sharif and another Palestinian, Ramzi Aziz al-Qasrawi, stabbed and wounded an Israeli 
soldier in Hebron, in the occupied West Bank, on 24 March before troops opened fire 
on them, wounding Sharif and killing Qasrawi. 
Footage of the scene several minutes later, filmed by a Palestinian nearby and released 
by an Israeli human rights group, shows Sharif alive. 
A soldier, identified as Sgt Azaria, is then seen cocking his rifle and fatally shooting Sharif 
from several metres away. 
Afterwards, Sgt Azaria told Israeli military police: "When I looked at him I saw that he 
was moving his head, and his hand was within reach of the knife he used in the stabbing 
- the black knife. He moved his hand towards the knife." 
 
He also said that he had feared that Sharif was wearing an explosive vest. 
However, army investigators said that before he opened fire, Sgt Azaria had told a 
comrade that the wounded man "deserved to die" for stabbing his friend. 
And on Sunday night, Israeli Channel 2 television broadcast a new video of the incident 
that appeared to show the knife mentioned by Sgt Azaria in his police statement was at 
least 1m (3ft) away from Sharif. 
Since October, 29 Israelis have been killed in stabbings, shootings or car-rammings by 
Palestinians or Israeli Arabs. 
About 200 Palestinians - mostly attackers, Israel says - have also been killed in that time. 
The assailants who have been killed have either been shot dead by their victims or 
security forces as they carried out attacks. Some attackers have been arrested. Other 
















Israeli soldier Basic Analysis 
The social actor is constructed as a soldier in the Israeli army. 
Background facts:  
Refer to fact sheet  Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) 
Likely reader stereotype/ideology:  
a. Neutral 
b. Someone who represents the oppression of the Israeli 
occupation (pro-Palestinian). 
c. A member of the army trying to carry out his duties in 
maintaining peace and protect himself and others from 
Palestinian terrorists (pro-Israel). 



















The social actor is constructed as a Palestinian aggressor albeit he is 
wounded 
Likely reader stereotype(s): 
a. Ongoing clashes between the Israelis and the Palestinians 
(neutral) 
b. Palestinians suffer from oppressive occupation and rebellious 
spikes are bound to occur (Pro-Palestinian). 
c. Palestinians initiate violence and therefore should pay the pay 
the price (pro-Israel). 
News agency stereotypes/ideologies: 
When the BBC labels the wounded Palestinian as ‘attacker’, it is 
immediately stereotyping Palestinians as violent people without 















Israeli soldier goes on trial 
for killing wounded 
Palestinian attacker 
 
Basic Analysis:   
The news agency is using a headline written in bold to say that the 
Israeli soldier is being tried for killing a Palestinian attacker (i.e. the 
Palestinian is already deemed guilty). 
Background facts:  
Elor Azaria is a soldier in the IDF (Israeli Defence Army). He killed a 
wounded Palestinian after the Palestinian had stabbed another 
Israeli soldier. Elor Azaria was arrested and was tried in the military 
court. His case became controversial in Israel and many Israelis 
supported him but he was eventually convicted of manslaughter. 
For further information, refer to fact sheet  Israeli Defence Forces 
(IDF), and to http://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Rule-of-Law-
Verdict-time-for-Azaria-476933 
Likely reader stereotype/ideology:  
a. Oppressed people would find a way to rebel against oppression 
(pro-Palestinian). 
b. Palestinians are terrorists, and are responsible for initiating 
violence, and so they would pay the price (pro-Israel).  
News agency stereotypes/Ideologies: 
Israel is a state of institutions and maintains law and proper 


















The trial of an Israeli soldier 
charged with manslaughter 
after killing a wounded 
Palestinian attacker has 




The news agency is presenting more information about the case in 
this sub-headline.  
Background facts: 
Please see discussion above. 
Likely reader stereotype/ideology:  
a. Many of the verdicts of Israeli soldiers end in whitewash 
mechanisms (pro-Palestinian). 
b. Despite conflict with Palestinians, Israel is a state of institutions 
and the soldier will be subject to trial (pro-Israel). 
News agency stereotype(s)/Ideologies:   
This sub headline confirms an image of the Israeli military 














Sgt Elor Azaria, 19 Basic Analysis: 
The social actor is constructed as a named Israeli soldier whose 
military rank and age are also given. 
Background facts: 
Sargent in the Kfir Brigade (IDF). Conscription exists in Israel to all 
citizens above 18 including Druze and Circassians but not Israeli 
Arabs. For further information, please refer to fact sheet Israeli 
Defence Forces (IDF) 
Likely reader stereotype(s)/Ideology:  
‘Sgt’ provides an official rank, giving the individual a status in an 
official organisations, which is likely to be read positively. The age 
‘19’ might suggest that the person is not to be considered as fully 
culpable for their actions as someone who is older (neutral). 















Abdul Fatah al-Sharif Basic Analysis 
 The social actor is constructed as a named individual (The wounded 
Palestinian) 
Background facts 
A Palestinian youth from the city of Hebron who was shot dead by 
an IDF soldier while immobile and wounded (see discussion, below). 
Likely reader stereotype(s)/Ideology:  
Abdul Fatah al-Sharif is not given professional status (unlike Elor 
Azaria, above), which may make him less important.  The name may 
sound Arabic/Muslim to a few people but for the majority it is a 
foreign name (neutral). 











apparently The use of the ‘apparently’ seems to mitigate the act of killing or to 






















Sgt Elor Azaria, 19, shot 
Abdul Fatah al-Sharif in the 
head while the 21-year-old 
was apparently 
incapacitated in Hebron, in 
the West Bank, in March. 
 
Basic analysis:  
The news agency is providing details of the incident: names, ages, 
date, location and also the state of the victim being incapacitated. 
Background: 
Refer to fact sheet 5.3 Hebron 
Likely reader stereotypes/Ideologies:  
a. Israeli soldiers use excessive force against Palestinians (pro-
Palestinian). 
b. Israeli soldiers are only responding to violence on the part of 
the Palestinians (pro-Israel). 
News agency Stereotype(s)/Ideology:  
The word ‘incapacitated’ means a temporary immobility which may 
give an indirect reason for Azaria to shoot al-Sharif. There is 
inherent doubt in the ‘incapacitated’ which gives a rather pro-Israel 














The soldier denies violating 




Basic Analysis:  
The news agency is reporting the standpoint of the defendant. 
Likely reader stereotypes/Ideologies:  
Neutral 
News agency Ideology(s): 
The use of official jargon ‘military rules of engagement’ ‘operational 
justification’ suggest that the Israeli army has high professional 















The incident, which was 
caught on video, has divided 
opinion in Israel. 
Basic Analysis: 
The news agency is introducing Israeli views on the subject. 
Background facts: 
Thousands of Israelis rallied in support of the Israeli soldier. He also 

















thought he should be charged. For further information, please see:  
https://www.timesofisrael.com/netanyahu-backs-pardon-for-
soldier-convicted-of-killing-wounded-stabber/  
News agency stereotypes/ ideologies:  
The news agency is seemingly objective, introducing different views 
of the incident, though the fact that these are all Israeli views gives 
the text a somewhat pro-Israeli ideology (pro-Israel). 
events and 
utterances 
Human rights groups say Sgt 
Azaria carried out an extra-
judicial killing,  
The topoi of Humanitarianism is used here to explain that some 
action does not conform to human rights. 












Human rights groups say Sgt 
Azaria carried out an extra-
judicial killing,  
Basic Analysis: 
The news agency is presenting a perspective which incriminates Sgt 
Azaria. 
Background facts: 
There are active human rights groups in Israel. A well-known one is 
B’Tselem. Refer to fact sheet 5.3 B’Tselem 
Likely reader stereotypes/Ideologies:  
Human rights groups are objective and deal with occupation crimes 
against humanity (pro-Palestinian). 



















while thousands of people 
who believe he did nothing 
wrong attended rallies in 
support of him last month. 
Basic Analysis: 






Likely reader stereotypes/Ideologies: 
The Israeli society seems to be in support of aggression, and 
unwilling to accept the right of others to live freely without 
occupation (pro-Palestinian). 
News agency likely Stereotype(S)/Ideology: 
















The Truth will out 
Basic Analysis: 
A headline which espouses the position which supports the Israeli 
soldier and objects to his trial.  
News agency stereotypes/ideologies: 
By using this headline, the news agency is adopting an ideology 


















"The truth will come out. 
The path will be long. We 
will endure," said Binyamin 
Malka, a member of the 
soldier's defence team. 
 
Basic Analysis: 
The news agency is introducing the position of the supporters of Sgt 
Azaria. 
Background facts: 
The Defence team is planning an appeal and request for pardon. 
Eventually, Elor Azaria, was released after serving 9 months in 




Likely reader stereotypes/Ideologies: 
a. Many of the verdicts of Israeli soldiers end in whitewash 
mechanisms (pro-Palestinian). 
b. It is right to follow the legal channels in well-established legal 
system (neutral). 
News agency stereotypes/ideologies: 





























"The truth will come out. 
The path will be long. We 
will endure," said Binyamin 
Malka, a member of the 
soldier's defence team. 
 
 
The fallacy of ‘Appeal to Ignorance’ is used here, which serves to 
make the standpoint of the protagonist is “regarded as true if it has 
not been refuted”.  However, the already available facts make it 
fairly clear that Azaria is guilty 






treatment, or the 
use of a fallacious 
discursive practices 
which violate the o 












The social actor is constructed as the team of prosecutors who 
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figures 
Constructing 










The social actor is constructed as terrorist, which is very prejudiced 
and bigoted towards Arab Palestinians. It immediately provides a 
mitigating reason for the killing of a person who was incapacitated. 
 
Background facts: 
Over many years of occupation, and to justify the oppression of 
Palestinians, the Israeli media has labelled Palestinian protestors or 
freedom fighters as terrorists.  As an occupied people, the 






Likely reader stereotypes/Ideologies:  
a. Palestinians are resisting against occupation (pro-Palestinian). 
b. Palestinians are terrorists (pro-Israel). 
News agency stereotypes/ideologies: 
The term ‘terrorist’ is a very negative stereotype in itself. It gained 
prominence in the 70’s as an ideological term used by Western 
political elite and Israeli politicians to describe PLO operations. Its 
extensive use could have made a stereotypical image of 
Palestinians. However, this image is slightly decreasing with 
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figures 
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In their indictment, 
prosecutors said Sgt Azaria 
"violated the rules of 
engagement without 
operational justification as 
the terrorist was lying on the 
ground wounded and 
represented no immediate 
threat for the accused or 
others who were present". 
 
Basic Analysis: 
The news agency is reporting the exact wording of the indictment 
pronounced by the prosecutors in which he was found guilty. 
Likely stereotypes/ideologies: 
a. Although Israel has a seemingly well-established legal system, it 
resorts to whitewash mechanisms at some point when it comes 
to convicted Israeli soldiers (pro-Palestinian). 
b. Israel has a well-established and fair legal military courts unlike 
most of its Arab neighbours (pro-Israel). 
 News agency stereotypes/ideologies: 
The report may enhance a positive stereotype of a fair Israel’s 
judicial system. At the same time, this seemingly reliable judicial 



















Sharif and another 
Palestinian, Ramzi Aziz al-
Qasrawi, stabbed and 
wounded an Israeli soldier in 
Hebron, in the occupied 
West Bank, on 24 March 
before troops opened fire 
on them, wounding Sharif 
and killing Qasrawi. 
Basic Analysis: 
A description of the situation which shows involvement 
(mentioning of names and date). It also gives a comprehensive 
picture and more credibility to a certain situation but from a 
specific perspective to justify the act of killing. 
Background facts: 
Though the news agency mentions that the stabbing happened in 
the occupied West Bank, but it is ignoring the history of the conflict 
and overlooking the occupation as the main reason for violence. For 
further information please see 4.6 Historical background  
Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies: 
Palestinians are responsible for violence in this ongoing conflict 
(pro-Israel). 
News agency stereotypes/ideologies: 
The sequence in which the events are presented endorses the 














Israeli human rights group 
Basic Analysis: 
The social actor is constructed as an Israeli human rights group 
Background facts: 
There are a number of human rights groups in Israel. The most well-
















Footage of the scene several 
minutes later, filmed by a 
Palestinian nearby and 
released by an Israeli human 
rights group, shows Sharif 
alive. 
A soldier, identified as Sgt 
Azaria, is then seen cocking 
his rifle and fatally shooting 




Another detailed description of the incident which supports the 
Palestinians perspective.  
Likely stereotypes/ideologies: 
This could be one of many stories of Israelis using excessive force 
against Palestinians (pro-Palestinian). 
News agency stereotypes/ideologies: 
Reporting that would give more credibility to the news outlet being 
seemingly balanced in its reporting as the description now leans 
towards the Palestinians perspective. However, the name of the 
Palestinian who filmed the incident is not mentioned and there is 


















Afterwards, Sgt Azaria told 
Israeli military police: "When 
I looked at him I saw that he 
was moving his head, and 
his hand was within reach of 
the knife he used in the 
stabbing - the black knife. 
He moved his hand towards 
the knife." 
 
He also said that he had 
feared that Sharif was 
wearing an explosive vest. 
 
Basic Analysis: 
A direct quotation by the defendant himself in which he provides a 
more a detailed description from an Israeli perspective.  Azaria is 
trying to justify the killing by claiming that the victim was about to 
use a knife in an attempt to stab him. He even claims the 
incapacitated victim could have had an explosive vest.  
Background facts: 
The last decade has witnessed a rise in Islamic militancy, and the 
advent of Jihadist groups. Israel finds it useful to make a link 
between Palestinian resistance against occupation and the actions 
of these groups.  
 Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies: 
a. This detailed quotation can reinforce a violent image of the 
Palestinians especially the use of lethal weapons (pro-Israel). 
b. Palestinians are Muslims and so they are liable to carry out 
suicide bombings (pro-Israel). 
News agency stereotypes/ideologies: 
Introduction of the violent images of the Palestinians.  The lethal 
weapons, and the explosive vest which immediately evokes the 
stereotype of the Jihadist suicide bombers. For a Western reader, it 
is very easy to link between any Arab/Muslim and Islamist militancy 
























an explosive vest 
 
A strong stereotypical image also connection to Islamist militancy. It 
is used here to label the victim by giving a strong impression that he 
is a potential suicide bomber.   









army investigators  Basic Analysis: 
The social actors are constructed as investigators in the Israeli army. 
Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies: 
Well organised military judicial system (pro-Israel). 
News agency stereotypes/ideologies: 
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Israeli Channel 2 television  The social actor is constructed as an Israeli commercial television 








Use of  rhetorical 
figures 
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However, army investigators 
said that before he opened 
fire, Sgt Azaria had told a 
comrade that the wounded 
man "deserved to die" for 
stabbing his friend. 
And on Sunday night, Israeli 
Channel 2 
television broadcast a new 
video of the incident that 
appeared to show the knife 
mentioned by Sgt Azaria in 
his police statement was at 
least 1m (3ft) away from 
Sharif. 
Basic Analysis: 
Reporting and adding more details which are this time supportive of 
the Palestinian stand, and present evidence which refutes the 
claims of Sgt Azaria. 
Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies: 
Aggressive Israeli army (pro-Palestinian). 
News agency stereotypes/ideologies: 
There is strong evidence which incriminates Sergeant Azaria. 
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About 200 Palestinians 
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Labelling the Palestinians negatively and stereotyping them as 
violent.  








Since October, 29 Israelis 
have been killed in 
stabbings, shootings or car-
rammings by Palestinians or 
Israeli Arabs. 
About 200 Palestinians - 
mostly attackers, Israel says 




The news agency is foregrounding the violent incidents which Israel 
accuses Palestinians of having committed. The violence committed 
by Israel is mentioned later and also justified. Although the number 
of Palestinians killed is far higher than the number of Israelis, the 
Palestinians are described as attackers, thereby mitigating the act 
of killing on the Israeli side. 
Background facts: 
Refer to fact sheet 5.3 Hebron & The Occupied West Bank 
Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies: 
a. Palestinians started the violence, and so they would pay the 
price (pro-Israel) 
b. Palestinians suffer from oppressive occupation and rebellious 
spikes are bound to occur. They are also paying heavy price for 
the excessive use of force by the Israelis (pro-Palestinian). 
News agency stereotypes/ideologies:  
Again the news agency is using techniques such as foregrounding 
violence committed by Palestinians to that of the Israelis, and 














A wave of stabbing, shooting 
and car-ramming attacks by 
Palestinians and Israeli 
Arabs over the past eight 
The trajectio in alium 
Strategically employed in rationalisation, in the discursive 
construction of scapegoats, in victim- victimiser reversals consisting 
of putting the responsibility, guilt or blame on somebody else 















months have left 29 Israelis 
dead. 
More than 200 Palestinians - 
mostly attackers, Israel says 




undermine or aims 
at discrediting the 
argument 
The assailants 
The social actors are constructed as the Palestinians who are 
engaged in confrontations with the Israelis. They are constructed 
and labelled as the aggressors (pro-Israel news agency stereotype) 
Membership 
categorization 







their victims or security 
forces 
Basic Analysis: 
Constructing the social actors as the Israelis who shot Palestinians 
dead. However, the news agency still calls them victims and 
stipulates that the Palestinians were the aggressors.  
News agency stereotypes/ideologies: 
Reinforcing a stereotype that Israelis are usually the victims of 
Palestinian violence. The Palestinians were killed because they 
initiated violence on the part of either their pre-empted victims or 













The social actors are constructed as Palestinians who engaged in 
confrontations with Israeli soldiers. 
Membership 
categorization 











The assailants who have 
been killed have either been 
shot dead by their victims or 
security forces as they 
carried out attacks. Some 
attackers have been 
arrested. Other Palestinians 
have been killed in clashes 
with Israeli troops. 
Basic Analysis: 
The news agency narrates the events and concludes the media text 
in a way that justifies the Israeli actions and underestimates the 
Palestinian suffering whether it was the number of victims or the 
background of the conflict (occupation and its consequences). It is 
adopting the Israeli narrative, and justifying the massive killing of 
Palestinians by holding them responsible. 
Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies: 
Palestinians are aggressors and so they would be dealt with 
accordingly (pro-Israeli). 
News agency stereotypes/ideologies: 
The ideology of the news agency continues to justify Israeli actions, 



































The assailants who have 
been killed have either been 
shot dead by their victims or 
security forces as they 
carried out attacks. Some 
attackers have been 
arrested. Other Palestinians 
have been killed in clashes 
with Israeli troops. 
 
Begging the question  
This means that what is controversial and in question is 
presupposed as the starting point. 
The text is presupposing that Palestinians are aggressors without 
any reference to the main reason for violence, which is occupation 
and its practices. 








undermine or aims 











 محاكمة جندي إسرائيلي متهم بقتل مهاجم فلسطيني جريح وقتله
محكمة عسكرية في مدينة حيفا محاكمة جندي إسرائيلي اتهم بإطالق النار على فلسطيني جريح وقتله في  بدأت
 .الضفة الغربية المحتلة
ويواجه الجندي، إلورأزاريا، تهمة القتل غير العمد في قضية أثارت جدال كبيرا، وفي حالة نادرة لجندي في الخدمة 
 .يواجه مثل تلك التهم
التي وقعت قبل شهرين، قد بدأت ببعض الهجمات طعنا تعرض لها جنود في القوات اإلسرائيلية  وكانت الحادثة،
 .الخليل في
 -بحسب ما قاله الجيش  -وقال الجيش اإلسرائيلي آنذاك إن فلسطينيين قُتال بعد إطالق النار عليهما، بينما كانا 
 .يشنان هجوما بالطعن، أصيب فيه جندي إسرائيلي
ديو نشرتها بعد ذلك جماعة بيت سيلم لحقوق اإلنسان، أظهرت أحد المهاجَمين وهو ملقى على ظهره لكن مقاطع في
 .جريحا على األرض بعد إطالق النار عليه، وال يكاد يتحرك
 .وتبين أيضا كيف أطلق أزاريا عليه النار مستهدفا رأسه من مسافة قريبة
نيون واستمرت شهورا وقتل فيها وأصيب عدد من قوات وقد وقعت الحادثة وسط موجة من الهجمات شنها فلسطي
 .األمن والمدنيين والفلسطينيين
ويتهم فلسطينيون إسرائيل باستخدام القوة المفرطة ضد المهاجمين في تلك الهجمات، الذين إما أوقفوا بالفعل بعد 
 .ين أبرياء في بعض الحاالتمجابهة قوات األمن أو بعض األفراد لهم، وإما أصيبوا، ويتهمونها أيضا بقتل مدني
ونشر نشطاء عددا من مقاطع الفيديو التقطها هواة تؤيد ما يقوله الفلسطينيون. غير أن حادثة الخليل ربما كانت 
 .أقواها من حيث الدليل على ما يرتكبه اإلسرائيليون
ن يخشى أن يكون هذا وقد ندد قادة في الجيش اإلسرائيلي بما فعله الجندي. ولكن أزاريا نفسه يقول إنه كا
 .الفلسطيني الجريح يخفي قنبلة
 .وانبرت عناصر من اليمين اإلسرائيلي للدفاع عن الجندي، متهمة الجيش بمعاملته معاملة غير عادلة
 .وقال بنيامين مالكا، محامي أزاريا، إن فريقه مستعد لمجابهة التهم الموجهة إلى موكله
الرسمية، ونحن مستعدون، وسنواصل خطنا في الدفاع. وسوف تظهر العدالة. وأضاف "هذه هي بداية المحاكمة 
 ".الطريق سيكون طويال، وسوف نتعامل معه
 
Translation:  
The trial of an Israeli soldier accused of killing a Palestinian attacker 
Military court in Haifa started the trial of an Israeli soldier charged with shooting a 
wounded Palestinian and killing him in the occupied West Bank 
The soldier, Elor Azaria faces the charge of manslaughter in a highly controversial and 





The incident which took place two months ago had earlier started with some stabbing 
incidents against Israeli army soldiers in Hebron. 
The Israeli army said then that two Palestinians were killed after being shot while they 
were – according to the Israeli army – launching an attack with knives which caused the 
injury of an Israeli soldier.  
Video clips which were later released by the human rights group B’ Tselem however, 
showed one of the attackers lying on his back wounded and incapacitated after being 
shot. It also showed how Azaria shot him at close range aiming at his head.  
The incident took place amid a months’ long wave of attacks by Palestinians during 
which a number of security men, civilians and Palestinians were killed.  
The Palestinians accuse Israel of using excessive force against the attackers who were 
either arrested after challenging the security forces or were injured. In some cases, they 
accuse Israel of killing innocent civilians. 
Activists disseminated video clips taken by amateurs which confirm what the 
Palestinians say. The Hebron incident however, provided the strongest evidence of what 
the Israelis committed.  
High-ranking officers in the Israeli army denounced what the soldier did, but Azaria 
himself says he feared the wounded Palestinian was hiding a bomb. Members of the 
Israeli right wing leapt to defend the soldier, accusing the army of treating him unfairly.  
Binyamin Malka, Azaria’s lawyer said his team is ready to refute the charges against his 
client. He added: “This is the beginning of the official trial, we are prepared and will 











the Arabic text 
 










Israeli soldier Basic Analysis 
 The social actor is constructed as a soldier in the Israeli army 
Background facts:  
Refer to fact sheet 5.3 Israeli Defence Forces (IDF)  
Likely reader stereotype(s):  
Someone who represents the oppression of the Israeli occupation (pro-
Palestinian). 
A member of the Israeli army who might be aggressive towards 
Palestinians. (Fairly pro-Palestinian). 






























The news agency gives this headline to the text, which describes the 
situation as a legal process taking place to hold accountable an Israeli 
soldier who had an exaggerated response to an act of violence by an 
outlaw or even a thug. 
Background facts: 
Elor Azaria is a soldier in the IDF (Israeli Defence Army). He killed a 
wounded Palestinian after the Palestinian had stabbed another Israeli 
soldier. Elor Azaria was arrested and was tried in the military court. His 
case became controversial in Israel and many Israelis supported him but he 
was eventually convicted of manslaughter. For further information, refer to 
fact sheet 5.3 Israeli Defence Forces (IDF), and to 
http://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Rule-of-Law-Verdict-time-for-Azaria-
476933 
Likely reader stereotype/ideologies: 
a. The Israeli military courts act as fair and transparent, but in fact they 
have clever ways to pardon their soldiers (pro-Palestinian). 
b. Israel is the only democracy in the Middle East with a well-established 
judicial system which it applies equally to all including the Palestinians 
who Israel is in conflict with (pro-Israel). 
News agency stereotypes/ideologies: 
An image of Israel as a civilized state which maintains law and proper 
procedures despite conflict with the Palestinians (pro-Israel). Many, Arab 
readers may not however, be profoundly influenced by this image. For 

























The social actor is constructed as an Israeli military court responsible for 
trying military personnel. 
Membership 
categorization 




































The news agency is providing more information in this sub-headline like the 
location of the killing ‘the occupied West Bank’ and that of the trial, which 
was not mentioned in the English text. We also note the word مهاجم   
‘attacker’ is dropped from the Arabic text in the sub-headline. 
Likely reader stereotype/ideologies: 
a. The Israeli military courts act as fair and transparent, but in fact they 
have clever ways to pardon their soldiers (pro-Palestinian). 
b. Israel is the only democracy in the Middle East with a well-established 
judicial system which it applies equally to all including the Palestinians 
who Israel is in conflict with (pro-Israel). 
News agency stereotypes/ideologies: 
The news agency is providing a better image of Israel by presenting this 























The social actor is constructed as a soldier in the Israeli army charged with 
manslaughter. The age and military rank are dropped from the Arabic text 
which make him less personalised.   
Background facts: 
Please see the discussion above 
Reader likely stereotypes/ideologies: 
a. A member of the Israeli aggressor army who is likely to be a culprit in 
this case (pro-Palestinian). 
b. Neutral 


































in a highly 
controversial 
and rare case 
of a soldier in 
military 
service facing 
charges of the 
like 
Basic Analysis: 
The news agency is neutrally introducing the general atmosphere in Israel 
regarding this case describing it as controversial and uncommon. Yet, it is 
adding that this is a ‘rare case’ of an Israeli soldier being tried suggests 
some sympathy for the Palestinians. 
Background facts: 
Please see the discussion above 
Reader likely stereotypes/ideologies: 
a. How many Israeli soldiers should face the same charge! (pro-
Palestinian). 
b. Civilised and well-established judicial system which Israel applies to the 
Palestinians who it is in conflict with (pro-Israel). 
News agency Stereotypes/ideologies: 
The text shows an ideological bias to the Israeli side. This is shown through 
the neutral reporting of the events without reference to many injustices 




















Constructing the social actors as soldiers in the Israeli army. 
Background facts: 
Refer to factsheet 5.3 Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) 
Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies: 
Individuals who belong to a very strong military forces that tend to use 
excessive force against unarmed Palestinians (pro-Palestinian). 










































A mild description/reporting of the situation which is less supportive of the 
Israeli perspective from the English text, but does not convey a 
comprehensive picture of the nature of the conflict.  
Background facts: 
Refer to fact sheet 5.3 Hebron 
Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies: 
a. Palestinians have the right to resist occupation (pro-Palestinian). 
b. Palestinians suffer from oppressive occupation and rebellious spikes 
are bound to occur (pro-Palestinian). 
News agency Stereotypes/ideologies: 
Seemingly neutral reporting of the incident, however, it ignores the roots 



































The social actor is constructed as the Israeli army. 
Background facts: 
Refer to Fact sheet 5.3 Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) 
Likely reader Stereotypes/ideologies: 
Strong army that tends to wage wars and use excessive force against 
disarmed Palestinians (pro-Palestinian). 



















 -بينما كانا 
بحسب ما قاله 





















injury of an 
Israeli soldier.  
 
Basic Analysis: 
The news agency is quoting directly and indirectly the Israeli army, which is 
presenting a scenario that incriminates the two Palestinians and justifies 
the killing at the hands of the Israeli soldier. The news agency is however 
stressing that it is quoting the Israeli army and adopting its scenario, which 
is different from the English text. 
Likely reader Stereotypes/ideologies: 
a. Palestinians have the right to resist occupation (pro-Palestinian). 
b. Israelis try to justify killing Palestinians by claiming that Palestinians are 
initiating violence (pro-Palestinian). 
News agency Stereotypes/ideologies: 
Quoting the Israeli army gives indirect credibility to its scenario which 

























Constructing the social actor as an Israeli human rights group 
Background facts: 
Please see fact sheet 5.3 B’Tselem 
Likely reader Stereotypes/ideologies: 
A glance of hope for justice for Palestinians (pro-Palestinian). 














وهو ملقى على 
ظهره جريحا 
 على األرض
one of the 
attackers lying 






Constructing the social actor as one of the Palestinian attackers who was 
lying on the floor and was incapacitated  
Background facts: 
Please see the discussion above 
Likely reader Stereotypes/ideologies: 
An image of a Palestinian victim would be dominant even though the text 
mentions مهاجم ‘attacker’ (pro-Palestinian). 
News agency Stereotypes/ideologies: 
The news agency continues with its seemingly neutral reporting which 
ignores the roots of the conflict (fairly pro-Israel). 
Membership 
categorization 




































by the human 










shot. It also 
showed how 
Azaria shot 
him at close 
range aiming 
at his head.  
 
Basic Analysis: 
The news agency is indirectly reporting the view point of a human rights 
groups which provides details that support the Palestinian position. 
Likely reader Stereotypes/ideologies: 
Palestinians are often targeted by the Israeli army, and this anecdote 
confirms that (pro-Palestinian) 



















 :Palestinians Basic Analysis فلسطينيون
The social actors are constructed as Palestinian individuals. 
Background facts: 
Refer to fact sheet 5.3 The Palestinians 
Likely Reader Stereotypes/ideologies: 
a. Oppressed people under Israeli occupation (pro-Palestinian). 
b. Vulnerable refugees who sometimes constitute a burden on some Arab 
states (neutral). 


















The social actors are constructed as Israeli security forces and civilians. 
Background facts:  
The news agency missed out the fact that some of the civilians are Israeli 
settlers. 
Reader likely Stereotypes/ideologies: 
a. The Israeli security forces oppress the Palestinians, and the civilians 
could well be Israeli settlers who are allowed by Israeli law to carry 
weapons and use them (pro-Palestinian). 
b. Neutral 
News agency Stereotypes/ideologies: 

































long wave of 
attacks by 
Palestinians 





were killed.  
 
Basic Analysis: 
The news agency is describing the situation from a seemingly neutral 
perspective. However, it is again foregrounding the Israeli casualties and 
stressing that the attacks are ‘launched by Palestinians’.  It is also ignoring 
the number of casualties on both sides which shows the huge number of 
Palestinian casualties in comparison with the Israelis. 
Background facts: 
 Please see the discussion above 
Reader stereotypes/Ideologies: 
Palestinians who are under occupation have the right to resist (pro-
Palestinian). 
News agency stereotypes/Ideologies: 
Again the news agency is endorsing a pro-Israel ideology in presenting the 






















Israel Basic Analysis: 
The social actor is constructed  as the state of Israel 
Background facts: 
Refer to fact sheet 5.3 Israel 
Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies: 
a. An enemy by default responsible for many crimes towards Arabs over 
many years (pro-Palestinian). 
b. Rogue state which was established on stolen land, and which keeps a 
policy of land and culture annexation (pro-Palestinian). 
c. A de facto state which has the full support of the US (international 
super power) and we need to deal with this reality (neutral). 
d. A potential ally against more dangerous enemies (Iran) (pro-Israel). 
-http://www.pewglobal.org/2007/06/27/chapterFor further information:  
  conflict-east-middle-the-of-views-5 


















attackers Basic Analysis: 
The social actors are constructed as the Palestinian attackers.  
Likely reader Stereotypes/ideologies: 
For the majority of the Arabic readers, Palestinian attacks are justified and 
viewed as a type of resistance (pro-Palestinian). 
News agency stereotypes/Ideologies: 
The news agency maintains qualifying the Palestinians involved in the 
incident as attackers regardless of surrounding circumstances created by 
















The social actors are constructed as innocent Palestinian civilians. 
Likely reader Stereotypes/ideologies: 
Many innocent Palestinians are victims of Israeli aggression (pro-
Palestinian). 
























































The news agency is reporting the Palestinian perspective and describing 
the indiscriminate excessive force Israel is using against Palestinians. 
Background facts:  
Refer to fact sheet 5.3 Hebron, Israeli Defence Forces & The occupied West 
Bank 
Reader Stereotypes/ideologies: 
The Arab audience is more aware of the meagre means of resistance which 
Palestinians possess, and are likely to believe and agree with this 
perspective. The image of Israel as a strong aggressive power in the region 
though weakened but still exists in the Arab mind (pro-Palestinian). 




















activists Basic Analysis: 
The social actors are constructed as supporters of human rights and 
Palestinians’ rights. 
Likely reader Stereotypes/ideologies: 
Relatively new concept to the Arab mentality for two reasons: first, the 
general idea that Israelis are aggressors, second, the non-democratic Arab 
states which suppress all anti-establishment voices (neutral). 


















Israelis Basic Analysis: 
The social actors are constructed as the Israeli army, security forces, Israeli 
civilians and illegal settlers in the West Bank. 
Background facts: 
Refer to fact sheet 5.3The Israelis (Israeli society) 
Likely reader Stereotypes/ideologies: 
a. A population of mainly Jewish people from different countries and 
ethnicities who forced out the indigenous Palestinian population, and 
settled in their place (pro-Palestinian). 
b. De facto enemies (pro-Palestinian). 
c. Potential allies (pro-Israel). 





















تؤيد ما يقوله 
الفلسطينيون. 
غير أن حادثة 
الخليل ربما 
كانت أقواها 
من حيث الدليل 























The news agency is providing details of evidence of the Israeli use of 
excessive force. 
Background facts: 
Refer to fact sheet 5.3 Hebron 
Likely reader Stereotypes/ideologies: 
There are many Palestinian victims of the Israeli occupation/oppression 
(pro-Palestinian). 
News agency stereotypes/Ideologies: 































قادة في الجيش 
 اإلسرائيلي 
High-ranking 
officers in the 
Israeli army 
Basic analysis:  
The social actors are constructed as high-ranking officers in the Israeli 
army. 
Background facts:  
Refer to fact sheet 5.3 The Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) 
Likely reader Stereotypes/Ideologies:  
Leaders in an army with history of aggression towards Palestinians and 
some Arab neighbouring countries (pro-Palestinian). 























Basic Analysis:  
High ranking officers in the Israeli army have expressed their dissatisfaction 
with the soldier’s action.  
Likely reader Stereotypes/Ideologies:  
Military leaders whose non-biased opinion can be very surprising (fairly 
pro-Israel). 
News agency stereotypes/Ideologies: 



















نفسه يقول إنه 







he feared the 
wounded 
Palestinian 
was hiding a 
bomb.  
Basic Analysis: 
Azaria claimed that the wounded Palestinian could have hidden a bomb 
which is an implausible excuse. The news agency reports this in both texts 
but it is reduced from an ‘explosive vest’ in the English text to the less 
specific ‘bomb’   قنبلة in the Arabic text.  
Likely reader Stereotypes/Ideologies:  
Israelis may make up lies to incriminate Arabs (pro-Palestinian). 
News agency stereotypes/Ideologies: 
The Israeli soldier’s story is taken into consideration, however, it is 


















Hiding a bomb Although this is a verbal phrase, it refers to a stereotypical trait and an 
evaluative attribute which is that of a violent attacker or a suicide bomber.  































The news agency is reporting the controversy prompted by the incident. 
Some commanders in the Israeli army have been critical of the soldier’s 
behaviour, while right-wing members of the government defended Azaria 
and criticised the military establishment. 
Likely reader Stereotypes/Ideologies:  
It is expected that Netanyahu’s government would not side by the 
Palestinian victims (pro-Palestinian). 
































































lawyer said his 
team is ready 




added: “This is 
the beginning 
of the official 





come out. It 
will be a long 
road but we 
will deal with 
it”.  
Basic Analysis: 
The news agency is presenting the viewpoint of the defendant’s lawyer, 
which is of course very biased. He is ready to refute the charges against 
Azaria and sees justice only in his acquittal of all charges against him. The 
Arabic text uses the term  العدالة  ’justice’ instead of ‘truth’ in the English 
one, which is rather milder.  
Likely reader Stereotypes/Ideologies:  
The concept of justice in the Israeli mind is very twisted! (pro-Palestinian). 
News agency stereotypes/Ideologies: 
Quoting the Azaria’s lawyer who is presuming that justice can only be 
realised when he is acquitted of all charges is an indirect endorsement of 




































“This is the 
beginning of 
the official 





come out, it 
will be a long 
way but we 
will deal with 
it”. 
The trajectio in alium 
Strategically employed in rationalisation, in the discursive construction of 
scapegoats, in victim-victimiser reversals consisting of putting the 
responsibility, guilt or blame on somebody else. 
 
It also uses the  
begging the question fallacy which presupposes what is in question and 
controversial as a starting point. 























The English text may seem balanced to a reader who has minimal background on the 
Israel/Palestine question. It has almost evenly distributed the paragraphs to cover both 
the Israeli and the Palestinian sides of the story. Yet, starting with the headline, which is 
usually the most prominent feature, Palestinians are labelled as attackers and the Israeli 
soldier who might have not abided by the laws of engagement will be on trial. This gives 
the impression that Israel is a state of institutions and fairness facing savage Palestinians 
who use barbaric tools to attack civil Israelis. There is also this image of a democratic 
Israel which has human rights groups, free demonstrations and freedom of expression. 
The text however, foregrounds the Israeli point of view and sometimes marginalises the 
Palestinian one. The text uses a sub-headline ‘The truth will out’ which suggests that 
truth is on the Israeli side. There is also this strong association between Palestinian 
attackers and suicide bombers in ‘explosive vest’, which is very suggestive of an Islamist 
militant dimension of the Palestinian resistance.  
Instead of ‘explosive vest, Arabic text uses ‘hiding a bomb’ (يخفي قنبلة), which is indicative 
of violence, but not of Islamic militancy. Moreover, the English text refers to Palestinians 
as ‘terrorists’, ‘assailants’ and ‘attackers’, which are very negative terms, and enhance a 
violent stereotype of the Palestinians. The text informs the reader about the 
demonstrations and rallies in support of Azaria which were attended by thousands. This 
confirms what was mentioned in a previous text about the discriminatory trends in 
Israeli society. 
The Arabic text takes into consideration the Arabic audience who largely sympathises 
with the long Palestinian suffering under Israeli occupation. In comparison with the 
English text, it mentions in the headline ‘wounded Palestinian’ (فلسطيني جريح), ‘the 
occupied West Bank’ (الضفة الغربية المحتلة) – two nominal phrases which preserve the Arab 
perspective (Palestine is an occupied territory and the Palestinians are oppressed 
people). However, the text maintains the use of ‘attacker’ (مهاجم) to describe the 
Palestinians involved in stabbings. The text also avoids mentioning details such as the 





the English text says that the video was broadcast on Israeli television (Channel 2), the 
Arabic one says that the video was released by a Human Right’s group, B’Tselem, and 
later by anonymous activists. The English foregrounds the Israeli deaths and elaborates 
on the many methods the Palestinian and Israeli Arabs use to attack Israelis. Despite the 
details of the Hebron incident and the alternative views mentioned in the English text, 
it describes the Israeli casualties as victims and the Palestinians as attackers. The Arabic 
text however, does not totally adopt the Palestinian side as it mentions the wave of 
stabbings attributed to Palestinians, and the casualties among all parties. However, the 
Arabic text sometimes uses a phrase like بحسب ما قاله الجيش ‘according to Israeli army 
sources’, which implies that the news agency is distancing itself from the information 
given.  
Elor Azaria, has been released from prison after serving 9 months out of his 14 months 





The quantitative analysis of the English and Arabic texts give total scores as follows: 
 
English text: news service stereotypes/ideologies 
The quantitative analysis of the English text gives a total score of -34 for news service 
stereotypes/ideologies, with 26 relevant records. The average score per record (-34 ÷ 
26) is thus -1.3. This indicates that the news service stereotypes/ideologies are clearly 
anti-Palestinian/pro-Israel.  
English text: reader stereotypes/ideologies  
The quantitative analysis of the English text gives a total score of 1 for reader 
stereotypes/ideologies, with 21 relevant records. The average score per record (1 ÷ 21) 







Arabic text: news service stereotypes/ideologies 
The quantitative analysis of the Arabic text gives a total score of -18 for news service 
stereotypes/ideologies, with 26 relevant records. The average score per record (-18 ÷ 
26) is thus -0.692. This indicates that the news service stereotypes/ideologies are fairly 
anti-Palestinian/Pro Israel.  
 
Arabic text: reader stereotypes/ideologies 
The quantitative analysis of the Arabic text gives a total score of 38.66 for reader 
stereotypes/ideologies, with 27 relevant records. The average score per record (38.66 ÷ 
25) is thus 1.43. This indicates that the reader stereotypes/ideologies are clearly pro-
Palestinian. 
 
Comparison of qualitative and quantitative analyses in relation to news service 
sterereotypes/ideologies 
The qualitative analysis of the English text shows that it highlights the incident and the 
trial without providing the necessary background of the violence, and uses negative 
stereotypical terms to refer to Palestinians and also hints to Islamic militancy at the 
Palestinian side. The text also refrains from using the term occupation as in the Arabic 
text. It then exhibits substantial anti- Palestinian ideology which is reflected in the 
quantitative analysis result/score.  
The qualitative analysis of the Arabic text shows that the Palestinian side is under 
occupation when it mentions the occupied West bank, and preserves the Arabic 
perspective of the conflict which is an occupied territory by Israeli forces. However, in 










5.4.1 The overall averages of the Israel/Palestine conflict 
 
 






















































5.5 Fact sheet (Islamophobia) 
 
(1) Ahrar al-Sham 
Ahrar al-Sham is a Sunni Salafist militant group. It was formed in November 2011, and 
operated all over Syria but was first based in Idlib region (Stanford University, 2017).7 
Some leading members of the group were imprisoned by the Syrian government for 
their Islamist leaning, but were released in 2011. The movement of Ahrar al-Sham aimed 




According to the BBC. “Al-Qaeda is an organisation of Islamic militants that has declared 
"holy war" on Americans, Jews and their allies. It is blamed for thousands of deaths in 
the 11 September attacks on the US and other attacks around the world. […] Experts say 
it is a loose-knit global network, with links to radical groups in Algeria, Central Asia, 
Kashmir, the Philippines and across the Middle East” (BBC, 2006)9. 
 
(3) al-Qaeda in Yemen: 
Islamic militancy represented by al-Qaeda has struck Yemen in the past decades. Al-
Qaeda in Yemen was formed in the year 2000. In 2009, it merged with the Saudi branch 
to form al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). IS presence in Yemen was formally 
acknowledged in 2014, and it had a growing presence in southern areas where 
                                                             
7 Stanford University. 2017. Mapping Militant Organizations. Ahrar al-Sham. [Online]. [Accessed 
31 October 2018]. Available from: http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-
bin/groups/view/523  











significant Sunni population exists. For more information about the rise of the Islamic 
State in Yemen, see10:   
 
(4) Association of Muslim Scholars of Iraq 
A religious and political organisation which emerged in the post-Saddam era to advocate 
for Sunni Arab interests, and resist the ‘American occupation’. It springs from the 
Muslim Brotherhood. For further information, see section 5.6.1 on Islamism. 
 
 (5) Ayman al-Zawahiri 
An Egyptian doctor who comes from a distinguished Egyptian family. He had links to the 
Egyptian Islamic Jihad before joining the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan. He succeeded 
Osama Ben Laden in leading Al Qaeda (CNN, 2018). 
 
(6) Badr Organisation 
The organisation was founded in 1983 by Hadi al-Amiri as a Shia Iranian-backed proxy. 
During 1983-2003 it operated from Iran against the regime of Saddam Hussein and 
fought against Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988). After the fall of Saddam 
Hussein in 2003, the organisation returned to Iraq, and renamed itself as the ‘Badr 
Organisation for Reconstruction and Development’. During 2004-2006 it was accused of 
committing atrocities against the Arab Sunni population in Iraq. The Badr organisation 
split from the Supreme Council of Iraq in 2012 and maintained in addition to its links to 
Iran both military and political roles. The Badr Organisation took part in fighting Islamic 
State alongside the Iraqi army and other Shia militias. For further information, see: Iraq 
Conflict 11 
 
                                                             
10 Stanford University. 2015. Mapping Militant Organizations. Al Qaeda in Yemen. [Online]. 
[Accessed 31 October 2018]. Available from: http://web.stanford. 
edu/group/mappingmilitants /cgi-bin/groups/view/23  
 
11Stanford University. 2016. Badr Organization of Reconstruction and Development. [Online]. 








(7) Free Syrian Army 
It was formed in the first year of the revolution (2011) mainly from defecting secular 
Syrian army members. However, it didn’t receive enough backing or support till Turkey 
recognised it in 2017 to create a ‘safe zone’ in northern Syria.  
 
(8) Haider al-Abadi 
Haider al-Abadi was Iraqi Prime Minister from 2014 to 2018. He is the chairman of the 
Islamic Dawa Party which was persecuted during the rule of Saddam Hussein. The Dawa 
party calls for the creation of an Islamic state in Iraq based on the values of Shia Islam. 
The al-Abadi government was supported by Iran.  
 
(9) Hezbollah 
Hezbollah (literally ‘Party of God’) is a Shia Islamist, social, political and paramilitary 
movement (Worrall, Mabon and Clubb, 2016 pp. 7-10). It was founded during the period 
following the Israeli invasion of South Lebanon in 1982, and is backed by Iran.  Hezbollah 
was formally established in 1985. It gradually gained power in the Lebanese political 
system, being officially represented in the Parliament in 1992 (Worrall, Mabon and 
Clubb, 2016 p. 92). In the year 2000 Hezbollah was given credit for driving Israeli forces 
out of South Lebanon. After the liberation of the Lebanese territories, the issue of the 
party’s arms was debated extensively. However, Hezbollah refused to renounce its arms, 
which increased tension between Hezbollah and other Lebanese political parties 
particularly the Future Movement, which is aligned with Saudi Arabia. In 2006, Israel 
fought a devastating war against Hezbollah, which lasted for 34 days. In recent years, 
Hezbollah intervened in Syria siding with the al-Assad government against opposition 
factions supported by Saudi, Qatar and Turkey. This military intervention has deepened 
the rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia and also the Sunni/Shia sectarian division. 





States, Israel, Canada, the Arab league12, the Gulf Cooperation Council13, the United 
Kingdom, Australia and the European Union. Hezbollah fought a bitter war against the 
Israeli occupation of South Lebanon which started in the late 1970’s but more land was 
encroached upon after the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Hezbollah was the major 
Lebanese power which undertook the responsibility of liberating South Lebanon from 
the Israeli occupation which spanned over two decades but was finally achieved in the 
year 2000. “Hizbu’llah defines itself first and foremost as a ‘jihadist movement’ or a 
‘party of the resistance’ whose paramount function is the liberation of Lebanese 




The Houthis are a group of mainly Zaidi Yemenis (an offshoot of Shia Islam) who hail 
from Sa’ada governorate in the northern Yemen. The Houthi group was founded in the 
1990’s by Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi. Their official name is Ansarullah. They 
attempted a revolt against President Ali Abdallah Salih in 2004. During the political 
anarchy that followed the Yemeni revolution, the Houthis executed a coup against 
President Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi and forced him to flee the country, seizing the 
capital Sana’a. Iran is considered an ally of this movement and thought to have been 
providing it with arms14 (The Sydney Morning Herald, 2017).  
 
(11) Iran 
                                                             
12 Noueihed, L. and Sabah, Z. 2017. Arab League Condemns Iran, Calls Hezbollah a Terrorist 
Group. [Online]. ]. [Accessed 20 February 2019]. Available from: 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-11-19/arab-league-labels-lebanon-s-
hezbollah-a-terrorist-organization-ja77de7b  
13 Al Jazeera. 2016a. GCC declares Lebanon’s Hezbollah a terrorist group. [Online]. [Accessed 
20 February 2019]. Available from: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/03/gcc-declares-
lebanon-hezbollah-terrorist-group-160302090712744.html  
14 Saul, J. Hafezi, P. and Georgy, M. 2017. War in Yemen: Iran steps up support for Houthis. 







Iran is a state in West Asia on the Persian Gulf with a population of around 81 million. 
The Pahlavi dynasty ruled Iran from 1926 to 1979. From the 1920’s through to the 1940’s 
the British owned the oil company which had the rights of drilling, refining and of selling 
Iranian oil. By the end the WW2 Iran like other Middle Eastern countries experienced a 
wave of nationalism.  In 1951, Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq nationalised the 
oil company and promised that Iranian oil profits would be used to develop Iran. This 
was followed by Western interference to restore British and American interests in Iran. 
Premier Mossadaq was imprisoned and the Shah went on to rule Iran with an iron fist, 
torturing and killing all his dissidents (Abrahamian, 2008, pp. 113-122). In 1979 a 
religious dissident Ayatollah Khomeini returned from exile in France to culminate a 
popular revolution against Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. Iran is still under the rule of 
Ayatollahs (velayat-e faqeh) following the Shia Islam faith despite sporadic popular 
unrest in recent years. American hostage crisis in 1979 15 was followed by sanctions 
imposed by the United States which saw in Iran a major threat to both America and 
Israel. Regionally, Iran fought a devastating war with Iraq (1980-1988). It has intervened 
in a number of Middle Eastern countries (Iraq, Syria, Yemen) causing a lot of tension 
with the conservative Sunni Gulf countries, particularly Saudi Arabia. However and as 
Ervand Abrahamian (2008) puts it “Iran entered the twenty-first century as a major 
regional power – certainly in the Persian Gulf, if not in the entire Middle East. With some 
70 million people, it is the largest country in the region. It plays a key role in the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, is the world’s third largest producer of 
oil” (Abrahamian, 2008, p. 194). 
 
(12) Islamic state 
Islamic State; also known as Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and Islamic State in Iraq 
and the Levant (ISIL) and Islamic State (IS). It is self-governed according to Salafi laws 
inspired by the Wahhabi doctrine. 
In the wake of the American invasion of Iraq, ISIS originated as a group which paid 
allegiance to al-Qaeda in 2004. The aim of the group was to expel the American troops 
                                                             
15 History.com Editors. 2018. Iran Hostage Crisis. [Online]. [Accessed 3 February 2019]. 





and establish a Sunni Islamist state in Iraq. When the Syrian civil war broke out, the 
group expanded into Syria and gained ground in both Syria and Iraq. The major 
achievement of ISIS was to capture of Mosul the second biggest Iraqi city in North Iraq 
in 2014.  
“ISIS aims to create an Islamic state called a caliphate across Iraq, Syria and beyond” 
(CNN, 2017). The group implements an austere version of Sharia Law inspired by the 
teachings of Muhammed ibn Abd al-Wahhab (an 18th century Muslim scholar, who 
resided in the Arab Peninsula and the spiritual forebear of the Saudi state).  Islamic State 
is involved in mass killings, abductions and beheadings (BBC, 2015). Many suicide 
bombings in Iraq were claimed by Islamic State.  
The group has also been involved in fighting the Syrian and Iraqi authorities but it also 
engaged in fights with Jabhat al-Nusra and other Islamist groups in Syria. Islamic State is 
responsible for the killing of many people in Syria and Iraq who belong to different sects 
and religions and political affiliations including Sunnis.16 It has also claimed responsibility 
for terror attacks and suicide bombings in the Middle East, Europe and the US: Charlie 
Hebdo, January 2015; Paris attacks November, 2015; Brussels Bombings, March 2016; 
Nice terror attack, July, 2016; Normandy church attack, July 2016; Berlin Christmas 
market attack, December 2016; Westminster attack, March 2017; Stockholm attack, 
April 2017; Paris shooting, April 2017; Manchester terror attack, May 2017; London 
Bridge terror attack, June, 2017; Spanish terror attacks, August 2017. In the US it carried 
out terror attacks in San Bernardino, California, December, 2015; and Orlando, Florida, 
June, 2016. The victims of the Islamic State however are mainly Muslims.17 
 
 
                                                             
16 Perez, A. 2016. UN Human Rights of Inquiry Concludes ISIS is Committing Genocide Against 
Yazidis (June 16, 2016). [Online]. [Accessed 30 September 2018]. Available from: 
https://www.asil.org/blogs/un-human-rights-commission-inquiry-concludes-isis-committing-
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(13) Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) 
A significant military militia, which was created after the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 
1979. Its prime purpose is to maintain the national security and safeguard the Islamic 
revolution. The IRGC has become a strong player inside Iran and across the region 
especially through the Quds force, which has worked closely with Hezbollah and Hamas. 
IRGC has conducted operations in Iraq, Bosnia and recently in Syria, where it has offered 
advice and military support to President Bashar al-Assad’s government since 2012. The 
commander of the Quds force is Maj. Gen. Qasem Soleimani.  
 
 (14) Jabhat al-Nusra (Jabhat Fateh al-Sham) 
An offshoot of Al-Qaeda, Jabhat al-Nusra (Jabhat Fateh al-Sham) was founded by Abu 
Muhammad al-Jawlani in 2012 in Syria taking advantage of the opportunity afforded by 
the chaos that followed the uprising against al-Assad’s rule. The group has a Salafist 
jihadist ideology which eventually aims at establishing an Islamic caliphate. “Jabhat al-
Nusra has been explicitly clear about its religio-political objectives since 2012, when it 
identified itself as a movement devoted to nusrat ahl al-sham (support for the people 
of the Levant). While its earliest statements also made clear reference to its intention to 
impose ‘God’s law on Earth’” (Lister, 2016, p. 23). In 2015, the group merged with other 
rebel groups in Syria to form ‘The Army of Conquest’ or ‘Jaish al-Fath’. In 2016, the group 
announced its split from al-Qaeda although it had initially sprung from it. 18 
 
(15) Jaish al-Fateh 
A loose alliance of rebel groups formed in March 2015 to fight against the forces of 
president Bashar al-Assad. The members of this alliance are mostly Islamists, but 
includes some other moderate factions (The New York Times, 2015).  A major member 
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group is al-Nusra Front which is the al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria. The alliance is in conflict 
with the Islamic State as well as the Syrian government. 
 
(16) Muqtada al-Sadr 
An Iraqi Shia cleric, political leader and founder of the Sadrist movement. The revered 
Al-Sadr family hails from Jabal Amel in South Lebanon. Muqtada’s father was the Grand 
Ayotallah Mohammad Sadiq al-Sadr, and his cousin is Ayotallah Mohammad Baqir. al-
Sadr was brutally executed by Saddam Hussein together with his sister Amina. After the 
fall of Saddam Hussein, and the American occupation of Iraq, al-Sadr formed the al-
Mahdi Army (more a militia than an organised army) to push the coalition forces which 
toppled Saddam Hussein authoritarian regime out of Iraq, and voiced his outright 
defiance of the American occupation19. After the American withdrawal from Iraq in 2011, 
al-Sadr leaned towards moderation and renunciation of arms. In 2014, he called for the 
forming of ‘Peace Companies’ to protect Shia shrines from the Islamic State. The al-
Mahdi Army also participated in some battles against the Islamic State. In 2016 al-Sadr 
led a huge protest against corruption and the government’s failure to fulfil promises of 
reform. Al-Sadr remains an influential political figure in Iraqi modern politics20. Al-Sadr 
coalition ‘Saairun’ won the highest number of seats in the 2018 parliamentary 
elections21. 
 
(17) Mustafa Badreddine 
A top military commander in the Lebanese Shia military group Hezbollah. He is 
believed to have run the group’s operations in Syria since 2011. The Special Tribunal 
for Lebanon which investigated the killing of the Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri 
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by a car bomb indicted Badreddine of organising the bombing. On 13 May 2016 
Badreddine was killed in an explosion near Damascus International Airport22. 
 
(18) Osama Ben Laden 
The son of a wealthy Saudi businessman, Bin Laden was influenced by religion and 
believed in pan-Islamic holy war. He joined the Mujahedeen 1979 to fight the Soviet 
forces in Afghanistan. He became a target for the US after the September 11 attacks 
which Al Qaeda claimed responsibility for. Bin Laden was shot by US forces on 2 May 
2011 in Pakistan.  
 
(19) Popular Mobilisation Forces 
After the fall of Mosul \t the hands of the Islamic State in 2014, and out of fear for the 
capital Baghdad being over taken by the insurgents of the Islamic State, the grand 
Ayatollah Sistani issued a Jihad fatwa to recruit Shia fighters against the advance of the 
Islamic State. Many Shia men volunteered and different Shia militias merged to form the 
Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) operating under the umbrella of the Iraqi 
government23.  
 
(20) Russian military bases 
There is a tradition of special relations between Syria and Russia that goes back to the 
time after Syria gained its independence from the French mandate (1946). However, 
these relations intensified after the Baath party rose to power in 1963. In the 60s and 
early 70s the Soviets contributed to the creation of national industry in Syria. USSR was 
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given a port in the city of Tartus, which permitted the Soviet navy to have presence in 
the Mediterranean.  
In September 2015 the Russians started airstrikes against opposition enclaves and also 
against jihadist groups (IS and Qaeda) in support of the Al-Assad government, which had 
been facing an internal uprising since 2011. For further information, refer to section 5.8 
The Syrian conflict.  
 
(21) Saddam Hussein 
Saddam Hussein was an authoritarian ruler of Iraq during the period 1979-2003. He was 
a member, then the leader, of the Baath Arab Socialist Party. His era was characterised 
by brutality and ruthless crackdowns on his adversaries. Hussein launched a war against 
Iran which lasted 8 years (1980-1988). In 1990 Hussein invaded Kuwait, which led to the 
formation of a United Nations-authorised coalition of forces against Iraq led by the 
United States. Kuwait was liberated by February 1991. The Gulf War was followed by a 
Shia uprising in the south and a Kurdish one in the north. Both were crushed by Saddam 
Hussein’s forces. Saddam was finally toppled by the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, 
and hanged on 30 December 2006 at an Iraqi army base.  
 
(22) Saudi Arabia  
A country in the Arabian Peninsula which was founded in 1932 under the rule of the 
House of Saud who are a tribe which had contested the reign of the area with several 
other tribes, but finally were able to defeat their contesters (Al Rashid) and unify the 
kingdom under their rule. The House of Saud have historical links with Muhammad ibn 
Abd al-Wahhab the founder of Wahhabism. The government of Saudi Arabia has 
espoused the Wahhabi doctrine in running the civil and religious affairs of the country. 
Saudi Arabia has the privilege of being the custodian of the birthplace of Prophet 
Muhammad, and the host of the Muslim pilgrimage in Makkah. Owning quarter of the 
oil reserves in the world, Saudi is a massive oil exporter. Saudi Arabia is an affluent Gulf 
state and a major player in the Arab region. The Saudi royal family have entrenched the 





Islamic revolution in Iran, Saudi Arabia has considered Iran an ominous threat and it has 
joined alliances and financed proxy wars to avert what it sees as the danger of Iran.  
 
(23) 11 September Attacks 
On September 11, 2001, 4 passenger jets were hijacked when flying out of airports in 
the American east coast. The planes targeted the twin towers of the World Trade Centre, 
and the Pentagon. Over 3,000 lives were lost including the 19 hijackers. Al-Qaeda was 
implicated in the attacks. The lawyers of families of the victims have found evidence that 
members of the Saudi royal family sponsored terrorist organisations related to the 
attacks24 
 
(24) United States 
A country that covers a vast swathe of land in North America, the US emerged as a 
superpower, and in the eyes of many a colonial power, after the end of WW2. Currently, 
it has significant military bases around the world, notably in the Middle East. The highest 
number of American troops in the Middle East is based in Kuwait (16,592 soldiers). In 
1995, the United States established the 5th fleet, which is focused on the waterways of 
the region (Persian Gulf, North Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, Red Sea and Gulf of Oman) 
(Zenko, 2018). 25The United States launched a ‘war on terror’ and most specifically 
against the Jihadist organisation al-Qaeda in the aftermath of 9 September attacks. It 
also led a coalition, which comprised a number of western and Middle Eastern countries, 
to fight Islamic State in Syria and Iraq in 2014.  
 
(25) US-led coalition in Syria and Iraq 
The coalition was formed in 2014 when the Islamic State was able to capture large 
swathes of land in Iraq and Syria including the Iraq’s second largest city Mosul. The 
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coalition is led by the United States of America and comprises many Middle Eastern and 
Western countries including: Australia, Canada, Belgium, Denmark, Sweden, France, 
Germany, Italy, Norway, Turkey, Netherlands, Jordan, Morocco and Spain. In addition to 
these countries, there are a few countries who are intervening in Syria only: Saudi Arabia, 
Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates in support of rebel groups, and Russia in support 
of the Syrian regime. The US-led coalition provided air power to support the Iraqi 
government forces fighting the Islamic State. 
 
 (26) Wahhabism 
A puritanical version of Sunni Islam founded in Najd (contemporary Saudi Arabia) in the 
18th century by Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab. The movement preaches austere 
implementation of Muslim teachings inspired by the Medieval Sunni theologian Ibn 
Taymiyya.  
 
5.6 Discussion of some controversial terms 
5.6.1 Islamism 
Some Muslims believe that Islam is the final perfect version of the three monotheistic 
religions. Yet, many more Muslims look at their past with admiration and nostalgia. For 
within a short period after the beginning of Dawa (the preaching of Islam as a new 
religion by the Prophet Mohammad), the followers of Mohammad, who were the 
dwellers of the Arab Peninsula, were able to conquer the empires of the time, the 
Byzantines and Sassanians. Within 100 years the Islamic Empire extended from Spain to 
India. The Arab/Islamic supremacy was not only military; culture, including translation, 
architecture and sciences, also flourished. Many contemporary Muslims yearn for their 
glorious past and make this subconscious association between Islam and a new 
renaissance (Pipes, 2000, pp.87-88). 
There have been periods where many Muslim countries opted for secular governments 
especially after the decolonisation of Arab states. Arab nationalist ideas were also 
dominant during the 1950’s and the 1960’s. Yet, the association between Islam and the 
regaining of an advanced and successful position in modern times is recurrent and can 





the last 100 years. The most well-known of these is the Muslim Brotherhood, which was 
founded in Egypt in 1928, and later spread to Syria in the mid-thirties. Hasan al-Banna, 
founder of the Muslim Brotherhood wrote: “Rebuilding the international prominence of 
the Islamic Umma by liberating its lands, reviving its glorious past, bringing closer the 
cultures of its regions and rallying under one word. Until once again the long awaited 
united and lost Khalifa is returned”. Although al-Banna and other Islamists who laid 
down the scholarly foundations of Islamist thought were not combative, non-violent 
Islamists are accused by a significant segment of Western scholars and academics of 
inspiring jihadist beliefs: “The competition between secular politics and political Islam 
after the collapse of Ottoman authority and the ensuing processes of colonization and 
decolonization have contributed in part to regional instability, and it is during this period 
that elements of Islamism which fuse the notions of jihad and Salafism began to emerge” 
(Turner, 2012, p. 173).  
Islamism tends to draw a line between Islam and Islamism, as Islamism makes a close 
link between faith and ideology where Sharia (Islamic law) is sacred and an 
appropriation of western influences is conducted. Gita Sahgal and Nira Yuval Davis 
believe that Islamic fundamentalism has three main features: “it is a project to control 
women’s bodies; it is a political practice which rejects pluralism; and it is a movement 
that purposefully conflates religion and politics as a means of furthering its aims” (Sahgal 
and Yuval-Davis, 1992, cited in Sayyid, 2015, p. 8).  
Glenn E. Robinson (1997) believes that there is a consensus in the West that Islamist 
groups are clinging onto outdated beliefs: “[...] movements bent on turning back the 
historical clock hundreds of years, of returning to traditional ways. Alternatively, 
Islamism [...] has been viewed as a movement of rage, of marginal groups that have been 
excluded from the social and global orders lashing out at persons who are seen to 
oppress them [...]” (Robinson, 1997, p. 132).  
In the aftermath of recent attacks in Europe (e.g. in Belgium and France) which were 
blamed on jihadists, and for some of which the Islamic State has claimed direct 
responsibility, conservative voices expressed fear that Europe is being terrorized and 





determined attack on our civilization, so this must be recognised, not evaded. Its 
adherents declaredly hate freedom, democracy, women’s rights, Judaism and 
Christianity. They entirely deny the rights of anyone [...] who does not share their views. 
They recognise no law except Sharia” (Moore, 2016). Unfortunately some of these 
voices have overlooked the fact that the majority of the ISIS victims are Muslims who 
may not agree with their views or happen to exist in their areas of dominance.  
Islamism denotes an ideology which may or may not involve militancy. Therefore, 
Islamist groups encompass the revolution in Iran and the Shi’a political group, Hizbollah, 
in South Lebanon, the Jama’at groups in Egypt as well as the various branches of the 
Muslim Brotherhood in a number of Arab countries.  
It is worthwhile explicating the denotation and connotations of the term ‘Islamist’. In 
1998, Daniel Pipes wrote an article entitled ‘Distinguishing between Islam and Islamism’.  
He makes the distinction between Islam as a faith and Islamism as an ideology. He goes 
on to explain that there is no incompatibility between Islam and the west but there is 
one between Islamism and the west. He defines Islamism as “[...] in other words, yet 
another twentieth-century radical utopian scheme. Like Marxism-Leninism or fascism, it 
offers a way to control the state, run society, and remake the human being. It is an 
Islamic-flavoured version of totalitarianism. As can be discerned from this definition in 
addition to the discussion above, Islamism/Islamist has a very negative connotation in 
the Western mind. It is associated with a radical and dogmatic ideology. (Abaza (2010) 
argues that some people in the West confuse Islam the faith with Islamism the ideology, 
hence wrongly attacking Islam and ordinary Muslims.  
Interestingly, ‘Islamist’ has no standard equivalent in Arabic which would convey the 
same meaning and have the same connotations/impact on the reader (although various 
terms, such as  اسالموي, have occasionally been used to translate ‘Islamist’). It is 
therefore standardly translated as اسالمي, which is in English ‘Islamic’. ‘Islamic’ has no 
particular negative connotations except for what can be imparted from the context that 







The word ‘jihadist’ has a negative stereotypical connotation in Western political 
discourse and in the West in general. It derives from the Arabic word جهاد jihād, which 
means a holy war or as the online Merriam Webster Dictionary puts it: “a holy war 
waged on behalf of Islam as a religious duty”  or “a crusade for a principle of belief”. The 
dictionary also adds: “a personal struggle in devotion to Islam especially involving 
spiritual struggle”. According to English Oxford Living Dictionary: a ‘jihadist’ is “A person 
involved in a jihad; an Islamic militant”.  The first use of the term ‘Jihadist’ was in 1967 
when the American historian John Ralph Willis coined the term to describe the Sokoto 
Caliphate established in West Africa in the 18th and 19th centuries (Sedgwick, 2015, p. 
15). The BBC (2014) mentions that “The term "jihadist" has been used by Western 
academics since the 1990s, and more widely since the 11 September 2001 attacks, as a 
way to distinguish between violent and non-violent Sunni Islamists”. Earlier in 1986, 
Haggai Erlich used the term ‘Jihadism’ to refer to Mahdists in Sudan as did Nikki Keddie 
in 1994.  
In 2015 Mark Sedgwick discussed the fact that Jihadism has been defined between two 
extremes: “At one extreme it has been argued that the term denotes religiously 
obligatory campaigns of conquest directed against non-Muslims, who, qua non-
Muslims, should in principle be conquered. At another extreme it has been argued that 
it denotes any commendable effort made in a good cause, such as stopping smoking or 
planting trees to prevent environmental degradation. There are a variety of positions 
between these two extremes” (Sedgwick, 2015, p. 34). Omar Ashour (2011) defined 
Jihadism as “armed confrontations with political rivals [which] is a theologically 
legitimate and instrumentally efficient method for socio-political change” (Ashour, 
2011, 379).  
Some Western experts try to find the roots of jihadist violence in Islamic theology or in 
the Quran, but Olivier Roy (2004) stresses that these acts of violence perpetrated by the 
jihadists are coming from people not from an Islamic tradition “We speak about people, 
acts and motivations, not theology. Interestingly, however, the terrorists in their 





innovations. The most important is the status of jihad.” (Roy, 2004, p. 41). One of the 
interesting findings that Olivier Roy confirms is that the concept of suicide attacks is not 
found in Islam (2004, p. 42). 
In 2006, Thomas Hegghammer distinguished between three varieties of what he called 
‘Islamist violence’:  
The first modern violent Islamist groups appeared in the Middle East in the 
1960s and 1970s as radical expressions of broader socio-revolutionary 
movements. These groups struggled for state power and their main enemies 
were the local political regimes. In the 1980s and 1990s, Islamism as an 
ideological framework was adopted by nationalist and separatist movements 
in many different parts of the world. This type of militant Islamist group, 
present in places such as Palestine and Chechnya, did not fight primarily for 
state power, but for a specific territory. Their principal enemies were non-
Muslim states or communities that contested the same piece of land. In the 
mid-1990s, a third type of militant Islamism appeared, namely global 
jihadism. It emerged as a result of Usama bin Ladin’s adoption of a doctrine 
in 1996 which emphasized the fight against the US over the fight against local 
regimes (Hegghammer, 2006, pp. 12-13). 
In the past decade, and largely because of the various armed conflicts that swept 
the region, the Middle East has witnessed the emergence of more jihadist 
organisations, the most infamous of which is the Islamic State. The Islamic State 
claimed a number of attacks and suicide bombings in the Middle East and Europe.  
 
5.6.3 Mujahideen 
The term Mujahideen ( دينمجاه  mujādīn in Arabic, plural of mujāhid مجاهد) is derived from 
‘Jihād’ جهاد in Arabic meaning a holy war (see section 5.6.4). According to Merriam 
Webster Dictionary, Mujahideen means “Islamic guerrilla fighters especially in the 





It seems the term was first used extensively in English to refer to the fighters in 
Afghanistan during the 1980’s. The word was, however, originally applied to Afghan 
fighters who opposed the British Raj’s push into Afghanistan in the 19th Century.  
The fighters in the 20th century were Islamic groups defending Afghanistan from the 
Soviet invasion. In 1979, Soviet forces invaded Afghanistan, and the invasion was swiftly 
confronted with a wide-scale rebellion by Islamic groups who called themselves 
‘Mujahideen’ (Taylor, 2014). They were made of different ethnic groups (Chechnyans, 
Uzbeks, Tajiks and a few Arabs). It is worth mentioning that one of the Arabs was Osama 
Bin Laden. Foreign support poured in to aid the diverse groups of rebels: “The mujahidin 
would not have been competitive without having access to large sums of money and 
arms, which were supplied by the United States and Saudi Arabia” (Barfield, 2004, pp. 
282-283). 
The use of the word ‘Mujahideen’ brings to recent memory an image of Muslim fighters 
from various Islamic countries fighting an atheist and anti-Islamic enemy (the Soviet 
Union). At the same time it conjures up older memories and images among Muslims in 
particular of wide-ranging Islamic unity winning battles against infidels and spreading 
the word of truth. 
 
5.6.4 Mujahid 
As noted in section 5.6.3, the root of the Arabic word ‘mujāhid ‘  مجاهد is ‘Jihād’ جهاد, 
which means a holy war in Arabic. The plural is ‘Mujahideen’, which has also been used 
specifically to refer to the Mujahideen in Afghanistan since 1979 (see section 5.6.3). The 
term ‘Jihad’ as a general term means an internal effort to observe Islamic virtues. The 
Dictionary of Spiritual Terms defines Mujahid as follows: “Literally ‘one who exerts 
himself,’ refers to those who participate in Jihād, as both an inward and outward 
exertion for the realization of religious objectives.” ‘Jihād’ جهاد has a general positive 
connotation in Arabic relating to sacrifice for good causes, and so does ‘mujāhid’ مجاهد, 
which has been occasionally used in the Arabic texts (e.g. Reuters 20 May). For example, 





referred to by the party’s general secretary and the personnel involved in them (fighters 
or commanders) falls under this positive meaning of the word. 
 
5.6.5 Rawāfiḍ 
As their forebears did throughout their extended and interlocked 
histories, today’s Shi’is and Sunnis weave narratives of remote ages and 
events into a rich tableau of contemporary politics. In effect they 
consciously combine the past and present in dealing with events of the 
moment and anticipating developments of the future (Lassner, 2011, 
p.17). 
Rawāfiḍ (روافض)  means ‘rejecters’ or ‘those who reject’. The common use of the term 
rawāfiḍ among the majority of Sunni Muslim followers is in reference to Shi’a Muslims. 
The term has a negative, derogatory implication.  
The beginning of the Sunni/Shia divide was a political clash between a group of 
supporters of Imam Ali, primarily his clan (Banu Hashim) who thought he had more 
legitimacy to Muslim rule, the caliphate (خالفه), after the death of the Prophet 
Muhammad (AD 632) since he was first cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet than the 
first three caliphs أبوبكر (Abu Bakr)  عمر بن الخطاب (Omar Ben Al Khattab) and عثمان 
(Othman). At that time, in the 7th century, the division was political and tribal rather 
than sectarian or theological. The appointment of these three companions of the 
Prophet to rule the Muslim community was disputed. As mentioned in al-sīra al-
nabawiyya (the Biography of the Prophet), Abu Bakr and Omar rushed to a meeting 
place to be involved in the process of electing a successor to the Prophet, while Ali was 
with a few other companions (in other references members of the Banu Hashim clan) 
preparing for the funeral of the Prophet. According to Caetani (1905) in (Madelung, 
1997) “The Banu Hashim refused to recognise Abu Bakr and buried their illustrious 
kinsman privately, depriving the new caliph and A’isha of the honour of attendance” 
(Madelung, 1997, p. 4). A’isha, the Prophet’s favourite wife and daughter of Abu Bakr, 
had feelings of antipathy towards Ali and strongly sided against his appointment as 





The division intensified when Othman عثمان was appointed caliph, because he belonged 
to the Umayyads, a different clan of Quraysh to Banu Hashim. However, after 25 years 
Imam Ali was eventually appointed caliph, though he faced a number of rebellions. The 
most serious one came from the Umayyad ruler of Damascus (wālī) Mo’awiya Ben Abi 
Sufian. Between 656 and 659 Ali and his partisans fought a number of battles with 
dissidents. All the battles took place in present-day Iraq.  However, “Taking advantage 
of the problems that Ali was having with dissidents, Mo’awiya consolidated his position 
in Syria and occupied Egypt” (Richard, 1991, p. 18). Eventually Ali was assassinated by a 
Kharijite (another dissident group) in 661 AD. Hasan, the elder son of Ali, chose to 
conclude a pact with the Umayyads according to which he withdrew to Medina. Yet, and 
according to Shia sources, the Umayyads schemed to kill him by getting one of his wives 
to poison him in 670 AD. When Mo’awiya died in 680, Hussein the son of Ali, refused to 
pledge allegiance to Mo’awiya’s son Yazid. Hussein headed to Kufa to lead a rebellion 
against Yazid, but the Umayyad troops hindered his advancement, so he had to stop in 
a spot called Karbala in the month of Muharram 61 AH. When Hussein and his 
companions camped in Karbala, Yazid cut the route off from food and water supplies. 
On the morning of 10 Muharram, Yazid’s troops attacked the camp and the majority of 
Hussein partisans were slaughtered. Hussein was decapitated, and his head was taken 
to Yazid’s palace in Damascus (Richard, 1991, p. 16-29).The Shia’s profound 
disappointment at the defeat of Hussein turned into polemics repeatedly heard at 
important Shia occasions particularly Ashura (10 Muharram).  
Towards the end of the Umayyad caliphate (740 AD/122 AH), another uprising by Zaid 
Ben Ali زيد بن علي (son of the fourth Imam) took place, but the followers of Zaid deserted 
and rejected him as they did not believe in the efficacy of resorting to arms. Another 
alleged reason for the use of the term rawāfiḍ )روافض( is that the followers of Zaid, 
requested that he publicly detach himself from Abu Bakr and Omar and call them 
‘usurpers’ . Hence the term could refer to the rejection of the Twelver Shias of the first 
two caliphs in Islamic history (Kohlberg, 1979 p. 677-679). This incident also marks a 
division within the Shia into Zaidis (those who only believe in the first five imams and 
the Twelver Shias (those who believe in twelve imams descending from Ali and Fatima). 





Shia include the Ismailis, who are followers of Ismail, the elder son of the sixth Imam 
Ja’far al-Sadeq (d.765) (see Figure 5.4). On the other hand Alawites/Nusayris, who are 
classified in some resources as a Shia group are according to various sources influenced 
by the Shia doctrine, but they have influences from other faiths and philosophies. 
However, in the 1970’s the Alawites were included under the umbrella of Shiism by the 
Shia religious leader Sayyid  Musa al-Sadr upon the request of President Hafez al-Assad 
who was an Alawi himself. See section Nusayris.  
The Safavid Empire (1501–1722) in Iran made Twelver Shia Islam the official religion of 
the state, and converted the Iranian population to it. The Safavids had several 
confrontations with the Ottomans, who were predominantly Sunnis and whose official 
religion was Sunni Islam. The 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran is a landmark as it has 
triggered the revival of Shia Islam particularly in the Middle East.  For further 
information, see section 5.6.6 below The Savafids. 
After the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, the Shia were mostly categorised 
among the oppressed and the deprived specially in the Gulf, Iraq and in Lebanon. This 
situation made them turn to communism: “In Iraq and Lebanon after World War I, 
numerous Shi’ites turned to communism to resolve problems of poverty, rural 
disintegration, colonial rule, and political marginalization” (Jurdi Abisaab and Abisaab, 
2014, p. xxvii). A Shia cleric founded in 1970 the mahrumin (deprived) movement in 
Lebanon as a voice for the deprived (Jurdi Abisaab and Abisaab, 2014, p. 113 -117).  
In 1979, a remarkable event took place that would change the scene in the Middle East 
and drive towards a revival of Shia in the region: the Islamic Revolution in Iran. In 1985, 
Hezbollah (The Party of God), an Islamist Shia para military group, was formed in South 
Lebanon as one of the major consequences of this revolution. Hezbollah engaged in 
fighting the Israeli occupation of South Lebanon, and later became an influential political 
party in Lebanon and in the region. Iran has also supported the Iraqi Shia-led 
government in the following the end the Saddam era which was characterised by Shia 






Shias and Sunnis share and agree on the main tenants of Islam. However, towards the 
end of the eighth century both groups started to establish their own jurisprudence. “The 
period that followed this first crisis and tension between the ideal and the real gradually 
marked the growth of discontent among the people, which led to revolutions and 
rebellions as to discussions and deliberations. This is reflected in the early Islamic fiqh 
(theology cum jurisprudence) literature that emerged toward the end of the 
second/eighth century” (Sachedina, 1988, p. 4). There are some differences in 
inheritance and marriage rules, but the most prominent characteristic of Twelver Shia 
Islam, which is not approved by Sunni scholars, is the sacred position of the imams. “The 
Ithna Asharis are the largest group and believe that Muhammad's religious leadership, 
spiritual authority and divine guidance were passed on to 12 of his descendants […]” 
(BBC, 2016).  
According to the Pew Research Centre, “Sunni Muslims and Shia Muslims (also known 
as Shiites) comprise the two main sects within Islam. Sunni and Shia identities first 
formed around a dispute over leadership succession soon after the death of the Prophet 
Muhammad in 632 AD. Over time, however, the political divide between the two groups 
broadened to include theological distinctions and differences in religious practices as 
well. While the two sects are similar in many ways, they differ over conceptions of 
religious authority and interpretation as well as the role of the Prophet Muhammad’s 















5.6.6 The Safavids 
The Safavids were a dynasty which ruled in Persia (Iran of today, parts of Turkey and 
Georgia) between 1501 and 1722. Safavidism started as a Sufi order in the region of 
Azerbaijan. The founding figure was Safi al-Din Alardabili (1252-1334), who converted 
to Shia Islam. The group grew stronger with time and became a military and religious 
group by the 15th century when they launched a war (Jihad) against Ottoman Turkey and 
Georgia. By that time, Turkey had outlawed Shia Islam and persecuted its followers. 
Shah Ismail was the first Safavid ruler. He carried out a military conquest and took power 
over all of Iran by 1510 establishing what is historically known as the Safavid Empire. 
The Safavid Empire instituted Shia Islam and declared it as the formal religion of the 
state although it was not practiced by the bulk of the population of that time. “The first 
Ismail had decreed that the Ithna-ashari Shi’i form of Islam and the Ja’fari system of law 
be formally established in the country” (Gholsorkhi, 1994, p. 477).  As a result the 
Safavids converted the predominantly Sunni population, and spent generously on 
religious institutions and Shia scholars to create a religious class that was closely 
associated with the state. In this sense the Safavid Empire was a theocracy. Sunni 
Muslims were persecuted in this empire as were all forms of Islam other than the 
Twelver Shiism adopted by the heads of the state. One may ascribe “two important 
historical accomplishments to the house of Safavids: one, predictably enough, was 
maintaining and sheltering Twelver Shi’ite faith in an entirely Sunni world; the other was 
the unification of western Iran with the formerly Timurid country of Khorasan, […]” 
(Fragner, 2012, p. 24). 
The Safavid Empire benefited from being on the cross-roads of trade between Europe 
and Central Asia, and although religious, it built its own secular administrative and 
government institutions. The capital was Isfahan which till now represents the 
renowned Safavid art and culture. 
The Safavid Empire worked on its empowerment to face the threat of the neighbouring 
Ottoman Empire, but by the 17th century the threat from the Ottomans declined and 





and even corrupt. A Shia religious council was able to seize power and eventually 
deposed the Shahs. As a result, the world's first Islamic Republic was proclaimed in the 
eighteenth century. In 1726, an Afghan group destroyed the ruling dynasty but they 
retained the Shia religious institutions and Ulama (men of religion) which led to a 
separation of powers (BBC, 2009). 
Due to the sectarian polarization in the Arab world and the Middle East, the term 
‘Safavids’ صفويون has been used specially by hard-line Sunni groups to refer to Iran in 
order to highlight its Shia affiliation specially given that Iran is led by an Islamic 
government that follows the Shia Muslim faith.  
 
5.6.7 The Nusayris (Alawites) 
For their part the ‘Alawis suffered from an acute sense of grievance, 
nourished over centuries, which explained the formidable energy, even the 
frenzy, with which this unfavoured community snatched at education, 
wealth and power once the wheel of fortune turned. With their history of 
oppression and exploitation, it was to be expected that ‘Alawis should seek 
redress for the injustices of the past and should be utterly determined 
never to be subdued again (Seale, 1995, p.23). 
The ruling family in Syria belongs to a sect named Alawis, Alawites or Nusayris. The name 
‘Alawite’ (العلويون in Arabic) is the most common form and widely used in Syria. It is taken 
for granted that this name is after ‘Ali Bin Abi Taleb’ the cousin of Prophet Mohammad 
and his son-in-law. After 2011, the term ‘Nusayris’ became more used than before 
especially in media dominated by some factions opposing the Syrian regime. 
From a social point of view, Syrian Alawites lived in rural coastal areas and worked in 
farming till the 1960’s when the Baath Party rose to power (08/03/1963). Before this 
date Alawites were a more-or-less persecuted segment of Syrian society; they were 
largely poor and illiterate and identified as peasants. Yet, many of them joined the 
military during the French mandate as the French authorities facilitated this for them, 
“Under the French Mandate (1923 -46) a kind of divide-and-rule policy was followed by 





Circassians and other minorities, who then formed part of the Troupes Spéciales du 
Levant, which were used to maintain order and suppress local rebellion.” (Van Dam, 
2017, pp.16-17). After Syria gained its independence in 1946, some Alawites opted for 
more nationalist and leftist ideologies, so good numbers of them joined the Baath Arab 
Socialist Party probably as a reaction to the feudal system which prevailed under the 
Ottomans and through the French mandate till the late 1950’s. President Jamal Abdul 
Naser, President of the United Arab Republic (Egypt and Syria: 1958–1961) carried out 
a reform policy of land and major enterprises ownership which was endorsed by the 
ruling Arab Socialist Baath Party during the years following the break-up of the UAR. 
Interestingly, it has always been controversial whether Alawites are Muslims or whether 
they have distinct beliefs from mainstream Islam. The name ‘Nusayri’ comes from 
Mohammad Bin Nusayr (A.D. 859) a close companion of the 11th Imam of the Twelvers 
Shia community (Imam Hasan al-Askari) who was named as his own intimate messenger 
(as Mohammad Bin Nusayr claimed). The movement started in Iraq and then the 
Nusayris moved to Aleppo under Sayf Al Dawla Al Hamdani (a Nusayri himself). At the 
turn of the 12th century, the crusaders conquered ‘the western part of the Alawi 
territory’ (Farouk Alli, 2015, p. 32); many Nusayris were then concentrated in the coastal 
mountains of Syria. 
Alawism spread out over Mesopotamia and into northern Syria, Aleppo, 
Hama, and finally the coastal highlands from Acre to Latakia (in that order). 
This was not the result of some imagined flight from oppression, but rather 
of a sustained missionary effort (da’wah). Its later concentration in the 
Syrian coastal mountains was above all the product of the Crusades, which 
spelled the effective end of the da’wah and increasingly forced the Alawis to 
organise themselves along tribal lines. The Alawis emerged from the twelfth 
century as something they had not been before, but which would define 
them for the rest of history: as a ‘minority’ (Van Dam, 2017, p. 22). 
During the Mamluk period the Alawites were persecuted and many of them were killed. 
Then after the Ottoman invasion of the area, the Nusayris lived in their mountains 





Ottomans supported the Nusayris against the Egyptian conscription policy in 1834 
following the invasion of Greater Syria by Muhammad Ali Pasha the Viceroy of Egypt 
(Talhami, 2012).  
Another question which has been frequently asked is whether Nusayris are an offshoot 
of Shi’a Islam, taking into the consideration that both denominations consider Imam Ali 
to be of uniquely high eminence. There is a consensus among a number of sources that 
the Alawi (Nusayri) faith is secretive. It has syncretic and mystic rites which only a few 
of the elite (Khassa) of the sect itself know or are allowed to know. The rest of the 
community (Amma) is kept ignorant of their own beliefs. According to the Islamic 
Monthly (Nguyen, 2016) “The core of the Nusayrism is the concept of triad (Ali, 
Mohammad and Salman Al Farisi (Salman the Persian) who is a Persian companion)”. 
This trinity concept made a number of scholars believe that Nusayrism “derives from 
Christianity”. The Nusayris also endorse the concept of reincarnation (the 
transmigration of the soul and reincarnation after death), which is most likely borrowed 
from Hinduism. Nusayrism is believed to have some Greek influences as well. Faruk Alli 
(2015) says: “Mahmud Faksh points out that the Alawi religion crystallised in the tenth 
and eleventh centuries as a mixture of various Islamic and non-Islamic beliefs and 
practices […]” (Alli, 2015, p. 29). He explains that there are pagan, Shia and Ismaili 
characteristics in the Alawi beliefs26. The Nusayris resort to Taqqiya ‘dissimulation’ to 
protect themselves. There had been a number of fatwas both against and for the 
Nusayris, the most known of which is that of Ibn Taymiyya’s (14th century), who declared 
that Nusayris are infidels and issued fatwas which threatened their lives (Talhami, 2010).  
Under al-Assad the father, efforts were made to bring the Alawites closer to mainstream 
Islam. A number of mosques were built in major Alawite towns in the 1970’s and 
President Hafiz al-Assad was able to “obtain a legal decision about their status as an 
Muslims (offshoot of Shia Islam) from the Lebanese religious leader Imam Musa al-Sadr 
in 1973” (Harvard Divinity School, N.D.). 
 
                                                             
26 Kerr, M. and Larkin, C. eds., 2015. The Alawis of Syria: War, faith and politics in the Levant. 





5.6.8 The Crusaders 
“A crusade was a holy war fought against those perceived to be the external or internal 
foes of Christendom for the recovery of Christian property or in defence of the church 
or Christian people” (Riley-Smith, 1987, xxviii). Although there were other crusades, e.g. 
in the Baltic, the best-known crusades were the medieval military campaigns intended 
to reconquer the Holy Land (Jerusalem) from the ‘infidels’ (the Muslims). These crusades 
are often termed ‘the Crusades’. 
The Crusades were carried out in a number of campaigns over a period of 200 years. In 
1095 Pope Urban II called for “a war of liberation”, under the banner of the Catholic 
Church after an appeal from the Byzantine emperor Alexius, who had been alarmed by 
the Turks’ advances in Asia Minor. His call also echoed the desire for reform expressed 
by progressive churchmen to free the church from corruption (Riley-Smith, 1987, pp. 1-
4). The fact that the Crusades were meant to defend and free people from Muslim rule 
and to free the holy city of Jerusalem where Christ was crucified gave them an aura of 
pilgrimage. Moreover, Pope Urban II preached the idea that it is not a sin to kill non-
Christians, and all those who fight in the Holy Land will have their past sins forgiven 
(Crusades, 2010). 
The Crusader armies were mainly recruited from Western Europe. The first campaign 
achieved its goal with the capture of Jerusalem, which was under the Egyptian Fatimids, 
in 1099. Jerusalem became the first Latin state in the East Mediterranean.  Earlier in 
1098 and during their march to Jerusalem, the Crusader armies along with their 
Byzantine allies were able to capture the important Syrian City of Antioch. Upon 
conquering Jerusalem, the Crusaders committed massacres of civilians and unarmed 
people of all faiths including Christians. The following is an account by al-Qalanisi: “The 
Franks stormed the town and gained possession of it. A number of the townfolk fled to 
the sanctuary and a great host were killed. The Jews assembled in the synagogue, and 
the Franks burned it over their heads. The sanctuary was surrendered to them on 
guarantee of safety on 22 Sha’ban [14 July] of this year, and they destroyed the shrines 





Louis VII of France and Conrad III of Germany headed the Second Crusade, 1147-1149, 
which scholars are agreed was not successful. Overall, the period between 1110-1187 
was not as active in crusading terms, and popes found it difficult to convince people to 
take up the cross and join new expeditions since the Holy Land was already in the hands 
of the Latins. However, two major losses were inflicted on the Crusaders: the loss of 
Edessa in 1144 and the Horns of Hattin in 1187. By 1189, all that was left of Palestine 
(Kingdom of Jerusalem) was the port of Tyre (Riley-Smith & Riley-Smith, 1981, pp. 15-
19). 
For almost the entire following century, the Crusaders actively attempted to regain 
control over lost territory. The Third Crusade, 1189-1192, was led by a number of kings, 
the most well-known of whom was Richard I of England, known as Richard the Lionheart, 
who captured Acre, then defeated Saladin in the battle of Arsuf In 1191. In 1192 Richard 
I and Saladin signed a peace treaty which preserved the kingdom of Jerusalem though 
without the city of Jerusalem itself (Crusades, 2010). “The third crusade had recaptured 
much of the coastline, but Jerusalem was still in Muslim hands” (Riley-Smith & Riley-
Smith, 1981, p. 21). 
The Fourth Crusade 1202-1204 was called for by Pope Innocent III with the aim of 
recapturing Jerusalem. However, a diversion of mission happened en route to 
Jerusalem. The crusading armies struck a deal with the Byzantine prince Alexius Angelos 
to attack Constantinople, and restore his deposed father to power in return for financial 
and military assistance to be provided later to the Crusaders to help them achieve their 
ultimate goal, Jerusalem (Riley-Smith & Riley-Smith, 1981, p. 23-24). In 1204, Alexius 
was killed in a popular uprising against him and his father. In response, the Crusaders, 
decided on a conquest of the Byzantine capital, which they sacked. The Fourth Crusade 
ended with the storming and looting of Constantinople and the establishing of a Latin 
state instead.  
There were various subsequent crusades which aimed at “[…] combating any and all of 
those seen as enemies of the Christian faith” (Crusades, 2010). The Fifth Crusade, 1213-
1221, called for by Pope Innocent III before his death targeted Egypt ruled then by the 





the Holy Land. The campaign made some advances into Egypt, but was finally defeated 
at the city of Al Mansurah.  
The Sixth Crusade started in 1228 with another attempt to capture Jerusalem. Though 
King Frederick II had “[…] envisaged an attack upon Egypt, but now a direct assault on 
Jerusalem became his goal” (Riley-Smith & Riley-Smith, 1981, p. 26). In fact, Frederick II 
was able to reach an agreement with the Sultan of Egypt Al Kamel on a peaceful transfer 
of control of Jerusalem and other parts of Palestine, including Bethlehem, Nazareth, 
Jaffa and Sidon to the Crusaders. King Frederick had a crown-wearing ceremony in the 
Church of the Holy Sepulchre. The agreement lasted for 10 years, after which the 
Muslims regained control of Jerusalem.  
The Seventh Crusade, begun in 1239, briefly regained control over Jerusalem and a large 
part of Palestine, but this land was lost again in 1244 to forces loyal to the Sultan of 
Egypt. In reaction, King Louis IX of France embarked on the Eighth Crusade in 1249. He 
headed to Egypt where he was defeated and forced to go back to Acre in Palestine. 
During the following years, the Mamluk dynasty rose to power in Egypt. The Mamluks, 
who were former extraordinary slaves of the Sultan with particular martial skills, were 
able to crush the Mongols, who emerged as a potential ally of the crusaders, at Ain Jalut 
in 1260. Baibars, who was a commander of the Mamluk army, became Sultan of Egypt 
after the assassination of the previous Sultan Qutz. He initiated a crackdown on the 
remaining Crusader strongholds in Palestine. In 1268 Baibars demolished Antioch, 
prompting another campaign led by King Louis IX. However, the campaign was diverted 
to Tunis where the Crusader army was subject to an epidemic and King Louis IX himself 
died.  
The last Crusade took place in 1289 when the Mamluk Sultan Qalawan captured Tripoli. 
Warships arrived to defend the remaining Crusader fortresses. In the following year, 
Qalawan’s son marched with a huge army to besiege Acre, the effective capital of the 
Crusaders (Crusades, 2010). The coastal city of Acre fell after seven weeks, marking an 






The medieval Crusades are indicative of the political authority of the Pope, and the 
extensive influence of the Catholic Church in life in medieval Europe. In a video entitled 
‘Crusades’, Professor Henry Louis Gates JR says the Crusades were also characterized by 
“[…] tremendous barbarity […]” (Gates, 2010). The Crusaders built formidable castles in 
what is now Israel/Palestine, Lebanon, Syria and Jordan, many of which still remain. 
In the minds of contemporary Arabs and Muslims, the Crusades are typically 
remembered as just one of the many assaults by various invaders on the region. As a 
child at school in Syria, I was taught that the Crusades were started mainly to seize 
control of the resources of the area, and to divert the attention of people in Europe from 
internal political and economic difficulties. However, a connection is sometimes made 
between current Western intervention in the Arab world and the Crusades, particularly 
by Islamist organisations.  
Over the past 200 years, in particular, the Arab/Islamic world has undergone setbacks 
and lengthy periods of decline, which appear all the more prominent when compared 
with the advanced West. In 1798 Napoleon Bonaparte occupied Egypt without great 
difficulty. Further colonial domination was experienced in Algeria in 1830 when French 
military fleet landed on the Algerian shores. During the 1900’s the term ‘crusade’ and 
its legacy were used by European elite as was done by the Archbishop of Aix-en-Province 
in a prayer to French soldiers in Algeria. The archbishop associated ‘crusading’ and ‘just 
war’ and used terms like ‘the sword of God’ and ‘Christians under Muslim slavery’, which 
“[…] call to mind the blessed instruments of war Crusaders used to wage war in the Holy 
Land. In addition, his reference to Christians under Muslim slavery also calls to mind 
Pope Urban II’s calling of the First Crusade […]” (Dartmouth, 2016, p. 4). 
In the early 20th century, a substantial area of the Arab region was divided between 
Britain and France (Sykes–Picot agreement), which were the great colonial empires of 
the time. Some researchers noted two trends in the way Arabs/Muslims reacted to these 
setbacks: secular and Islamist. The secular trend viewed these interventions as a secular 
colonial conflict “based on greed and political control” (Dartmouth, 2016, p. 3). A 
number of Arab leaders and political movements preached this view especially around 





Western interventions in Muslim countries as a continuation of the Crusades. They 
perceive the relationship between the East and the West as one of rivalry and distrust 
mainly because of the legacy of the Crusades. Subsequent engagements between 
Muslims and European Christians for Islamists are but subsequent episodes of the 
Crusades. “Some contemporary Arab and Muslim scholars evaluate and reinterpret the 
crusading phenomenon in the light of recent experiences such as colonialism, Arab 
nationalism, the establishment of the state of Israel, the liberation of Palestine and the 
rise of ‘Islamic fundamentalism” (Hillenbrand, 1999, p. 4).  
Some groups of Islamic fundamentalists believe in a united Islamic community, under 
one Muslim caliphate; even those who don’t, still believe that faith should govern all 
aspects of life including the state and political life. Muslim fundamentalist scholars 
consider that the above interventions have laid the groundwork for developing militant 
Islam. Sayyid Qutb, one of the leading figures of the Muslim Brothers movement, is 
regarded as one of the most important scholars involved in developing the ideology of 
militant Islam, and making the link between the Crusades and contemporary conflicts: 
“[…] Qutb paints the crusades as deep, festering wounds in the hearts and minds of 
Islamic society” (Dartmouth, 2016, p. 7). Moreover, the Crusades have affected Jihadist 
(5.6.2) rhetoric, calling for a holy war against offences against Muslim lands and peoples. 
“Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, for example, often employ the rhetoric of the crusades, 
framing modern westerners as ‘crusaders’ in their efforts to rally support for their 
causes” (Holt, N.D. p.7). 
According to the American critic, Paul Berman (New York Times, 2003), Al Qaeda, which 
incorporated some Egyptian Islamist factions, was influenced by the conceptions of 
Sayyid Qutb. As Lawrence puts, it “While Bin Laden and his suicide warriors came from 
Saudi Arabia, their broader roots came from Egypt via Afghanistan. […] The Egyptian 
factions emerged from a school of thought within Egypt’s fundamentalist movement, 
the Muslim Brotherhood, in the 1950s and 60s. At the heart of that single school of 
thought stood, until his execution in 1966, a philosopher named Sayyid Qutb […]” 
(Lawrence, 2006). Al Qaeda has frequently used the Crusades in its discourse to refer to 
the long-standing animosity between the Muslim East and Christian Europe, of which 





It is noteworthy too that US President George Bush Junior described the 2003 invasion 
of Iraq as a ‘new crusade’.  Although he was using ‘crusade’ in the sense ‘An aggressive 
movement or enterprise against some public evil, or some institution or class of persons 
considered as evil’ (Oxford English Dictionary Online), this carried a clear echo, i.e. what 
Dickins, Hervey and Higgins (2016, p.103) call a ‘reflected meaning’, of ‘crusade’ in the 
more basic sense discussed in this section. Bush’s statement caused significant 
resentment across the Middle East. It is noteworthy that the concepts of Jihad in Islam 
(particularly militant Islam) and Crusade in Christianity) share a common ground, which 
is engaging in holy war in the name of religion.  
 
5.7 Case for the likely reader stereotypes inclinations (Islamophobia related texts) 
I collected the Islamophobia-related texts from Reuters news agency over the month of 
May 2016. These texts were varied in their content, relaying news from Iraq, Syria, 
Lebanon, Yemen, Saudi Arabia and Iran. People who are following the news from the 
Middle East and North Africa know that the issue of Islamophobia has become 
exacerbated in that region and beyond, with the rise of Islamist organisations, including 
jihadist ones, and the polarisation of Muslim, but more notably Arab, public opinion 
along sectarian lines: Shia and Sunni. Shia and Sunni are the two mainstream Muslim 
denominations.  
From a statistical point of view, Sunni Muslims make up 90% of the world’s Muslims (1.4 
billion in 2010), and the Shia make up 10 percent of the world’s Muslims (162 million in 
2010) (Pew Research Centre, 2011)27. The largest three Sunni Muslim countries are not 
Arab, while the second and fourth largest Shia Muslim countries are Arab. Iran, the 
largest country with a majority Shia population28, though not Arab, has influence in the 
                                                             
27 Pew Research Center. 2011. The Future of Global Muslim Population; projections for 2010-
2030. [Online]. [Accessed 10 November 2018]. Avialable from: 
http://www.pewresearch.org/wp-
content/uploads/sites/7/2011/01/FutureGlobalMuslimPopulation-WebPDF-Feb10.pdf 
28 Pew Research Center. 2013. Shias-Sunnis Religious Conflict. [Online]. [Accessed 10 







Arab region and is a major regional player. It has been noted both in the media, and by 
researchers that there are high levels of sectarian tension in some of the countries 
where Sunnis and Shias live side by side. There is also rising concern about radical 
religious groups. Shia and Sunni Muslims have the same beliefs with respect to the 
principal tenets of Islam (see Section 5.6.5). 
The news texts collected, as mentioned above, are related to countries where sectarian 
tensions have in one way or another contributed to the problems discussed. Shia and 
pro-Shia voices are clearly heard, especially given the effective media outlets that serve 
their causes, such as Al Manar (Hezbollah TV), Al Alam (an Iranian TV station which 
broadcasts in Arabic), and Al Mayadeen and Al Jadid, two Lebanese TV channels which 
endorse the pro-resistance (anti-Saudi) stance. On the other side are channels such as 
Al Arabia TV, which represents the Saudi point of view, and also Al Jazeera, which 
although in dispute with Saudi Arabia (as a Qatar-based channel), has been anti-Shia, as 
well as the Lebanese Future Television owned by Saad Al Hariri, the current Lebanese 
prime minister, who is also a Saudi national. There are no precise figures for the 
Shia/Sunni distribution in areas of conflict but approximate percentages are available 
from (Dickins, J. and Watson, J., 1999: 30-32):  
Iraq: Shia Muslims: 50%, Sunni Muslims: 45% 
Syria: Shia Muslims (Alawi): 12%, Sunni Muslims: 70% 
Yemen: Shia Muslims (Zaydi): 43%, Shia Muslims (Ismaili): 7%, Sunni Muslims: 50% 
Lebanon: Shia Muslims: 35%, Sunni Muslims: 23% 
Saudi Arabia: Shia Muslims: 4%, Sunni Muslims: 96%  
Demographic information for the Arab world can also be found on this link: 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-25434060  
I have tried to devise the likely reader stereotype relying on opinion polls, surveys 
whenever available and also news articles/videos from both Arab and British media 
sources. This technique is known as extrapolation. For the reasons given above, and 





and also because it has impacted on the major Arab political and military conflicts during 
the past few years, and particularly following the ‘Arab Spring’, I have given generally 
equal weight to the likely reader stereotypes of both categories of readers: those who 
are pro-Sunni (and especially pro-Islamist) and those who are pro-Shia. The pro Shia 
readers for example in Syria and Lebanon are more likely to be pro the so called 
resistance axis. It is worth noting that this category pro-Shia or pro-‘resistance’, is not 
confined to Shia populations only, as some Sunnis and some Christians, and probably 
other minorities have joined this group for various reasons, e.g. nationalistic stance or 
for concern over Islamist encroachment in the region. In Iraq, the Shia population which 
was suppressed under Saddam Hussein’s rule thought they had rightfully earned power 
in the post-American invasion era since they are the majority. Consequently, Sunnis felt 
they were marginalised “The fear of marginalisation and impotence in the face of both 
a rising Shi’a militancy and a powerful occupying force kept most Sunni Arabs in a state 
of active or passive hostility to the new order” (Allawi, 2007, p.136). The devastating 
Yemen war can also be viewed from the perspective of a proxy war between Sunni Saudi 
Arabia and Shia Iran.  
 
5.8 The Syrian Conflict 
Syria has been ruled autocratically by members of the al-Assad family for the past 45 
years. Hafez al-Assad was the General Secretary of Arab Socialist Baath Party and rose 
to power in 1970 following a coup d’état. He was in office from 12 March 1971 to 10 
June 2000. He was also the commander in chief of the Syrian armed forces. During the 
1960’s, the Alawites/Nusayris were establishing themselves in the army. Al-Assad, an 
Alawite/Nusayri himself, consolidated Alawite/Nusayri control over sensitive positions 
in the army and intelligence. He declared emergency rule in Syria in the aftermath of an 
uprising led by the Muslim Brotherhood from the mid 1970’s to the early 1980’s. This is 
still in effect. Throughout the duration of al-Assad’s rule, the iron grip of the regime 
stifled all freedoms and restricted power to a small circle. “During the three decades 
that Hafiz al-Asad had the monopoly of power in Syria (1970-200), very little changed in 
the power structure of the Syrian regime. Most of the prominent Alawi officers who 





the early and mid-1970swere after 25 years still in the same, or similar, positions” (Van 
Dam, 2017, p.54). This practice has created some barriers between the Alawites and the 
other Syrian communities. At some instances, the Sunni majority felt marginalised. 
Hafez al-Assad died in the year 2000, and his son Bashar was unanimously nominated 
president in a Parliamentary session. The session was followed by general election in 
which al-Assad (the son) was the only candidate. He was elected president, and assumed 
office on 17 July 2000.  
When Mohamed Bouazizi set himself on fire in December 2010, this incident marked 
the beginning of what was later called the Arab spring. A democratic wave swept 
through the region and proved contagious. Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen and Libya experienced 
uprisings against authoritarian governments and Syria was to follow.  
In March 2011, some Syrians started to form a small-scale popular movement. Syrians 
took to the streets peacefully asking for major reforms. The regime reacted brutally, and 
used violence (live ammunition, random detentions, indiscriminate shooting of 
protestors) against the peaceful protests. Consequently, the demonstrators demanded 
the toppling of the regime and establishing a secular democratic state. The regime 
employed increasing levels of violence which initially triggered the idea of local self-
protection militias. However, regional and international factors pushed to militarise the 
peaceful revolution. The Syrian uprising dramatically changed into a bitter internal fight 
between various opposition factions and the official Syrian army.  
The Syrian conflict has regional and international dimensions. Saudi Arabia, Turkey and 
Qatar have backed the opposition, while Iran and Russia have backed the regime. 
Currently, there are is a Saudi-based opposition and a Turkish-based opposition. There 
are also specific members of the opposition who are affiliated with certain regional or 
international states such as Qatar, the USA and even Israel “As a result of this foreign 
support, the war in Syria developed into a war by proxy, as well as being an internal 
intra-Syrian war” (Van Dam, 2017, p.64). 
Moreover, Jihadist groups (IS and Jabhat al-Nusra, which is affiliatied with al-Qaeda) 





observers of the Syrian scene noted that the Syrian regime found in the Jihadists an 
opportunity to improve their own image, and to claim that the alternative to it is even 
worse. In fact  some of those Islamist insurgents had been previously released from the 
regime’s prisons at the early stages of the crisis, “Indeed, some of the released Islamist 
leaders later played a prominent role in the Syrian War, like Hasan ‘Abbud of Ahrar al-
Sham and Zahran Alloush of Liwa’ al-Sham (Later Jaysh al-Islam)” (Van Dam, 2017, p.80). 
Charles Lister states, “Weakening the moderate insurgency and therefore facilitating the 
rise to prominence of Islamists had been a consistent and key element of the regime’s 
strategy” (Lister, 2015, p.289).  
The Kurdish issue has cast its complications on the Syrian issue. There are several 
Kurdish forces which are pursuing a separatist agenda in the war-torn country. The (YPG 
or People’s Protection Units), who are a militia and main component of the Syrian 
Democratic Forces (SDF) which was founded in October 2015 as a multi-ethnic and 
multi-religious group (Middle East Observer, 2015). The United States is backing the YPG 
and providing them with arms. The role of the YPG in what they call ‘Rojava’ or ‘Syrian 
Kurdistan’ worries the Syrian opposition, Turkey and probably the Syrian government. 
Despite its legitimate demands – freedom of expression, democracy and curbing 
corruption – the Syrian revolution was not supported by the international community. 
A number of international initiatives were attempted under the auspices of the United 
Nation: Geneva I in June 2012, Geneva II in 2014, and Geneva III in February 2016. The 
first communique issued by the action group conference on 30 June 2012 stressed the 
need for a "transitional government body with full executive powers", which could 
include members of the present Syrian government and of the opposition (BBC, 2012). 
In the summer of 2011, defecting members of the official Syrian army formed the Free 
Syrian Army (FSA). The FSA was a national secular power. However, it was not supported 
sufficiently and the FSA dwindled in numbers and effectiveness.  A number of other 
armed factions were then established in different Syrian regions. Liwa al-Islam was 
established by Zahran Alloush in the Damascus suburbs (Eastern Ghouta). Zahran 
Alloush is the son of a religious scholar based in Saudi Arabia. He was imprisoned in Syria 





called Jaysh-al Islam led by Zahran Alloush. “Saudi Arabia appears to be central to the 
merger of rebel groups around Damascus. Liwa al-Islam chief Zahran Alloush is backed 
by Riyadh, while both Ahrar al-Sham, which is supported by Qatar, and Jabhat al-Nusra 
have been excluded from the new grouping” (Hassan, 2013). 
The Syrian conflict has also witnessed the unceasing backing of Iran and Hezbollah for 
the Syrian regime. Military, economic and intelligence support have been huge. Russia 
has shown unwavering support to the official Syrian authorities, voted against a of UN 
resolutions aimed at delegitimising the Syrian regime or imposing sanctions against it 
(2011), condemning Syria over its crackdown on anti-government protesters 
(2011), demanding that all parties in Syria — both Government forces and armed 
opposition groups — stop all violence and reprisals (2012), referring Syria to an 
international criminal course (2014) and also condemnation of the Syrian regime for 
carrying out chemical attacks (2017). Since September 2015, Russia has intervened 
militarily on the ground. In cooperation with Iran and the official Syrian army, the 
Russians were able to conquer the last stronghold of the rebels in Aleppo, the largest 
Syrian city in the north of the country. Most of the rebels are now concentrated in the 
northern city of Idlib, and negotiations are taking place in the Kazakh capital Astana. 
However, these are now more about understandings between Russia, Turkey and Iran 
than about the will and demands of the Syrian people. 
 
5.8.1 Data analysis example (Syria) 
There are six texts related the Syrian conflict. Here below is the first one, and the rest 
are to be found on Appendix 2. 
Reuters English: 08/05/2016 
Al Qaeda chief tells jihadist fighters in Syria: Unite or die 
Al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri urged rival jihadist fighters in Syria to unite or risk 
death but again decried fellow Sunni Muslim militants Islamic State as "extremists" in an 





As successor to Osama bin Laden, Zawahiri has the allegiance of al Qaeda branches in 
the Middle East, North Africa and South Asia. But the group’s dominance is being 
challenged by Islamic State, which controls territory in Syria and Iraq and followings in 
Libya and Yemen. 
In Syria, al Qaeda offshoot Nusra Front and Islamic State are the two most powerful 
groups fighting government forces. Once a single group, they split in 2013, largely due 
to a power struggle among leaders. 
"We have to want the unity of the Mujahideen in Sham (Syria) so it will be liberated from 
the Russians and Western crusaders. My brothers ... the matter of unity is a matter of 
life or death for you,” Zawahiri said.  
The authenticity of the recording, the first since January, could not be immediately 
verified, but it had the hallmarks of previous Zawahiri tapes. In January, the Egyptian 
former doctor called for revenge after Saudi Arabia executed dozens of militants. 
He is believed to be hiding in a border area between Afghanistan and Pakistan. 
On the recording, Zawahiri lambasted a U.N.-backed political process to find a solution 
in Syria, and praised Nusra Front, which controls most of Idlib province. 
Nusra is also part of an alliance of Islamist brigades known as Jaish al Fateh, which is 
leading battles against Syrian government forces and its Russian- and Iranaian-backed 
allies in the southern Aleppo countryside.  
In January, Nusra Front tried unsuccessfully to convince rival Islamist factions to merge 
into one unit, including the powerful Ahrar al-Sham. 
Zawahiri also emphasized once again the ideological divide between al Qaeda and 
Islamic State, which is fighting a Western-led coalition and Russian forces while also 





He described them as "extremists and renegades" whose followers would eventually 


















Jihadist fighters Basic analysis: 
The social actors are constructed as Jihadists.  
 
Background facts: 
Members of jihadist organisations or Islamist rebel factions 
fighting in Syria. For further information, refer to 5.6.1 & 5.6.2 
Islamism & jihadism. 
 
Likely Reader stereotypes/ideologies: 
The term conjures up images of the violent and ruthless 
Muslim fighters who are guided by irrational exclusive views 
and could be involved in globalised terror (very negative image 
of Islam). 
 
News service stereotypes/ideologies: 
Violent members of militant Muslim organisations (very 












Use of rhetorical 
figures  








Al Qaeda chief tells 
jihadist fighters in 
Syria: Unite or die 
 
Basic analysis: 
A title where the news service is introducing the piece of news 
which is the focal point of this media text. 
 
Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies: 
Al-Qaeda is a terrorist Muslim organisation which is involved in 
global terror attacks and killing innocent people (very negative 
image of Islam). 
 
News service stereotypes/ideologies: 
Islamic fundamentalist rhetoric, which conforms with the 
concept of sacrificing one’s life for a certain cause (very 




quotation of events 
and utterances 
Expressing involvement, 




Al Qaeda leader 
Ayman al-Zawahiri 
Basic analysis: 
The social actor is constructed as the leader of Al-Qaeda who 
succeeded Osama Ben Laden. 
 
Background facts: 
Refer to fact sheet 5.5 Ayman al-Zawahiri  
 
Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies: 
A leader of a Jihadi group involved in global terror (very 
negative image of Islam).  
 
News service stereotypes/ideologies: 
The leader of a Muslim jihadist organisation which is 
responsible for global terror attack and which is still planning 
to commit more terror attack around the world, particularly in 





Use of rhetorical 
figures 













The social actors are constructed as the fighters of the Islamic 
State who are defined as Sunni Muslim militants. 
 
Background facts: 
Please refer to fact sheet 5.5 Islamic State 
 
Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies: 
Apparently, Sunni Islam is more militant and extremist than 
other versions of Islam (very negative image of Sunni Islam). 
 
News service stereotypes/ideologies: 
The jihadist organisations, and other militant groups follow 





Use of rhetorical 
figures 




"extremists" The Islamic State militants are labelled as “extremists” by the 
Al Qaeda leader. The news service is distancing itself from this 























Al Qaeda leader 
Ayman al-Zawahiri 
urged rival 
jihadist fighters in S
yria to unite or risk 





"extremists" in an 
audio recording 




The news service is reporting a statement by Al Qaeda leader 
Ayman al-Zawahiri who is calling on all jihadist fighters in Syria 
including his rivals to unite. Yet, he criticized IS and described 
the Islamic State as extremists.  
 
Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies: 
The Muslim Jihadi fighters are in pursuit of death in order to 
reach the bliss of heaven including the many virgins (very 
negative image of Islam).  
 
News service stereotypes/ideologies: 
The leader of the jihadist group al Qaeda is urging the militant 
groups in Syria to unite, however, he has criticized the Islamic 
State and described it as extremist (very negative image of 

















quotation of events 
and utterances 
Expressing involvement, 








Osama bin Laden Basic analysis: 
The social actor is constructed as the former Al Qaeda leader.  
 
Background facts: 
Please refer to fact sheet 5.5 Osama Ben Laden 
 
Likely reader stereotypes/Ideologies: 
Former leader of the jihadist group al-Qaeda which is 
responsible for the 9/11 attacks (very negative image of Islam). 
 
News service stereotypes/ideologies: 
A jihadist leader of al Qaeda who has been accused for being 
primarily responsible for ‘international terrorism’ (very 
negative image of Islam). 
Membership 
Categorization, Use 
of rhetorical figures 




Islamic State Basic analysis: 
The social actor is constructed as a Sunni Salafist jihadist 




Refer to fact sheet 5.5 Islamic State  
 
Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies: 
A Jihadist organisation which carries out violent and 
unjustified actions in the name of Islam (very negative image 
of Islam). 
 
News service stereotypes/ideologies:  
Membership 
Categorization, Use 
of rhetorical figures 








Sunni Salafist jihadist organisation which aims at establishing a 
Muslim caliphate in the region (very negative image of Islam). 
 
As successor to 
Osama bin Laden, 
Zawahiri has the 
allegiance of al 
Qaeda branches in 
the Middle East, 
North Africa and 
South Asia. But the 
group’s dominance 
is being challenged 
by Islamic State, 
which controls 
territory in Syria 
and Iraq and 
followings in Libya 
and Yemen 
Basic analysis: 
The news service is introducing al-Zawahiri and the groups he 
is leading by providing information about al Qaeda, its areas of 
influence and its former leader Osama Bin laden. 
 
Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies: 
Unfortunately, the jihadist organisations are proliferating! 
(very negative in Islam). 
 
News service stereotypes/ideologies:  
Al-Qaeda is led by al-Zawahiri who succeeded Osama Bin 
Laden. It has a number of branches in the Middle East and 
North Africa. However, it is challenged by the Islamic State 
which is another jihadist Sunni organisation that is gaining 
territories and support in various areas in the Middle East 














quotation of events 
and utterances 
Expressing involvement, 











al Qaeda offshoot 
Nusra Front 
Basic analysis: 
The social actor is constructed as a jihadist group based in 
Syria. It has pledged allegiance to Al Qaeda. 
 
Background facts:  
Refer to fact sheet  5.5 Jabhat al-Nusra (Jabhat Fateh al-Sham) 
 
Likely reader Stereotypes/Ideologies: 
Jihadi Islamist Sunni group based in Syria with an allegiance to 
al-Qaeda (very negative image of Islam).  
 
News service stereotypes/ideologies:  
Since it is an offshoot of al-Qaeda, then it is a Sunni jihadist 
organisation (very negative image of Sunni Islam). 
Membership 
Categorization,   
Use of rhetorical 
figures 




government forces Basic analysis: 
The social actor is constructed as the official Syrian 
government forces. 
 
Background facts:  
Refer to 5.8 Syrian Conflict 
 
Likely reader Stereotypes/ideologies: 
Although the Syrian government is autocratic, at least it is 
secular, and it is fighting fundamentalist groups (very negative 
image of Islam). 
 
Membership 
Categorization,   
Use of rhetorical 
figures 








News service stereotypes/ideologies: 
The official Syrian government which is secular and in conflict 
with Sunni, Jihadist groups (very negative image of Sunni 
Islam). 
In Syria, al Qaeda 
offshoot Nusra 
Front and Islamic 




Once a single 
group, they split in 
2013, largely due to 
a power struggle 
among leaders. 
Basic analysis: 
The news service is providing information on the inception of 
Nusra Front and its affiliations. 
 
Background facts:  
Refer to 5.5 Islamic State &  Jabhat al-Nusra (Jabhat Fateh al-
Sham) 
 
Likely reader Stereotypes/ideologies: 
Syria has become a hotbed for fundamentalist groups and 
organisations (very negative image of Islam). 
 
News service stereotypes/ideologies: 
The Sunni jihadist organisations, the al Qaeda offshoot Nusra 
Front and the Islamic State, are powerful groups fighting the 
Syrian government. However, they had an internal leadership 
conflict which eventually led to their split (very negative image 











quotation of events 
and utterances 
Expressing involvement, 












Mujahideen Basic analysis: 
The social actors are constructed as Mujahideen with a 
reference to the ‘Mujahideen’ in Afghanistan.  
 
Background facts: 
Refer to 5.6.3 Mujahideen 
 
Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies: 
Salafist believers in Jihad or Muslim holy war who were mainly 
in Afghanistan in the 1980’s fighting the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan (neutral). 
 
News service stereotypes/ideologies: 
Al-Zawahiri is calling the fighters of the Islamist groups 
‘Mujahideen’ which means the Muslim fighters who are ready 
to sacrifice their lives for ‘Jihad’ which is a holy war (very 
negative image of Islam). 
Membership 
Categorization,   
Use of rhetorical 
figures 







The social actors are constructed as the Russian forces which 
intervened in Syria on the side of the Syrian regime. al-
Zawahiri is making an association (allusion) between the 
Russian intervention and other Western interventions in the 





Use of rhetorical 
figures 








Refer to 5.6.8 Crusaders 
 
Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies: 
An emerging stereotype of Western invasion of the Muslim 
world. The image of crusaders in the western mind used to be 
positive, but westerners are gradually developing a less 
positive view towards them (neutral). 
 
News service stereotypes/ideologies: 
Al-Qaeda jihadists and their followers have retained the image 
of the West as the ‘Crusaders’ of the Middle Ages (very 
negative image of Islam).  
"We have to want 
the unity of the 
Mujahideen in 
Sham (Syria) so it 
will be liberated 
from the Russians 
and Western 
crusaders. My 
brothers ... the 
matter of unity is a 
matter of life or 
death for you,” 
Zawahiri said. 
Basic analysis: 
The news service is reporting a direct quotation by al- 
Zawahiri.  Al-Zawahiri is likening the conflict in Syria to that in 
Afghanistan by using the term ‘mujahideen’  
 
Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies: 
Urging people to die is a kind of jihadist discourse (very 
negative image of Islam). 
 
News service stereotypes/ideologies: 
Al-Zawahiri is urging the jihadist fighters in Syria to unite in 
face of the Russians and the Western crusaders or face death. 
He is retrieving a mediaeval image of clash between the 
Muslims in the East and crusaders from the West (very 















U.N Basic analysis: 
The social actor is constructed as an international organisation 
whose role is to attempt to solve international conflicts and 





Use of rhetorical 
figures 




On the recording, 
Zawahiri lambasted 
a U.N.-backed 
political process to 
find a solution in 
Syria, and praised 
Nusra Front, which 
controls most of 
Idlib province. 
Basic analysis: 
The news service is reporting the dissatisfaction of Al  Zawahiri 
with U.N involvement in Syria, probably relaying a general 




Refer to 5.8 Syrian Conflict. 
 
Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies: 
Jihadist groups wouldn’t comply with international law (very 
negative image of Islam). 
 
News service stereotypes/ideologies: 
Al-Zahrawi is angry at the UN peace negotiations related to 
Syria, while he is pleased with the advances of al-Qaeda off-










quotation of events 
and utterances 
Expressing involvement, 














Jaish al Fateh Basic analysis: 
The social actor is constructed as a rebel coalition which 
consists mainly of Islamist factions Including al-Nusra Front.  
 
Background facts: 
Refer to 5.5  Jaish al-Fateh 
 
Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies: 
Some Islamist group fighting in Syria (very negative image of 
Islam). 
 
News service stereotypes/ideologies: 
Al Nusra Front, which is an al Qaeda affiliate, is in alliance with 





Use of rhetorical 
figures 







The social actor is constructed as the official Syrian 
government forces. We note a change in the naming of the 
Syrian leadership from ‘regime’ to ‘government’. This changes 
the construction of the social actor. 
 
Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies: 
Membership 
Categorization,  
Use of rhetorical 
figures 








Though it is an authoritarian rule, it is the lesser evil than the 
(Jihadist groups) (very negative image of Islam). 
 
News service stereotypes/ideologies: 
The forces which belong to the official Syrian government (the 





The social actors are constructed as forces which intervened in 
the Syrian conflict in favour of the Syrian regime - Russia and 
Iran-affiliated forces (mainly Hezbollah). 
 
Background facts: 
Refer to 5.8 Syrian Conflict. 
 
Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies: 
Some regional and international powers have intervened in 
the Syrian conflict (neutral).  
 
News service stereotypes/ideologies: 
The Syrian government is backed by Iran and Russia (neutral). 
Membership 
Categorization,  
Use of rhetorical 
figures 




Nusra is also part of 
an alliance of 
Islamist brigades 
known as Jaish al 





The news service is presenting the situation in some conflict 
areas in Syria and introduces the opposing alliances.  
 
Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies: 
The Syrian conflict is no longer confined to Syrians but has 






quotation of events 
and utterances 
Expressing involvement, 








and its Russian- 
and Iranian-backed 
allies in the 
southern Aleppo 
countryside.  
News service stereotypes/ideologies: 
The Syrian government is backed by Iran and Russia against 
Islamist and jihadist groups including al-Nusra front which is an 
al-Qaeda affiliate (very negative image of Islam). 
Ahrar al-Sham Basic analysis: 
The social actor is constructed as an Islamist rebel faction. 
 
Background facts: 
Refer to fact sheet 5.5 Ahrar al-Sham 
 
Likely stereotypes/ideologies 
Islamist rebel group operating in Syria (very negative image of 
Islam). 
 
News service stereotypes/ideologies: 
A Sunni Islamist and Salafist group and a rival of Nusra Front 
(very negative image of Sunni Islam).  
Membership 
Categorization,  
Use of rhetorical 
figures 








Islamist factions to 
merge into one 




The news service is shedding light on the efforts of al-Nusra 





quotation of events 
and utterances 
Expressing involvement, 

















The social actor is constructed as an international coalition led 
by the US to fight the Islamic State. 
 
Background facts: 
Refer to fact sheet  5.5 US-led coalition in Syria and Iraq 
 
Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies: 
The whole world should cooperate against this terrorist 
jihadist group and eliminate it (very negative image of Islam).  
 
News service stereotypes/ideologies: 
The jihadist organisation Islamic State has gained ground in 
Iraq and Syria, and thus an international coalition led by the US 
has intervened in both Iraq and Syria to fight IS (very negative 











Use of rhetorical 
figures 

















The social actor is constructed as the Western-backed Kurdish 
groups who are armed and trained by the US to take part in 
fighting the Islamic State in Northern Syria.  
 
Background facts: 
The US-supported Kurdish militias and Arab tribes opposing 
Jihadi organisations in north-east Syria particularly the Islamic 
State. 
 
Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies: 
Positive view of Kurds, since they are secular and Western-
backed (very negative image of Islam). 
 
News service stereotypes/ideologies: 
The United States has armed and trained some Kurdish groups 
to take part in fighting the jihadist group the Islamic State 









Use of rhetorical 
figures 














The Syrian army Basic analysis: 
The social actor is constructed as the official Syrian army 
fighting opposing rebel groups and defending the Syrian 
government. 
 
Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies: 
The official Syrian army fighting a cohort of Islamist factions 
(very negative image of Islam). 
 
News service stereotypes/ideologies: 
The Syrian army which is fighting the Islamic State alongside a 
number of regional and international forces including Russia 
and the United States (very negative image of Islam).  
Membership 
Categorization,  
Use of rhetorical 
figures 








between al Qaeda 
and Islamic State, 





The news service is reporting the attitudes of al-Qaeda 
towards the Islamic State. 
 
Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies: 
Both al-Qaeda and the Islamic State are jihadist groups and 
pose the threat of global terror (very negative image of Islam). 
 




quotation of events 
and utterances 
Expressing involvement, 








while also clashing 
with Western-
backed rebels and 
the Syrian army. 
Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State are rivals although both are 
jihadist Islamist groups. The Islamic State is battling with a 
number of regional and international forces (very negative 






The Islamic State is labeled by the al-Qaeda leader using 
stereotypically Islamic negative terms ‘extremists’ and 
‘renegades’. The news service is distancing itself from this 




Labelling social actors 
negatively 
Predication 
He described them 




their beliefs and 
methods. 
Basic analysis: 
The news service continues to report al-Zawahiri’s viewpoint 
on IS, but distances itself from it by using inverted commas.  
 
Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies: 
Both are jihadist groups who are responsible for global terror 
attacks (very negative image of Islam). 
 
News service stereotypes/ideologies: 
Al-Zawahiri is using Islamic rhetoric to blemish the Islamic 
State accusing it of not following the right path of Islam, but of 




quotation of events 
and utterances 
Expressing involvement, 









 الظواهري يقول للمتشددين في سوريا: اتحدوا أو موتوا
دعا أيمن الظواهري زعيم تنظيم القاعدة المقاتلين المتشددين في سوريا لالتحاد أو مواجهة خطر الموت ولكنه وصف 
 "غالة" في تسجيل صوتي جديد بث على اإلنترنت يوم األحد.من جديد متشددي تنظيم الدولة اإلسالمية بأنهم 
دة بفروع التنظيم في الشرق األوسط وفي شمال ويعترف الظواهري الذي خلف أسامة بن الدن مؤسس تنظيم القاع
أفريقيا وجنوب آسيا. لكن هيمنة الجماعة تعرضت لتحد ماثل بقيام تنظيم الدولة اإلسالمية الذي يسيطر على أجزاء 
 .من سوريا والعراق وله أتباع في اليمن وليبيا
ن يقاتالن القوات الحكومية السورية. وكان وفي سوريا فإن تنظيمي الدولة اإلسالمية وجبهة النصرة هما أكبر تنظيمي
 .ألسباب أهمها الصراع على السلطة بين قادتها 2013التنظيمان يعمالن تحت مظلة تنظيم واحد إلى أن انفصال في 
من واجبنا اليوم أن ننفر لنصرته خفافا وثقاال وأن نحرض على وحدة المجاهدين في الشام حتى “وقال الظواهري 
 .النظام النصيري العلماني وأعوانه الروافض الصفويين وحلفائه الروس والغربيين الصليبيينيتحرر من 
 “.إخواني المجاهدين من كل الدنيا.. إن مسألة الوحدة هي قضية الحياة أو الموت لكم”
تسجيالت ولم يتسن على الفور التحقق من صحة التسجيل وهو األول منذ يناير كانون الثاني لكنه يحمل سمات 
الظواهري السابقة. وفي يناير دعا الظواهري وهو طبيب سابق مصري إلى الثأر بعدما أعدمت السعودية عشرات 
 .المتشددين
وانتقد الظواهري في تسجيل يوم العملية السياسية التي تدعمها األمم المتحدة سعيا للوصول إلى حل في سوريا وأشاد 
 .جزاء محافظة إدلببجبهة النصرة التي تسيطر على معظم أ
وجبهة النصرة جزء من تحالف من فصائل إسالمية يدعى جيش الفتح الذي يقود معارك ضد القوات الحكومية 
 .السورية وحلفائها الروس والمدعومين من إيران في ريف جنوب حلب
للتوحد في كيان واحد  وفي يناير كانون الثاني حاولت جبهة النصرة ولم تفلح في إقناع الفصائل اإلسالمية المنافسة
 .بمن فيهم تنظيم أحرار الشام
وشدد الظواهري من جديد على االنقسام األيديولوجي بين القاعدة والدولة اإلسالمية التي تقاتل القوات الروسية 






The leader of Al-Qaeda Ayman Al-Zawahiri called upon hardline (radical) fighters in Syria 
to unite or risk death. However, he again described the IS extremists as “Exaggerators” 
in an audio recording posted online on Sunday.  
Al-Zawahiri, who succeeded Osama Bin Laden founder of Al-Qaeda organisation, 
recognises its branches in the Middle East, North Africa and South Asia. However, the 
hegemony of the group was challenged by IS which controls swathes of land in Syria and 
Iraq and has followers in Yemen and Libya. 
In Syria, IS and Al Nusra Front are the two largest groups fighting the Syrian government 
forces. Both groups worked under the umbrella of one organisation until they split in 
2013, mainly because of conflict over power among the leaders.  
Al Zawahiri said “It is our duty today to go forth for Islam’s victory light and heavy (with 
all that we can afford), and to urge the unity of the Mujahideen in Sham, until it is 
liberated from the secular Nusayri regime, its Rafidites (apostate, renegades, defectors, 
rejectors) Safavids collaborators, and its Russian and Western Crusader allies. 
 “My Mujahideen brothers all over the world.. the issue of unity is a matter of life or 
death for you”. 
The recording which was the first since January was not immediately verified. Yet, it has 
the same features as all previous recordings of al-Zawahiri. In January, al-Zahrawi, a 
former Egyptian doctor called for revenge after Saudi had executed tens of extremists. 
In today’s recording, al-Zawahiri criticised the political process backed by the UN in order 
to reach a solution in Syria. He praised Al Nusra Front which controls most parts of Idlib 
governorate.  
Al-Nusra Front is part of an alliance of Islamist factions called Jaysh al-Fateh (Army of 
Conquest), which is leading the fight against the Syrian Government forces and its 





In January, al-Nusra Front unsuccessfully tried to convince rival Islamic factions to merge 
in one unit including Ahrar Al Sham. 
 
Al Zawahiri stressed the ideological divide between Al-Qaeda and Islamic State which is 
fighting the Russian forces and the Western-led coalition, and at the same time battles 



















  أيمن الظواهري
 زعيم تنظيم القاعدة
Ayman al-Zawahiri, the 




The social actor is constructed as the leader of Al-Qaeda 
who succeeded Osama Ben Laden. 
 
Background facts: 
Refer to fact sheet  5.5 Ayman al-Zawahiri  
 
Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies: 
A leader of a Jihadi group whose actions have no moral 
justification (fairly negative image of Islam). 
 
News service stereotypes/ideologies: 
The leader of an Islamist jihadist organisation (very 













   المتشددين
Hardline fighters Basic analysis: 
The social actors are constructed as extremist fighters 
who have joined the various Islamist factions in Syria. 
 
Background facts: 
Members of jihadist organisations or Islamist rebel 
factions fighting in Syria. For further information, refer 
to 5.6.1 & 5.6.2 Islamism & jihadism. 
 
















a. Terror groups who are terrorizing civilians and 
destabilizing the Syrian establishment (very negative 
image of Islam). 
 
b. Patriotic fighters and strong believers (very positive 
image of Islam).  
 
News service stereotypes/ideologies: 
Islamist fighters who are members of various rebel 
groups fighting the Syrian government and its allies in 
Syria (very negative image of Islam).  
متشددي تنظيم 
 الدولة اإلسالمية 
extremists of the Islamic 
State 
Basic analysis: 
The social actors are constructed as members of the 
‘Islamic State’. 
 
Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies: 
Extremist fighters who are members of the extremist 
organisation the Islamic State (very negative image of 
Islam).  
 
News service stereotypes/ideologies: 
Extremist fighters of the jihadist organisation Islamic 



















A qualifying adjective used to label the social actors ‘The 
extremists of the Islamic state’.  
 












Islamic sects deviating from mainstream Sunni Islam 
(neutral). 
 
News service stereotypes/ideologies: 
The al-Qaeda leader is accusing the Islamic State of 





ريا لالتحاد في سو
أو مواجهة خطر 
الموت ولكنه 
وصف من جديد 
متشددي تنظيم 
الدولة اإلسالمية 
بأنهم "غالة" في 
تسجيل صوتي جديد 
بث على اإلنترنت 
 يوم األحد.
 
The leader of Al-Qaeda 
Ayman al-Zawahiri called 
upon hardline fighters in 
Syria to unite or risk death. 
However, he again 
described the IS extremists 
as “Exaggerators” in an 
audio recording posted 
online on Sunday.  
 
Basic analysis: 
The news service is introducing the viewpoint of an 
Islamist figure, and the leader of a globally known 
fundamentalist organisation. Al-Zawahiri is emphasising 
the notion of unity and Jihad. However, he is excluding 
and labelling IS fighters. 
 
Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies: 
The Syrian arena is overrun with radical Islamic factions 
(very negative image of Islam). 
 
Newsagency stereotypes/ideologies: 
The leader of the jihadist organization al-Qaeda is calling 
upon the hardline fighters in Syrian to unite, and he is 
accusing the hardliners of the Islamic State of deviating 












point of view 
Perspectivation 
(Indirect) 
أسامة بن الدن 
مؤسس تنظيم 
 القاعدة
Osama Bin Laden founder 
of the Al-Qaeda 
organisation 
Basic analysis: 




















Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies: 
The most wanted person by the United States after 9/11 
serial attacks and former leader of al-Qaeda organisation 
(fairly negative image of Islam). 
 
News service stereotypes/ideologies: 
The founder and former leader of the jihadist 
organisation al-Qaeda. He is responsible for global terror 













Refer to fact sheet  5.5 Islamic State 
 
Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies: 
An extremist organisation which carries out violent and 
unjustified actions in the name of Islam (fairly negative 
image of Islam). 
 
News service stereotypes/ideologies:  
Salafist jihadist organisation which aims at establishing a 

























الذي خلف أسامة 
بن الدن مؤسس 
تنظيم القاعدة 
بفروع التنظيم في 
الشرق األوسط وفي 
أفريقيا شمال 
وجنوب آسيا. لكن 
هيمنة الجماعة 
تعرضت لتحد ماثل 
بقيام تنظيم الدولة 
اإلسالمية الذي 
يسيطر على أجزاء 
من سوريا والعراق 
وله أتباع في اليمن 
 .وليبيا
Al-Zawahiri, who 
succeeded Osama Bin 
Laden founder of Al-Qaeda 
organisation, recognises its 
branches in the Middle 
East, North Africa and 
South Asia. However, the 
hegemony of the group 
was challenged by IS which 
controls swathes of land in 
Syria and Iraq and has 
followers in Yemen and 
Libya. 
Basic analysis: 
The news service is describing al-Qaeda’s expanding 
authority, which is at the same time faced by the 
expansion of the Islamic State on the ground.  
 
Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies: 
It is unfortunate that Muslims should be represented by 
extremist organisation such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic 
State who carry out morally unjustified action in the 
name of Islam (fairly positive image of Islam). 
 
News service stereotypes/ideologies:  
Al-Zawahiri, a successor to Osama Bin Laden, 
acknowledges the branches of al-Qaeda in the Middle 
East and North Africa. However, it is challenged by the 
Islamic State which is another jihadist Sunni organisation 
that is gaining territories and support in various areas in 











point of view 
Perspectivation 
(Indirect) 
 Al-Nusra Front Basic analysis جبهة النصرة
The social actor is constructed as the al-Qaeda branch in 
Syria (the Levant). 
 
Background facts:  
Refer to fact sheet 5.5 Jabhat al-Nusra (Jabhat Fateh al-
Sham) 
 


















Being affiliated to al-Qaeda would make the general 
public concerned about its ideology and its violent 
means (very negative image of Islam).  
For further information, see:  
http://www.pewglobal.org/2013/09/10/muslim-publics-
share-concerns-about-extremist-groups/   
 
News service stereotypes/ideologies:  
Sunni Salafist jihadist organisation (very negative image 
of Sunni Islam).  
القوات الحكومية 
 السورية
Syrian government forces Basic analysis: 




Refer to 5.8 Syrian Conflict 
 
Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies: 
a. Likely reader Authoritarian regime where an Alawite 
minority is oppressing the Sunni majority (very 
negative image of sectarian division). For further 




b. Civil government with strong links to the resistance 
axis, which includes Iran. Hence, it is viciously 


















been mobilised by Saudi Arabia (very negative image 
of Sunni Islam).  
 
News service stereotypes/ideologies: 
A secular government facing a Sunni Islamist 
fundamentalism. However, it is supported by some 
regional and international powers (very negative image 
of Sunni Islam). 
 
في سوريا فإن 
تنظيمي الدولة 
اإلسالمية وجبهة 





تحت مظلة تنظيم 
واحد إلى أن 
 2013انفصال في 
ألسباب أهمها 
الصراع على 
 .السلطة بين قادتها
In Syria, IS and Al Nusra 
Front are the two largest 
groups fighting the Syrian 
government forces. Both 
groups worked under the 
umbrella of one 
organisation until they split 
in 2013, mainly because of 
conflict over power among 
the leaders.  
 
The news service is reporting the recent history of the 
two Islamist organisations, which were fighting the 












point of view 
Perspectivation 
(Direct) 
 :Mujahideen Basic analysis المجاهدين
The social actor is constructed as Muslims who are 
fighting in support of Islam. ‘ Mujahideen ‘ is an Islamic 
term which means a group of Muslims fighting in order 


















it. A more contemporary sense of ‘Mujahideen’ is 
associated with the Taliban.  
 
Background facts: 
Refer to 5.6.3 Mujahideen. 
 
Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies: 
Holy warriors who could be very good believers. 
However, this stereotype/ideology is subject to some 
confusion because people repeatedly hear and read in 
media sources that individuals named as such are 
committing atrocities (fairly negative image of Islam).  
 
News service stereotypes/ideologies: 
The Islamist rebels who belong to a number of rebel 
factions fighting in Syria (very negative image of Islam).  
النظام النصيري 
 العلماني
The Nusayri secular regime Basic analysis: 
The social actor is constructed as the Syrian regime 
(being non-religious or secular). There is also a strong 
reference to the Assad family and senior officials as 
being Alawites (Nusayris).  
 
Background facts: 
Refer to 5.6.7 Nusayris. 
 


















A secular regime, which is actually relying on a minority 
that monopolises political and military power and 
undermines the Sunni Muslims who make up the 
majority of the population (very negative image of 
sectarian division).  
 
News service stereotypes/ideologies: 
Al-Zawahiri is describing the Syrian government of being 
both sectarian and secular but in a negative sense (as in 
non-believer), and also of belonging to the Nusayri sect. 
which could be classified as heretic by Sunni Salafists 
(very negative image of sectarian division and very 
negative image of Sunni Islam).  
وأعوانه الروافض 
 الصفويين
its Rafidite Safavid  
collaborators 
Basic analysis: 
The social actor is constructed as the Iranian allies. They 
are referred to as the Rafidites (derogatory reference). 
The Safavids were a dynasty (1501-1722) which ruled 




Refer to 5.6.5 & 5.6.6 Rawafid &  Safavids  
 


















A group of Muslims who deviated from mainstream 
Islam, they are mainly from Iran (very negative image of 
sectarian division).  
 
News service stereotypes/ideologies: 
Sunni Islamist organisations like al-Qaeda and the Islamic 
State label Shia Muslims as deviants from mainstream, 
or proper, Islam (very negative image of sectarian 
division & very negative image of Sunni Islam). 
 :Basic analysis  وحلفائه الروس
The social actor is constructed as the Russian Federation 
which intervened in Syrian on the side of the Syrian 
government. 
Background facts: 
The Russians intervened militarily in Syria in September 
2015. Refer to Syrian Conflict  5.8 for further 
information.  
 
Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies: 
a. The Russians have intervened in Syria to support 
the regime against the Syrian people who are 



















b. The Russians have intervened in Syria to support 
the Syrian government against Sunni jihadist 
groups (very negative image of Sunni Islam). 
 
News service stereotypes/ideologies: 
Al-Zahrawi, leader of al-Qaeda, is attacking the Syrian 
government allies Iran and Russia (neutral).  
والغربيين 
 الصليبيين
Western Crusaders Basic analysis: 
The social actor is constructed as the Western powers 




Refer to 5.6.8 Crusaders. 
 
Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies: 
The crusades are medieval military campaigns similar to 
other campaigns by different groups over history 
(neutral). 
 
News service stereotypes/ideologies: 
The leader of the jihadist organisation al-Qaeda is 
making a direct association between the contemporary 
Western powers and the Crusades of the Middle Ages 























من واجبنا اليوم أن “
ننفر لنصرته خفافا 
وثقاال وأن نحرض 
على وحدة 
المجاهدين في الشام 








Al-Zawahiri said “It is our 
duty today to go forth for 
Islam’s victory light and 
heavy (with all that we can 
afford), and to urge the 
unity of the Mujahideen in 
Sham, until it is liberated 
from the secular Nusayri 
regime, its Rafidites 
(apostate, renegades, 
defectors, rejectors) 
Safavids collaborators, and 




The news service is using a direct quotation from al-
Zawhiri which has many nominations meant to be 
derogatory (‘Rafidite Safavids’, ‘Western Crusaders’). 
The vocabulary  used is more relevant to the early days 
of Muslim conquest.  Al-Zawahiri is also quoting a 
Quranic verse خفافا وثقاالا انفروا  ‘go forth light and heavy’. 
 
Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies: 
Although al-Zawahiri is using eloquent language and 
addressing religious emotions, he is still a leader of an 
extremist organisation which has conducted unjustified 




News service stereotypes/ideologies: 
Al-Qaeda leader al-Zawahiri is urging the Islamist rebel 
groups in Syria to unite in face of Shia Iran, Russia and 
the Western powers, who he considers the crusaders of 



















 Mujahedeen  The social actors are constructed as fighters of a holy المجاهدين
war, Muslims who are ready to sacrifice their lives for a 















من كل الدنيا.. إن 
مسألة الوحدة هي 
قضية الحياة أو 
 “.الموت لكم
 
“My Mujahideen brothers 
all over the world .. the 
issue of unity is a matter of 
life or death for you”. 
 
Basic analysis: 
Al-Zawahiri continues to urge the Islamist rebel factions 
and followers to unite in face of the various above 
groups or risk death.  
 
Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies: 
Unfortunately, those Mujahedeen do not represent the 
real Muslim mujahideen who followed the tolerant 
teachings of Islam (fairly negative image of Islam). 
 
News service stereotypes/ideologies: 
Al-Zawahiri is calling on the Islamist rebel groups in all 















point of view 
Perspectivation 
(Direct) 










The social actor is constructed as an international 
organisation which has a role in mediating international 
conflicts and monitoring the solution processes. 
 
Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies: 
According to PEW research centre 2013, most of the 
Arab countries have unfavourable view of the UN (less 
than 50%) except for Lebanon 
http://www.pewglobal.org/2013/09/17/united-nations-
retains-strong-global-image/  
(The stereotype is not classified). 
 
News service stereotypes/ideologies: 
An international organisation which mediates in 
international conflicts and monitors solution processes 









في تسجيل يوم 
العملية السياسية 
التي تدعمها األمم 
المتحدة سعيا 
للوصول إلى حل 
في سوريا وأشاد 
بجبهة النصرة التي 
تسيطر على معظم 
In today’s recording, al-
Zawahiri criticised the 
political process backed by 
the UN in order to reach a 
solution in Syria. He 
praised Al Nusra Front 
which controls most parts 
of Idlib governorate. 
Basic analysis:  
The news service continues to report the content of al-
Zawahiri’s audio recording in its own words.  
 
Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies: 
Sadly, extremist organisations are controlling large 
swathes of land in Syria (fairly negative image of Islam). 
 





















The jihadist organisation al-Qaeda is critical of the UN-
backed peace process in Syria, but praises its affiliate al-
Nusra which is controlling Idlib governorate (very 
negative image of Islam). 
 :Al-Nusra Front Basic Analysis وجبهة النصرة




Refer to fact sheet 5.5  Jabhat al-Nusra (Jabhat Fateh al-
Sham) 
 
Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies: 
Al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria that once tried to stand up to 
America, but uses the wrong means, as it has killed many 
civilians (fairly negative image of Islam). 
 
News service stereotypes/ideologies:  
Sunni Salafist jihadist organisation (very negative image 


















 Jaysh al-Fateh (Army of جيش الفتح
Conquest) 
Basic analysis: 
The social actor is constructed as a rebel coalition which 




Refer to fact sheet 5.5 Jaish al-Fateh 
 
Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies: 
a. Al- Nusra Front, which is an al-Qaeda affiliate in 
Syria, is part of this group which means it is an 
extremist group (fairly negative image of Islam). 
 
b. There may be some extremist elements in this 
alliance, but they are patriotic fighters fighting an 
oppressive regime (fairly positive image of Islam). 
 
News service stereotypes/ideologies:  
Al Nusra Front, which is an al-Qaeda affiliate, is in 
alliance with other Islamist factions fighting in Syria (very 














القوات   
 السورية  الحكومية
Syrian government forces Basic analysis: 
The social actor is constructed as the Syrian government 
forces. 
 
Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies: 
a. Authoritarian regime, where an Alawite minority is 
oppressing the Sunni majority (very negative image 






















b. Civil government with strong links to the resistance 
axis, which includes Iran. Hence, it is viciously 
attacked by Sunni fundamentalist groups which have 
been mobilised by Saudi Arabia (very negative image 
of Sunni Islam). 
 
News service stereotypes/ideologies:  
The official Syrian government forces (neutral).  
 :Iran Basic analysis إيران
The social actor is constructed as a Shia Muslim state 
and regional power with specific alliances.  
 
Background facts: 
Refer to fact sheet 5.5 Iran 
 
Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies: 
a. A Shia state which intervenes in neighbouring Arab 
countries with ill intentions of undermining Sunni 
Islam (very negative image of sectarian division & 
very negative image of Shia Islam). 
 
b. A strong regional power which stands up to the 
colonial schemes of the US and Israel (the stereotype 



















News service stereotypes/ideologies:  
A powerful state on the Persian Gulf which has tense 
relations with its Arab neighbours particularly Saudi 
Arabia, but is an ally of the Syrian government (neutral). 
وجبهة النصرة 
جزء من تحالف من 
فصائل إسالمية 
يدعى جيش الفتح 





إيران في ريف 
 .جنوب حلب
 
Al-Nusra Front is part of an 
alliance of Islamist factions 
called Jaysh al-Fateh (Army 
of Conquest), which is 
leading the fight against 
the Syrian Government 
forces and its Russian allies 
backed by Iran in the 
countryside of South 
Aleppo. 
Basic analysis: 
The news service is presenting some opposing alliances 
in the Syrian civil war, with government forces and their 
allies facing an alliance of Islamist rebel groups.  
 
Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies: 
a. The Syrian government and its allies are fighting an 
alliance of extremist groups including al-Nusra Front, 
which is the al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria (very negative 
image of Islam). 
 
b. The Russians and the Iranians are backing the al-
Assad regime against its own people (the stereotype 
is not classified).  
 
News service stereotypes/ideologies: 
The official Syrian government backed by Iran and Russia 
is battling with an alliance of Islamist factions headed by 











point of view 
Perspectivation 
(Direct) 
 :Ahrar al-Sham Basic analysis أحرار الشام




















Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies 
a. Islamist rebel group operating in Syria against the 
Syrian government (very negative image of Islam). 
 
b. God-fearing and patriotic group seeking to topple 
the al-Assad regime (very positive image of Islam). 
 
News service stereotypes/ideologies: 
A Sunni Islamist and Salafist group operating in Syria, 





وفي يناير كانون 
الثاني حاولت جبهة 
النصرة ولم تفلح 
في إقناع الفصائل 
اإلسالمية المنافسة 
للتوحد في كيان 
واحد بمن فيهم 
 .تنظيم أحرار الشام
In January, al-Nusra Front 
tried unsuccessfully to 
convince rival Islamic 
factions to merge into one 
unit, including Ahrar al-
Sham. 
The news service is shedding light on the efforts of al-
Nusra Front to unite the efforts of the Islamist groups 











point of view 
Perspectivation 
(Direct) 
 :Al-Qaeda Basic analysis القاعدة
























An extremist organisation responsible for global terror 
attacks. The actions of al-Qaeda are not morally justified 
and do not represent Islam (fairly negative image of 
Islam). 
 
News service stereotypes/ideologies: 
A Sunni jihadist organisation which is responsible for 
global terror attack specially 9/11 (very negative image 












التحالف الذي يقوده 
 الغرب
Western-led coalition Basic analysis: 
The social actor is constructed as an international 
coalition led by the US to fight the Islamic State. 
 
Background facts: 
Refer to fact sheet  5.5 US-led coalition in Syria and Iraq 
 


















It is a necessity to fight IS, but the coalition strikes are 
not making progress so far (neutral). 
 
News service stereotypes/ideologies: 
The jihadist organisation Islamic State has gained ground 
in Iraq and Syria, and thus an international coalition led 
by the US has intervened in both Iraq and Syria to fight IS 




















The social actor is constructed as the Western-backed 
Kurdish groups who are armed and trained by the US to 
take part in fighting the Islamic State in Northern Syria.  
 
Background facts: 
The US supported Kurdish militias and Arab tribes 
against Jihadi organisations in north-east Syria 




















Unfortunately, some Kurdish groups have a separatist 
agenda (the stereotype is not classified). 
 
News service stereotypes/ideologies: 
The United States has armed and trained some Kurdish 
groups to take part in fighting the jihadist group the 
Islamic State (very negative image of Islam). 
 :The Syrian army Basic analysis الجيش السوري




a. The Syrian army is participating in suppressing the 
revolution of the Syrian people (the stereotype is not 
classified). 
 
b. The national Syrian army is facing a cohort of 
extremist Sunni factions (very negative image of 
Sunni Islam). 
 
News service stereotypes/ideologies: 
The official Syrian army is in conflict with Islamist rebels 
and jihadist organisations (very negative image of Sunni 
Islam) 
  Nomination 
وشدد الظواهري 




Al-Zawahiri stressed the 
ideological divide between 
Al-Qaeda and Islamic State, 
which is fighting the 
Basic analysis: 
The news service continues to report al-Zawahiri’s 
viewpoint on IS, which stresses the ideological difference 























الذي يقوده الغرب. 






Russian forces and the 
Western-led coalition, and 
at the same time battles 
with the Western- backed 
insurgents and the Syrian 
army. 
Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies: 
Syria has become a battlefield for armies and factions 
from all over the world (the stereotype is not classified) 
 
News service stereotypes/ideologies: 
According to al-Zawahiri, leader of al-Qaeda, there is an 











The English text uses the word ‘jihadist’, which has a negative stereotypical connotation 
in the Western mind. For further information see Jihadism. The use of ‘Sunni Muslim 
militants’ in the English text draws attention to a possible new trend in western media, 
which may be to associate Sunni Islam with militancy versus a more moderate Shia 
Islam. This is contrary to the general situation since the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran, 
in which the Islamic Republic of Iran has generally been very negatively viewed in the 
West.  
The news service is reporting the call of al-Zawahiri for Jihad, which is as mentioned 
above a negative term in the western mind. The text goes on to describe the expanded 
authority of al-Qaeda over regions and groups in the area, and how this authority is now 
challenged by another even more violent Jihadist group, IS. The English text underlines 
the differences between al-Qaeda and IS when it reports al-Zawahiri’s statements 
criticising IS and stressing the different ideologies of the two Jihadist groups. The text 
also defines the warring groups and on which side of the conflict they stand.  
The word ‘Mujahideen’ again derives from Arabic  جهاد (jihād). The definition given in 
Oxford English Dictionary is: ‘A person (esp. a guerrilla) who strives or fights in support 
of Islam; spec. an Islamic fundamentalist guerrilla’. See section Mujahideen for further 
details. 
The English text also preserves the controversial usage ‘Western Crusaders’ which 
conjures up images of the West as invaders and as antagonists of the Muslim East. The 
mention of the Crusades, which took place between 1095 and 1291, might exacerbate 
an image of the conflicts in the Middle East as religious wars between the Christians and 
Muslims. For more about the use of ‘Crusades/Crusaders’ by Islamists, refer to 
Crusaders. 
In the following paragraph the word ‘Islamist’ is used, which again has a negative 
connotation in the Western reader’s mind, because it has developed a stereotypical 





(Islam) and maintains a strong association between the teachings of Islam and every 
walk of life within the Muslim community including politics, as well as relations with 
other non-Muslim communities. For more comprehensive discussion of the term, see 
Islamism. 
Finally the use of ‘Syrian Government’ indicates a change in the stance towards the 
Syrian government/regime as the word ‘regime’ is no longer dominant as it was in the 
first 2 years of the Syrian revolution.  
The Arabic text uses words such as متشدد (mutašaddid) instead of ‘jihadist’ or ‘Muslim 
militant’. The word متشدد (mutašaddid) can often be translated as ‘hardliner’. It does not 
have a full range of negative associations for an Arabic reader as terms such ‘jihadist’ or 
‘Muslim militant’ do. The text also uses words such as غالة (ġulāt) (‘exaggerators’), which 
refers to sectarian differentiation as some Sunni scholars consider Shia theology to 
deviate from a number of important Islamic principles and propound some 
exaggerations specially in regard to the character of Imam Ali and other members of Al 
Al-Bayt (the Prophet’s family). Interestingly, as per Babylon Online Dictionary, the term 
was initially used by Shia theologians to refer to some Shia groups who added “divine 
characteristics to figures of the Islamic history (usually a member of Prophet 
Muhammad's family (Al al-Bayt)) or hold beliefs deemed deviant by mainstream Shi'i 
theology”.  
The Arabic text also reports the words of al-Zawahiri خفافا وثقاال, which are quoted from 
the Quran: انفروا خفافا وثقاال وجاهدوا بأموالكم وأنفسكم في سبيل هللا ذلكم خير لكم ان كنتم تعلمون    (At-Tawba 
chapter, verse 41), which is translated as follows: “Go forth, light armed and heavy 
armed, and strive with your wealth and your lives in the way of Allah! That is best for 
you if ye but knew” (Picktall, 2017). The use of Quranic vocabulary in al-Zawahiri’s 
recording echoes his wish to frame himself as an Islamic leader who derives his influence 
from the holy books. A strong reference to the Shia is made through the use of the terms 
  .(Nusayrī) نصيري ṣafawiyīn) and the) صفويين (rāwāfiḍ) روافض
The ruling family in Syria belongs to a sect named Alawites or Nusayris. The name 
‘Alawite’ is much more common and widely used in Syria. It is taken for granted that the 





law. After 2011, the term ‘Nusayri’ became more commonly used than before especially 
by the factions opposing the Syrian government. For a comprehensive account of the 
Nusayris, see Nusayris. 
The text later mentions the term ‘Safavids’, making a clear association between this 
term and the Shia of today particularly the Iranians. Al-Zawahiri used the term روافض 
(rāwāfiḍ) to refer to the Shia, which is considered a derogatory description.  For more 
detailed account of who the ‘Safavids’ and ‘Rawafid’ were see Rawafid and Safavids. 
Again the Russians and Western Crusaders are stressed, and ‘Syrian government’ is 
mentioned in the Arabic text, as it is in the English text. 
 
Quantitative analysis 
The quantitative analysis of the English text gives total scores as follows: 
 
English text: news service stereotypes/ideologies 
I. The quantitative analysis of the English text gives a total score of -36 for news 
service stereotypes/ideologies for Islam and sectarian division, with 19 relevant 
records. The average score per record (-36÷19) is thus -1.894. This indicates that 
the news service stereotypes/ideologies present a strongly negative view of 
Islam and sectarian division.  
 
II. The quantitative analysis of the English text gives a total score of -12 for news 
service stereotypes/ideologies for Sunni Islam, with 6 relevant records. The 
average score per record (-12÷6) is thus -2. This indicates that the news service   
stereotypes/ideologies present an extremely negative view of Sunni Islam. 
 
III. The quantitative analysis of the English text yields no stereotypes/ideologies 








English text: reader stereotypes/ideologies  
I. The quantitative analysis of the English text gives a total score of -40 for reader 
stereotypes/ideologies for Islam and sectarian division, with 23 relevant records. 
The average score per record (-40÷23) is thus -1.74. This indicates that the reader 
stereotypes/ideologies present a strongly negative view of Islam and sectarian 
division. 
 
II. The quantitative analysis of the English text gives a total score of -2 for reader 
stereotypes/ideologies for Sunni Islam, with 2 relevant records. The average 
score per record (-4÷2) is thus -2. This indicates that the reader 
stereotypes/ideologies present an extremely negative view of Sunni Islam.  
 
III. The quantitative analysis of the English text yields no stereotypes/ideologies 
records for Shia Islam. 
 
The quantitative analysis of the Arabic text gives total scores as follows: 
Arabic text: news service stereotypes/ideologies 
I. The quantitative analysis of the Arabic text gives a total score of -34 for news 
service stereotypes/ideologies for Islam and sectarian division, with 22 relevant 
records. The average score per record (-34÷22) is thus -1.545. This indicates that 
the news service stereotypes/ideologies present a strongly negative view of 
Islam and sectarian division. 
 
II. The quantitative analysis of the Arabic text gives a total score of -6 for news 
service stereotypes/ideologies for Sunni Islam, with 3 relevant records. The 
average score per record (-6÷3) is thus -2. This indicates that the news service 







III. The quantitative analysis of the Arabic text yields no records for news service 
stereotypes/ideologies for Shia Islam. 
 
Arabic text: reader stereotypes/ideologies 
I. The quantitative analysis of the Arabic text gives a total score of -24 for reader 
stereotypes/ideologies for Islam and sectarian division, with 24 relevant record. 
The average score per record (-24÷24) is thus -1. This indicates that the reader 
stereotypes/ideologies present a fairly negative view of Islam and sectarian 
division. 
 
II. The quantitative analysis of the Arabic text gives a total score of -8 for reader 
stereotypes/ideologies for Sunni Islam, with 4 relevant record. The average score 
per record (-8÷4) is thus -2. This indicates that the reader stereotypes/ideologies 
present an extremely negative view of Sunni Islam.  
 
III. The quantitative analysis of the Arabic text gives a total score of -2 for reader 
stereotypes/ideologies for Shia Islam, with 1 relevant record. The average score 
per record (-2÷1) is thus -2. This indicates that the reader stereotypes/ideologies 
present an extremely negative view of Shia Islam.  
 
Comparison of qualitative and quantitative analyses in relation to news agency 
stereotypes/ideologies 
The qualitative analysis of the English text refers to the use of stereotypical and 
evaluative terms which have very negative connotations in the Western mind (jihadist, 
Islamist, militant). It also explains that the text revolves around the call by the al-Qaeda 
chief to launch attacks against ‘Western crusaders and Russians’ in Syria and the 
difference between the two infamous jihadist groups: al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. 
Therefore the qualitative analysis conforms to the quantitative analysis, which presents 
strongly negative views of Islam and sectarian division. The qualitative analysis also 





this also justifies the extremely negative view of Sunni Islam shown in the quantitative 
results. 
The qualitative analysis of the Arabic text shows that the negative evaluative terms used 
in the English text are replaced by Arabic terms which do not have the full range of the 
negative associations connoted by the English terms. On another note, the Arabic text 
stresses more the sectarian division in Syria, and introduces the conflict in Syria to a 
large extent as a sectarian war between Sunnis and Shias. Hence the quantitative results, 
though still strongly negative for Islam and sectarian division, are not as strong as those 
for the English text. Since Sunni Islam is associated with violent hardline groups, the 
quantitative results relevant to it remain extremely negative. Neither the English nor the 
Arabic text make direct reference to Shia Islam. The only reference to Shia Islam is 

















5.8.2The overall averages for Syria texts: 
 

























































5.9 The Iraq Conflict 
In 2003 America led by George W. Bush lobbied to invade Iraq under the pretext of 
weapons of mass destruction which the American leadership claimed that Iraq 
possessed. The American President also made an association between the 9/11 attacks 
on the Twin Towsers and the government of President Saddam Hussein, claiming that 
Saddam had links to the 9/11 attacks (Bonn, 2010, pp. 1-2). Saddam ruled Iraq between 
1979 and 2003. He was previously a leading member of the Arab Socialist Ba’ath party, 
which rose to power in Iraq in 1968. Saddam was an authoritarian leader, whose rule 
was characterized by ruthlessness and suppression of all segments of the Iraqi people; 
however reports of his brutal crackdown on the Shia and Kurdish uprisings in 1991, 
following the expulsion of Iraqi troops from Kuwait, particularly shocked many people. 
“Post–uprising repression has been particularly harsh in the two holy Shi’a holy cities of 
al-Najaf and Karbala. Since the uprising, religious institutions and prominent clerical 
families have been targeted in a campaign to subdue Shi’a opposition, which Saddam is 
thought to view as the greatest potential popular threat to his rule. Unlike the Kurds, 
whose political aspirations mainly concern the region in which they are in the majority 
[…]” (Goldstein, 1992, p. 26). 
The power vacuum which followed the coalition invasion of 2003 was very soon filled by 
Shia Islamist forces especially in the south and in the poor suburbs of Baghdad where 
the Shia are predominant. In the largely Sunni Arab provinces of central Iraq, however 
the sentiment was that of resistance to the occupier and “a serious fear of 
disempowerment” (Allawi, 2007, pp. 90-95).  In the aftermath of the occupation, 
ministerial buildings including the National Museum of Iraq were looted and burnt, and 
criminal acts like theft and kidnapping took place on a large scale. The indiscriminate use 
of force by American troops and the failure to impose order and security created a 
general feeling of rejection for the occupiers (Cockburn, 2007, pp. 74-107).  
2004 witnessed the beginning of wide-scale suicide bombings which were claimed by 
the jihadi organisation al-Qaeda. “Wahhabi teachings infiltrated the Sunni Arab 
community in Iraq, and a number of Wahhabi preachers and even academics issued a 
fatwa authorising a jihad against the Shi’a” (Allawi, 2007, pp.233-236). In addition, “The 





introduced” (Allawi, 2007, p. 235). Resistance or insurgency against American 
occupation mainly involved the Sunni Arabs or ‘Ba’athist elements’ and fundamentalist 
groups, most notably al-Qaeda. However, the Sadrist movement led by Muqtada al-Sadr 
son of the Shia cleric Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr who was assassinated by Saddam was 
also gaining ground in Sadr City, a poor densely populated Shiite suburb of Iraq, and 
people there mobilised against American troops. “The main Iraqi opposition came from 
the Arab Sunnis — the ousted Ba‘thists, Sunni religious elements, and al-Qa‘ida, which 
now gained a foothold in Iraq. In addition, a group of poor and disaffected Shi‘a, also 
excluded from power, was mobilized against the occupation by Muqtada al-Sadr, son of 
the former assassinated cleric Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr, and the supporters he had left 
behind” (Marr, 2011, p. x).  
On a governance level, the Americans kept control of security, but instituted an interim 
Iraqi government. “Sovereignty was handed to an interim Iraqi government in June 
2004; control of security, however, stayed in US hands. The parliamentary elections in 
January and December 2005 and the referendum in October were significant” 
(Cockburn, 2007, p. 110). Although the elections were run on a party/coalition or 
individual level, they produced an ethnic-sectarian quota system (the Iraqi governing 
system) (Marr, 2011, pp. 287-290). 
The American troops withdrew from Iraq in December 2011 after 8 years, again leaving 
a power vacuum, which ISIS seized (Brown, 2018). The Islamic State follows a Wahhabi 
doctrine which also excludes Shia and other minorities. In 2013 the United States came 
back to the country to fight ISIS through the US-led coalition. The American troops were 
deployed mainly to support the Iraqi forces fighting ISIS and to train the Kurdish militias 
for the same purpose. In 2014, the Islamic State gained large swathes of land including 
Mosul, the second most important city in Iraq, and declared their caliphate in Iraq and 
Syria. Huge numbers of civilians fled their homes to other Iraqi regions particularly the 
relatively safe Kurdish region. However, some Arab Sunnis collaborated with the Islamic 
State because of their grievances and marginalisation under a Shia-led government 
supported by Iran.  In October 2016 the battle for Mosul began. “By mid-2016, ISIS was 
pushed out of the areas it had captured in 2014, and preparations were made for the 





lingering presence in Iraq and neighbouring Syria, its transformation into a formidable 
sponsor of regional and international terrorism, as well as contributor to the collapse of 
neighbouring Syria” (Marr and Al- Marashi, 2017, pp. 287-288). Mosul fell in July 2017 
after a long siege. For further details, please check (Marr and Al- Marashi, 2017, p. 287-
305). The post Saddam era and the emergence of jihadi groups was characterised by a 
sectarian rift between the Sunni and Shia populations.  
The Islamic State committed many atrocities including many suicide bombings. “ISIS’s 
struggle for power since 2011 has been marked by hundreds of suicide and car bombing 
attacks, killing thousands of civilians, including through the use of child soldiers. In 
territory under its control in 2017, fighters continued to resort to ill-treatment, including 
sexual violence, as well as public beheadings and other grotesque killings and acts of 
torture as a method of governing through fear” (Human Rights Watch, 2018). 
 
5.9.1 Data analysis example (Iraq) 
There are four texts related to the Iraqi conflict. Here below is the first one, and the rest 
are to be found on Appendix 2. 
Reuters 09/05/2016 
Islamic State car bomb in eastern Iraq kills 16, sources say 
A car bomb claimed by Islamic State in the eastern Iraqi city of Baquba killed at least 16 
people on Monday and wounded 54 others near a bakery close to the city center, 
police and hospital sources said. 
The Amaq news service, which supports Islamic State, said a suicide bomber had 
targeted Shi'ite Muslim militia fighters in the provincial capital of Diyala, a mixed Shi'ite 
and Sunni Muslim area bordering Iran. 
The sources said many of the fatalities were children eating at a nearby restaurant. 
Iraqi officials declared victory over Islamic State in Diyala more than a year ago, after 





insurgents have remained active and militia elements have been accused of abuses 
against Sunni residents. 
The fight against Islamic State has exacerbated a long-running sectarian conflict in Iraq, 
mostly between the Shi'ite majority and the Sunni minority. Bombings in Baquba and a 
nearby town in January set off a string of apparently retaliatory attacks against Sunnis. 
Sectarian violence also threatens to undermine efforts by Prime Minister Haider al-
Abadi, a moderate Shi'ite Islamist, to dislodge the militant group from areas in the 





Examples Justification of using a particular strategy Devices Objectives Strategies 
Islamic State  Basic Analysis: 
A jihadist Salafist organisation that has 
carried out many violent actions, and deadly 
attacks in various countries, but mainly in 
the Middle East. 
Background facts: 
Refer to fact sheet 5.5 Islamic State 
Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies: 
A Jihadist organisation which carries out 
violent and unjustified actions in the name 
of Islam (very negative image of Islam). 
News service stereotypes/ideologies: 
A Sunni Salafi-jihadist organisation (very 
negative image of Sunni Islam). 
Membership 
categorization 
Use of  rhetorical figures 
Constructing social actors 
in in-groups and out-
groups 
Nomination 
a suicide bomber Basic Analysis: 
The social actor is constructed as an Islamic 
State suicide bomber. 
Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies: 
Horrific suicide bombings are perpetrated by 
Muslim Jihadists who bring their criminal 
acts to the west as well (very negative image 
of Islam). 
News service stereotypes/ideologies: 
A type of act of mass murder, usually 
committed by individuals who belong to 
Jihadi Sunni Islamist organisations (very 
negative image of Sunni Islam). 
Membership 
categorization 
Use of rhetorical figures 
Constructing social actors 







A car bomb claimed by 
Islamic State in the eastern 
Iraqi city of Baquba killed 
at least 16 people on 
Monday and wounded 54 
others near a bakery close 
to the city center, police 
and hospital sources said. 
Basic Analysis: 
The Islamic State claims responsibility for 
many suicide bombing attacks in Iraq. Many 
Iraqis have lost their lives due to violence 
from different parties including this jihadist 
organisation. 
 
Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies: 
The cycle of violence in Iraq is exacerbated 
by the jihadist Islamist organisations who kill 
innocent people in Iraq and elsewhere (very 
negative image of Islam). 
 
News service stereotypes/ideologies: 
The Sunni jihadist organisation Islamic State 
is carrying out suicide bombings in public 
places in Iraq and killing many innocent 
people (very negative image of Sunni Islam). 
Reporting, description, 
narration or quotation 
of events and 
utterances 
Expressing involvement, 




Shi'ite Muslim militia 
fighters 
Basic Analysis: 
The social actors are constructed as 
paramilitary Shia troops which support the 
Iraqi government.  
Background facts:  
Refer to fact sheet Badr Organisation & Iraq 
conflict 
Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies: 
a. The war in the Middle East is between 
different Muslim sects (very negative 
image of sectarian division). 
Membership 
categorization 
Use of rhetorical figures 
Constructing social actors 







b. Shi’ite Muslims are grouped in formal 
militias and not fundamentalist 
organisations like the Sunnis (neutral for 
Shia Islam & very negative image of 
Sunni Islam).  
News service stereotypes/ideologies: 
The Shi’ite militias are siding with the official 
Iraqi government to fight the Jihadist Sunni 
organisation IS (fairly positive image of Shia 
Islam, very negative image of Sunni Islam & 
very negative image of sectarian division). 
a mixed Shi'ite and Sunni 
Muslim area 
Describing the geographical/residential area 
according to the sects of its residents.  
News service stereotypes/ideologies: 
Very negative image of sectarian division 
Stereotypical evaluative 
attributes/traits 
Labelling social actors 
negatively/positively 
Predication 
The Amaq news service, 
which supports Islamic 
State, said a suicide 
bomber had targeted 
Shi'ite Muslim militia 
fighters in the provincial 
capital of Diyala, a mixed 
Shi'ite and Sunni Muslim 
area bordering Iran. 
Basic Analysis: 
Narrating events from the viewpoint of the 
source (Islamic State); also elaborating on 
the sectarian division/conflict. 
Background facts: 
Refer to 5.9 Iraq conflict 
Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies: 
a. Sectarian war is sweeping the Middle 
East, but it is particularly devastating in 
Iraq (very negative image of sectarian 
division). 
b. The vacuum of leadership post the 
American invasion of Iraq was sadly filled 
by sectarianism (neutral). 
Reporting, description, 
narration or quotation 
of events and 
utterances 
Expressing involvement, 








c. Islam, particularly Sunni Islam, is a 
religion which promotes violence (very 
negative image of Sunni Islam). 
News service stereotypes/ideologies: 
A devastating sectarian war between Sunni 
and Shia Muslims in which Shia Muslims are 
being more moderate (fairly positive image 
of Shia Islam & very negative image of 
sectarian division). 
Iraqi officials The social actors are constructed as officials 
representing the Iraqi government. 
Membership 
categorization 
Use of rhetorical figures 
Constructing social actors 
in in-groups and out-
groups 
Nomination 
security forces and Shi'ite 
militias 
Basic Analysis: 
The social actor is constructed as the official 
Iraqi forces which belong to the Iraqi official 
government, and the Shi’ite armed militias 
affiliated with it. 
Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies: 
The sectarian split in Iraq has got worse. Shia 
militias openly support the Shia-led 
government and many Sunnis support the 
fundamentalist organisations (very negative 
image of sectarian division).  
News service stereotypes/ideologies: 
The Shi’ite militias are siding with the official 
Iraqi government to fight the Jihadist Sunni 
organisation IS (fairly positive image of Shia 
Islam, very negative image of Sunni Islam & 
very negative image of sectarian division). 
Membership 
categorization 
Use of rhetorical figures 
Constructing social actors 







the insurgents Basic Analysis: 
The social actors are constructed (as 
members of IS) as outlaws who are carrying 
out an insurgency against the official Iraqi 
government.  
Background facts:  
Refer to 5.9 Iraq conflict 
Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies: 
The Sunni Jihadists are carrying out an 
insurgency against the official Iraqi 
government which is affiliated to Shia Iran 
(very negative image of Sunni Islam & very 
negative image of sectarian division). 
News service stereotypes/ideologies: 
The Shia-led Iraqi government is fighting a 
violent Sunni insurgency (very negative 
image of Sunni Islam, neutral image of Shia 






Use of rhetorical figures 
Constructing social actors 
in in-groups and out-
groups 
Nomination 
Sunni residents. Basic Analysis: 
The social actors are constructed according 
to religious/sectarian affiliation, hence 
concentrating on the sectarian nature of the 
conflict.  
News service stereotypes/ideologies: 




Use of rhetorical figures 
Constructing social actors 








Iraqi officials declared 
victory over Islamic State in 
Diyala more than a year 
ago, after security forces 
and Shi'ite militias drove 
them out of towns and 
villages there. But the 
insurgents have remained 
active and militia elements 
have been accused of 




Again narration of events, stressing and 
elaborating on the sectarian nature of the 
conflict. 
Background facts: 
Refer to 5.9 Iraq conflict 
Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies: 
a. Iraq is drowning in a devastating 
sectarian war (very negative image of 
Islam). 
b. Apparently, Shia Muslims are more 
reasonable than the Sunnis and are 
fighting them because Sunnis have 
formed violent Jihadist groups (fairly 
positive image of Shia Islam & very 
negative image of Sunni Islam). 
News service stereotypes/ideologies: 
The Shia-led official Iraqi government is 
fighting a violent Sunni insurgency led by the 
Islamic State (very negative image of Sunni 
Islam, fairly positive image of Shia Islam & 
very negative image of sectarian division). 
Reporting, description, 
narration or quotation 
of events and 
utterances 
Expressing involvement, 




a long-running sectarian 
conflict 
A nominal phrase which describes and 
evaluates the type of conflict in Iraq.  
News service stereotypes/ideologies: 












the Shi'ite majority 
Basic analysis: 
The social actors are constructed according 
to sectarian affiliation.  
News service stereotypes/ideologies: 
Very negative image of sectarian division 
Membership 
categorization 
Use of rhetorical figures 
Constructing social actors 
in in-groups and out-
groups 
Nomination 
the Sunni minority Basic analysis: 
The social actors are constructed according 
to sectarian affiliation.  
News service stereotypes/ideologies: 
Very negative image of sectarian division 
Membership 
categorization 
Use of rhetorical figures 
Constructing social actors 
in in-groups and out-
groups 
Nomination 
apparently The word ‘apparently’ is used here to 
mitigate the act of retaliation. 
Intensifying or 
mitigating the 
illocutionary force of 
discriminatory 
utterances 
Modifying the epistemic 
status of the proposition 
Mitigation 
The fight against Islamic 
State has exacerbated a 
long-running sectarian 
conflict in Iraq, mostly 
between the Shi'ite 
majority and the Sunni 
minority. Bombings in 
Baquba and a nearby town 
in January set off a string of 
apparently retaliatory 
attacks against Sunnis. 
Basic analysis: 
The news service elaborates on the reason 
for the intensified sectarian conflict in Iraq.  
Background facts: 
Refer to 5.9 Iraq conflict 
Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies: 
Iraq has been a victim of a series of wars and 
invasions which culminated in this sectarian 
conflict (fairly negative image of sectarian 
division). 
News service stereotypes/ideologies: 
A country wrecked by longstanding sectarian 
division regardless of any other factors or 
Reporting, description, 
narration or quotation 
of events and 
utterances 
Expressing involvement, 








the circumstances surrounding this sectarian 
war (very negative image of sectarian 
division). 
Sectarian violence Basic Analysis: 
The social actor is constructed in terms of a 
sectarian civil war (personification). 
Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies: 
Fundamentalist organisations have driven 
Iraq into this bitter sectarian conflict (very 
negative image of sectarian division). 
Background facts: 
Refer to 5.9 Iraq Conflict 
News service stereotypes/ideologies: 
Sectarian violence is the main and maybe 
the only reason for the bloodshed in Iraq 
(very negative image of sectarian division). 
Membership 
categorization 
Use of  rhetorical figures 
Constructing social actors 
in in-groups and out-
groups 
Nomination 
Prime Minister Haider al-
Abadi 
Basic Analysis: 
The social actor is constructed as the Iraqi 
prime minister. 
Background facts: 
Refer to fact sheet 5.5 Haider al-Abadi 
Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies: 
Official Iraqi prime minister in a country 
which is torn by numerous wars and conflicts 
(neutral). 
News service stereotypes/ideologies: 
A moderate Shi’ite Islamist prime minister 
who is working to drive Sunni militancy out 
Membership 
categorization 
Use of  rhetorical figures 
Constructing social actors 







of Iraq (fairly positive image of Shia Islam & 
very negative image of Sunni Islam). 
 
 
moderate Shi'ite Islamist 
Qualifying the social actors with a certain 
degree of Islamic extremism. Associating the 
trait of moderation with Shia Islam rather 
than Sunni Islam.   
News service stereotypes/ideologies: 






















Use of  rhetorical figures 
Constructing social actors 











Sectarian violence also 
threatens to undermine 
efforts by Prime Minister 
Haider al-Abadi, a 
moderate Shi'ite Islamist, 
to dislodge the militant 
group from areas in the 
north and west that they 
seized in 2014. 
Basic Analysis: 
The news service is making a direct 
statement illustrating that the prime 
minister, who belongs to specific 
denomination (Shia) is moderate though 
Islamist, and he is fighting a Sunni Jihadist 
group widely known for its violent actions 
and extremism.  
Background facts:  
Refer to fact sheet  5.5 Haider al-Abadi  & 
5.9 Iraq conflict 
Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies: 
a. The Iraqi prime minister is a moderate 
Muslim (fairly positive image of Shia 
Islam). 
b. Sunni Islam is a militant form of Islam 
(very negative image of Sunni Islam). 
News service stereotypes/ideologies: 
a. Iraq is devastated by sectarian violence 
(very negative image of sectarian 
division). 
b. Islamic State is a Sunni Muslim militant 
group (very negative image of Sunni 
Islam). 
Reporting, description, 
narration or quotation 
of events and 
utterances 
Expressing involvement, 









c. Iraqi prime minister. Though a Shia 
Islamist, he is relatively moderate (fairly 






 شخصا في انفجار تبنته الدولة االسالمية بالعراق 16مصادر: مقتل 
قالت مصادر طبية ومصادر من الشرطة إن سيارة ملغومة أعلن تنظيم الدولة اإلسالمية  -)رويترز( غداد ب
 54شخصا على األقل وأصابت  16مسؤوليته عن تفجيرها في مدينة بعقوبة بشرق العراق يوم االثنين قتلت 
 .آخرين بالقرب من مخبز قريب من وسط المدينة
يدة للتنظيم المتشدد أن "عملية استشهادية استهدفت تجمعا للحشد )الشعبي( وأوردت وكالة )أعماق( لألنباء المؤ
 .بمنطقة شفتة في بعقوبة مركز )محافظة( ديالى" المتاخمة إليران والتي يسكنها مزيج من السنة والشيعة
 .وقالت المصادر إن كثيرا من القتلى أطفال كانوا يأكلون في مطعم قريب
النصر على تنظيم الدولة اإلسالمية في ديالى قبل أكثر من عام بعد أن طردته قوات وأعلن المسؤولون العراقيون 
األمن العراقية والحشد الشعبي من قرى وبلدات هناك غير أن المقاتلين المتشددين استمروا في نشاطهم في حين 
 .سنةوجهت اتهامات إلى عناصر في الجماعات المسلحة الشيعية بارتكاب انتهاكات ضد السكان ال
وفاقم القتال ضد تنظيم الدولة اإلسالمية الصراع الطائفي المستمر منذ فترة طويلة في العراق بين األغلبية الشيعية 
 .ةيالسن واألقلية
وتسببت تفجيرات في بعقوبة وبلدة قريبة منها في يناير كانون الثاني في سلسلة من الهجمات االنتقامية على ما يبدو 
 .ضد السنة
العنف الطائفي بتقويض مساعي رئيس الوزراء العراقي حيدر العبادي لطرد التنظيم المتشدد من مناطق كما يهدد 
 في شمال وغرب البالد. 2014سيطر عليها عام 
 
Translation: 
Car bomb in eastern Iraq claimed by Islamic State kills 16, sources say 
Hospital and police sources said that a car bomb took the lives of 16 people and 
wounded 54 others on Monday in Bakouba, Eastern Iraq. The Islamic State claimed 
responsibility for the explosion which took place near a bakery close to the city centre.  
Amak News service which supports the hard-line group said “a martyrdom operation 
targeted a group of the ‘Popular Mobilisation Forces’ in Bakouba (the Centre of Diyala 





population. The sources said that many of the casualties were children eating in a nearby 
restaurant. 
Iraqi officials declared victory over Islamic State in Diyala over a year ago after Iraqi 
security forces and Popular Mobilisation Forces drove them out of towns and villages 
there. But extremist fighters remained active. At the same time, elements in the Shi’ite 
militias were accused of committing atrocities against the Sunni residents. 
The fight against Islamic State has exacerbated a long-running sectarian conflict in Iraq, 
mostly between the Shi'ite majority and the Sunni minority. Bombings in Baquba and a 
nearby town in January set off a string of apparently retaliatory attacks against Sunnis. 
Sectarian violence also threatens to undermine efforts by Prime Minister Haider al-





Examples Translation of the 
Arabic text 
Justification of Using a Particular 
Strategy 
Devices Objectives Strategies 
 The Islamic State الدولة االسالمية
 
Basic Analysis: 
The social actor is constructed as the 
Jihadist Sunni organisation IS. 
Background facts: 
Refer to 5.5 Islamic State 
Likely reader 
stereotypes/ideologies: 
a. IS does not represent real Islam. 
It is harming Islam with its 
violent actions (fairly positive 
image of Islam). 
b. A Sunni Islamist exclusive 
organisation which is waging a 
war against minorities, Shia in 
particular. (very negative image 
of sectarian division & very 
negative image of Sunni Islam). 
News service 
stereotypes/ideologies: 
A Sunni Jihadist/Islamist organisation 
which carries violent actions and 
maintains an exclusive ideology 
especially towards minorities 
particularly Shia Muslims (very 
negative image of Sunni Islam). 
Membership 
categorization 
Use of  rhetorical 
figures 
Constructing social 







شخصا في انفجار  16مقتل 
 تبنته الدولة االسالمية بالعراق
Car bomb in eastern 
Iraq claimed by 




A title which informs the reader 
about the violence caused by the 




a. IS continues its violent actions in 
the name of Islam (very negative 
image of Islam). 
b. This Sunni Islamist exclusive 
organisation is waging a war 
against minorities, Shia in 
particular (very negative image 
of sectarian division & very 
negative image of Sunni Islam). 
News service 
stereotypes/ideologies: 
Violent actions by a Sunni 
Islamist/Jihadist organisation which 
maintains an exclusive and violent 













قالت مصادر طبية ومصادر 
من الشرطة إن سيارة ملغومة 
أعلن تنظيم الدولة اإلسالمية 
مسؤوليته عن تفجيرها في 
مدينة بعقوبة بشرق العراق 
يوم االثنين قتلت 16 شخصا 
على األقل وأصابت 54 
Hospital and police 
sources said that a 
car bomb took the 
lives of 16 people 
and wounded 54 
others on Monday in 
The news service introduces the 
event (an explosion carried out by 
the Islamic State) which is the focal 
point of this media text.  
Reporting, 
description, narration 













آخرين بالقرب من مخبز 
 قريب من وسط المدينة
Bakouba, East Iraq. 
The Islamic State 
claimed 
responsibility for the 
explosion which 
took place near a 
bakery close to the 
city centre.  
 Hard-line group Evaluative description of the Islamic للتنظيم المتشدد
State which categorises the group as 
hard-line or extremist.  
News service 
stereotypes/ideologies: 







 A martyrdom عملية استشهادية
operation 
Basic Analysis: 
The social actor is constructed as a 
‘martyrdom operation’عملية استشهادية 
carried out by what is termed a 
‘suicide bomber’. The Arabic text 
uses this term which is much more 
positive that ‘suicide bombing’ عملية 
 However the news service is .انتحارية
distancing itself from the term by 
using inverted commas.  
Likely reader 
stereotypes/ideologies: 
a. It is incomprehensible how 
someone can end his own life to 
Membership 
categorization 
Use of  rhetorical 
figures 
Constructing social 







kill innocent people (fairly 
positive image of Islam). 
b. The Islamic State is using the 
divine values of Islam to harm 




What are termed by militant/Jihadist 
organisations “martyrdom 
operations” are used to kill dozens of 
innocent people in a vicious 
sectarian war that is sweeping the 
region (very negative image of Islam 
& very negative image of sectarian 
division). 
 Popular Mobilisation للحشد )الشعبي(
Forces 
Basic Analysis: 
The social actor is constructed as the 
Shia militias aligned with the official 
Iraqi military forces. 
Background facts: 




a. Popular militias formed to retake 
land  lost to the extremist group 




Use of  rhetorical 
figures 
Constructing social 







b. Shi’ite militias which are 
contributing to the persecution 
of Sunnis in Iraq (very negative 
image of sectarian division & 




Popular Shia militias aligned with the 
Iraqi military forces which play a 
significant part in fighting IS (fairly 
positive image of Shia Islam). 
وأوردت وكالة )أعماق( 
 لألنباء المؤيدة للتنظيم المتشدد
أن "عملية استشهادية 
استهدفت تجمعا للحشد 
)الشعبي( بمنطقة شفتة في 
بعقوبة مركز )محافظة( 
ديالى" المتاخمة إليران والتي 
يسكنها مزيج من السنة 
  والشيعة
Amak News service 
which supports the 
hard-line group said 
a martyr executed a 
suicide bombing in a 
crowd of the 
“Popular  
Mobilisation Forces  
in Shafta area in 
Bakouba the centre 
of Diyala 
governerate”which 
borders Iran and is 
inhabited by a mixed 
Sunni  Shi’ite 
population 
Basic Analysis: 
Narration of events from the 
viewpoint of the source (Islamic 
State). 
Background facts: 





a. It is very sad to witness this 
bloody sectarian war in Iraq 
(neutral) 
b. The Sunni Jihadist organisations 
are killing Shia and other 
minorities (very negative image 
of Sunni Islam). 
Reporting, 
description, narration 













c. The Iraqi government along with 
Iran are persecuting Sunnis who 
no longer have a representation 
in the government (very negative 
image of sectarian division & 




A sectarian war In which the Sunnis 
are represented by the Jihadist 
militant group IS and the Shia are 
represented by the official Islamist 
moderate Iraqi government and the 
popular mobilisation forces aligned 
with it (very negative image of a 
sectarian division).  
  a mixed Sunni مزيج من السنة والشيعة
Shi’ite population 
Highlighting the central issue of 
sectarianism by naming social actors 
according to their sects.  
News service 
stereotypes/ideologies: 




Use of  rhetorical 
figures 
Constructing social 
actors in in-groups 
and out-groups 
Nomination 
 Iraqi officials The social actor is constructed as المسؤولون العراقيون
officials in the Iraqi government.  
Membership 
categorization 
Use of  rhetorical 
figures 
Constructing social 







 :extremist fighters Basic Analysis المقاتلين المتشددين
Constructing the social actors as 
members of the hard-line 
organisation IS.  
Likely reader 
stereotypes/ideologies: 
a. Extremist fighters who belong to 
an extremist organisation 
(neutral). 
b. Sunni extremist fighters (very 
negative image of Sunni Islam). 
News service 
stereotypes/ideologies: 
Extremist fighters who belong to the 





Use of  rhetorical 
figures 
Constructing social 
actors in in-groups 
and out-groups 
Nomination 
عناصر في الجماعات 
 المسلحة الشيعية
elements in the 
Shi’ite militias 
Basic Analysis: 
The social actors are constructed as 
Shia individuals in the armed militias. 
Background facts: 
Refer to fact sheet 5.5 Badr 





After the American invasion, Iraq 
descended into anarchy and 
Membership 
categorization 
Use of  rhetorical 
figures 
Constructing social 







sectarian rule as the Shia-led 
government recruited individuals on 
a sectarian basis to support it (very 
negative image of sectarian division 
& very negative image of Shia Islam). 
News service 
stereotypes/ideologies: 
There is a sectarian war in Iraq 
where each sect has its own armed 










 :Sunni residents Basic Analysis السكان السنة
The social actors are constructed 
according to their religious/sectarian 
affiliation. 
Background facts:  
It is widely assumed that Iraq has a 
Shia majority but there is little 
reliable data on the breakdown of 
the population. For more 
information, see:  
Membership 
categorization 
Use of  rhetorical 
figures 
Constructing social 















a. The Shia majority are 
persecuting the Sunni minority 
(very negative image of sectarian 
division & very negative image of 
Shia Islam). 
b. Sunnis and Shias have lived 
peacefully together for hundreds 
of years, it is foreign powers that 
are manipulating the co-
existence in Iraq (fairly positive 
image of Islam). 
News service 
stereotypes/ideologies: 
There is an armed conflict in Iraq 
which revolves around sectarian 
divisions (very negative image of 
sectarian division). 
وأعلن المسؤولون العراقيون 
النصر على تنظيم الدولة 
اإلسالمية في ديالى قبل أكثر 
من عام بعد أن طردته قوات 
Iraqi Officials 
declared victory 
over Islamic State in 
Diyala over a year 
Basic Analysis:  
A narration/reporting of the events 















األمن العراقية والحشد الشعبي 
من قرى وبلدات هناك غير أن 
المقاتلين المتشددين استمروا 
في نشاطهم في حين وجهت 
اتهامات إلى عناصر في 
الجماعات المسلحة الشيعية 
بارتكاب انتهاكات ضد السكان 
 السنة
ago after Iraqi 
security forces and 
‘People’s Mass’ 
forces drove them 
out of towns and 
villages there. But 
extremist fighters 
remained active. At 
the same time, the 
Shi’ite militias were 
accused of 
committing 
atrocities against the 
Sunni residents. 




a. The moderate Shia Iraqi 
government is facing extreme 
Sunni terror (very negative 
image of Sunni Islam and fairly 
positive image of Shia Islam). 
b. The Shia Islamist Iraqi 
government is persecuting 
Sunnis (very negative image of 
sectarian division and very 




The Iraqi government is in a long 
conflict with IS, but the conflict is 
taking on a more and more sectarian 
nature (very negative image of 
sectarian division). 
 
speaker’s point of 
view 
 األغلبية الشيعية
Shi'ite majority Basic analysis: 
The social actor is constructed as the 
Iraqi Shia population who make up 





Use of  rhetorical 
figures 
Constructing social 







Very negative image of sectarian 
division. 
 األقليةالسنية
Sunni minority Basic analysis: 
The social actor is constructed as the 
Iraqi Sunni population who make up 
the minority.  
News service 
stereotype/ideologies : 



















Use of  rhetorical 
figures 
Constructing social 
actors in in-groups 
and out-groups 
Nomination 
وفاقم القتال ضد تنظيم الدولة 
اإلسالمية الصراع الطائفي 
المستمر منذ فترة طويلة في 
The fight against 




The news service identifies a long-
standing sectarian conflict in Iraq 
and relates it to current events. 
Reporting, 
description, narration 












العراق بين األغلبية الشيعية 
 واألقليةالسنية
وتسببت تفجيرات في بعقوبة 
وبلدة قريبة منها في يناير 
كانون الثاني في سلسلة من 
الهجمات االنتقامية على ما 
 يبدو ضد السنة
conflict in Iraq, 
mostly between the 
Shi'ite majority and 
the Sunni minority. 
Bombings in Baquba 
and a nearby town 
in January set off a 





Refer to 5.9  Iraq conflict 
Likely reader 
stereotypes/ideologies:  
The Islamic State and the formations 
of Shia militias triggered the 
sectarian conflict in Iraq where 
different denominations lived 
peacefully for hundreds of years 
(fairly positive image of Islam).  
News service 
stereotypes/ideologies: 
There is a sectarian conflict in Iraq 
that goes back to thousand years. 
The advent of IS has only 
exacerbated the situation (very 
negative image of Islam & very 
negative image of sectarian division). 
speaker’s point of 
view 
 Apparently The fact of launching retaliation على ما يبدو
attacks against Sunnis is mitigated by 
using على ما يبدو (‘apparently’) 
Intensifying or 
mitigating the 















 :Sectarian violence Basic analysis العنف الطائفي
The social actor is constructed as 
sectarian violence (personification).  
News service stereotype/ideology: 





Use of  rhetorical 
figures 
Constructing social 
actors in in-groups 
and out-groups 
Nomination 
حيدر   رئيس الوزراء العراقي
 العبادي
Iraqi prime minister  
Haider al-Abadi 
Basic Analysis: 
The social actor is constructed as the 
Iraqi prime minister. 
Background facts: 





a. Iraqi prime minister of a Shia-led 
government which is backed by 
Iran, and persecuting the Sunnis 
in Iraq (very negative image of 
sectarian division). 
b. The official Iraqi prime minister 
who is trying to lead the country 
amidst chaos and penetration of 
jihadi organisations in Iraq (fairly 
positive image of Shia Islam). 
 
News service 
stereotypes/ideologies:   
Membership 
categorization 
Use of  rhetorical 
figures 
Constructing social 







The official Iraqi prime minister who 
is trying to drive the extremist 
organisation out of Iraq and restore 
peace in Iraq (neutral). 
 
كما يهدد العنف الطائفي 
بتقويض مساعي رئيس 
الوزراء العراقي حيدر 
العبادي لطرد التنظيم المتشدد 
من مناطق سيطر عليها عام 




also threatens to 
undermine efforts 
by Prime Minister 
Haider al-Abadi, to 
dislodge the militant 
group from areas 




The news service is assuming that 
the nature of the conflict is sectarian 
and the escalating violence is 
hindering the state’s efforts to get 
rid of extremism.  
Background facts: 
Refer to 5.9  Iraq conflict 
Likely reader 
stereotypes/ideologies:  
a. A long sectarian war is turning 
Iraq into ruins (very negative 
image of sectarian division). 
b. Regional and international 
interventions have contributed 
to the current situation, and it is 
not only the sectarian war (fairly 
positive image of Islam). 
News service 
stereotypes/ideologies: 
Sectarian violence in Iraq is 
entrenched as some Sunnis may be 
supportive of the Sunni extremist 
organisation against the Shia-led 
Reporting, 
description, narration 























The English passage focuses on sectarian division as the main reason for violence in Iraq. 
It mentions the religious/sectarian affiliations of the factions involved, for example: 
‘Shi'ite Muslim militia fighters’. It introduces the war in Iraq mainly as a civil war based 
on sectarian conflict that has deep roots in history, overlooking other major factors such 
as the American intervention in Iraq, the corrupt Iraqi government and other regional 
factors. Moreover, it hints at the recent trend in Western media, which is to designate 
Shia Islam as the more moderate denomination of Islam in comparison with Sunni Islam, 
especially when Western media makes the direct association between the violent 
Islamic State and Sunni Islam.  
The body of the Arabic text is similar to the English one except that it does not mention 
the sectarian affiliation of the militias fighting the Islamic State; it only says: الحشد الشعبي. 
On another occasion, the Arabic text mitigates the sectarian conflict by the use of  على ما
 ’as it appears’), avoiding mentioning the reason for the ‘string of retaliatory attacks‘) يبدو
against Sunnis (سلسلة من الهجمات االنتقامية ضد السنة).  
The Arabic text avoids implying the moderation of Shia Islam in comparison to its 
counterpart Sunni Islam, omitting any equivalent of “a moderate Shi'ite Islamist” to 




The quantitative analysis of the English text gives total scores as follows: 
English text: news service stereotypes/ideologies 
I. The quantitative analysis of the English text gives a total score of -26 for news 
service stereotypes/ideologies for Islam and sectarian division, with 13 relevant 
records. The average score per record (-26÷13) is thus -2. This indicates that the 
news service stereotypes/ideologies present an extremely negative view of Islam 






II. The quantitative analysis of the English text gives a total score of -18 for 
newspaper stereotypes/ideologies for Sunni Islam, with 9 relevant records. The 
average score per record (-18÷9) is thus -2. This indicates that the news service 
stereotypes/ideologies present an extremely negative view of Sunni Islam. 
 
III. The quantitative analysis of the English text gives a total score of 7 for newspaper 
stereotypes/ideologies for Shia Islam, with 8 relevant records. The average score 
per record (7÷8) is thus 0.875. This indicates that the news service 
stereotypes/ideologies present a fairly positive view of Shia Islam. 
 
English text: reader stereotypes/ideologies  
I. The quantitative analysis of the English text gives a total score of -18 for reader 
stereotypes/ideologies for Islam and sectarian division, with 11 relevant records. 
The average score per record (-18÷11) is thus -1.73. This indicates that the reader 
stereotypes/ideologies present a strongly negative view of Islam and sectarian 
division. 
 
II. The quantitative analysis of the English text gives a total score of -8 for reader 
stereotypes/ideologies for Sunni Islam, with 4 relevant records. The average 
score per record (-8÷4) is thus -2. This indicates that the reader 
stereotypes/ideologies present an extremely negative view of Sunni Islam.  
 
III. The quantitative analysis of the Arabic text gives a total score of 2 for reader 
stereotypes/ideologies for Shia Islam, with 2 relevant records. The average score 
per record (2÷2) is thus 1. This indicates that the reader stereotypes/ideologies 
present a fairly positive view of Shia Islam.  
 
The quantitative analysis of the Arabic text gives total scores as follows: 
Arabic text: news service stereotypes/ideologies 
I. The quantitative analysis of the Arabic text gives a total score of -22 for news 





records. The average score per record (-22÷11) is thus -2. This indicates that the 
news service stereotypes/ideologies present an extremely negative view of Islam 
and sectarian division. 
 
II. The quantitative analysis of the Arabic text gives a total score of -6 for news 
service stereotypes/ideologies for Sunni Islam, with 3 relevant records. The 
average score per record (-6÷3) is thus -2. This indicates that the news service 
stereotypes/ideologies present an extremely negative view of Sunni Islam. 
 
III. The quantitative analysis of the Arabic text gives a total score of 1 for newspaper 
stereotypes/ideologies for Shia Islam, with 2 relevant records. The average score 
per record (1÷2) is thus 0.5. This indicates that the newspaper 
stereotypes/ideologies present a slightly positive view of Shia Islam. 
 
Arabic text: reader stereotypes/ideologies 
 
I. The quantitative analysis of the Arabic text gives a total score of -11 for reader 
stereotypes/ideologies for Islam and sectarian division, with 13 relevant record. 
The average score per record (-11÷13) is thus -0.846. This indicates that the 
reader stereotypes/ideologies present a fairly negative view of Islam and 
sectarian division. 
 
II. The quantitative analysis of the Arabic text gives a total score of -8 for reader 
stereotypes/ideologies for Sunni Islam, with 4 relevant record. The average score 
per record (-8÷4) is thus -2. This indicates that the reader stereotypes/ideologies 
present an extremely negative view of Sunni Islam.  
 
III. The quantitative analysis of the Arabic text gives a total score of -6 for reader 
stereotypes/ideologies for Shia Islam, with 6 relevant records. The average score 
per record (-6÷6) is thus -1. This indicates that the reader stereotypes/ideologies 






Comparison of qualitative and quantitative analyses in relation to news service 
stereotypes/ideologies 
The qualitative analyses of both English and Arabic texts are explicit about the sectarian 
division and the violence it is causing in Iraq. The suicide bombing is claimed by the 
Islamic State, which the news service presumes is a hard-line Sunni organisation since it 
is targeting Shia militias and civilians. While the English text remains slightly more 
explicit in this regard, the quantitative analyses of both the English and Arabic texts for 
Islam and sectarian division presents extremely negative views. Of course since Sunni 
Islam is associated with jihadist and extremist organisations responsible for suicide 
bombing attacks and killing innocent people, as shown in the above text, the 
quantitative analysis for Sunni Islam in English and Arabic is extremely negative.  
The qualitative analysis of the Arabic text demonstrates that the sectarian affiliation of 
the militias and the prime minister are dropped. The efforts of the Iraqi government, 
which is trying to drive extremist organisations out of Iraq and restore peace, are 
stressed, so the quantitative analysis of Shia Islam is slightly positive. The English text on 
the other hand gives more credit to Shia Islam, when it mentions the efforts of the 
government and the militias alongside their sectarian affiliation. Hence Shia Islam in the 














5.9.2The overall averages for the Iraq texts: 
 


























































5.10 The Yemen Conflict 
Yemen is a country with a long history before Islam. It is mentioned in both pre-Islamic 
and Islamic literature. When examining  socio-political aspects of Yemen,  it is 
appropriate to see it as two entities: north and south Yemen.    
In 1538 Aden in south Yemen fell under the Ottomans who subsequently extended their 
rule, but did not exercise much authority over the northern highlands except for a short 
period 1552-1560 when the whole of Yemen was officially under Ottoman rule. The 
northern highlands were ruled by Imam al- Mutwakkil Yahya Sharf ad-Din (1506–1555)), 
and subsequent Zaidi imams (Nahrawali, 2002). Zaidi Imams ruled northern Yemen for 
1,000 years till 1962 when military tribesmen tried to seize power from the Imams with 
support from Nasser’s Egypt  (Dresch, 2000, p. 89). In 1839 South Yemen was seized by 
the British Empire to secure the shipping route to India, but the Ottomans returned in 
1849. After the 1st World War Ottoman troops were finally withdrawn from South 
Yemen to be replaced by a British mandate till 1967.  
Yemen has a tribal social structure which is more conspicuous in the north where the 
land is more mountainous and rugged. The south is richer with its pastures and land that 
is good for farming. Over the years until the 1920’s and 1930’s, the northerners or 
highlanders repeatedly attacked the richer south and practiced a sort of looting of 
commodities (Dresch, 1984). Especially in the north, the tribes were able to devise their 
own system based on customary law (ʕurf) and to settle their own differences and 
disputes according to this system. The main tribes of the north are Hashid and Bakil, 
who in addition to their large numbers are politically influential. The Zaidi Imams for 
example “depended on the tribes for support” (Dresch. P. 1984, p.161), though they 
didn’t consider them as reliable allies. Hashid and Bakil gradually started to gain a 
greater political role in Yemen particularly after the end of Ottoman rule. 
The tribes embraced more liberal attitudes than the Zaidi state. In 1959, a revolution 
with a liberal, republican orientation took place. Tribalism in itself had some liberal 
basics in its system so the tribes were included in the government. In 1962 civil war 
erupted in Northern Yemen as military groups supported by Egypt tried to seize power 





by Jordan (Phillips, 2008, pp. 43-44). The republicans won the war in 1968 and declared 
the Yemen Arab Republic. The intervention of Saudi Arabia in Yemeni politics thus 
started as early as the 1960s.   
A number of coups took place in North Yemen during the 1970s, which was at the time 
officially entitled the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR). In 1977 Ibrahim al-Hamdi, who took 
several measures to exclude the tribes from ruling the state and curb their influence, 
was assassinated. In 1978, Ali Abdallah Salih seized power. As someone who already 
knew the rules of the political game, he made sure to maintain the privileges of the 
tribes and the military, fearful that he would otherwise end up like Al Hamdi. The current 
regime in Yemen before the revolution of 2011 had a tribal military base (Phillips, 2008). 
South Yemen on the other hand after independence in 1967, adopted a more far-left 
socialist ideology. It was officially called the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen 
(PDRY) and was supported by the former Soviet Union. Soon, there was an “ideological 
clash” between the two Yemeni states and the relationship was constantly fraught with 
tension. The PDRY, however, also suffered from internal conflicts over power that 
climaxed in 1986 with a two-week civil war that resulted in the ruling party allowing 
more freedoms. 
In the year 1990, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the two states unified but 
fairly quickly the Southerners came to resent the fact that the North was dominating 
resources and opportunities. This situation caused a civil war in Yemen in 1994, which 
was quickly won by the North. 
In addition to tribalism, Yemen has diverse religious communities. Zaidis, who are Fiver 
Shia (see Rawafid) make up 45% of the population. Sunnis (of the Shafi’i School of Law) 
make up 53% of the population, while the remaining minorities are Jews and other Shia 
sects (refworld, 2008). It is worth mentioning that the Zaidi teachings are closer to the 
Sunnis’ than to the Twelver Shia (the majority of Shia; see Rawafid). Zaidis and Sunnis 
have lived in harmony for hundreds of years. Reading the history of Yemen, there is no 





During the 1990’s, a movement named Ansarullah was founded by Hussein Al Houthi, a 
Zaidi leader from the North. He was supported by Iran, and the movement gradually 
came to follow in the footsteps of Hezbollah: “Houthis and Hezbollah follow the same 
doctrine” (The National Opinion, 2014). The Houthis revolted against the Yemeni 
establishment in 2004 (Sa’da war) (BBC, 2016). The Houthi insurgency continued till 
2011. The Houthis on their part present a different point of view of the issue, “[…] Huthi-
friendly sources assert that their movement originated merely in a cultural effort to 
rejuvenate Zaydism. Huthis thus fight today as true Yemenis, in defense of Zaydism 
against Wahhabi infiltration, military encroachment, and a Goy campaign against the 
community of Zaydis,” (Salmoni, B., Loidolt, B. Wells, M., 2010).  
The advent of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen, 2009, meant another 
complication in the Yemeni political scene. The group has claimed responsibility for a 
number of terrorist attacks in Yemen and abroad during 2009–2015. In 2016, AQAP was 
able to capture the Abyan Governorate and the town of Jaar in South Yemen 
(Mukhashaf, 2015). 
The contagious Arab Spring caught on in Yemen at roughly the same time as the Egyptian 
revolution of January 2011. The demands of the Yemeni uprising, as it was initially called, 
were also similar to those of other Arab revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and later in 
Syria. Protestors called for political reforms, freedom of expression, democratic 
succession of power, combatting of corruption and fairer distribution of national wealth. 
Ali Abdullah Salih, who had been in power since 1978, was accused of corruption and of 
depending on an inner circle of military men who mostly came from a tribal background. 
Yemenis also had worries that Salih was in the process of preparing his son to succeed 
him.  
Mass demonstrations took place in Sana’a, the capital, and in a number of major cities 
on Fridays for a number of successive weeks. For the first few weeks the demonstration 
went on without casualties. However, when the demonstrators started calling for Salih’s 
ousting, a number of protestors were shot and on Friday 18 March 52 protestors were 





In May 2011, Sheikh Sadik Al Ahmar, leader of the Hashid tribal federation declared his 
support for the opposition and fought with loyalist security forces in the streets of the 
capital Sana’a shortly after the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) suspended its mediation 
in the Yemeni crisis. The fighting escalated and the presidential compound was bombed. 
Salih was injured, and he flew to Saudi Arabia for treatment. Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi, 
his deputy took over as acting president. Yet, Salih insisted he was coming back after 
recovery to resume his position in office. The government showed reluctance in 
responding to the opposition’s demands, but in November 2011 under the patronage of 
the GCC, Salih signed a power-transfer agreement. On 25 February, 2012 Abd Rabbuh 
Mansour Hadi took the oath of office as interim President in Yemen’s Parliament.  
The security situation remained unsettled during 2012 with random killing and bombing 
incidents. Neighbouring Gulf States who were concerned about the situation in Yemen 
initiated a national dialogue conference. “The national dialogue conference – a 
cornerstone of the Gulf initiative – started in June 2013 and concluded on January 2014. 
Its purpose has been to address and resolve in an inclusive manner core Yemeni conflicts 
[..]” (Manea, 2015, p. 169).  
The founder of the Houthi movement, Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi, was killed and 
replaced by his brother Abdul-Malik al-Houthi in 2004 who instigated a rebellion against 
the government of Ali Abdullah Salih. In 2014, the Houthi movement managed to turn 
the tide against the Yemeni government with the support of Iran.  The movement took 
over wide areas including the capital Sana’ (BBC, 2016), with the help of then former 
president Salih who made a u-turn in his political allegiances. President Abd Rabbuh 
Mansour Hadi fled first to Aden then to Saudi Arabia. Iranian support for the Houthis 
was viewed as a direct threat by Saudi Arabia. Eventually Saudi Arabia, with the help of 
the US, formed an alliance of Gulf States which started targeting Houthi-held areas. 
The war in Yemen to date has proven very costly, and ‘Happy Yemen’ (Al Yemen Al Saeed 
or Arabia Felix) has drowned in misery. Around 10,000 people have been killed, mainly 
because of the Saudi-led coalition airstrikes, and millions have no access to clean water, 
food or medical aid.  Yemen is “one step away from famine”; “ […] over 14 million are 





meal is coming from. Over two million people are malnourished nationwide, including 
370,000 children who are severely malnourished” (O’Brien, 2016). 
5.10.1 Data analyses for Yemen 
There are two data analyses for Yemen which are found in Appendix 2. I have not 
presented them here for space restrictions. 
5.10.2 The overall averages for the Yemen texts 
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Figure 5- 10 
 
5.11 Data analysis example (Saudi Arabia) 
There is no raging conflict in Saudi Arabia, but the country is focal to Sunni-Shia tension, 
and to other terror group issues.  
There are two texts related the Saudi affairs. Here below is the first one, and the other 
is to be found on Appendix 2. 
 
Reuters 17 May 2016 
Senate passes bill allowing 9/11 victims to sue Saudi Arabia 
The Saudis, who deny responsibility for the 2001 attacks, strongly object to the bill. They 
had said they might sell up to $750 billion in U.S. securities and other American assets 
in retaliation if it became law. The U.S. Senate passed legislation on Tuesday that would 
allow families of Sept. 11 victims to sue Saudi Arabia's government for damages, setting 
up a potential showdown with the White House, which has threatened a veto. 
The "Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act," or JASTA, passed the Senate by 



























where the Judiciary Committee intends to hold a hearing on the measure in the near 
future, a committee aide said. 
If it became law, JASTA would remove the sovereign immunity, preventing lawsuits 
against governments, for countries found to be involved in terrorist attacks on U.S. soil. 
It would allow survivors of the attacks, and relatives of those killed in the attacks, to seek 
damages from other countries. 
In this case, it would allow lawsuits to proceed in federal court in New York as lawyers 
try to prove that the Saudis were involved in the attacks on the World Trade Center and 
Pentagon. 
Saudi Foreign Minister Adel bin Ahmed al-Jubeir has said his country's objection to the 
bill is based on principles of international relations. "What (Congress is) doing is stripping 
the principle of sovereign immunities which would turn the world for international law 
into the law of the jungle," he said in a statement on Tuesday. 
James Kreindler, a prominent trial lawyer who represents 9/11 families and won large 
payouts for the victims of the 1988 bombing of Pan American Airways Flight 103 over 
Scotland, said he expected the bill to pass the House and become law. 
"It would be crazy for (President Barack) Obama to veto bipartisan legislation (which 
would) open (U.S.) courts to victims of the worst terrorist attack in U.S. history," 
Kreindler said. 
Senator Charles Schumer, a New York Democrat and a JASTA co-sponsor, said the bill is 
overdue. 
"Today the Senate has spoken loudly and unanimously that the families of victims of 
terrorist attacks should be able to hold the perpetrators, even if it's a country, a nation, 






CLASSIFIED PAGES OF 9/11 REPORT 
Republican Senator John Cornyn, also a sponsor of the bill, said JASTA does not target 
the Saudis, although he alluded to a still-classified section of a report on the Sept. 11 
attacks that Saudi critics say might implicate Riyadh. 
"We have yet to see the 28 pages that have not been yet released about the 9/11 report, 
and that may well be instructive," Cornyn said at the news conference. 
Other lawmakers who have seen the 28 pages have said releasing them would quiet 
such rumors. 
Cornyn said it was up to the court to decide whether the Saudis were liable. "I don't 
believe that this will be destructive of the relationship that we have with the kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia," he said. 
The White House said Obama still plans to veto JASTA. 
"This legislation would change long-standing, international law regarding sovereign 
immunity," White House spokesman Josh Earnest told a daily press briefing. 
"And the president of the United States continues to harbor serious concerns that this 
legislation would make the United States vulnerable in other court systems around the 
world." 
Asked if Senate Democrats would back a veto, Schumer said he would vote against 
Obama. 
Republican Senator Lindsey Graham, who had opposed the bill, said the version passed 
on Tuesday eased his worries that it might leave U.S. allies more vulnerable to lawsuits, 
for example if groups based within their borders but not supported by their 





"We don't want to alienate allies, but we do want to create redress if a nation-state was 
involved in helping a terrorist organization attack American interests, and I think they 

















  Strategies 
The U.S. Senate The social actor is constructed as the 
Senate, which is the upper chamber of 
the American congress. 
Membership 
categorization 
Use of  rhetorical figures 
Constructing social 
actors in in-groups and 
out-groups 
Nomination 
Saudi Arabia's government Basic analysis: 
The social actor is constructed as the 
government of Saudi Arabia. 
 
Background facts: 
Refer to fact sheet 5.5 Saudi Arabia 
 
Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies: 
An affluent Arab/Muslim state that 
harbours extremist Islamist teachings, 
and could be involved in supporting 
some terrorist actions (very negative 
image of Islam). 
 
News service stereotypes/ideologies: 
A Muslim Arab state that might well be 
involved in sponsoring global terror 
attacks (very negative image of Islam). 
Membership 
categorization 
Use of  rhetorical figures 
Constructing social 
actors in in-groups and 
out-groups 
Nomination 
The Saudis, who deny 
responsibility for the 2001 
attacks, strongly object to the 
bill. They had said they might 
sell up to $750 billion in U.S. 
Basic Analysis: 
The news service is describing the Saudi 
point of view and possible reaction. 
 
Background facts: 
Refer to fact sheet 5.5 11 September 
Attacks 
Reporting, description, 
narration or quotation of 











securities and other American 
assets in retaliation if it 
became law.  
 
Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies: 
Saudis should be sued for their 
involvement in global terror (very 
negative image of Islam). 
 
News service stereotypes/ideologies: 
Members of the Saudi royal family are 
implicated in sponsoring global terror 
organisations. They are threatening to 
retaliate by selling high value assets 
(very negative image of Islam). 
The U.S. Senate passed 
legislation on Tuesday that 
would allow families of Sept. 
11 victims to sue Saudi 
Arabia's government for 
damages, setting up a 
potential showdown with the 
White House, which has 
threatened a veto. 
Basic Analysis:  
The news service goes on narrating the 
developments in the issue, highlighting 
the fact that it caused disagreement 
between the Senate and the White 
House. 
 
Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies: 
There should be no compromise on 
individuals, organisations or 
governments sponsoring jihadist terror 
(very negative image of Islam). 
 
News service stereotypes/ideologies: 
The American Senate wants to sue the 
Saudi government, while the White 
House is protective of American 




narration or quotation of 











"Justice Against Sponsors of 
Terrorism Act" 
Qualifying and describing the social 
actors as terrorists (a stereotypical trait 
which is usually attributed to Muslim 
terror). The protagonist is qualified as 
the one on the side of justice. 
 
News service stereotypes/ideologies 
Very negative image of Islam. 
Stereotypical evaluative 
attributes/traits 
Labelling social actors 
negatively 
Predication 
If it became law, JASTA would 
remove the sovereign 
immunity, preventing lawsuits 
against governments, for 
countries found to be involved 
in terrorist attacks on U.S. soil. 
It would allow survivors of the 
attacks, and relatives of those 
killed in the attacks, to seek 
damages from other countries. 
 
Basic Analysis: 
The news service is explaining the 
consequences of passing the bill. 
 
Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies: 
a. All means should be attempted to 
prevent terrorist attacks anywhere 
in the world (very negative image of 
Islam). 
b. The Islamist Saudi government 
could be complicit in the 2001 
attacks, and should not be 
protected by sovereign immunity 
(very negative image of Islam). 
 
News service stereotypes/ideologies: 
JASTA can remove sovereign immunity 
from governments thought to be 
involved in terror attacks, and would 
legally allow those harmed to sue 
complicit governments such as the 




narration or quotation of 











The Saudis The social actors are constructed as 




Use of  rhetorical figures 
Constructing social 
actors in in-groups and 
out-groups 
Nomination 
Saudi Foreign Minister Adel 
bin Ahmed al-Jubeir 
The social actor is constructed as the 
Saudi Foreign Minister. 
Membership 
categorization 
Use of  rhetorical figures 
Constructing social 
actors in in-groups and 
out-groups 
Nomination 
Saudi Foreign Minister Adel 
bin Ahmed al-Jubeir has said 
his country's objection to the 
bill is based on principles of 
international relations. "What 
(Congress is) doing is stripping 
the principle of sovereign 
immunities which would turn 
the world for international law 
into the law of the jungle," he 
said in a statement on 
Tuesday. 
Basic Analysis: 
The news service is presenting the Saudi 
perspective by reporting statements 
made by the Saudi Foreign Minister. 
 
Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies: 
Facing Islamist global terror justifies 
ignoring bureaucratic rules like 
“sovereign immunity” (very negative 
image of Islam). 
 
















narration or quotation of 











Saudi Foreign Minister Adel 
bin Ahmed al-Jubeir has said 
his country's objection to the 
bill is based on principles of 
international relations. "What 
(Congress is) doing is stripping 
the principle of sovereign 
immunities which would turn 
the world for international law 
into the law of the jungle," he 
said in a statement on 
Tuesday. 
Misplaced appeal to deep respect and 
reverence for authorities or in falsely 
parading once own qualities 
Topoi used to justify 
political inclusion or 
exclusion, discrimination 
or preferential treatment  
Justification of positive 
or negative attributes 
Argumentation 
In this case, it would allow 
lawsuits to proceed in federal 
court in New York as lawyers 
try to prove that the Saudis 
were involved in the attacks 




Narration of prospective events in case 
the bill was passed. 
 
Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies: 
The Saudis practise an extreme faith 
which encourages killing civilians (very 
negative image of Islam). 
 
News service stereotypes/ideologies: 
JASTA will work in favour of the victims 
of terror attacks on U.S. soil, allowing 
them to sue implicated governments 
and request compensation (the 






narration or quotation of 












"Today the Senate has spoken 
loudly and unanimously that 
the families of victims of 
terrorist attacks should be able 
to hold the perpetrators, even 
if it's a country, a nation, 
accountable," Schumer told a 
news conference. 
Pathetic fallacy (it consists of the appeal 
to prejudiced emotions, opinions and 
convictions of a specific social group) 
Topoi used to justify 
political inclusion or 
exclusion, discrimination 
or preferential treatment  
Justification of positive 
or negative attributes 
Argumentation 
"And the president of the 
United States continues to 
harbor serious concerns that 
this legislation would make the 
United States vulnerable in 
other court systems around 
the world." 
Basic Analysis: 
The news service is presenting the view 
point of the White House. 
 
Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies: 
The US has intervened in other 
countries (Iraq) and committed crimes 
against humanity which amount to acts 
of terror (neutral). 
 
News service stereotypes/ideologies: 
There is a rift between the views of the 











narration or quotation of 












"We don't want to alienate 
allies, but we do want to 
create redress if a nation-state 
was involved in helping a 
terrorist organization attack 
American interests, and I think 
they should be held liable," 
Graham said in a brief 
interview. 
Basic Analysis: 
The news service is quoting another 
public figure who is trying to create a 
balance between the two perspectives 
within the American government 
regarding the issue in question. 
 
Likely reader stereotypes/ideologies: 
All parties proven to have taken part in 
or supporting terrorist organisations 
anywhere in the world should be held 
liable (not classified). 
 
News service stereotypes/ideologies: 
Means should be found to hold 
countries or states which have 
contributed to supporting Islamist 
terrorist organisations accountable 
(very negative image of Islam). 
Reporting, description, 
narration or quotation of 












سبتمبر مقاضاة السعودية 11مجلس الشيوخ األمريكي يقر تشريعا يتيح لضحايا   
سبتمبر  11وافق مجلس الشيوخ األمريكي يوم الثالثاء على تشريع يسمح للناجين من هجمات  -)رويترز( واشنطن 
 .أيلول وذوي الضحايا بإقامة دعاوى قضائية ضد حكومة السعودية للمطالبة بتعويضات
أعضاء  وجرت الموافقة على التشريع الذي يعرف باسم قانون العدالة ضد رعاة اإلرهاب بموافقة جماعية من
 .المجلس
وإذا وافق مجلس النواب على التشريع ووقعه الرئيس باراك أوباما فسوف يتيح المضي قدما في دعاوى بالمحكمة 
االتحادية في نيويورك تسعى إلثبات أن السعوديين كانوا ضالعين في تلك الهجمات على مركز التجارة العالمي 
 .2001 ومبنى وزارة الدفاع األمريكية )البنتاجون( في
 .وتنفي السعودية أي دور لها في الهجمات
 
Translation: 
Senate passes bill allowing 9/11 victims to sue Saudi Arabia 
The American Senate passed a bill on Tuesday which allows survivors of the 9/11 attacks 
and relatives of the victims to proceed with lawsuits against the Saudi government and 
seek compensation. 
The bill, which is known as "Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act", was passed 
unanimously in the Senate. 
If the House of Representatives passed the bill and it was signed by President Obama, it 
would allow lawsuits to proceed in federal court in New York to prove that Saudis were 
involved in the attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon in 2001.   








Translation of the Arabic 
text 
 












The American Senate The social actor is constructed as the 
American Senate. 
Categorization 






 :The Saudi government Basic Analysis حكومة السعوديةال








a. The custodian of the Muslim 
holy places and an affluent Arab 
country which preserves 
conservative Sunni Muslim 
practices (very positive image of 
Islam & fairly positive image of 
Sunni Islam). 
b. A controversial government 
which meddles suspiciously in 
Yemen, Syria and elsewhere in 
addition to playing a suspicious 
role in sponsoring some 
Categorization 











(very negative image of Islam & 





A conservative Muslim government 
of an affluent Arab country and a 
major player in the region. This 
government is accused by the 
United States that it has a role in 
sponsoring 9/11 attacks (fairly 
negative image of Islam).  
وافق مجلس الشيوخ 
األمريكي يوم الثالثاء 
على تشريع يسمح 
للناجين من هجمات 
سبتمبر أيلول  11
وذوي الضحايا بإقامة 




The American Senate 
passed a bill on Tuesday 
which allows survivors of 
the 9/11 attacks and 
relatives of the victims 
to proceed with lawsuits 
against the Saudi 




The news service is introducing the 
issue taken up by the American 
Senate which is approving a 
legislation allowing families of 









11 September attacks are not 
morally justified. However, 
Reporting, 
description, narration 












according to this new legislation, 
Arab governments should have the 
right to sue the American 
government for committing war 
crimes in Iraq and other Muslim 





The American government is trying 
to find legal means to sue the Saudi 
government for September 11 
attacks (very negative image of 
Islam). 








epistemic status of 
the proposition 
Mitigation 
وجرت الموافقة على 
التشريع الذي يعرف 
باسم قانون العدالة ضد 
رعاة اإلرهاب بموافقة 
جماعية من أعضاء 
 .المجلس
The bill, which is known 
as "Justice Against 
Sponsors of Terrorism 
Act", was passed 




The news service is informing the 
reader of the name of the legislation 



















The United States should take into 
account its actions against Arabs and 
Muslims and apply this legislation on 





The American Senate has 
unanimously approved legislation 
which considers Saudi Arabia a 
sponsor for Muslim terrorism, and 
seeks justice in its application (very 
negative image of Islam). 
 the U.S. House of مجلس النواب
Representatives 
The social actor is constructed as the 
House of Representatives. The US 
Senate and the House of 
Representatives  together constitute 
the American Congress, which is the 
legislative institution of the US.  
Categorization 






 President Barak Obama The former president of the United الرئيس باراك أوباما





















وإذا وافق مجلس 
لتشريع النواب على ا
ووقعه الرئيس باراك 
أوباما فسوف يتيح 
المضي قدما في 
دعاوى بالمحكمة 
االتحادية في نيويورك 
تسعى إلثبات أن 
السعوديين كانوا 
ضالعين في تلك 
الهجمات على مركز 
التجارة العالمي ومبنى 




If the House of 
Representatives passed 
the bill and was signed 
by President Obama, it 
would allow lawsuits to 
proceed in federal court 
in New York to prove 
that Saudis were 
involved in the attacks 
on the World Trade 
Centre and the Pentagon 
in 2001.   
Basic Analysis: 
The news service is presenting a  





The United States wants to frame 
Muslims as terrorists and blackmail 




The Americans are pursuing legal 
channels and proper investigations 
to demonstrate that the Saudis are 
complicit in the 9/11 attacks and 
consequently sue them (very 

























وتنفي السعودية أي 
 .دور لها في الهجمات
 
Saudi denies taking any 
part in the attacks. 
Basic Analysis: 
The news service is introducing a 
strong Saudi stand which denies any 
involvement in the attacks. 
 
Background facts: 





Saudi Arabia is an ally of the United 
States, so how come it had a role in 
the attacks! (fairly positive image of 
Islam). 
 
Saudi Arabia's government endorses 
the Wahhabi doctrine and supports 
Muslim fundamentalist 
organisations (very negative image 




The response of Saudi Arabia to this 
debatable legislation is an absolute 
denial of sponsoring the 9/11 terror 


















The English passage is quite long and elaborate in comparison with the Arabic one. It 
presents a number of perspectives towards the issue in question, and also the 
complexity of the relations between the US and Saudi Arabia. Even at a time when the 
values of the United States contradict with those of Saudi Arabia, Saudi Arabia is still 
considered an ally. At the same time as the American Senate is attempting to hold the 
Saudi government responsible for the 9/11 attacks, other parties are trying to prioritize 
the interests of the United States. The viewpoint of the Saudi government is given little 
space in this long and extensive discussion about an issue that involves the Saudi 
government and its support for radical Islamism. There is only an understated Saudi 
argument regarding undermining international law. 
The Arabic text is very brief and detached from this controversial issue. It distances itself 
from the different point of views and the discussions which are found in the English text. 
At the end of this brief text, it allows room for the Saudi denial of any possible role in 
the 9/11 attacks, which is not mentioned in the English text.  
 
Quantitative analysis 
The quantitative analysis of the English text gives total scores as follows: 
 
English text: news service stereotypes/ideologies 
I. The quantitative analysis of the English text gives a total score -10 for news 
service stereotypes/ideologies for Islam and sectarian division, with 8 relevant 
records. The average score per record (-10÷8) is thus -1.25. This indicates that 
the new agency stereotypes/ideologies present a clearly negative view of Islam 
and sectarian division.  
 







III. There are no news service stereotypes/ideologies records for Shia Islam in the 
English text. 
 
English text: reader stereotypes/ideologies  
I. The quantitative analysis of the English text gives a total score of -12 for reader 
stereotypes/ideologies for Islam and sectarian division, with 7 relevant records. 
The average score per record (-12÷7) is thus -1.714. This indicates that the reader 
stereotypes/ideologies present a strongly negative view of Islam and sectarian 
division. 
 
II. There are no reader stereotypes/ideologies records for Sunni Islam in the English 
text. 
 
III. There are no reader stereotypes/ideologies records for Shia Islam in the English 
text. 
 
The quantitative analysis of the Arabic text gives total scores as follows: 
Arabic text: news service stereotypes/ideologies 
I. The quantitative analysis of the Arabic text gives a total score of -6 for news 
service stereotypes/ideologies for Islam and sectarian division, with 5 relevant 
records. The average score per record (-6÷5) is thus -1.2. This indicates that the 
news service stereotypes/ideologies present a clearly negative view of Islam and 
sectarian division. 
 
II. There are no news service stereotypes/ideologies records for Sunni Islam in the 
Arabic text. 
 







Arabic text: reader stereotypes/ideologies 
I. The quantitative analysis of the Arabic text gives a total score of 4 for reader 
stereotypes/ideologies for Islam and sectarian division, with 5 relevant record. 
The average score per record (4÷5) is thus 0.8. This indicates that the reader 
stereotypes/ideologies present a fairly positive view of Islam and sectarian 
division. 
 
II. The quantitative analysis of the Arabic text gives a total score of -2.5 for reader 
stereotypes/ideologies for Sunni Islam, with 2 relevant record. The average score 
per record (-2.5÷2) is thus -1.25. This indicates that the reader 
stereotypes/ideologies present a clearly negative view of Sunni Islam.  
 
III. There are no reader stereotypes/ideologies records for Shia Islam in the Arabic 
text. 
 
Comparison of qualitative and quantitative analyses in relation to news service 
stereotypes/ideologies 
Although the English text is much longer and more elaborate than the Arabic text, it 
does not yield far more records which involve stereotypes around Islam and sectarian 
division than the Arabic text. In fact, since the text revolves around the September 11 
attacks, it does not touch on the issue of sectarian division and it does not involve the 
current propagation of terror attacks whether in the Middle East or beyond. The same 
applies to the Arabic text though brief and much shorter than the one text. The 
qualitative analysis rather discusses the families of victims having the right to sue the 
government of Saudi Arabia for sponsoring ‘international terror’. Hence the quantitative 
analysis for Islam and sectarian division for both English and Arabic texts is negative, but 
not as strongly negative as in most other analysed texts.  As previously mentioned 
neither text discusses the Sunni Shia conflict, nor so there are no records for either Sunni 







5.11.1 The overall averages for the Saudi related texts:  
 
























































5.12 The overall averages for the Islamophobia-related texts:  
 




























































The chapter has covered all the evidence, justifications, classifications and explanations 
that enable the reader to fully comprehend the process of analysis undertaken in the 
exemplary analyses provided. It has complemented the contextual and circumstantial 
information given in chapter 4 which is an inherent constituent of the implemented 
analytical approach. This chapter mirrors the previous theoretical knowledge, and the 
cultural historical and political material provided in previous chapters and in this chapter, 


















6.1 Introduction:  
This chapter concludes this thesis, which has provided in-depth research study into the 
manifestations of prejudiced discourse using both stereotypical and ideological representations 
that aims at shaping the public opinion and creating the appropriate atmosphere for effecting 
particular agendas. The chapter gives a summary of the motivations and objectives of the 
research study. It also reminds the reader of the methodology adopted and the reason behind 
the choice of this particular methodological approach. The chapter then recapitulates the data 
analysis results and findings. The research questions are revisited and answered, these answers 
exhibiting a striking compatibility with the data analysis results. Finally, the chapter lists the 
contribution and implications of this research study referring also to its limitations, and puts 
forward recommendations for further research. 
 
6.2 Summary of the key objectives and methodology: 
This research study was instigated by the consistent misrepresentation of Arabs and 
Muslims in the British-based media. During the past few years when armed conflicts 
have raged in a number of Middle Eastern countries, it has been observed that some 
British media outlets have highlighted sectarian divisions and presented them as the 
main reason behind the various confrontations in the Arab world. Moreover, 
Islamophobic discourse has intensified because of the wave of terror attacks in Europe 
and elsewhere and also because of news of proliferating fundamentalist organisations 
in the Middle East. Other major news services like the BBC have been producing a biased 
discourse towards the Israeli/Palestinian issue for many years.  Although the separation 
wall and the wars on Gaza have influenced British public opinion, as has been noted in 
the reader stereotypes elicited, they have not been able to persuade the BBC to present 
objective reports either on the Palestinian issue as a whole or on the recurring events 
relating to the Israel/Palestine conflict.  
Since the theory of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) was developed to unveil social 





makes a connection between the relations of power in a given society (section 2.8) and 
the type of prevalent discourse, it is therefore an appropriate theory to scrutinise texts 
and investigate their underlying intentions. From within the theory of CDA, the 
Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA) emerged as an adaptable approach which has been 
particularly designed to trace anti-Semitic representations in media and political 
discourse. DHA (Chapter 3) has been implemented in analysing a number of cases which 
involved racist discourses. Its main advantage is its ability to incorporate various 
approaches, methods, theories and empirical data as well as background information. It 
postulates that to study historical and situational context requires other approaches in 
addition to textual analysis, including different theoretical concepts, such as ‘national 
identity’ and ‘gender’. Analysing context often also requires different methods and 
collecting different types of data other than language, such as participant observation, 
ethnographic data, demographic data, etc. This can also be termed, in non-academic 
language, ‘collecting background information’. The approach develops a number of 
discursive strategies (see section 3.4) which were implemented in this thesis (data 
analysis) to identify manifestations of prejudiced, racist and ideological discourse (for an 
overview of discourse and ideology, see section 2.6). Each of the discursive strategies is 
associated with a certain objective and a device. For the sake of this research study (data 
analysis), I have devised another category, justification for using a particular strategy, 
which in turn is sub-categorized into four sub-categories (for details of the data analysis 
process, refer to section 5.2). These categories include ‘reader stereotypes/ideologies’, 
which aims at assessing the inclinations of both the British and Arab reader towards the 
classifications of the stereotypes laid down (again for a full account see 5.2). In order to 
minimize the subjective element, I have had recourse to a significant number of opinion 
polls and surveys in addition to newspaper articles and reports. This method is called 
extrapolation. As mentioned in the course of the thesis, the two main themes of the 
data analysis are ‘Israel/Palestine conflict’ and ‘Islamophobia’. Background information 
and historical accounts have been collected to support the analysis as indicated in the 
approach adopted for this research study (chapters 4 & 5). The classification of the 
stereotypes along with their numerical categorization is also detailed in section 5.2, and 
the Excel sheets are found in Appendix 2.  Each of the data analysis tables (four examples 





Appendix 2) are followed by a discussion (qualitative analysis) and a quantitative analysis 
which was processed through Excel sheets. The results of both are subsequently 
discussed and compared. Graphs which demonstrate the overall analysis results for both 
news service stereotypes/ideologies and reader stereotypes/ideologies are presented 
(figures 5.2., 5.3, 5.5, 5.6, 5.7, 5.8, 5.9, 5.10, 5.11, 5.12, 5.13 and 5.14). 
 
6.3 Summary of results of data analysis 
6.3.1 Israel/Palestine Conflict (new service stereotypes/ideologies) 
The overall analysis of the Israel/Palestine conflict texts informs the reader that the 
English texts are fairly pro-Israel, while the overall average of the Arabic texts shows that 
they are very slightly pro-Israel. I will now consider how these conclusions were arrived 
at.  
The English texts generally put more weight on Israeli sources. So, the news service 
typically reports the news according to an Israeli source a greater number of times than 
it relies on a Palestinian source. The news service also often gives more room to the 
Israeli point of view than the Palestinian one. Consequently, the number of direct and 
indirect quotations ascribed to Israeli sources or officials outnumbers those ascribed to 
Palestinian ones. On a number of occasions, the news service foregrounds the Israeli 
perspective over the Palestinian one. When the news service reports the rounds of 
violence between the Palestinians and the Israelis, it on several occasions constructs the 
image of the Palestinians as ‘attackers, or ‘militants’. ‘Militants’ in particular is recurrent 
because it comes up almost every time there is tension between Hamas and Israel. 
Members of Hamas are constructed as ‘Islamist militants’, while on another occasion it 
is mentioned that an ‘Eritrean immigrant was confused for an Arab militant’, and 
similarly a Palestinian who was shot while incapacitated is an ‘attacker’. This 
construction of various Palestinian elements as violent fundamentalists explains the 
analysis results which indicate that the texts are fairly pro-Israel.  
Another reason for this result is the news service obscuring of the roots of the 
Israel/Palestine conflict. All the texts report the news of the episodes of violence 





the siege of Gaza and proliferating settlements. The BBC news service repeatedly 
foregrounds the number of Israeli victims, though this is far fewer than the Palestinian 
ones and uses headlines that refer to Palestinians as ‘insurgents’ and to the Israel as a 
‘sovereign state’ which is trying to deal with these insurgents, who could be 
fundamentalists, in order to sustain its security and stability. Argumentation strategies 
of persuasion like topoi and fallacies have also been used to impose an Israeli 
perspective and switch the positions of the victim and the victimizer.  
The Arabic texts on the other hand report the news on the Israel/Palestine conflict with 
more sympathy for the Palestinian side, taking into consideration the longstanding Arab 
unease with Israel as a force occupying Arab land, and as an antagonistic entity which 
has engaged in several confrontations with a number of Arab states/factions over the 
years. The Arabic texts refer to Hamas members as armed fighters ( ماسمسلحون تابعون لح ). 
The term ‘Islamist’, which translates in Arabic as )اسالمي), does not have the negative 
connotations it has in English; hence the Arabic texts would hardly read as negatively as 
the English ones. The term ‘militant’ used to describe Hamas members and the Hamas 
movement in the English texts has no equivalent in the Arabic texts. The Arabic texts use 
designations such as ‘the occupied West Bank’ (الضفة الغربية المحتلة), which reminds the 
reader of the reality on the ground. However, like the English texts, they do not discuss 
the roots of the issues, although they may depend more on Arab background knowledge 
of the Palestinian situation. The Arabic texts refer to the Palestinian Authority as a 
sovereign entity, mentioning, for example, لفلسطينيةا مؤسسات السلطة  (‘PA institutions’) and 
 the Palestinian President’), while the English texts decline this‘) الرئيس الفلسطيني
construction and to refer to Mahmoud Abbas as the Palestinian Authority President. The 
Arabic texts usually give more space to the Palestinian perspective and foreground the 
Palestinian victims when rounds of violence are reported.  
 
6.3.2 Israel/Palestine Conflict (reader stereotypes/ideologies) 
According to the opinion polls and newspaper articles consulted (see Appendix 1), the 
views of the British public towards the Israel/Palestine conflict have shifted to be more 
sympathetic towards the Palestinians. The wars on Gaza, and Israeli practices and 





substantial one. As the opinion polls also show, a significant segment of the British public 
is not concerned with the Israel/Palestine issue and so it does not follow or ponder upon 
it in order to have an informed opinion. 
Arab views, which present a clearly pro-Palestinian stance, are influenced by 
spontaneous Arab national feelings and a view of Israel as a de facto suspicious entity 
that could be aggressive. Of course the current dynamics of the Arab-Israeli conflict have 
significantly changed since the wave of Nasserism and Arab nationalism. However, a 
high percentage of the Arab population does not see Israel as a normal extension of the 
Middle Eastern formation. The Arab reader stereotype is informed also by a number of 
opinion polls and news articles (see Appendix 1). 
 
6.3.3 Islamophobia (new service stereotypes/ideologies) 
The overall outcome of the analysis of the Islamophobia texts informs the reader that 
the English texts reflect a clearly negative image of Islam and sectarian division, an 
extremely negative image of Sunni Islam and a slightly positive image of Shia Islam, while 
the overall average of the Arabic texts shows that they reflect a clearly negative image 
of Islam and sectarian division, a strongly negative image of Sunni Islam and a fairly 
negative image of Shia Islam.  
The texts deal with the problem of Islamophobia whether through direct reports of 
events relevant to fundamentalist organisations such as ‘al-Qaeda’ and ‘Islamic State’, 
or through current issues like the conflicts in Iraq, Syrian and Yemen. Nevertheless, the 
raging conflicts in Iraq, Syrian and Yemen have been strongly affected by the religious 
factor, and by dogmatic organisations and regional powers which have sectarian 
tensions that have probably inflamed sectarian confrontations elsewhere. In recent 
years, Islamophobia has become more complicated as the image of Islam has not only 
worsened, but has become blurred and confused with sectarian issues between Sunni 
and Shia. These issues might seem rather trivial and at times confusing to the English 
reader, but they may be frustrating to the Arab reader or they could rekindle sectarian 
feelings and attitudes.  
The texts, whether English or Arabic, show that there is an emerging image of a 





activities of fundamentalist organisations such as al-Qaeda and Islamic State, and their 
branches or similar oganisations (but on a smaller scale) which follow a very strict 
version of Sunni Islam. The English texts however, are more explicit in constructing the 
image of two types of Islam – ‘Sunni’ and ‘Shia’; they have also worked on associating 
particular traits with each type, specially the Sunni one. So, references such as ‘jihadist’, 
‘militant’ and ‘Islamist’ are only used with Sunni Islam. These references have 
stereotypical and ideological connotations. This explains the consistently extremely 
negative image of Sunni Islam throughout the texts, as it is constantly associated with 
jihadist and Islamist organisations which are involved in acts of terror in the Middle East 
and beyond. The texts frame Shia Islam as the counterpart of Sunni Islam, and hence it 
quickly gains a slightly more favourable status in an indirect comparison with the more 
extremist and violent Sunni Islam. For example, Hezbollah, which is technically a Shia 
Islamist political and paramilitary party, is not described as such in the texts, and neither 
are the numerous Iraqi military factions. The Arabic texts display the same association 
between extremism and Sunni Islam and so they also reflect a strongly negative image 
of Sunni Islam. However, as has been mentioned before, technical terms like ‘jihadist’, 
‘militant’ and ‘Islamist’ do not have Arabic equivalents which carry the same associations 
as in English (they are translated as  جهادي متشدد  , and  اسالمي respectively). These Arabic 
terms do not have a similar negative impact on the Arab reader as their English 
counterparts do. 
As has been frequently mentioned in the text analysis, the tense relationship between 
Iran and Saudi Arabia has affected the whole region, and manifested in political and 
military groups taking sides specially in countries like neighbouring Iraq, Syria and 
Yemen. The analysed texts however, show that the Arabic texts on a number of 
occasions put more weight on the Saudi viewpoint, and show more involvement in the 
Saudi side of the story. The Arabic texts as well sometimes refer to Iran as a Shia state 
backing a number of factions in the devastating wars in the region. This predication has 
contributed to the fairly negative image of Shia Islam in the Arabic texts. 
Both English and Arabic texts, through a number of strategies used in discriminatory 
discourse, relay the picture of sectarian conflict and communities divided along 





case is in Iraq for example. The discourse of these texts has developed an image of a 
divided Muslim community and ignored the many factors which have contributed to the 
current situation. Hence, a rather new stereotype of a sectarian Muslim community has 
been developed, while another new stereotype of extremist and fundamentalist Sunni 
Muslims has been created though it builds on lingering stereotypes of a violent and 
dogmatic faith which intimidates other communities. As the Shia Muslims were at this 
period of time facing the threat of Sunni extremists, the image of a violent and dogmatic 
Shia Muslim or even Shia Iran has been mitigated. This result confirms the point of 
Reisigl & Wodak (2001, p. 2): “[…] racist discourse is not static and homogeneous but 
dynamic and contradictory and it is also context-dependent”. Similarly stereotypes are 
not static entities; they develop, change and can be created. The context can also 
supress certain stereotypes and disclose others. As Wetherell and Potter (1992, p. 3) put 
it, “[…] discourses institute, solidify, change, create and reproduce social formations”.  
 
6.3.4 Islamophobia (reader stereotypes/ideologies) 
The English reader may have a generally negative view of Islam due to cultural and 
historical reasons. However, recent developments in the Middle East, and more 
significantly the rise of jihadist organisations who have committed several terror attacks 
in Europe must undoubtedly also have had a serious impact on the views of the British 
readers towards Islam. The sectarian division is yet another factor that reflected very 
negatively on the image of Islam. Although British and Western readers would not know 
much about Muslim denominations, and probably would not be that interested to know, 
the media coverage of recent conflicts has increasingly stressed the image of groups of 
Muslims embattled over sectarian grudges. The other factors which led to this situation 
whether in Syria, Iraq or Yemen were substantially ignored. Hence, the reader is rather 
influenced by this presentation, and the image of Islam and sectarian division is strongly 
negative, while Sunni Islam, which has been consistently more strongly associated with 
fundamentalist and jihadist organisations than Shia Islam, is viewed extremely 
negatively. On the other hand Shia Islam has gained a somewhat better reputation, or 





The Arab public is more concerned with and has more solid attitudes towards this 
division, which has been exacerbated by recent developments, and also by the media. I 
have tried to show the possibilities of both the pro-Shia and the pro-Sunni stereotypes 
for reasons explained in section 5.7. However, there is a generally strong negative view 
of Shia Islam, which may be due to the growing role of Iran and the empowering of Shia 
factions by the Iranian state. The views of Sunni Islam are even worse (extremely 
negative), as opinion polls show the majority of Arabs/Muslims are strongly against 
extremist jihadist organisations. As mentioned before, Sunni Islam has been consistently 
associated with jihadist and fundamentalist organisations. 
 
6.4 Revisiting research questions  
The Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA) was particularly designed to trace 
discriminatory discourse and reveal social injustices embedded in seemingly neutral 
discourse. One of the interesting points is that it was first used to expose stereotypical 
anti-Semitic utterances and discourses. This constituted a motivation to applying it in 
tracing stereotypical utterances in what could be Islamophobic discourse or discursive 
practices. Of course this could not make it any less suited to work out the stereotypical 
and ideological discourse encountered in the news texts covering the thorny 
relationship between Israel and the Palestinians. This research study is concerned with 
all of the above, in addition to the translational aspect.  
The following research questions were put forward in the introduction and in chapter 4: 
 
1. Do translations retain stereotypes, stereotypical imagery/discourse between 
Arabic and British-based media? 
2. Do translations increase, decrease or otherwise alter stereotypes/stereotypical 
imagery/discourse; in other words do they construct new stereotypes between 
Arabic and British-based media? 
3. If translations increase, decrease or otherwise alter stereotypes/stereotypical 
imagery/discourse between Arabic and British-based media, how do they do so? 
4. How do stereotypes and ideologies overlap, and how can they be combined or 





During the 1970’s a stereotype of the Palestinians was constructed in the West as a 
‘terrorist’ while this pejorative reference was countered by ‘freedom fighter’ in the Arab 
media. Despite some positive change in the views of the British public towards the 
Palestinians as has been noted in previous chapters, the British media – the BBC at this 
instance – has maintained a violent image of the Palestinian, which means that to a 
certain extent, it has retained this stereotype in the English texts. A blend of referential 
and predicational strategies, in addition to argumentative and perspectivation strategies, 
was used to maintain the image of the Palestinians as the instigators of violence, to 
overlook the basic rights of the Palestinian people and to equate the two sides of the 
conflict. The English texts have also noticeably made allusions to a possible association 
between ordinary Palestinians and Islamist extremism. In this way the news agency is 
taking advantage of a current stereotype of Muslims and trying to extend it to 
Palestinians, further consolidating the Israeli position. The Arabic texts, however, have 
fewer references and predications which would frame Palestinians as violent. Rather 
they use more perspectivation strategies in favour of the Palestinians, and generally 
foregrounded the Palestinian perspective. The Arabic texts, like the English ones do not 
present a historical synopsis of the Palestinian issue, but depend more on Arab 
recollections of the long-standing conflict. They also regard Israel as a legal yet hostile 
entity, and present an image of a legal Palestinian state and officials, while the English 
texts present a vague picture of the Palestinian entity. In the English texts, the negative 
stereotype of the Palestinians as terrorists is used to serve the ideology of the news 
service which is a pro-Israeli one and is reluctant to present facts that may incriminate 
Israel. The news agency is also making use of the negative stereotypes of Muslims as 
violent and extremist by attributing it to some Palestinians in order to further justify the 
Israeli actions.  
Western culture and naturally media as a constituent of this culture have a stable 
reservoir of pre-existing prejudices, explicit and implicit stereotypes towards Arabs and 
Muslims. These stereotypes, as has previously been explicated in this thesis, are the 
product of confrontation and rivalry at several stages in history. It has also been noted 
in the course of the thesis that the rise of Islamophobia in recent decades has given a 





on the context. The prejudicial discourse could then be latent in the text and rely more 
on the already negative views of the readers. But when the British news agency 
(Reuters), in the case of this study, uses an explicit stereotypical reference, the 
equivalent in Arabic is not as negative and does not carry the same connotations. 
Examples of such stereotypical references have been mentioned in the Summary of 
Results and many times in the qualitative discussion following each of the data analysis 
(militant, Islamist, jihadist). In this case the translation does not retain the stereotypical 
utterance. The context, however, in addition to other strategies such as perspectivation 
may bring about part of the intended stereotypical frame but it is not fully equivalent to 
the meaning produced in the English text.  
In the process of trans-editing and due to factors such as the agenda and ideology of the 
news service, some stereotypes are constructed. This has been strongly manifested in 
the formation of the new stereotypes of Sunnis and Shias as my data analysis has 
revealed. The stereotype of Sunni Muslims as violent and extremist has built on a 
general and profound stereotype of Islam as a violent and backward religion (refer to 
Islamophobia, section 4.7 and Crusades, section 5.6.8). Yet, the newly emerging image 
of Shia Islam as the more moderate group and a better version of Islam is novel specially 
if we look few years back and remember things such as the initial image of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran and the Salman Rushdie Fatwa. Moreover, there is an emphasis on the 
Sunni-Shia division in the British-based media, which mostly disregards any other 
imperative factors for the various conflicts (Iraq, Yemen and Syria). The Arabic texts 
generally retain a similar emphasis on the sectarian division as the English texts, but the 
deprecatory framing of Sunni Islam, though evident, is not as strong as in the English 
texts, while the image of Shia Islam in the Arabic texts does not present Shiism as the 
moderate branch of Islam, but as intimidating and aggressive towards the Sunni bloc 
and the region.  
This leads us to the conclusion that the news agencies are creating new 
stereotypes/images and that certain prejudices are recycled and functionalised and are 
later employed within a specific context in order to promote the ideology of the news 
service. Here, the overlap between stereotypes as traits of certain groups and ideologies 






6.5The main contributions and Implications of the research 
This is one of the few research studies which have been dedicated to stereotyping. Some 
other research studies have recognised the use of stereotypes in racist and prejudiced 
discourses which were utilized by the more dominant social class for the sake of creating 
favourable social relations and orders which would ultimately serve their interests. 
However, this is the first research work which has established the theoretical link 
between stereotyping and ideology and demonstrated the overlap between the two 
notions. The link between stereotyping and ideology has been illustrated by examples 
such as ‘moral panic’ and the stereotypes of Arabs in Hollywood films (section 2.4.) 
However, the data analysis conducted in this research study provides consistent and 
extensive examples from British-based media in English and Arabic exposing 
stereotypical utterances and discursive practices which have stereotypical and 
ideological content.  
The study has also shown how stereotypes are not static but can change or develop or 
even be suppressed. It has been demonstrated in the data analysis and the discussions 
that followed that new stereotypes can build on older conventions and historical 
experiences and cultural impressions can be stirred to generate new stereotypes that 
suit the agenda of the news service or the ideology of the elite. The data analysis has 
also shown that some stereotypes can be mitigated or retained in translation. In other 
cases they lack the ability to relay the same connotations, and hence they are distinct in 
their function in the English and Arabic texts.  
Another original aspect of this research study is the combination of both qualitative and 
quantitative analysis. The qualitative data analyses were thoroughly discussed with my 
supervisor and amendments were undertaken as agreed. Quantitative analysis was 
carried out for the first time in this type of research. The qualitative and quantitative 
analyses were done independently and there was no requirement for them to confirm 
one another in the final comparison and discussion after processing the results of the 
quantitative analysis.  
This research adds to the scope of studies concerning stereotyping in general, as 





political research. Previously, stereotyping had always been confined to psychology and 
social psychology (section 2.3). The study has also investigated the capacity for 
stereotypical utterances/phrases and discourses to be translated into another language 
(Arabic), and has measured their adaptability and flexibility between languages. It has 
also placed the context as a determining factor for firstly understanding the stereotype 
and later for its ability to be constructed, mitigated and deconstructed.  
The assessment of likely reader stereotypes is also a novel addition to this type of 
research. Research studies which rely on CDA approaches as their tool of analysis 
understandably concentrate on textual analysis. However, this research study also 
investigated the possible reader stereotypes by referring to numerous reliable sources. 
This addition has enriched the analytical process and provided an interesting aspect for 
comparison and deliberation.  
 
6.6 Limitations of the Study 
This study has used media texts from two news services (BBC and Reuters) for a limited 
period of one month in 2016. Only two main themes have been investigated: the 
Israel/Palestine conflict and Islamophobia. These limitations were largely imposed by 
restrictions of time.  For a more comprehensive view, a corresponding analysis could be 
conducted over a longer period of time.   
Another limitation is that it was impossible for me to personally conduct surveys in the 
Arab world to evaluate Arab public opinion, because of obstacles such as financial 
capacity to travel to a number of Arab countries and because of safety issues and armed 
conflicts raging in a number of Arab countries. 
Finally, I had originally intended to cover a third topic that of Women’s Issues. However, 
lack of time and thesis space made this impossible to do. This can, accordingly, also be 
regarded as a limitation on the thesis. 
 
6.7 Recommendations for future research 
This research opens the door for further research in this domain. As has been previously 
discussed, this research study examined the role of stereotypes from cultural, historical 





change, develop and dwindle. Issues like the Israel/Palestine conflict and Islamophobia 
are a hotbed for stereotyping and ideological discourse, and could be investigated in 
much greater depth. The processes of development that such discourses may 
experience would in my opinion be a very rich and interesting field to observe and 
analyse. Islamophobia is a rich area, and data analysis could be done according country 
(Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Saudi Arabia). More focused research projects could also be carried 
out, on a particular country or state in order to provide deeper specific analyses. Political 
discourse in Egypt and the rise and decline of Islamist organisations and nationalist 
parties as well as the situation of the Egyptian Copts is a fruitful topic that may make a 
very important contribution to the research on both Islamophobia and stereotyping and 
ideology. In fact, several Muslim and Arab countries could provide case studies for 
conducting similar research. This research study has great potential for being re-devised 
to suit varied settings of racist or discriminatory discourse that aim at shaping public 
opinion and pushing events in a certain direction. 
Another possibility would be to apply this analytical tool to Women’s Issues in the Arab 
world in order to shed light on how women are portrayed in Western and Arab media, 
the relationship between women and Islam, and women and nationalist movements. As 
noted above, this topic was intended to be included in this thesis but because of time 
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